{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 520041016","title":"NORTHWEST PIPELINE LLC — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2004-09-28","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 192.619(b), 192.739(d).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520041016.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520041016.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520041016","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/520041016","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving NORTHWEST PIPELINE LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 192.619(b),  192.739(d). The case was opened on 2004-09-28 and is reported as closed as of 2009-07-22. Proposed civil penalty: $100,000. Assessed civil penalty: $50,000. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n520041016_FinalOrder_07072009.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520041016/520041016_FinalOrder_07072009.pdf\n\n520041016_FinalOrder_07072009_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520041016/520041016_FinalOrder_07072009_text.pdf\n\n520041016_FinalOrder_07072009_text.pdf\n\nJUL 07 2009\nMr. Randy L. Barnard\nVice President - Operations and Gas Control\nWilliams Gas Pipeline Company, LLC\n2800 Post Oak Boulevard\nHouston, TX 77056\nRe: CPF No. 5-2004-1016\nDear Mr. Barnard:\nEnclosed is the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes a finding of violation\nand assesses a reduced civil penalty of $50,000. The Order also finds that you have addressed\nthe inadequacy in your procedures that was cited in the Notice of Amendment. Therefore, when\nthe civil penalty has been paid, this enforcement action will be closed. The penalty payment\nterms are set forth in the Final Order. Your receipt of the Final Order constitutes service of that\ndocument under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Chris Hoidal, Director, Western Region, PHMSA\nAnne F. Soiza, Director, WUTC Pipeline Safety\nCERTIFIED MAIL – RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED [7005 1160 0001 0046 9747]\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\n)\nIn the Matter of )\n)\nWilliams Gas Pipeline Company, LLC, ) CPF No. 5-2004-1016\na/k/a Williams Gas Pipeline – Northwest, )\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nFINAL ORDER\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, representatives of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration (PHMSA)1, Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), and the Washington Utilities and\noperation on a 26-inch gas transmission pipeline operated by Williams Gas Pipeline Company,\nLLC (Williams or Respondent) in Pierce County, Washington. The pipeline is part of\nRespondent’s Northwest Pipeline, a large gas transmission system spanning Oregon,\nWashington, Idaho, Colorado, Wyoming and Utah.\nTransportation Commission (WUTC)2 conducted an investigation of a July 15, 2003 abnormal\nAs a result of the investigation, the Director, Western Region, OPS (Director), issued to\nRespondent, by letter dated September 28, 2004, a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil\nPenalty, and Notice of Amendment (Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the\nNotice proposed finding that Respondent had violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.619(b) and proposed\nassessing a civil penalty of $100,000 for the alleged violation. The Notice also proposed, in\naccordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.237, that Respondent amend its Operating and Maintenance\nProcedures.\nRespondent responded to the Notice by letter dated October 21, 2004 (Response). Respondent\ncontested the allegation and requested a hearing. A hearing was held on December 15, 2004, in\nLakewood, Colorado, with an attorney from the Office of Chief Counsel, PHMSA, presiding.\n1 Effective February 20, 2005, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) succeeded\nthe Research and Special Programs Administration as the agency responsible for regulating safety in pipeline\ntransportation and hazardous materials transportation. See, section 108 of the Norman Y. Mineta Research and\nSpecial Programs Improvement Act (Public Law 108-426, 118 Stat. 2423-2429 (November 30, 2004)). See also, 70\nFed. Reg. 8299 (February 18, 2005) redelegating the pipeline safety authorities and functions to the PHMSA\nAdministrator.\n2 The WUTC serves as interstate agent for OPS in Washington State.\n\n\n\n2\nFINDING OF VIOLATION\nItem 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.619(b) which states:\n§ 192.619 Maximum allowable operating pressure; Steel or plastic\npipelines.\n(a) ….\n(b) No person may operate a segment to which paragraph (a)(4) of this\nsection is applicable, unless over-pressure protective devices are installed\non the segment in a manner that will prevent the maximum allowable\noperating pressure from being exceeded, in accordance with\n§ 192.195.\nItem 1 of the Notice alleged that Williams violated § 192.619(b) by failing to install over-\npressure protective devices on its 26-inch gas transmission pipeline in a manner that would\nprevent the maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP) from being exceeded. Specifically,\nit alleged that on July 15, 2003, during preparations for an in-line inspection tool run on the line,\nan overpressure event occurred between the Sumner and Snohomish Compressor Stations for\napproximately three hours (Incident). In its Response, Williams admitted that the MAOP was\nexceeded but argued that the event was not caused by inadequate over-pressure protection but by\nthe mechanical failure of an over-pressure protection device.