{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 520025018M","title":"BP PIPELINE (NORTH AMERICA) INC. — Notice of Amendment","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2002-05-09","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of amendment citing 195.452(b)(6)(ii).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520025018m.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520025018m.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520025018m","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/520025018M","body":"Notice of Amendment involving BP PIPELINE (NORTH AMERICA) INC.. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulation as 195.452(b)(6)(ii). The case was opened on 2002-05-09 and is reported as closed as of 2004-02-19. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n520025018m.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520025018M/520025018m.pdf\n\n520025018M_C.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520025018M/520025018M_C.pdf\n\n520025018M_order directing amendment_07082003.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520025018M/520025018M_order%20directing%20amendment_07082003.pdf\n\n520025018M_order directing amendment_07082003.pdf\n\nU.S. Department\nof Transportation\nResearch and\nSpecial Programs\nAdministration\n400 Seventh St . S W\nWash~ngton D C 20590\nMr. Lee Edwards\nPresident\nBP Pipelines North America, Inc.\n801 Warrenville Road\nLisle, IL 60532\nRe: CPF No. 5-2002-501 8M\nDear Mr. Edwards:\nEnclosed is the Order Directing Amendment issued by the Associate Administrator for\nPipeline Safety in the above-referenced case. It makes a finding of inadequate procedures and\nrequires that you amend your integrity management program procedures. When the terms of the\nOrder are completed, as determined by the Director, Western Region, OPS, this enforcement action\nwill be closed. Your receipt of the Order Directing Amendment constitutes service ofthat document\nunder 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nSincerely,\n$d ywendolyn M. Hill\nPipeline Compliance Registry\nOffice of Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REOUESTED\n\n\n\nDEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nRESEARCH AND SPECIAL PROGRAMS ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, DC 20590\nIn the Matter of 1\n1\nBP Pipelines North America, Inc. )\nRespondent.\nCPF NO. 5-2002-50 18M\nORDER DIRECTING AMENDMENT\nOn February 5-7,2002, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 5 601 17, representatives of the Western and Southern\nRegions, Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), inspected BP Pipelines North America, Inc.'s\n(Respondent's) integrity management program at Respondent's facility in Lisle, Illinois. As a result\nof the inspection, the Director, Western Region, OPS, issued to Respondent, by letter dated May 9,\n2002, a Notice of Amendment (NOA). The NOA alleged inadequacies in Respondent's integrity\nmanagement program segment identification procedures and proposed to require amendment of\nRespondent's procedures to comply with the requirements of 49 C.F.R. Part 195.\nRespondent responded to the NOA by letter dated June 13,2002. Respondent contested the NOA,\noffered an explanation, and requested a hearing. A hearing was held by telephone conference on\nFebruary 20,2003.\nBackground\nThe integrity management program regulations require hazardous liquid pipeline operators to have\nidentified \"all pipeline segments that could affect a high consequence area (HCA) ... no later than\nDecember 31, 2001.\" 49 C.F.R. 5 195.452(b)(l)(i) (Oct. 2001). OPS alleged that during its\ninspection, it found inadequacies in three areas of the technical procedures Respondent used to\nidentifj these segments. These inadequacies consisted of the following: (1) Respondent's\nprocedures were oriented around only those pipeline segments it considered could be assessed by\ninternal inspection and consisted mainly of flow diagrams lacking detailed methodologies for spill\nmodeling in documented form; (2) Respondent's procedures did not identi@ all HCAs that could be\naffected, including those associated with certain drinking water and ecological unusually sensitive\nareas (USAs); and (3) Respondent's procedures did not provide for the periodic review of HCA\nboundaries to identify new geographic areas falling within the HCA definition, due to changes in\nfactors such as population density.\n\n\n\nIn its response and at the hearing, Respondent did not demonstrate or even contend that it had fully\ndocumented segment identification procedures in place by the December 3 1 deadline. Rather,\nRespondent contested the NOA on the grounds that Section 195.452 could reasonably be interpreted\nto mean that although a full list of \"could affect\" segments had to be produced by December 3 1,\n2001, the technical procedures used for segment identification were not required to be formally\ndocumented until March 3 1,2002. Specifically, Respondent contended that although operators were\nrequired to identify all pipeline segments that could affect a HCA by December 3 1, 2001, the\nsegment identification process is an element ofthe overall integrity management program which was\nnot required to be documented until March 31, 2002. Respondent contended that under this\ninterpretation, it conservatively listed all of the relevant pipeline segments as \"could affect\" segments\nby December 3 1,200 1, as aplaceholder and then produced written segment identification procedures\nby March 31, 2002, that actually narrowed the list. Respondent argued that the NOA should be\nwithdrawn because the OPS inspection was conducted in February of 2002, and the documentation\ncontaining written procedures was not required until March 3 1, 2002.