{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 520045001","title":"ROCKY MOUNTAIN PIPELINE SYSTEM, LLC — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2004-02-18","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.452(b)(3), 195.452(e)(1), 195.452(f)(1), 195.452(f)(4), 195.452(f)(7), 195.452(f)(8), 195.452(i)(1), 195.452(j), 195.452(j)(1), 195.452(l).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520045001.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520045001.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520045001","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/520045001","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving ROCKY MOUNTAIN PIPELINE SYSTEM, LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195,  195.452(b)(3),  195.452(e)(1),  195.452(f)(1),  195.452(f)(4),  195.452(f)(7),  195.452(f)(8),  195.452(i)(1),  195.452(j),  195.452(j)(1),  195.452(l). The case was opened on 2004-02-18 and is reported as closed as of 2008-01-09. Proposed civil penalty: $34,000. Assessed civil penalty: $7,000. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n520045001_final order_12112006.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520045001/520045001_final%20order_12112006.pdf\n\n520045001_final order_12112006_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520045001/520045001_final%20order_12112006_text.pdf\n\nCPF_NO_5-2004-5001.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520045001/CPF_NO_5-2004-5001.pdf\n\n520045001_final order_12112006_text.pdf\n\nU 5 Department\nof Transportation\nPipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration\n400 Seventh Street, S W\nWashington, D C 20590\nDEC 1 t\nMr. Jesse G. Metcalf\nVice President, Operations and Technical Services\nRocky Mountain Pipeline System LLC\n555 17' Street\nSuite 3310\nDenver, CO 80202\nRECEIVED\nDEC 26 2006\nRe: CPF No. 5-2004-5001\nDear Mr, Metcalf:\nEnclosed is the Final Order issued by the Acting Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety\nin the above-referenced case. The Final Order withdraws several of the allegations of violation\nlisted in the Notice of Probable Violation dated Feb. 18, 2004, makes findings of violation with\nrespect to some of the other allegations, specifies actions to be taken to comply with the pipeline\nsafety regulations, requires amendment of certain integrity management program procedures and\nassesses a civil penalty of $7, 000. The penalty payment terms are set forth in the Final Order.\nWhen the civil penalty is paid and the terms of the compliance order and amendment of\nprocedures are completed, as determined by the Director, Western Region, OPS, this\nenforcement action will be closed. Your receipt of the Final Order constitutes service of that\ndocument under 49 C. F. R. $ 190. 5.\nSincerely,\names Reynolds\nPipeline Compliance Registry\nOffice of Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\nCC. Robert Mindess\nSenior Counsel\nPacific Energy GP, Inc.\n5900 Cherry Avenue\nLong Beach, CA 90805-4408\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT RE UESTED\n\n\n\nDEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION'\nWASHINGTON, DC\nIn the Matter of\nRocky Mountain Pipeline System, )\nRespondent.\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\nCPF No. 5-2004-5001\nFINAL ORDER\nFrom February 24-27, 2003, representatives of the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), pursuant to\n49 U. S. C. $ 60117, conducted an inspection of Rocky Mountain Pipeline System's (Respondent)\nintegrity management program at Respondent's offices in Denver, Colorado.\nAs a result of the inspection, the Director, Western Region, OPS, issued to Respondent, by letter\ndated February 18, 2004, a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil Penalty, Proposed\nCompliance Order and Notice of Amendment (Notice). In accordance with 49 C. F. R. $ 190. 207,\nthe Notice proposed finding Respondent had violated various regulatory provisions of 49 C. F. R.\n$195. 452, proposed assessing a civil penalty of $34, 000 for the alleged violations, and proposed\nthat Respondent take certain measures to correct the alleged violations. The Notice also\nproposed, in accordance with 49 C. F. R. $ 190. 237, that Respondent amend its integrity\nmanagement program procedures.\nOn March 9, 2004, Respondent requested a 60-day extension to respond to the Notice, which the\nRegional Director granted on March 15, 2004. Respondent submitted its response to the Notice\non May 20, 2004 (Response). Respondent contested the allegations, submitted information to\nexplain the allegations and requested a hearing. A hearing was held in the Western Region,\n' This case is no longer before the Research and Special Programs Administration, the agency\nthat initiated the case. Effective February 20, 2005, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration (PHMSA) w'as created to further the highest degree of safety in pipeline\ntransportation and hazardous materials transportation. See, section 108 of the Norman Y. Mineta\nResearch and Special Programs Improvement Act (Public Law 108-426, 118 Stat. 2423-2429\n(November 30, 2004)). See also, 70 Fed. ~Re . 