{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 520025017","title":"ALON USA, LP — Notice of Amendment","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2002-05-07","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of amendment citing 195.452(b)(2).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520025017.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520025017.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520025017","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/520025017","body":"Notice of Amendment involving ALON USA, LP. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulation as 195.452(b)(2). The case was opened on 2002-05-07 and is reported as closed as of 2005-03-14. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n520025017_order directing amendment_12312002.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520025017/520025017_order%20directing%20amendment_12312002.pdf\n\ncpf_520025017.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520025017/cpf_520025017.pdf\n\n520025017_order directing amendment_12312002.pdf\n\nDEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nRESEARCH AND SPECIAL PROGRAMS ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, DC 20590\nIn the Matter of\nALON USA,\nRespondent.\nCPF NO. 5-2002-50 17\n1\n1\nORDER DIRECTING AMENDMENT\nOn February 20-21, 2002, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 9 601 17, representatives of the Western and\nSouthern Regions, Ofice of Pipeline Safety (OPS), inspected ALON USA's (Respondent's)\nintegrity management program at Respondent's facility ih Big Spring, Texas. As a result of the ,\ninspection, the Director, Western Region, OPS, issued to Respondent, by letter dated May 7,2002,\na Notice of Amendment (NOA). The NOA alleged inadequacies in Respondent's integrity ,\nmanagement procedures and proposed to require amendment of these procedures to comply with the\nrequirements of 49 C.F.R. 8 195.452.\nBy letter dated June 5,2002, Respondent requested a 30 day extension of time to respond to the\nNOA. By letter dated June 18, 2002, OPS granted the request. By letter dated July 9, 2002,\nRespondent responded to the NOA (Response). With regard to the first of two issues raised in the\nNotice, Respondent did not contest the issue and described the actions it was taking to address the\ninadequacies in its procedures. With regard to the second issue, Respondent disagreed that its\nprocedures were inadequate, offered information in explanation of its position, and requested that\nthis item be withdrawn from the NOA.\nFINDINGS OF INADEOUATE PROCEDURES\nUncontested Inadequate Procedures\nItem 1 of the NOA alleged that Respondent's procedures involving its identification of pipeline\nsegments that could affect a high consequence area were inadequate and failed to meet the\nrequirements of 49 C.F.R. 8 195.452 in that the procedures failed to take stream and waterway\ntransport into account.\nIn its Response, Respondent did not contest the allegation, acknowledged the omission, and\nexplained the actions it was taking to address this inadequacy in its procedures. These actions\nincluded retaining an expert contractor to integrate stream and waterway modeling into their\n\n\n\nanalytical mapping process. Respondent also submitted a two page chart summarizing the approach\nthat would be used to identify pipeline segments that could affect a high consequence area on flat\nterrain.\nAs part of their integrity management program requirements, operators are required to identify\npipeline segments that could affect a high consequence area. The procedures used to identify these\nsegments must be adequately supported by technical justifications that take into account, among\nother things, topological and hydraulic gradients and stream flow characteristics when a buffer zone\napproach is utilized.\nThe information provided by Respondent with its response letter indicated that a 118 mile buffer zone\nand an average stream velocity of 2 feet per second would be used as basic assumptions for the water\ntransport modeling to be performed by their contractor. However, Respondent did not explain the\nbasis for these assumptions and did not demonstrate why they could be relied upon to ensure that all\nsegments are properly identified. Respondent must submit segment identification procedures which\ninclude detailed supporting justifications that provide a sound technical basis for the assumptions\nand formulas used in its spill modeling analysis. Although Respondent has articulated its intentions\nto correct any inadequacies in this regard, it has not yet submitted the revised procedures.themselves.\nAccordingly, I find Respondent's integrity management program procedures inadequate to ensure\nsafe operation of Respondent's pipeline system.\nContested Inadequate Procedures\nItem 2 of the NOA alleged that Respondent's procedures involving its determination of release\nvolumes were inadequate and failed to meet the requirements of 49 C.F.R. $ 195.452 in that the\nworst case discharge values used in its analysis were not supported by a sound technical basis\ndemonstrating their reliability.\nIn response to Item 2, Respondent contested the allegation, explained that its release volumes were\nbased on worst case discharge calculations that involved taking into account the distance between\nits block valves, the topography, and its recent leak history, and contended that they were therefore\ndefensible. Respondent requested that Item 2 be withdrawn from the NOA.\nThe integrity management program was established to enhance public safety by requiring operators\nto conduct a fresh evaluation of their pipelines in a comprehensive, system-wide manner, and to\nintegrate all available data sources to formulate a comprehensive program.to ensure the integrity of\ntheir pipelines on a long-term basis. As part of their initial integrity management program\nrequirements, operators are required to identi@ all segments of their pipelines that could affect a high\nconsequence area in the event of a release. This process in turn involves analyzing the possible\nconsequences of a pipeline rupture resulting in the release of various quantities of commodity,\ndepending on the nature of the failure, the type of commodity, the flow rate, the local topography,\nand other factors. One methodology for identifying these segments is to design a buffer zone around\neach pipeline segment and evaluate whether any portion of the buffer zone overlaps a high\n\n\n\nconsequence area. The size of the buffer zone can not be established arbitrarily, but rather, must be\ndetermined by calculating the expected spill trajectory associated with a given segment of pipeline.