# ALON USA, LP — Notice of Amendment

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** CPF 520025017
- **title:** ALON USA, LP — Notice of Amendment
- **source type:** enforcement
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** historical
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2002-05-07
- **effective on:** Not available
- **summary:** CLOSED notice of amendment citing 195.452(b)(2).
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- **source url:** https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/520025017
**body:**

Notice of Amendment involving ALON USA, LP. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulation as 195.452(b)(2). The case was opened on 2002-05-07 and is reported as closed as of 2005-03-14. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.

Official case documents:

520025017_order directing amendment_12312002.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520025017/520025017_order%20directing%20amendment_12312002.pdf

cpf_520025017.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520025017/cpf_520025017.pdf

520025017_order directing amendment_12312002.pdf

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
RESEARCH AND SPECIAL PROGRAMS ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, DC 20590
In the Matter of
ALON USA,
Respondent.
CPF NO. 5-2002-50 17
1
1
ORDER DIRECTING AMENDMENT
On February 20-21, 2002, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 9 601 17, representatives of the Western and
Southern Regions, Ofice of Pipeline Safety (OPS), inspected ALON USA's (Respondent's)
integrity management program at Respondent's facility ih Big Spring, Texas. As a result of the ,
inspection, the Director, Western Region, OPS, issued to Respondent, by letter dated May 7,2002,
a Notice of Amendment (NOA). The NOA alleged inadequacies in Respondent's integrity ,
management procedures and proposed to require amendment of these procedures to comply with the
requirements of 49 C.F.R. 8 195.452.
By letter dated June 5,2002, Respondent requested a 30 day extension of time to respond to the
NOA. By letter dated June 18, 2002, OPS granted the request. By letter dated July 9, 2002,
Respondent responded to the NOA (Response). With regard to the first of two issues raised in the
Notice, Respondent did not contest the issue and described the actions it was taking to address the
inadequacies in its procedures. With regard to the second issue, Respondent disagreed that its
procedures were inadequate, offered information in explanation of its position, and requested that
this item be withdrawn from the NOA.
FINDINGS OF INADEOUATE PROCEDURES
Uncontested Inadequate Procedures
Item 1 of the NOA alleged that Respondent's procedures involving its identification of pipeline
segments that could affect a high consequence area were inadequate and failed to meet the
requirements of 49 C.F.R. 8 195.452 in that the procedures failed to take stream and waterway
transport into account.
In its Response, Respondent did not contest the allegation, acknowledged the omission, and
explained the actions it was taking to address this inadequacy in its procedures. These actions
included retaining an expert contractor to integrate stream and waterway modeling into their



analytical mapping process. Respondent also submitted a two page chart summarizing the approach
that would be used to identify pipeline segments that could affect a high consequence area on flat
terrain.
As part of their integrity management program requirements, operators are required to identify
pipeline segments that could affect a high consequence area. The procedures used to identify these
segments must be adequately supported by technical justifications that take into account, among
other things, topological and hydraulic gradients and stream flow characteristics when a buffer zone
approach is utilized.
The information provided by Respondent with its response letter indicated that a 118 mile buffer zone
and an average stream velocity of 2 feet per second would be used as basic assumptions for the water
transport modeling to be performed by their contractor. However, Respondent did not explain the
basis for these assumptions and did not demonstrate why they could be relied upon to ensure that all
segments are properly identified. Respondent must submit segment identification procedures which
include detailed supporting justifications that provide a sound technical basis for the assumptions
and formulas used in its spill modeling analysis. Although Respondent has articulated its intentions
to correct any inadequacies in this regard, it has not yet submitted the revised procedures.themselves.
Accordingly, I find Respondent's integrity management program procedures inadequate to ensure
safe operation of Respondent's pipeline system.
Contested Inadequate Procedures
Item 2 of the NOA alleged that Respondent's procedures involving its determination of release
volumes were inadequate and failed to meet the requirements of 49 C.F.R. $ 195.452 in that the
worst case discharge values used in its analysis were not supported by a sound technical basis
demonstrating their reliability.
In response to Item 2, Respondent contested the allegation, explained that its release volumes were
based on worst case discharge calculations that involved taking into account the distance between
its block valves, the topography, and its recent leak history, and contended that they were therefore
defensible. Respondent requested that Item 2 be withdrawn from the NOA.
The integrity management program was established to enhance public safety by requiring operators
to conduct a fresh evaluation of their pipelines in a comprehensive, system-wide manner, and to
integrate all available data sources to formulate a comprehensive program.to ensure the integrity of
their pipelines on a long-term basis. As part of their initial integrity management program
requirements, operators are required to identi@ all segments of their pipelines that could affect a high
consequence area in the event of a release. This process in turn involves analyzing the possible
consequences of a pipeline rupture resulting in the release of various quantities of commodity,
depending on the nature of the failure, the type of commodity, the flow rate, the local topography,
and other factors. One methodology for identifying these segments is to design a buffer zone around
each pipeline segment and evaluate whether any portion of the buffer zone overlaps a high