8299 (February 18, 2005) redelegating the\npipeline safety functions to the Administrator, PHMSA.\n\n\n\nOPS, on December 14, 2004. After the hearing, Respondent submitted a Closing Statement\ndated March 16, 2005.\nFINDINGS OF VIOLATION\nAs discussed below, the Notice alleged violations of the integrity management program (IMP)\nrequirements in 49 C. F. R. $195. 452. In general, Respondent questioned whether the allegations\nhad any basis in law, since many related to the level of detail in the IMP processes. Respondent\nargued its IMP provided what the regulations literally require but that the procedures may lack\nthe detail necessary to satisfy some OPS inspectors. Respondent maintained OPS published a\nprotocol after the inspection that provided more guidance to operators on the level of detail\nnecessary in IMP procedures. The protocols Respondent refers to were first discussed at a public\nworkshop on July 23-24, 2002. The initial version of the protocols was posted on OPS's integrity\nmanagement website in conjunction with this workshop. A revised version was posted in January\n2003. The inspection of Respondent's facilities took place in February 2003. Additionally,\nbeginning in October 2001, OPS posted answers to FAQs to give hazardous liquid operators\ninformal advice about how to carry out the IMP requirements. Thus, guidance was available to\nRespondent before the OPS inspection.\nItem 1 alleged three violations of $195. 452(f)(1), which requires an operator's integrity\nmanagement program (IMP) to have a process for identifying those pipeline segments in its\nsystem that could affect a high consequence area. The Notice alleged—\n~ Respondent could not assure all of its pipelines were accurately reflected in the National\nPipeline Mapping System (NPMS) (la);\n~ Respondent had not identified pipeline facilities, such as breakout tanks and pump\nstations, that could affect high consequence areas, as required by $195. 452(f)(3) (1b); and\n~ Respondent's process for identifying pipeline segments could not ensure all segments\nthat could affect a high consequence area were identified (1 c).\nWith respect to la, Respondent maintained it had submitted its pipeline information to the\nNPMS on June 9, 2003. The due date was June 17, 2003. Respondent has demonstrated it\nprovided the requisite information before the due date; therefore, I am withdrawing the allegation\nof violation.\nIn its initial response to 1b, Respondent said it interpreted )195. 452(f)(3) to apply to pipeline\nassets only. At the hearing, Respondent confirmed its IMP program at the time of the inspection\ndid not include non linear facilities, such as pump stations and breakout tanks. At the hearing\nand in its post-hearing response, Respondent said it is surveying the locations and creating a\nfacility specific plan and methodology. Respondent said its next revision will include these\nfacilities and an expanded description of the methodology.\n' Item Numbers refer to the items listed in the Notice dated Feb. 18, 2004.\n\n\n\nSection 195. 452 (f)(1) requires an identification of all pipeline segments that could affect a high\nconsequence area. Section 195. 452(f)(3) requires an operator to integrate all available\ninformation concerning the entire pipeline. A pipeline is defined in )195. 2 to mean all parts of a\npipeline facility through which a hazardous liquid moves in transportation. Thus, I find\nRespondent violated ))195. 452{f){1) and 195. 452{f){3) because its IMP failed to identify and\naddress all of its pipeline facilities.\nIn addressing 1c, Respondent maintained the allegations were unclear. Respondent believed all\nof its segments are readily identifiable and segments that could affect high consequence areas are\nidentified on its maps. At the hearing, OPS explained Respondent's IMP did not have a process\nfor performing pipeline segment identification to ensure all segments that could affect high\nconsequence areas are included. Respondent maintained its maps provide adequate detail to\nidentify all of the pipeline segments that could affect high consequence areas. Respondent also\nincluded a description of the methodology used to identify the segments.\nSection 195. 453(f)(1) requires an operator to have a process for identifying which of the pipeline\nsegments in its system could affect a high consequence area. Sections 1. 3 -1. 3. 6 of Respondent's\nIMP describe the Bass-Trigon RiskCat tool and the Integrity Assessment Program (IAP) risk\nassessment model used in the identification process, factors used to identify segments, future\nidentification, data updates and incomplete data. Accordingly, I find Respondent did not violate\n)195. 