\nDiscussion\nThe integrity management program requirements in 49 C.F.R. 5 195.452 require hazardous liquid\npipeline operators to develop a written integrity management program that identifies, assesses, and\nmanages the risks on each pipeline that could affect a HCA in the event of a discharge. The first\nstep, segment identification, had to be completed by December 31, 2001, and the program\nframework then had to be in place by March 31, 2002. A full and accurate identification of all\npipeline segments that could affect HCAs was a crucial first step before an operator could implement\nfurther integrity management program requirements, such as the baseline assessment and\nremediation of the identified segments.\nThe process of determining which pipeline segments could affect HCAs involves identifying each\nHCA in the vicinity of a given pipeline, identifying the physical mechanisms by which pipeline\ndischarges from a given segment can travel to aHCA, and analyzing how catastrophic spill scenarios\nassociated with each geographic area would play out. The requirement that all \"could affect\"\nsegments be identified by December 3 1,2001, implies that a technically sound process be in place\nto do so. Evidencing their intent in this regard, the drafters of the integrity management regulations\nincluded an appendix providing guidance to operators on factors to consider in this process.\n49 C.F.R. Part 195, Appendix C, Part I (B). Among these factors are the local topography, hydraulic\ngradients, climate, and the presence of longer range transport paths such as streams, waterways, and\nair dispersion. In addition, all assumptions used in the segment analysis, such as discharge volumes\nand response times, must be conservative or consistent with worst case scenarios. Recognized\nindustry methodologies for calculating spill pool footprints must be utilized and any alternative\nmethodologies must be supported by reliable engineering evaluations. Accordingly, the segment\nidentification process requires a rigorous technical basis and written, descriptive procedures are\nnecessary for an operator's personnel to apply the process consistently in each geographic area where\npipeline discharges can affect HCAs in order to accurately identify all affected segments. Moreover,\nwithout written procedures describing an operators segment identification process, pipeline safety\ninspectors cannot evaluate the process an operator uses and determine whether or not an operator has\nidentified all relevant segments before implementing its integrity management program.\n\n\n\nConclusion\nFor the reasons discussed above, I do not accept Respondent's argument that the written segment\nidentification procedures and technical justifications were not required before March 3 1, 2002.\nRespondent did not contest the allegations of inadequate procedures. Accordingly, I find that\nRespondent's integrity management program procedures are inadequate to ensure the safe operation\nof its pipeline system.\nAMENDMENT OF PROCEDURES\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. 5 60108(a) and 49 C.F.R. 5 190.237, Respondent is ordered to make the\nfollowing amendments to its integrity management program segment identification procedures:\n1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Amend the procedures to include an accepted, technically sound land flow analysis using\nsite-specific spill modeling that incorporates factors such as topological and hydraulic\ngradients that could stretch the spill pool footprint, or alternatively, provide adequate\ntechnical justifications demonstrating that the overland flow assumptions being used for\ndetermining buffer zone size are consistent with conservative or worst case discharge\nscenarios;\nAmend the procedures to account for the presence of longer range transport paths such as\nstreams and waterways, and air dispersion in the case of highly volatile liquid pipelines, that\ncan transport releases of contaminants to HCAs;\nAmend the procedures to ensure that all HCAs in the vicinity of the affected pipelines have\nbeen identified, including all drinking water and ecological unusually sensitive areas,\nwhether or not such areas have been mapped in the Department of Transportation's National\nPipeline Mapping System;\nAmend the procedures to include a periodic review of HCA boundaries drawing on\ninformation from field personnel, control center data, census data, and other resources for\nthe purpose of identifying areas newly falling within the HCA definition;\nWithin 30 days following receipt of this Final Order, submit the amended procedures and all\ntechnical justifications demonstrating compliance with this Order to the Director, Western\nRegion, Office of Pipeline Safety, Golden Hills Center, Suite A-250, 12600 West Colfax\nAvenue, Lakewood, CO 802 15-3736.\nThe Director, Western Region, OPS, may grant an extension of time to comply with any of the\nrequired items upon a written request by the Respondent demonstrating good cause for an extension.\n\n\n\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties of up to $100,000\nper violation per day, or in the referral of the case for judicial enforcement.\nThe terms and conditions of this Order Directing Amendment are effective upon receipt.\nJUL - 8 2003\nDate Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety","truncated":false,"body_characters":10419}