{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 520031002H","title":"EL PASO ENERGY CORPORATION — Corrective Action Order","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2003-04-03","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED corrective action order.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520031002h.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520031002h.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520031002h","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/520031002H","body":"Corrective Action Order involving EL PASO ENERGY CORPORATION. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2003-04-03 and is reported as closed as of 2005-03-14. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n520031002H_corrective action order_04032003.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520031002H/520031002H_corrective%20action%20order_04032003.pdf\n\n520031002h_corrective action order_04032003_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520031002H/520031002h_corrective%20action%20order_04032003_text.pdf\n\n520031002h_corrective action order_04032003_text.pdf\n\nUS, Department\not Transportation\nItesecrth cad\nSpecial Ptogtonts\nloose en&n 5& sw\n'wlshnplon D c jp59Q\nMr. Tom Morgan\nVice President of Operations\nEl Paso Corporation\n2 North Nevada\nColorado Springs, CO 80903\nRe: CPF No, 5-2003-1002H\nDear Mr. Morgan:\nEnclosed is a Corrective Action Order issued by the Associate Administrator for Pipeline\nSafety in the above-referenced case. Lt requires you to take certain corrective actions with respect\nto the operation of your SB and SA lines &om the Cheyenne Compressor Station to the Watkins\nCompressor Station.\nService is being made by certified mail and facsimile. Your receipt of the enclosed document\nconstitutes service of that document. The terms and conditionsl of this Corrective Action Order are\neffective upon receipt.\nSmcerely,\n~\n&vendolyn M. Hi\nPipeline Compliance Registry\nOffice of Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\n\n\n\nDEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nRESEARCH AND SPECIAL PROGRAMS ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, DC 20590\nIn the Matter of\nEl Paso Corporation,\nRespondent.\nCPF No. 5-2003-1002H\nThis Corrective Action Order is bong issued, under authority of 49 U. S, C, ) 601 l 2, to require El\nPaso Corporation (Respondent) to take the necessary corrective action to protect the public and\nenvironment from potential hazards associated with a failure on kcspondciit's 24-inch and 22-inch\nnatu% gas trmsniission hncs known as the 58 and SA hnes respectively from the Cheyenne\nCompressor Station (CS) to the Watkins CS. Pursuarit to 49 U. S, C. 5 60 ( 17, the Western Region,\nONce of Pipeline Safety (OPS), iriitiatcd an investigation of the failure,\nBased on the information gathered during the investigation of the pipeline failure, 1 find that the\noperation of Respondent's \"SB\" 24-inch and \"SA\" 22-inch interstate natural gas transmission\npipeline from Cheyenne CS to Watkins CS, withoutcorrective measures, would be hazardous to life,\nproperty and the environment.\nThis finding is based on the following factual determinations:\n~ On March 23, 2003, at approximately 7:50 p. m. Mountain Standard Time, Respondent's 24-\ninch diameter gas transmission pipeline \"SB\" ruptured at MilePost (MP) 54. 04. Thc\nescaping natural gas subsequently ignited.\n~\n~ Respondent operates a parallel line, the 22-inch diameter \"SA\" linc, that attaches to the \"SB\"\nline with valved-cross-over lines. The SB and SA lines are normally operated as a single\nsystem, that is, there are cross-overs between the lines that are normally open to the flow of\nnatural gas.\nThe force of the rupture, blew an approximate 95 to 100 foot segment off the SB pipeline.\n\n\n\nThe incident occurred in a rural area approximately 7 miles north of the town of Greeley in\nWeld County, Colorado. Thee persons &om three separate homes were evacuated. No\nfatalities or injuries werc rcportcd. No interruption of supply occurred.\nThe pipeline rupture and subsequent fire damaged a house approximately 671 feet away from\nthe north end of the failure site. A barn located approximately 761 feet from the north end\nof the failure site was undamaged. The fire burned an area approximately 600 feet in\ndiameter.\nThe 5B and 5A lines start at the Cheyenne CS, located approximately 10 miles south of\nCheyenne, Wyoming, and continue south to the Watkins CS, which is located just east of\nDenver, Colorado. The right of way is approximately 81 miles long, with 73. 5 miles in Class\n1, one mile in Class 2, and 6. 5 miles in Class 3. Thc failure site is in an area of farm land.