452(f)(I), because its IMP has a process for identifying those segments in its system that\ncould affect high consequence area. But this process is deficient and needs to be amended to\nensure safe operation of the pipeline system. Respondent's process needs to ensure the process\nthe consultant used applies to Respondent's system. The approach needs to be better described\nand documented and include a method for reviewing the results provided by the consultant.\nThus, this item will be included in the Amendment section of this document.\nItem 2 alleged three violations of 49 C. F. R. )195. 452(b)(3). The regulation requires a pipeline\noperator to have in its integrity management program a plan to carry out the baseline assessment\nof line pipe according to the baseline assessment plan requirements in )195. 452(c). The Notice\nalleged—\n~ Resporiderit's baseline assessment plan did not specify or technically justify the choice of\nassessment methods {2a);\n~ Documentation stated Respondent did not have pre-1970 electric resistance welded\n(ERW) or lap welded pipe in its system, contrary to information presented to OPS\ninspectors that this type of pipe was in the system. Respondent's assessment tools had\nnot considered the seam failure susceptibility of these types of pipe (2c); and\n~ Respondent did not have a process for revising the baseline assessment plan {2d).\nFor 2a, Respondent initially responded that section 4. 10 of its IMP discussed available and\nallowable methods of assessments. Respondent maintained it did not interpret the rule to require\nan operator to specify or technically justify its choice of assessment methods.\n\n\n\nAt the hearing, OPS maintained Respondent's IMP did not show its decision making process on\ndetermining assessment methods. In its closing statement, Respondent said it addressed OPS's\nconcerns by explaining sections 4. 10 and 4. 11 address the different assessment methods and\nwhat conditions must exist to choose a method.\nRespondent's IMP (section 4. 10) has procedures discussing assessment methods for the baseline\nassessment. Thus, I do not find a violation of )195. 452{b){3). Although Respondent has\nprocedures, the procedures are very general statements about types of assessment methods.\nThus, this item will be included in the Amendment section of this Order because the procedures\nare not adequate to ensure safe operation of Respondent's system. Respondent will be required\nto further amend its procedures to provide more detailed information about how personnel are to\nchoose an integrity assessment method if certain conditions exist on a segment of line pipe.\nWith respect to 2c, Respondent acknowledged its IMP incorrectly indicated the system had no\npre-1970 ERW or lap welded pipe. Respondent maintained it has since corrected the statement\nin its IMP (section 4. 10) and has implemented procedures for assessing and repairing this pipe.\nAt the hearing OPS and Respondent discussed whether Respondent had analyzed the risk\nassociated with this type of pipe. Respondent explained the database that performs its risk\nanalysis did consider the pipe and the risk algorithm shows the program used this information.\nSection 195. 452(b)(3) requires an operator to have a baseline assessment plan that complies with\nthe baseline plan requirements in $195. 452(c). Section 195. 452(c)(1)(i) requires an operator to\nuse assessment methods capable of assessing seam integrity and of detecting corrosion and\ndeformation anomalies if the system has low frequency electric resistance welded (ERW) pipe or\nlap welded pipe and the pipe is susceptible to longitudinal seam failure. Under )195. 303(d) all\npre-1970 ERW pipe and lap welded pipe is considered susceptible to longitudinal weld failure\nunless an engineering analysis shows otherwise.\nRespondent has demonstrated the statement in its IMP at the time of the inspection was an error\nthat has since been removed, Respondent's risk algorithm also includes an input field for pipe\nseam design. But, according to Respondent's March 2005 closing statement, there were 35 miles\nof lap welded pipe and 2. 25 miles of low frequency ERW pipe in its system. Yet, the modified\nprocedure Respondent submitted (Section 4. 10) only discusses what might happen if pipelines\nacquired in the future contain low frequency ERW pipe. The procedure does not discuss how the\ncurrent pipe in the system will be addressed or how a newly acquired pipe with lap welded pipe\nwill be addressed.\nFurther, section 4. 10 only states appropriate assessment techniques will be evaluated for\neffectiveness in managing the potential threat (i. e.\n, susceptibility to longitudinal seam failure).\nRespondent must either have its IMP provide for assessment methods that address seam issues as\nspecified in the regulation (i. e.