\nBackground\nSeveral months before the Incident, this same line experienced a serious failure. On May 1,\n2003, a 46-foot section of Respondent’s line near Lake Tapps, in Pierce County, Washington,\nruptured with significant force, causing pipe fragments to be thrown approximately 250 feet from\ntheir original position. A nearby elementary school, a supermarket, and several houses within an\napproximately 4-mile radius were evacuated. Fortunately, the May 1 incident did not result in an\nignition of gas or any injuries.\nThe day after the May 1st rupture, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60112, PHMSA issued a Corrective\nAction Order (CAO) to Williams, requiring the company to take immediate corrective action to\nlimit the pressure on the pipeline to no more than 80% of the MAOP. Prior to the May 1 failure,\nthe pipeline had an MAOP of 674 psig but with the 80% restriction, it was limited to 539 psig.\nprotect life, property and the environment.3 Among other actions, the CAO required Williams to\nDuring the Incident, the pressure on the line reached 701 psig, or 130%, of the MAOP set by the\nCAO.\n3 In the Matter of Williams Gas Pipeline – Northwest, Corrective Action Order, CPF No. 5-2003-1003H (May 2,\n2003), 2003 WL 25429847.\n\n\n\n3\nDiscussion\nIn its Response and at the hearing, Williams argued that it committed no violation of\n§ 192.619(b) because the Incident was caused by the mechanical failure of an over-pressure\nprotection device, not “inadequate overpressure protection,” as alleged in the Notice. I find\nRespondent’s argument unpersuasive for several reasons.\nFirst, the evidence shows that Respondent’s pressure control equipment was configured in such a\nway that it failed to prevent the MAOP from being exceeded. During the July 15, 2003 pigging\npreparations, Williams isolated the pipeline sections upstream and downstream from the Sumner\nStation (Station) by closing a ball valve at the Station. By closing this valve, Williams\ninadvertently isolated a small sensing line that was used for a pressure control valve on a seldom-\nused crossover line connecting the isolated 26-inch line and a parallel 30-inch line. The isolation\nof this sensing line caused the control valve to detect the pressure on the wrong side of the ball\nvalve and to open, allowing high-pressure gas from the 30-inch line into the crossover. When\nthe high-pressure gas reached a second “monitor” control valve on the crossover, that valve\nfailed to close due to the malfunction of a pilot and gas moved into and over-pressured the 26-\ninch line. Had the sensing line been configured properly, it would not have detected the low-\npressure side of the ball valve and would not have opened. After the Incident, Williams moved\nthe sensing line to a location where the pressure could be properly monitored.\nSecond, the drawings that the company provided to the personnel who were involved in making\nthe pigging preparations did not show the existence or location of any sensing lines. Had the\ndrawings included this information, Williams personnel would have been in a better position to\nunderstand the configuration of its pressure control equipment and to take appropriate action to\nprevent the MAOP from being exceeded. After the Incident, Williams modified the Sumner\nStation drawings to reflect the presence of the sensing lines.\nThird, the record contains information suggesting that the monitor control valve failed to close\nsenses line pressure and sends a signal to open or close a valve at a pre-set pressure. Although\nOPS did not allege that Williams failed to follow procedures for inspection, testing or\nprevented the MAOP from being exceeded.\nwhen a pilot malfunctioned as a result of dirt inside the sensing line.4 A pilot is a device that\nmaintenance of the control valve pilot or the sensing line, the presence of dirt inside the line\nindicates that the overpressure protection device may not have been installed in a manner that\nFourth, and perhaps most importantly, Williams admitted that its over-pressure protection\nequipment failed due to human error. In a November 21, 2003 letter to the WUTC, Williams\nacknowledged that the MAOP was exceeded “because of human error.”5\nSpecifically, Williams\n4 See PHMSA Violation Report, Ex. 16. Letter from Williams to WUTC at 2 (Nov. 21, 2003) (Williams “found dirt\nin the tubing after the device failed”); and Violation Report, Ex. 4. Letter from Bettis (pilot manufacturer) to\nWilliams (Aug. 5, 2003) (Bettis “suspect[ed] root cause was plugged tubing…”)\n5 Letter from Williams to WUTC at 1 (Nov. 21, 2003).\n\n\n\n4\nexplained that three factors contributed to the over-pressure event: the failure of an overpressure\nvalve to close, incomplete drawings, and the location of the pressure sensing line.6\nTherefore, it is clear that the Incident was not caused simply by the mechanical failure of an\nover-pressure protection device. The evidence shows that the pressure sensing line was\nimproperly configured, that company personnel did not have access to accurate drawings that\nwould have alerted them to the improper configuration, that there was probably dirt in the\nsensing line that may have interfered with operation of the pilot, and that human error was at\nleast partly responsible for the malfunctioning of the company’s over-pressure protection\nequipment. Accordingly, upon consideration of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent\nviolated 49 C.F.R. § 192.619(b) by failing to install over-pressure protective devices on its\npipeline in a manner that would prevent the MAOP from being exceeded.