# EL PASO ENERGY CORPORATION — Corrective Action Order

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** CPF 520031002H
- **title:** EL PASO ENERGY CORPORATION — Corrective Action Order
- **source type:** enforcement
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** historical
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2003-04-03
- **effective on:** Not available
- **summary:** CLOSED corrective action order.
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- **source url:** https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/520031002H
**body:**

Corrective Action Order involving EL PASO ENERGY CORPORATION. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2003-04-03 and is reported as closed as of 2005-03-14. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.

Official case documents:

520031002H_corrective action order_04032003.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520031002H/520031002H_corrective%20action%20order_04032003.pdf

520031002h_corrective action order_04032003_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520031002H/520031002h_corrective%20action%20order_04032003_text.pdf

520031002h_corrective action order_04032003_text.pdf

US, Department
ot Transportation
Itesecrth cad
Special Ptogtonts
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Mr. Tom Morgan
Vice President of Operations
El Paso Corporation
2 North Nevada
Colorado Springs, CO 80903
Re: CPF No, 5-2003-1002H
Dear Mr. Morgan:
Enclosed is a Corrective Action Order issued by the Associate Administrator for Pipeline
Safety in the above-referenced case. Lt requires you to take certain corrective actions with respect
to the operation of your SB and SA lines &om the Cheyenne Compressor Station to the Watkins
Compressor Station.
Service is being made by certified mail and facsimile. Your receipt of the enclosed document
constitutes service of that document. The terms and conditionsl of this Corrective Action Order are
effective upon receipt.
Smcerely,
~
&vendolyn M. Hi
Pipeline Compliance Registry
Office of Pipeline Safety
Enclosure



DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
RESEARCH AND SPECIAL PROGRAMS ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, DC 20590
In the Matter of
El Paso Corporation,
Respondent.
CPF No. 5-2003-1002H
This Corrective Action Order is bong issued, under authority of 49 U. S, C, ) 601 l 2, to require El
Paso Corporation (Respondent) to take the necessary corrective action to protect the public and
environment from potential hazards associated with a failure on kcspondciit's 24-inch and 22-inch
natu% gas trmsniission hncs known as the 58 and SA hnes respectively from the Cheyenne
Compressor Station (CS) to the Watkins CS. Pursuarit to 49 U. S, C. 5 60 ( 17, the Western Region,
ONce of Pipeline Safety (OPS), iriitiatcd an investigation of the failure,
Based on the information gathered during the investigation of the pipeline failure, 1 find that the
operation of Respondent's "SB" 24-inch and "SA" 22-inch interstate natural gas transmission
pipeline from Cheyenne CS to Watkins CS, withoutcorrective measures, would be hazardous to life,
property and the environment.
This finding is based on the following factual determinations:
~ On March 23, 2003, at approximately 7:50 p. m. Mountain Standard Time, Respondent's 24-
inch diameter gas transmission pipeline "SB" ruptured at MilePost (MP) 54. 04. Thc
escaping natural gas subsequently ignited.
~
~ Respondent operates a parallel line, the 22-inch diameter "SA" linc, that attaches to the "SB"
line with valved-cross-over lines. The SB and SA lines are normally operated as a single
system, that is, there are cross-overs between the lines that are normally open to the flow of
natural gas.
The force of the rupture, blew an approximate 95 to 100 foot segment off the SB pipeline.