\n,\nthe assessment method must be capable of assessing seam\nintegrity and of detecting corrosion and deformation anomalies) or provide an engineering\n\n\n\nanalysis demonstrating the low frequency ERA pipe and lap welded pipe in Respondent's\nsystem is not susceptible to longitudinal seam failure. And if not determined susceptible to\nlongitudinal seam failure, the procedures must describe the assessment method Respondent will\nuse to assess this pipe.\nAt the time of the inspection Respondent's procedure was inaccurate. As discussed above, the\nrevised procedure is still inaccurate and does not satisfy the regulation. Accordingly, I find\nRespondent violated $195, 452(b)(3).\nIn response to 2d, Respondent initially said sections 2. 2, 2. 2. 3, 5 and Appendix H of its IMP\ndiscuss how updates and modifications are to be made. Respondent believes OPS misinterpreted\nth\nthe reference to version 5. 0 as being the 5 revision. Respondent explained the reference was an\narchive reference inadvertently left in the document. At the hearing Respondent again explained\nthe reference to revision 5 was not a 5'\" revision. Respondent further explained sections 2. 2,\n2. 2. 3, chapter 5 and appendix H of its IMP describe in detail its process for updating and\nmodifying its IMP and Respondent will expand the description in the next IMP revision.\nThis allegation concerned Respondent's IMP not having a process for revising the baseline\nassessment plan when changes to segment identification occur. This was not a\nmisunderstanding over whether Respondent had documented its IMP revisions. As part of the\nrequirement to have a baseline assessment plan that conforms with $195. 452(c), Respondent is to\ndocument any changes or modification to the assessment plan. Changes include documenting\nwhen new high consequence areas are identified and included in the baseline assessment plan.\n(See $195. 452(d)(3)(ii). ) The IMP procedures Respondent submitted do not provide for this.\nAccordingly, I find Respondent violated )195. 452(b)(3).\nItem 3 alleged four violations of 49 C. F. R. $195. 452(f}(8). The regulation requires an operator's\nIMP to have a process for review of integrity assessment results and information analysis by a\nperson qualified to evaluate the results and information. The Notice alleged Respondent's IMP—\n~ did not have a process description for performing reviews of assessment results {3a);\n~ did not have a process description for ensuring personnel performing these reviews are\nqualified (3b);\n~ had grading features in the appendix that did not correlate with the rule's repair criteria\n(3c); and\n~ defines discovery of a condition as occurring up to 30 days after final inspection results\nare received {3d).\nIn addressing 3a, Respondent initially responded its IMP has procedures to review and integrate\nintegrity assessment results and to confirm assessment results. Respondent referenced several\nsections in its IMP that Respondent maintained showed these processes.\nAt the hearing, Respondent described the process for reviewing integrity assessment results.\n\n\n\nRespondent pointed to Section 4. 2 of its IMP, which refers to integrating and reviewing data to\ndevelop a dig prioritization of the findings to confirm anomalies. Respondent agreed to rename\nthe section to more specifically identify the review process. Section 7. 0 discusses the quality\ncontrol plan for managing integrity assessment data.\nThe process flow charts for analyzing data, communication plan and the procedures describing\ndata integration and periodic maintenance are not relevant to this alleged violation. The\nrequirement to have a process for review of integrity results is separate from the requirement to\nconduct a periodic information analysis. A process for a dig prioritization process is not the\nsame as a process for reviewing integrity assessment results. The dig prioritization program may\ncome after the review of the assessment results. Only section 7. 1 of the IMP Quality Control\nplan on personnel qualifications includes a general statement that a Pacific Energy senior\nengineer will review the assessment results.\nI do not see that any of the IMP sections Respondent referenced describe a process of how\nRespondent's personnel are to evaluate and validate the integrity assessment results.\nAccordingly, I find Respondent violated )195. 452(f)(8).\nIn response to 3b, Respondent initially maintained it had not violated any regulation because\nOPS had not cited any regulation requiring such material to be in its IMP. According to\nRespondent, the regulation only requires the persons performing the assessment be qualified, and\nRespondent's personnel are qualified because of their extensive experience. At the hearing OPS\nclarified the allegation concerned whether Respondent's IMP has a process description for\nensuring personnel reviewing integrity assessments are qualified. Respondent maintained its\npersonnel who do these reviews are experienced and it also has a rigorous contractor\nqualification process. Respondent said it revised section 7. 