\nThe procedures used to establish such buffer zones must involve conservative spill scenarios\nsupported by technical justifications for a range of release volumes, including worst case release\nvolumes associated with catastrophic failures.\nIn its Response, Respondent described its efforts to improve its ability to quickly identify and\nrespond to discharge events, such as the placement of emergency response trailers in the vicinity of\nthe pipeline, as well as its efforts to minimize the frequency of release incidents by establishing\npublic education programs. Respondent contended that these efforts had resulted in a significant\nreduction in release volumes in recent years and argued that its use of assumptions that limited worst\ncase release volumes to values less than that which could physically be released was justified on this\nbasis. However, although faster response times might decrease the volume of commodity released\nin a given incident, such results are uncertain at best. Similarly, although public outreach might\nreduce the probability of a spill, it can not eliminate it altogether and these measures, while\nimportant, have no direct mitigating effects on any spill that should occur. Respondent must focus\non the consequences of a potential discharge event where all of the commodity that can physically\ndrain down is accounted for. In this case, Respondent did not introduce any physical apparatus or\nequipment, such as the strategic placement of check valves, emergency flow restricting devices, or\nremotely operated valves, that would directly reduce the volume of such a spill with certainty and\nthereby justify the use of release volumes lower than those physically possible.\nFinally, Respondent contended that release volumes used for Oil Pollution Act (OPA) response\nplanning could be utilized for integrity management segment identification purposes. However,\nalthough the methodologies used may be similar, worst case discharge calculations for OPA response\nplanning involve pipeline sections within coastal and inland response zones formulated under\ndifferent criteria than integrity management high consequence areas. To the extent which OPA\ndeterminations are relevant to integrity management procedures, Respondent must fully incorporate\nthese detailed models and calculations into its segment analysis. In short, the Respondent must\nsubmit segment identification procedures which include detailed supporting justifications that\nprovide a sound technical basis for the assumptions used in its spill trajectory modeling and\ndemonstrate why they can be relied upon to ensure that all segments are properly identified.\nAccordingly, I find that Respondent's integrity management program procedures are inadequate to\nensure safe operation of its pipeline system.\nAMENDMENT OF PROCEDURES\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. $ 60108(a) and 49 C.F.R. $ 190.237, Respondent is ordered to make the\nfollowing changes to its integrity management program procedures:\n1 . Amend its procedures to provide adequate technical justification for determining the\nextent of the buffer zone used to identify pipeline segments that could affect high\nconsequence areas to account for longer range paths, such as minor streams and\nwaterways, that can transport releases of commodity to a high consequence area.\n\n\n\n2. Amend its procedures to provide adequate technical justification for determining the\nvolume of commodity that could be released from a pipeline leak or rupture in\ndetermining the extent of the buffer zone used to identify pipeline segments that could\naffect high consequence areas, such that the worst case release volume associated with\ncatastrophic failure is taken into account or physical equipment directly reducing release\nvolume is introduced.\n3. Respondent must amend its procedures within 30 days following receipt of this Order\nDirecting Amendment. Submit all amended procedures and technical justifications\ndemonstrating compliance with this Order to the Director, Western Region, Office of\nPipeline Safety, Golden Hills Centre, Suite A-250, 12600 West Colfax Avenue,\nLakewood, CO 802 15-3736.\nThe Director, Western Region, OPS, may grant an extension of time to comply with any of the\nrequired items upon a request by the Respondent demonstrating good cause for an extension.\nFailure to comply with this Order Directing Amendment may result in the assessment of civil\npenalties of up to $25,000 per violation per day, or in the referral of the case for judicial\nenforcement. The terms and conditions of this Order are effective upon receipt.\n~tacey Gerard .\n* Associate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\n\n\n\nU.S. Deportment\nof Transportation\nResearch and\nSpecial Pmgmms Mministmtion\n400 Seventh St.. S.W\nWashmgton. D.C 20590\nDEC 3 1\nMr. Randy Hillman\nPipelines and Terminals Operations Manager\nALON USA\nP.O. Box 13 1 1\nBig Spring, TX 79721\nRe: CPF No. 5-2002-501 7\nDear Mr. Hillman:\nEnclosed is the Order Directing Amendment issued by the Associate Administrator for\nPipeline Safety in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of inadequate procedures and\nrequires that you amend your integrity management program procedures. When the .terms of the\nOrder are completed, as determined by the Director, Western Region, OPS, this enforcement action\nwill be closed. Your receipt ofthe Order Directing Amendment constitutes service ofthat document\nunder 49 C.F.R. $ 190.5.\nSincerely,\nSU/ Gwendolyn M. Hill\nPipeline Compliance Registry\nOffice of Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Bob Reed\nSenior Staff Environmental Specialist\nALON, USA\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REOUESTED","truncated":false,"body_characters":11752}