The incident occurred in a rural area approximately 7 miles north of the town of Greeley in
Weld County, Colorado. Thee persons &om three separate homes were evacuated. No
fatalities or injuries werc rcportcd. No interruption of supply occurred.
The pipeline rupture and subsequent fire damaged a house approximately 671 feet away from
the north end of the failure site. A barn located approximately 761 feet from the north end
of the failure site was undamaged. The fire burned an area approximately 600 feet in
diameter.
The 5B and 5A lines start at the Cheyenne CS, located approximately 10 miles south of
Cheyenne, Wyoming, and continue south to the Watkins CS, which is located just east of
Denver, Colorado. The right of way is approximately 81 miles long, with 73. 5 miles in Class
1, one mile in Class 2, and 6. 5 miles in Class 3. Thc failure site is in an area of farm land.
The 5B line is buned approximately 12 feet underneath and perpendicular to County Road
72. The failure site is approximately 1/4 mile &om the intersection of County Road 72 and
Highway 59.
The failure site is approximately four miles south of the town of Eaton, Colorado. In 2000
Eaton had a population of 2, 690, according to the 2000 census,
Both the 5B and 5A pipelines operate at a Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure(MAOP)
of 850 psi. At the time of the explosion, the 5B pipeline was operating at about 814 psi.
The failed pipe is high frequency Electric Resistance Weld pipe, API 5L X-60 with 0. 25-inch
wall thickness, manufactured by Stupp. The fractured pipeline segment was mstalled in
1978.
The segment of failed pipe is approximately 95 to 100 feet in length. The failure extended
through a saddle weld on a 4-inch lateral connection at approximately thc three o' clock
position (looking south) on the mainline 24-inch pipe. Preliminary examination of the failed
pipe revealed no apparent internal or external corrosion nor any visible third party damage
on the pipeline. The cause of the failure is unknown at this time.
Respondent sent its metallurgist from Houston out to the site to get samples of the failed
segment of pipeline for metallurgical testing.
This incident appears to be similar to an incident that occurred on Respondent's "2B" 20-
inch pipeline in the area downstream of Watkins CS on 12/20/1994. The 1995 metallurgical
report from that incident indicates that an anomaly in thc pipe at the toe of the saddle-weld
accompanied with fatigue induced &om independent motion of the lateral from the mainline
20-inch pipe over an approximate twenty year time frame combmed to cause the saddle-weld
to fail.



AAer thc 1994 release Respondent uncovered and performed nondestructive testing of 12
hot tap saddle weld connections in the area of the release. Respondent reportedly found no
anomalies. Respondent also examined approximately 112 connections associated with the
saddle welds, such as blow~ff risers, crossover saddles and hot tap piping. Respondent
found approximately 30 defects and repaired them, according to Respondent.
Thc 4-inch lateral connection pipe, which was constructed around the same time as the 24-
inch 5B lme, goes to a meter station that has been used only occasionally in the last seven
years, according to Respondent. The 4-inch line and meter station were originally intended
to supply gas to Colorado Public Service Company for distribution to the greater Greeley,
Colorado area. Colorado Public Service Company, however, gets most of its gas from other
sources. Respondent had closed the valves to the meter station, but had left the 4-inch line
connection intact.
Respondent has remotely operated valves, approximately 1 mile south of the release site, on
both the A and B lines. AAer recognizing a pressure drop on its SCADA system,
Respondent immediately shut off thc remotely operated valves and dispatched personnel to
shut oH'the manually operated valves located approximately 9 miles north of the release site.
Respondent has isolated approximately 9 miles of both 5B and SA lines since the rupture.
El Paso Corporation has owned the 5B and 5A pipclines since a merger with Colorado
Interstate Gas Company in 2001.
Section 60112 of Title 49, United States Code, provides for the issuance of a Corrective Action
Order, aAcr reasonable notice and the opportunity for a hearing, requiring corrective action, which
may include the suspended or restricted usc of a pipeline facility, physical inspection, testing, repair,
replacement, or other action as appropriate. The basis for making the determination that a pipeline
facility is hazardous, requiring corrective action, is set forth both in the above referenced statute and
49 C, F. R. )190. 233.
Section 60112, and the regulations promulgated thereunder, provides for the issuance of a Corrective
Action Order without prior opportunity for notice and hearing upon a finding that failure to issue the
Order expeditiously will result in likely serious harm to life, property or thc environment. In such
cases, an opportunity for a hearing will be provided as soon as practicable aAer the issuance of the
Order.
AAer evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, I find that the continued operation of the
pipeline without corrective measures would be hazardous to life, property and thc environment.
Additionally, aAer considering the age of thc pipe and the method of manufacturing, suspected cause
of the failure, the proximity of the pipeline to populated areas, public roads, and environmentally
sensitive areas, and the size of the line, I find that a failure to issue expeditiously this Order,
requiring immediate corrective action, would result in likely serious harm to hfe, property, and thc
environment.