1 of its IMP to include information on\nwho will perform the assessment review.\nOPS did not allege Respondent's personnel were not qualified; rather, the allegation concerned\nthe lack of a process to establish the qualifications of the person performing the review. As one\nof the required IMP elements, a program must have a process for review of integrity assessment\nresults by a person qualified to evaluate the results. This is a two-part process: the review of the\nintegrity assessment results and the qualification of personnel who will be performing that\nreview.\nI find Respondent violated )195. 452(f)(8) because, at the time of the inspection, its IMP did not\nhave a process for establishing the person's qualifications to perform the integrity results review.\nMoreover, the revised procedure Respondent submitted in March 2005 still does not establish a\nformal documented process for how Respondent establishes the reviewer is qualified.\nWith respect to 3c, Respondent maintained sections 4. 4 through 4. 8 set forth its repair criteria,\nwhich are consistent with the IMP repair requirements. Respondent further maintained OPS\nreviewed Respondent's Engineering Standard 9000 in a later inspection and found it complied\n\n\n\nwith the rule's requirements, At the hearing, Respondent maintained OPS misunderstood the\npurpose of the engineering standard.\nAfter further review, OPS agrees Respondent's engineering standard 9000 is not inconsistent\nwith the repair criteria. Respondent uses the standard in addition to the repair criteria. The\nstandard helps categorize the anomalies into subcategories to prioritize the conditions for repair.\nAccordingly, I am withdrawing the allegation of violation.\nFor 3d, Respondent initially responded that its program and other documents reflect an\nappropriate response to discovery of a condition. At the hearing, OPS argued Respondent's\nprocedure on discovery conflicted with the rule's requirements and implied a longer period for\ndiscovery. Respondent maintained it addressed these concerns by explaining its bid form\nrequires contractors to release their final reports for Respondent to meet the 180-day deadline. In\nits closing statement, Respondent included amended section 4. 3, which Respondent maintained\nclarifies information must be received no later than 180 days after the assessment.\nSection 195. 452(f)(8) concerns the requirement to have a process for review of integrity\nassessment results and information analysis by a qualified person. But the allegation concerns\nthe requirements on discovery of a condition in $195, 452(h)(2). Thus, I am withdrawing this\nallegation of violation because the regulation cited does not relate to the alleged problem.\nFurthermore, Respondent's revised procedure appears to satisfy OPS's concern about clarifying\nwhen discovery of a condition occurs to be consistent with the regulation.\nItem 4 alleged Respondent had violated 49 C. F. R. $195. 452(f)(4), which requires an operator's\nIMP to have criteria for remedial actions to address integrity issues raised by the assessment and\ninformation analysis. The Notice alleged Respondent's process description in its program did not\nhave sufficient detail on criteria for determining remedial actions Respondent would take to\naddress integrity issues.\nIn its initial Response, Respondent said its repair criteria are in section 4. 0 of its IMP and the\ncriteria are consistent with the criteria in the IMP regulation. At the hearing OPS explained that\nRespondent's repair criteria did not have sufficient detail for determining remedial actions.\nRespondent explained its IMP has the repair criteria in sections 4. 4 through 4. 8 and an\nengineering standard in Appendix C. Its OAM manual also has references to the process\ndescription for determining remedial actions. Respondent said it revised its IMP to reference the\n0&M Manual.\nI am withdrawing this allegation of violation because Respondent's IMP had the procedures,\nalbeit they needed to reference other documents. The revised procedures Respondent submitted\nprovide more detail.\nItem 5 alleged three violations of 49 C. F. R. $195. 452(e)(I). This regulation requires an operator\nto develop an assessment schedule based on risk factors reflecting the risk conditions on the\n\n\n\npipe ine segmen .\nline segment. The regulations list certain risk factors an operator must consider. The Notice\nalleged Respondent—\n~ had not documented its risk analysis process description (5a);\n~ needed to establish a process for populating data fields in the risk model with values\nbased on the best available information (Sb); and\n~ did not have a process for analyzing the risk of pipeline facilities {5c}.\nIn response to 5a, Respondent initially maintained OPS had not cited any regulation to support\nthe allegation and in any event, section 3. 