\nThe 5B line is buned approximately 12 feet underneath and perpendicular to County Road\n72. The failure site is approximately 1/4 mile &om the intersection of County Road 72 and\nHighway 59.\nThe failure site is approximately four miles south of the town of Eaton, Colorado. In 2000\nEaton had a population of 2, 690, according to the 2000 census,\nBoth the 5B and 5A pipelines operate at a Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure(MAOP)\nof 850 psi. At the time of the explosion, the 5B pipeline was operating at about 814 psi.\nThe failed pipe is high frequency Electric Resistance Weld pipe, API 5L X-60 with 0. 25-inch\nwall thickness, manufactured by Stupp. The fractured pipeline segment was mstalled in\n1978.\nThe segment of failed pipe is approximately 95 to 100 feet in length. The failure extended\nthrough a saddle weld on a 4-inch lateral connection at approximately thc three o' clock\nposition (looking south) on the mainline 24-inch pipe. Preliminary examination of the failed\npipe revealed no apparent internal or external corrosion nor any visible third party damage\non the pipeline. The cause of the failure is unknown at this time.\nRespondent sent its metallurgist from Houston out to the site to get samples of the failed\nsegment of pipeline for metallurgical testing.\nThis incident appears to be similar to an incident that occurred on Respondent's \"2B\" 20-\ninch pipeline in the area downstream of Watkins CS on 12/20/1994. The 1995 metallurgical\nreport from that incident indicates that an anomaly in thc pipe at the toe of the saddle-weld\naccompanied with fatigue induced &om independent motion of the lateral from the mainline\n20-inch pipe over an approximate twenty year time frame combmed to cause the saddle-weld\nto fail.\n\n\n\nAAer thc 1994 release Respondent uncovered and performed nondestructive testing of 12\nhot tap saddle weld connections in the area of the release. Respondent reportedly found no\nanomalies. Respondent also examined approximately 112 connections associated with the\nsaddle welds, such as blow~ff risers, crossover saddles and hot tap piping. Respondent\nfound approximately 30 defects and repaired them, according to Respondent.\nThc 4-inch lateral connection pipe, which was constructed around the same time as the 24-\ninch 5B lme, goes to a meter station that has been used only occasionally in the last seven\nyears, according to Respondent. The 4-inch line and meter station were originally intended\nto supply gas to Colorado Public Service Company for distribution to the greater Greeley,\nColorado area. Colorado Public Service Company, however, gets most of its gas from other\nsources. Respondent had closed the valves to the meter station, but had left the 4-inch line\nconnection intact.\nRespondent has remotely operated valves, approximately 1 mile south of the release site, on\nboth the A and B lines. AAer recognizing a pressure drop on its SCADA system,\nRespondent immediately shut off thc remotely operated valves and dispatched personnel to\nshut oH'the manually operated valves located approximately 9 miles north of the release site.\nRespondent has isolated approximately 9 miles of both 5B and SA lines since the rupture.\nEl Paso Corporation has owned the 5B and 5A pipclines since a merger with Colorado\nInterstate Gas Company in 2001.\nSection 60112 of Title 49, United States Code, provides for the issuance of a Corrective Action\nOrder, aAcr reasonable notice and the opportunity for a hearing, requiring corrective action, which\nmay include the suspended or restricted usc of a pipeline facility, physical inspection, testing, repair,\nreplacement, or other action as appropriate. The basis for making the determination that a pipeline\nfacility is hazardous, requiring corrective action, is set forth both in the above referenced statute and\n49 C, F. R. )190. 233.\nSection 60112, and the regulations promulgated thereunder, provides for the issuance of a Corrective\nAction Order without prior opportunity for notice and hearing upon a finding that failure to issue the\nOrder expeditiously will result in likely serious harm to life, property or thc environment. In such\ncases, an opportunity for a hearing will be provided as soon as practicable aAer the issuance of the\nOrder.\nAAer evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, I find that the continued operation of the\npipeline without corrective measures would be hazardous to life, property and thc environment.\nAdditionally, aAer considering the age of thc pipe and the method of manufacturing, suspected cause\nof the failure, the proximity of the pipeline to populated areas, public roads, and environmentally\nsensitive areas, and the size of the line, I find that a failure to issue expeditiously this Order,\nrequiring immediate corrective action, would result in likely serious harm to hfe, property, and thc\nenvironment.