Accordingly, this Corrective Action Order mandating needed immediate corrective action is issued
without prior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Order are
effective upon receipt.
Within 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may request a hearing, to be held as soon as
practicable, by notifying the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, delivered
personally, by mail or by telecopy at (202) 366-4566. The hearing will be held in Denver, Colorado
or Washington, DC, on a date that is mutually convenient to OPS and Respondent.
After receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, OPS may identify
other corrective measures that need to be taken. In that event, Respondent will be notified of any
additional measures required and amendment of this Order will bc considered. To the extent
consistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to
the imposition of any additional corrective measures.
Pursuant to 49 U. S. C. ) 60112, I hereby order Respondent to immediately take the following
corrective actions with respect to its 5B line &om thc Cheyenne CS to thc Watkins CS, and also with
respect to its 5A line from the Cheyenne CS to the %atkins CS:
1. Immediately reduce the operating pressure in the 5B line by 20'/o of the operating pressure at
the time of the March 23, 2003 incident, which was 814 psig. At no time is the pressure to
exceed 651 psig.
2. Conduct a detailed metallurgical analysis of the pipe that failed on March 23, 2003, to
deteiminc the cause of failure and contributing factors. Submit an original copy of the report
of this analysis to the Director, Western Region, OPS, within one week of your receipt of the
report.
3. Create a written plan to expose and perform nonMcstructive~xamination {NDE) of each saddle
weld reinforcement on the 5B line between the Cheycnnc CS and the Watkins CS. If any
anomalous conditions are identified during the NDE process, initiate appropriate repairs or
remove the saddle weld reinforcement. Submit a copy of the plan to thc Director, Western
Region, OPS, for approval, before implementing the plan.
4. During the investigation of saddle weld reinforcements, document each step of the process in
sufficient detail to be able to subsequently evaluate the results with thc purpose of identifying
any trends in the data.
5. Continuously review NDE results toward identifying any trends, If a trend is identified,
immediately notify the Director, Western Region, OPS, and modify the initial plan required in
item ¹3 above to immediately investigate any and all appurtenances identified by the trend.



6. Once respondent has completed NDE ofsaddle weld connections and addressed any anomalous
conditions identified on the 5B line, reduce the operating pressure on the 5A line by 20% aild
initiate an immediate plan to expose and perform non-destructive-examination (NDE) of each
saddle weld reinforcement on the 5A line between the Cheyenne CS and the Watkins CS. If any
anomalous conditions are identified during the NDE process, initiate appropriate repairs or
remove the saddle weld reinforcement. Submit a copy of the plan to the Director, Western
Region, OPS, for approval, before implementing the plan.
7. Implementation of the plans required in items 3 and 6 above shall be completed within 180 days
of the issuance of this corrective action order,
8. Within 30 days of the completion of the investigation on the SB and 5A line, Respondent must
report the results to the Director, Western Region, OPS. At that time, a plan to address saddle
weld reinforcements on the remainder of the CIG system will be discussed.
9. All pressure reductions required in this order will remain in place until the Respondent obtains
written approval Irom the Director, Western Region, OPS, to return to normal operating
pi'essures.
10. The Director, Western Region, OPS, may grant an extension of time for compliance with any
of the terms of this order for good cause. A request for an extension must be in writing.
The procedures for the issuance of this Order are described in Part 190, Title 49, Code of Federal
Regulations, f 190. 233, a copy of which is enclosed, is made part of this Order and describe the
Respondents' procedural rights relative to this Order.
Failure to comply with this Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties of not more than
$100, 000 per day for each day the violation persists up to a maximum $1, 000, 000 for any related
series of violations, and in referral to the Attorney General for appropriate relief m United States
District Court.
APR -3 m3
Date Issued
Stacey Gerard
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety
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