2, 2 of its IMP has all the variable definitions. At the\nhearing OPS explained Respondent had not documented the risk analysis process in sufficient\ndetail, particularly how it was using the information from the Bass Trigon algorithm model.\nRespondent maintained it allayed this concern by explaining Appendix K to its IMP contains the\nBass-Trigon methodology user implementation manual for the software program. Respondent\nsaid it reviews the results of the program and runs them through its management of change.\nSections 3. 2. 2, 3. 2. 3, 3. 2. 4 and 6. 1. 3 explain how the information is used. In its closing\nstatement, Respondent submitted a revised section 3. 2. 2, which Respondent said now includes\ndefinitions of the variables.\nSection 195. 452(e)(1) requires an operator to use risk factors in establishing the assessment\nschedule for the baseline and continuing integrity assessments. Thus, an operator must have a\nprocess escri i\nrocess describing the risk analysis it is using to support its assessment schedule. Respondent\nhas a basic procedure describing its risk algorithm. Thus, I do not find Respondent violated\n$195. 452(e)(1). But, the procedure still lacks sufficient detail to be adequate. Information, such\nas the basis for risk categories and variable weights, needs to be documented. Thus, this item\nwill be included in the Amendment section of this Order.\nTo address 5b, Respondent initially responded that its risk model was populated with the best\ninformation available and its IMP addresses the need to include the most current data in the\ndatabase on a continuing basis. At the hearing OPS maintained that Respondent had not\ndocumented the process for populating the risk model data fields. Respondent explained that\nAppendix K to its IMP has the user implementation manual and the specifics on how the\ninformation is used is in sections 3. 2. 2, 3. 2. 3, 3. 2. 4 and 6. 1. 3 of the IMP. Respondent further\nsaid it revised section 3. 2. 2 to include definitions of the variables and will expand on the\ndescription in its next revision.\nThe requirement in $ 195. 452(e)(1) to establish an assessment schedule based on risk factors\nimplies the necessity for the operator to use the best available data. Without this data, there is no\nassurance the prioritization process reflects the actual risk conditions. Because Respondent has a\nprocess describing its risk algorithm that helped generate its assessment schedule, I do not find a\nviolation of $195. 452(e)(l). Nevertheless, this item will be included in the Amendment section\nof this Order because the process is lacking sufficient detail to be considered adequate.\nRespondent must ensure its IMP procedure provides for including historical data as well as\n\n\n\ncurrent data and input from subject matter experts, and keeping this information updated on a\ncontinuing basis. For example, as discussed at the informal hearing, Respondent had not\nincluded historical information from the previous operator into its risk model.\nIn response to 5c, Respondent said it understood OPS was concerned Respondent did not have a\ndocumented process for analyzing the risk posed by the non-linear portions of Respondent's\npipeline facilities, Respondent maintained it was the first company required to perform a risk\nassessment of its facilities. Respondent explained it has ongoing surveys to address non linear\nfacilities. When these surveys are completed, Respondent will perform HAZOP studies to assess\nthe risk and create programs for the facilities. Respondent will include the expanded process\ndescription in its next IMP revision.\nContrary to Respondent's assertion about being the first cited for this failure, it has been standard\npractice during an IMP inspection for an OPS inspector to determine if an operator has identified\nand evaluated the risks of facilities that can affect high consequence areas. OPS has taken action\nagainst operators who do not have a process for doing so.\nNevertheless, I do not find this failure was a violation of )195. 452{e){1). Respondent's failure to\ninclude its pipeline facilities, such as pump stations and break out tanks, should have been cited\nas a violation of $195. 452(b)(I) — not having a program that addresses risk on each segment of\npipeline, or of $195. 452(f)(3) and 195. 452(g) — not fulfilling the data and information analysis\nand integration requirements. Since Respondentwasnotcited forviolatingtheseregulations, I\ncannot make a finding of violation. This item will be placed in the warning section of this\ndocument.\nItem 6 alleged Respondent's integrity management program did not provide sufficient details on\nthe methods Respondent would use in evaluating additional preventive and mitigative measures,\nin violation of 49 C. F. R. $195. 452(i)(I).\nIn its Response, Respondent said it believed section 4. 8 of its IMP adequately discusses\npreventive and mitigative measures. At the hearing, Respondent explained Appendix J contains\nmore detail on the methods it uses. Section 4. 