{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 520035013","title":"MARATHON ASHLAND PIPE LINE LLC — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2003-05-29","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.55(a)(4), 195.569, 195.571.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520035013.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520035013.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520035013","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/520035013","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving MARATHON ASHLAND PIPE LINE LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.55(a)(4),  195.569,  195.571. The case was opened on 2003-05-29 and is reported as closed as of 2006-02-16. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n520035013_final order_02162006.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520035013/520035013_final%20order_02162006.pdf\n\n520035013_final order_02162006_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520035013/520035013_final%20order_02162006_text.pdf\n\nCPF NO  5-2003-5013 MARATHON ASHLAND PIPELINE LLC.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520035013/CPF%20NO%20%205-2003-5013%20MARATHON%20ASHLAND%20PIPELINE%20LLC.pdf\n\n520035013_final order_02162006_text.pdf\n\nU. S. Depanment\nof Transportation\nPipeline anct\nHazotctoua Melerlals Safety\nActmlnlltratlon\n400 Seventh Street, S. W\nwashington D C 2D590\nCraig O. Pierson\nVice President of Operations\nMarathon Ashland Pipe Line LLC\n539 South Main St\nFindlay, OH 45840-3229\nRe: CPF No. 5-2003-5013\nDear Mr. Shaw:\nEnclosed is the Final Order issued by the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in\nthe above-referenced case. It makes a finding of violation and finds that you have completed\nthe actions specified in the Notice required to comply with the pipeline safety regulations\nThe Final Order also finds that you have addressed the inadequacies in your procedures that\nwere cited in the Notice of Amendment This case is now closed. Your receipt of the Final\nOrder constitutes service under 49 C. F. R. $ 190, 5.\nSincerely,\nJames Reynolds\nPipeline Comphance Registry\nOffice of Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\nVIA CERTIFIED MAIL — RETUEIV RECEIPT RE UES TED\n\n\n\nDEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIAI. S SAFETY ADllflNISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, DC 20590\nIn the Matter of\nMarathon Ashland Pipe Line, LLC,\nRespondent\nCPF No. 5-2003-50I3\nFINAL ORDER\nOn October 28-31, 2002, pursuant to 49 U S C ) 60117, a representative of the Office of\nPipelme Safety (OPS), Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), conducted an\non-site pipeline safety inspection of Respondent's Red Butte Pipe Line facilities from Silver Tip,\nMontana, to Casper, Wyoming, and Respondent's manuals and records at its Powell and\nChatham, Wyoming offices. ' As a result of the inspection, the Director, Western Region, OPS,\nissued to Respondent, by letter dated May 29, 2003, a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed\nCompliance Order, and Notice of Amendment (Notice) In accordance with 49 C F. R.\n) 190. 207, the Notice proposed finding that Respondent had committed a violation of 49 C F. R\nPart 195 and proposed that Respondent take certain measures to correct the alleged violation.\nThe Notice also proposed, in accordance with 49 C. F. R. ) 190. 237, that Respondent amend its\nprocedural manual for operations, maintenance and emergencies (OM&E).\nAfter requesting and receiving an extension of time to respond, Respondent responded to the\nNotice by letter dated July 18, 2003 (Response) Respondent contested several of the\nallegations, offered information in explanation of the allegations, and provided information\nconcerning the corrective actions it has taken Respondent mitially requested a hearing; but\nwithdrew its request by letter dated June 23, 2004 Respondent submitted additional information\nconcerning the corrective actions it has taken by letter dated October 19, 2004\nFINDING OF VIOLATION\nItem 3 m the Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C F R $ 195 571 by failing to properly\nThe Norman Y. Mineta Researcli and Spn, ial Programs Iinprovement Act, Pub L. No 108-426,\n118 Stat 2423 (2004), created the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) and\ntransferred the authority of RSPA exercised under chapter 601 of title 49, United States Code, to the\nAdministrator of PHMSA See also 70 Fed. Reg 8299, 8301-8302 (2005).