consequence area. The size of the buffer zone can not be established arbitrarily, but rather, must be
determined by calculating the expected spill trajectory associated with a given segment of pipeline.
The procedures used to establish such buffer zones must involve conservative spill scenarios
supported by technical justifications for a range of release volumes, including worst case release
volumes associated with catastrophic failures.
In its Response, Respondent described its efforts to improve its ability to quickly identify and
respond to discharge events, such as the placement of emergency response trailers in the vicinity of
the pipeline, as well as its efforts to minimize the frequency of release incidents by establishing
public education programs. Respondent contended that these efforts had resulted in a significant
reduction in release volumes in recent years and argued that its use of assumptions that limited worst
case release volumes to values less than that which could physically be released was justified on this
basis. However, although faster response times might decrease the volume of commodity released
in a given incident, such results are uncertain at best. Similarly, although public outreach might
reduce the probability of a spill, it can not eliminate it altogether and these measures, while
important, have no direct mitigating effects on any spill that should occur. Respondent must focus
on the consequences of a potential discharge event where all of the commodity that can physically
drain down is accounted for. In this case, Respondent did not introduce any physical apparatus or
equipment, such as the strategic placement of check valves, emergency flow restricting devices, or
remotely operated valves, that would directly reduce the volume of such a spill with certainty and
thereby justify the use of release volumes lower than those physically possible.
Finally, Respondent contended that release volumes used for Oil Pollution Act (OPA) response
planning could be utilized for integrity management segment identification purposes. However,
although the methodologies used may be similar, worst case discharge calculations for OPA response
planning involve pipeline sections within coastal and inland response zones formulated under
different criteria than integrity management high consequence areas. To the extent which OPA
determinations are relevant to integrity management procedures, Respondent must fully incorporate
these detailed models and calculations into its segment analysis. In short, the Respondent must
submit segment identification procedures which include detailed supporting justifications that
provide a sound technical basis for the assumptions used in its spill trajectory modeling and
demonstrate why they can be relied upon to ensure that all segments are properly identified.
Accordingly, I find that Respondent's integrity management program procedures are inadequate to
ensure safe operation of its pipeline system.
AMENDMENT OF PROCEDURES
Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. $ 60108(a) and 49 C.F.R. $ 190.237, Respondent is ordered to make the
following changes to its integrity management program procedures:
1 . Amend its procedures to provide adequate technical justification for determining the
extent of the buffer zone used to identify pipeline segments that could affect high
consequence areas to account for longer range paths, such as minor streams and
waterways, that can transport releases of commodity to a high consequence area.



2. Amend its procedures to provide adequate technical justification for determining the
volume of commodity that could be released from a pipeline leak or rupture in
determining the extent of the buffer zone used to identify pipeline segments that could
affect high consequence areas, such that the worst case release volume associated with
catastrophic failure is taken into account or physical equipment directly reducing release
volume is introduced.
3. Respondent must amend its procedures within 30 days following receipt of this Order
Directing Amendment. Submit all amended procedures and technical justifications
demonstrating compliance with this Order to the Director, Western Region, Office of
Pipeline Safety, Golden Hills Centre, Suite A-250, 12600 West Colfax Avenue,
Lakewood, CO 802 15-3736.
The Director, Western Region, OPS, may grant an extension of time to comply with any of the
required items upon a request by the Respondent demonstrating good cause for an extension.
Failure to comply with this Order Directing Amendment may result in the assessment of civil
penalties of up to $25,000 per violation per day, or in the referral of the case for judicial
enforcement. The terms and conditions of this Order are effective upon receipt.
~tacey Gerard .
* Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety



U.S. Deportment
of Transportation
Research and
Special Pmgmms Mministmtion
400 Seventh St.. S.W
Washmgton. D.C 20590
DEC 3 1
Mr. Randy Hillman
Pipelines and Terminals Operations Manager
ALON USA
P.O. Box 13 1 1
Big Spring, TX 79721
Re: CPF No. 5-2002-501 7
Dear Mr. Hillman:
Enclosed is the Order Directing Amendment issued by the Associate Administrator for
Pipeline Safety in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of inadequate procedures and
requires that you amend your integrity management program procedures. When the .terms of the
Order are completed, as determined by the Director, Western Region, OPS, this enforcement action
will be closed. Your receipt ofthe Order Directing Amendment constitutes service ofthat document
under 49 C.F.R. $ 190.5.
Sincerely,
SU/ Gwendolyn M. Hill
Pipeline Compliance Registry
Office of Pipeline Safety
Enclosure
cc: Bob Reed
Senior Staff Environmental Specialist
ALON, USA
CERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REOUESTED
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