8 further discusses the methods and their\nappropriate and effective use. Respondent said its next IMP revision will include more of its\nthought processes on how it decides among the different methods and include references to its\noperator qualification plan and operations manual.\nBecause Respondent has a procedure in its IMP for addressing additional preventive and\nmitigative measures, I do not find a violation of $195. 452(i)(1). Respondent did not provide\nAppendix J. Thus, I cannot determine if the procedure provides sufficient detail to be adequate\nto protect the high consequence areas. Therefore, this item will remain in the Amendment\nsection of this Order,\nItem 7 alleged three violations of 49 C. F. R. )$195. 452(e)(1) and (j)(1). The Notice alleged\n\n\n\nRespondent's IMP-\n+did not describe in detail the process for continual evaluation and assessment, and did\nnot include a justification for establishing the 5-year and 3-year (bare pipe) reassessment\nintervals (7a);\n~ did not describe a methodology for choosing reassessment methods (7b); and\n~ did not address OPS notification for reassessment interval extension (7c).\nSection 195. 452(e)(1) requires an operator to establish an integrity assessment schedule that\nprioritizes the pipeline segments for assessment, based on all risk factors applicable to each\nsegment. Section 195. 452(j)(1) requires continual assessment and evaluation of each covered\npipeline segment.\nIn response to 7a, Respondent said its reassessment intervals are directly from the regulation.\nRespondent explained it selected the 5-year interval as an initial reassessment period in the\nabsence of historical data and experience demonstrating a different interval is warranted. At the\nhearing Respondent explained sections 4. 11 and 4. 12 of its IMP address the reassessment\nintervals and how changes are handled in the assessment schedule.\nSection 195. 452 (j)(I) requires an operator to establish continual assessment at specified\nintervals. Per $195. 452(j)(3) intervals are not to exceed five years, but are to be based on the\nrisk the line pipe poses to the high consequence area.\nSection 4. 11 of Respondent's IMP sets a five-year reassessment period for all segments except\nthose with bare pipe. It does not appear the schedule accounted for the risk each segment poses\nto the high consequence area. Respondent's procedures show no process for determining which\nsegments are of higher risk or of any basis why all segments pose the same risk and are to be\nassessed at five-year intervals. Respondent's procedures must include justification for the\ndeterminations made to implement its program. Accordingly, I find Respondent violated\n)$195. 452 (e)(1) and (j)(1).\nFor 7b, Respondent initially argued its IMP discussed available and allowable methods to\nconduct an integrity assessment. Respondent does not interpret the regulation to require an\noperator to specify or justify the choice of assessment method. In its post-hearing submittal,\nRespondent maintained sections 4. 10-4. 11 of its IMP address the different assessment methods\navailable and what conditions must exist to choose one method over another. Respondent\nfurther explained it uses a combination of methods for different situations and plans to describe\nits methodology in more detail in its next IMP revision.\nSections 4. 10-4. 11 of Respondent's IMP include statements on current assessment technology\nand preferred assessment methods. Respondent does not have a process for personnel to\ndetermine which assessment method is preferable in defined circumstances. Further, the\nprogram does not describe a methodology for choosing integrity reassessment methods. Section\n195. 452(j)(5) allows an operator to use certain methods to assess the line pipe. To carry out the\n\n\n\nrequired continual integrity reassessments per )195. 452(j)(1), Respondent must have procedures\ndescribing how its employees are to choose an assessment method based on the line segment\nconditions and the information analysis Respondent is required to conduct.\nAccordingly, I find Respondent did not violate )195. 452{j)(1) because its IMP has procedures\nfor reassessment and lists assessment methods. But, as described, the procedures are not\nadequate to ensure safe operation of the pipeline system. Thus, this item will be included in the\nAmendment section of this Order requiring amendment of certain IMP procedures.\nIn response to 7c, Respondent explained it does not intend to deviate from the reassessment\ninterval it had established. Respondent maintained it did not include an extensive write up to\navoid the implication an extension is an acceptable practice. Respondent thought it obvious one\nwould have to communicate with OPS to request an extension. Respondent said it would revise\nsection 4. 12 addressing assessment schedule changes to include such language.