\nASSESSMENT OF PENALTY\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60122, Respondent is subject to an administrative civil penalty not to exceed\n$100,000 per violation for each day of the violation, up to a maximum of $1,000,000 for any\nrelated series of violations.\n49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.225 require that, in determining the amount of a civil\npenalty, I consider the following criteria: the nature, circumstances, and gravity of the violation,\nincluding adverse impact on the environment; the degree of Respondent’s culpability; the history\nof Respondent’s prior offenses; the Respondent’s ability to pay the penalty and any effect that\nthe penalty may have on its ability to continue doing business; and the good faith of Respondent\nin attempting to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. In addition, I may consider the\neconomic benefit gained from the violation without any reduction because of subsequent\ndamages, and such other matters as justice may require.\nNotice Item 1 proposed a civil penalty of $100,000 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 192.619(b) for\nRespondent’s failure to install overpressure protective devices in a manner that would prevent\nthe MAOP from being exceeded. In its Response, Williams argued that the proposed $100,000\npenalty was not warranted because the company self-reported the Incident and because the\nfailure was caused by the mechanical failure of an over-pressure protection device.7\nAs for the company’s argument on self-reporting, it should be remembered that Williams was\nexpressly prohibited by the CAO from exceeding an MAOP of 539 psig. Under paragraph six of\nthe Required Corrective Action section of the CAO, Williams was obliged to obtain approval\nfrom the Director in order to “remove or modify” the pressure restriction.8 Thus, it can hardly be\n6 Id. at 2.\n7 Response at 1.\n8 In the Matter of Williams Gas Pipeline – Northwest, Corrective Action Order at 4, CPF No. 5-2003-1003H.\n\n\n\n5\nargued that Williams should be given credit for “voluntarily” reporting the fact that it had\nviolated one of the key provisions of a recently issued CAO.\nThis is particularly true in light of the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the CAO. The\npressure restriction in the CAO was an important safety requirement intended to prevent\nadditional pipeline ruptures on the Williams Northwest Gas Pipeline system. The pressure\nrestriction provided a certain measure of safety until Williams could perform various testing and\ninspection to determine the condition of its pipeline and make any necessary repairs. By\nexceeding the MAOP without permission and before diagnostic and repair activities could take\nplace, Williams overrode a key barrier to the prevention of additional failures. Additionally, as\ndiscussed above, the overpressure did not occur simply because of the failure of a single over-\npressure protection device but because Williams failed to install the equipment in a manner that\nenabled it to function properly and because Williams did not provide accurate drawings to its\npersonnel.\nOn the other hand, the record shows that Williams did take several actions following the May\n2003 release but before the Incident in an effort to reduce the likelihood of future failures. For\nexample, Williams adjusted its pressure control equipment in an attempt to ensure that the\nreduced MAOP would not be exceeded and installed a new monitor control valve pilot with a\nwhat was required in the CAO. Respondent collective efforts show that the company made\nreduced set point.9 Respondent also conducted testing and evaluation of its pipeline beyond\ngood-faith attempts prior to the Incident to comply with the reduced MAOP and to prevent future\nreleases.\nAccordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, I assess\nRespondent a reduced civil penalty of $50,000 for violating 49 C.F.R. § 192.619(b).\nAMENDMENT OF PROCEDURES\nItem 2 of the Notice alleged inadequacies in Respondent’s Operations, Maintenance and\nEmergencies Manual and proposed to require amendment of Respondent’s procedures for\ncomplying with § 192.739. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Respondent’s procedures for the\noperation and maintenance of pressure control equipment were inadequate.\nBy letter dated November 3, 2004, Respondent submitted copies of its amended procedures,\nwhich the Director has reviewed. Accordingly, based on the results of this review, I find that\nRespondent’s original procedures as described in the Notice were inadequate to ensure safe\noperation of its pipeline system, but that Respondent has corrected the identified inadequacies.\nTherefore, no need exists to issue an Order Directing Amendment.\nUnder 49 C.F.R. § 190.215, Respondent has a right to submit a Petition for Reconsideration of\nthis Final Order. The petition must be received within 20 days of Respondent’s receipt of this\n9 PHMSA Violation Report, Ex. 16. at 3.\n\n\n\n6\nFinal Order and must contain a brief statement of the issue(s). The filing of the petition\nautomatically stays the payment of any civil penalty assessed. However, if Respondent submits\npayment for the civil penalty, the Final Order becomes the final administrative decision and the\nright to petition for reconsideration is waived. The terms and conditions of this Final Order are\neffective on receipt.\n___________________________________ __________________________\nJeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety","truncated":false,"body_characters":16293}