\n\n\n\nAccordingly, this Corrective Action Order mandating needed immediate corrective action is issued\nwithout prior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Order are\neffective upon receipt.\nWithin 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may request a hearing, to be held as soon as\npracticable, by notifying the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, delivered\npersonally, by mail or by telecopy at (202) 366-4566. The hearing will be held in Denver, Colorado\nor Washington, DC, on a date that is mutually convenient to OPS and Respondent.\nAfter receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, OPS may identify\nother corrective measures that need to be taken. In that event, Respondent will be notified of any\nadditional measures required and amendment of this Order will bc considered. To the extent\nconsistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to\nthe imposition of any additional corrective measures.\nPursuant to 49 U. S. C. ) 60112, I hereby order Respondent to immediately take the following\ncorrective actions with respect to its 5B line &om thc Cheyenne CS to thc Watkins CS, and also with\nrespect to its 5A line from the Cheyenne CS to the %atkins CS:\n1. Immediately reduce the operating pressure in the 5B line by 20'/o of the operating pressure at\nthe time of the March 23, 2003 incident, which was 814 psig. At no time is the pressure to\nexceed 651 psig.\n2. Conduct a detailed metallurgical analysis of the pipe that failed on March 23, 2003, to\ndeteiminc the cause of failure and contributing factors. Submit an original copy of the report\nof this analysis to the Director, Western Region, OPS, within one week of your receipt of the\nreport.\n3. Create a written plan to expose and perform nonMcstructive~xamination {NDE) of each saddle\nweld reinforcement on the 5B line between the Cheycnnc CS and the Watkins CS. If any\nanomalous conditions are identified during the NDE process, initiate appropriate repairs or\nremove the saddle weld reinforcement. Submit a copy of the plan to thc Director, Western\nRegion, OPS, for approval, before implementing the plan.\n4. During the investigation of saddle weld reinforcements, document each step of the process in\nsufficient detail to be able to subsequently evaluate the results with thc purpose of identifying\nany trends in the data.\n5. Continuously review NDE results toward identifying any trends, If a trend is identified,\nimmediately notify the Director, Western Region, OPS, and modify the initial plan required in\nitem ¹3 above to immediately investigate any and all appurtenances identified by the trend.\n\n\n\n6. Once respondent has completed NDE ofsaddle weld connections and addressed any anomalous\nconditions identified on the 5B line, reduce the operating pressure on the 5A line by 20% aild\ninitiate an immediate plan to expose and perform non-destructive-examination (NDE) of each\nsaddle weld reinforcement on the 5A line between the Cheyenne CS and the Watkins CS. If any\nanomalous conditions are identified during the NDE process, initiate appropriate repairs or\nremove the saddle weld reinforcement. Submit a copy of the plan to the Director, Western\nRegion, OPS, for approval, before implementing the plan.\n7. Implementation of the plans required in items 3 and 6 above shall be completed within 180 days\nof the issuance of this corrective action order,\n8. Within 30 days of the completion of the investigation on the SB and 5A line, Respondent must\nreport the results to the Director, Western Region, OPS. At that time, a plan to address saddle\nweld reinforcements on the remainder of the CIG system will be discussed.\n9. All pressure reductions required in this order will remain in place until the Respondent obtains\nwritten approval Irom the Director, Western Region, OPS, to return to normal operating\npi'essures.\n10. The Director, Western Region, OPS, may grant an extension of time for compliance with any\nof the terms of this order for good cause. A request for an extension must be in writing.\nThe procedures for the issuance of this Order are described in Part 190, Title 49, Code of Federal\nRegulations, f 190. 233, a copy of which is enclosed, is made part of this Order and describe the\nRespondents' procedural rights relative to this Order.\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties of not more than\n$100, 000 per day for each day the violation persists up to a maximum $1, 000, 000 for any related\nseries of violations, and in referral to the Attorney General for appropriate relief m United States\nDistrict Court.\nAPR -3 m3\nDate Issued\nStacey Gerard\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety","truncated":false,"body_characters":13784}