\n\n\n\nconsider voltage drop when measuring cathodic protection levels on the Red Butte Pipe Line\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent used a -850 mV criterion to conduct its 2002 cathodic\nprotection survey, but used an unacceptable method of considering voltage drop.\nIn its Response, Respondent contended that it complied with the requirements of 49 C. F R\n) 195. 571 by using acceptable methods for considering voltage drop, including methods\nrecognized by NACE Standard RP0169-96 To support its claim, Respondent submitted sections\nof its written procedures, inspection and testing reports, accounts of its corrosion control\nprograms, and other relevant documentation.\nSection 195. 571 requires Respondent to ensure that its cathodic protection systems comply with\none or more of the applicable criteria contained in paragraphs 6. 2 and 6. 3 of NACE Standard\nRP0169-96. Section 6. 2 of the Standard lists the -850 mV criterion for determimng whether\nadequate levels of cathodic protection have been achieved, It also states that \"voltage drops .\nmust be considered for valid interpretation of this voltage measurement. \" The record shows that\nRespondent used a -850 mV criterion to determine the adequacy of its cathodic protection system\nduring its 2002 annual cathodic protection survey. Accordingly, under ) 195, 571, Respondent\nmust determine the sigmficance of voltage drop in accordance with NACE Standard RP0169-96.\nRespondent's procedural Standard No. MPLMNT-073 states that Respondent is to consider\nvoltage drop to interpret the potential or voltage measurement when using an \"on\" criterion, such\nas the -850 mV criterion. Respondent's procedures list a number of methods for considering\nvoltage drop. Several of those methods are identical to those identified in NACE Standard\nRP0169-96 for determimng voltage drop significance Despite Respondent's written procedures,\nhowever, there is no indication that Respondent utilized any of those methods hsted in its\nprocedures during the 2002 cathodic protection survey The record shows that Respondent used\nan IR free (IRF) reading during the 2002 survey, but the IRF reading alone is not an accepted\nmethod for determining the significance of voltage drop, because the IRF reading is a pipe-to-\nsoil potential reading taken on the ground surface directly above the pipeline with the cathodic\nprotection rectifiers operating uninterrupted. When the readmg is taken with the rectifier\noperatmg uninterrupted, the volt meter may not accurately discern the difference between the\n'\npotential voltage and the IR voltage\nI his can cause the reading to appear more negative than the\npotential readmg alone. Therefore, the IRF reading alone is not an accurate or acceptable\nmethod for determining the significance of voltage drop\nThe record shows that Respondent also considered voltage drop during individual pipeline\ninspections, noted on Respondent's \"Land and Pipe Management Reports*' However, these\nreports are inconclusive to show that Respondent utilized an accepted method for determining\nvoltage drop significance. The reports do not indicate the criterion that had been used to\nconsider voltage drop. In addition, the reports were not completed as part of a cathodic\nprotection survey; rather they were completed during separate and distinct inspections at\nindividual sites along the pipeline,\nIn its response, Respondent further contended that it used the 100 mV criterion at various\nlocations along the pipeline during 2001 and 2002. According to Respondent, this method\n\n\n\n3\nenabled Respondent to consider voltage drop by direct measurement calculations. While\nsection 6. 2 of the NACE Standard RP0169-96 recogmzes the 100 mV )riterion as an acceptable\nmethod to determine the adequacy of cathodic protection, Respondent did not document use of\nthis method on the entire pipeline Respondent's test records show that Respondent used the 100\nmV criterion at isolated locations along the line Therefore, Respondent's use of the 100 mV\ncriterion did not determine the adequacy of Respondent's cathodic protection or the significance\nof voltage drop for the entire pipeline\nRespondent provided documentation that it had installed a number of metal coupon test stations\nThese test stations are capable of measuring soil potentials with the cathodic protection current\ninterrupted. The coupon test stations appear to be acceptable methods for considering voltage\ndrop; but Respondent had not installed the coupons at every test station on the line.\nWhile Respondent has taken a number of steps to consider voltage drop and determine the\nadequacy of its cathodic protection system, I find Respondent failed to document the use of an\naccepted method to consider the significance of voltage drop on the entire Red Butte Pipe Line\nAccordingly, I find that Respondent violated 49 C F R g 195 571 as alleged in the Notice\nThis finding of violation will be considered a prior offense in any subsequent enforcement action\ntaken against Respondent.\nCOMPLIANCE ORDER\nThe Notice proposed a compliance order with respect to Item 3 of the Notice. Under 49 U. S C\n) 60118(a), each person who engages in the transportation of hazardous liquids or who owns or\noperates a pipeline facility is required to comply with the applicable safety standards established\nunder Chapter 601. The Director, Western Region, OPS has mdicated that Respondent has taken\nthe following actions specified m the Proposed Comphance Order.\nRespondent implemented a new format for annual cathodic protection surveys that\ndocuments the critenon, targets and actual readings to assure that IR drop consideration is\ncompleted and documented. Respondent developed target \"on\" readings for each test\nstation and completed a comprehensive cathodic protection survey.\nAccordingly, since compliance has been achieved with respect to this violation, it is not\nnecessary to include the compliance terms in this Order.\nAMENDMENT OF PROCEDURES\nItem 1 in the Notice alleged inadequacies in Respondent's OMBRE manual and proposed to\nrequire amendment of Respondent's procedures to comply with the requirements of 49 C. F R\ng 195, 402(f) and 195 55\nSection 195 402(f) requires Respondent to have procedures for personnel to recognize safety-\nrelated conditions subject to reporting under $ 195 55 Surges in pipeline pressure in excess of\n\n\n\n110% of the maximum operating pressure is a safety-related condition that must be reported in\naccordance with $ 195 55. The Notice alleged that Respondent's procedures listed this condition\nas an abnormal operation, not a reportable safety-related condition.\nIn its Response, Respondent admitted that its \"Standard Procedures\" listed Lhe condition as an\nabnormal operation, but argued that another portion of its OM&E manual titled \"Safety-Related\nConditions\" listed the condition as a safety-related condition in accordance with $ 195 402(f)\nTherefore, Respondent contended, it complied with $ 195 402(f) and the inadequacy alleged in\nthe Notice should be withdrawn.\nAlthough Respondent properly listed the condition as a reportable safety-related condition, the\ncondition was also listed elsewhere in its OMBRE manual as an abnormal operation. Respondent\nhad not cross-referenced the two sections. Were personnel to consult \"Standard Procedures'*\nonly, they would recognize the condition as an abnormal operation, rather than a reportable\nsafety-related condition. Respondent agreed that clarification and cross-referencing would be\nbeneficial.\nRespondent submitted copies of its amended procedures, which the Director, Western Region,\nOPS, reviewed Based on the results of this review, I find that Respondent's original procedures\nas described in the Notice were inadequate to ensure safe operation of its pipeline system, but\nthat Respondent has corrected the identified inadequacies Therefore, no need exists to issue an\norder directing amendment.\nWARNING ITEM\nThe Notice did not propose a civil penalty or corrective action for Item 2 of the Notice, but\nwarned Respondent that it should take appropriate corrective action to correct the item The\nwarning was for:\n49 C. F R. $ 195. 569 — failing to examine exposed portions of bur~ed pipeline for\nevidence of external corrosion.\nIn its Response, Respondent presented mformation showing that it has addressed this item.\nRespondent is again warned that if OPS finds a violation for the cited item in a subsequent\ninspection, enforcement action will be taken\nThe terms and conditions of this Final Order are effective on receipt\nace\nssoci\nrP\nG d\nte Administrator\neline Safety\nDate Issued","truncated":false,"body_characters":12608}