\nThe regulations require reassessment at intervals based on the risk each line segment poses to the\nhigh consequence areas but no longer than five years. An interval can extend longer than five-\nyears in limited situations requiring OPS notification and adequate justification supporting the\nextension. Interval extensions are optional. Thus, I do not find a violation of $195. 452{j)(1)\nbecause Respondent's procedures on reassessment do not provide for an extension.\nAlthough Respondent stated it has no intention of deviating from the 5-year interval,\ncircumstances, such as unavailable technology, may prevent Respondent from completing the\nassessment within that period. And as the IMP matures, Respondent may determine it can justify\na longer interval on certain segments. Its IMP procedures should explain the circumstances in\nwhich an interval extension is allowed, the type of supporting documentation needed and how to\nnotify OPS. Procedures should not assume employees know the proper method of notification.\nAccordingly, this item will remain in the Amendment section of this Order.\nItem 8 alleged Respondent violated 49 C. F. R. )195. 452{f)(7) because its integrity management\nprogram did not define the process for applying performance metrics to evaluate program\neffectiveness. Section 195. 452(f)(7) requires an operator's integrity management program to\nhave methods to measure the program's effectiveness.\nRespondent initially maintained the regulation merely requires the IMP set forth methods to\nmeasure the program's effectiveness, and its section 5. 2. 3 meets this requirement. At the hearing\nRespondent said it understood OPS's concern was whether the IMP provides adequate detail on\nhow performance metrics will be evaluated. Respondent explained section 5. 2. 3 contains a\nprocess for reevaluating the program's effectiveness and it has added the performance metrics in\nASME B31. G. Respondent said it would include an expanded description of the process in its\nnext revision.\nSection 5. 2. 3 of Respondent's IMP is written in the future tense. The section says Respondent\n\n\n\n12\nwill create a plan that includes performance measures. This section also gives suggested\nperformance measures from ASME 831. 8, rather than actually incorporating the measures into\nthe program. Respondent's IMP needs an established process not one Respondent plans to\nestablish at some future date. Accordingly, I find Respondent violated 49 C. F. R.\n5195. 452(f)(7).\nItem 9 alleged two violations of 49 C. F. R. $195. 452(1)(I)(ii), which requires an operator to\nmaintain certain records to establish compliance with the IMP requirements. The Notice alleged\nRespondent—\n~ had not recorded revisions to its integrity management program (9a); and\n~ had not analyzed pipeline integrity information inherited from BP, the previous owner of\ncertain pipeline segments (9b).\nIn response to 9a, Respondent reiterated the IMP's reference to version 5 was not a fifth revision\nbut a reference to a plan draft and plan footer used for internal circulation. OPS agrees\nRespondent tracked the program changes. Accordingly, I am withdrawing this allegation of\nviolation.\nFor 9b, Respondent argued OPS had not cited a regulation requiring the specified action.\nRespondent maintained the regulation does not require any specified level of review.\nRespondent explained it was not trying to present BP's past assessments as part of Respondent's\nqualified baseline assessment. Rather, Respondent used the fact of previous assessments in its\nrisk ranking algorithm. At the hearing OPS explained Respondent was not analyzing the\nhistorical information from the previous owner. Respondent said the algorithm used to\ndetermine ranking of the pipeline segments took into account this information but Respondent\nchose not to use the information in its baseline assessment. Respondent believed it better to start\nwith a fresh baseline assessment.\nThe regulation OPS cited addresses the requirement to maintain for review documents to support\nactions Respondent takes to implement and evaluate each element required in an IMP.\nRespondent had information from the previous operator concerning internal inspection runs but\ncould not demonstrate it was integrating this information into its IMP and analyzing the\ninformation. Thus, I do not find Respondent violated $195. 452(1)(1)(ii), because it had the\nrecords for review.\nRather, Respondent's failure was not the lack of records to support its action but that Respondent\nfailed to integrate this information into its IMP. Section 195. 452(e)(1) requires operators, in\nestablishing a baseline integrity assessment schedule, to base the schedule on certain factors,\nincluding the results of previous integrity assessments. Section 195. 452(f)(3) requires operators\nto include in their IMP an analysis that integrates all available information about the integrity of\nthe entire pipeline. Section 195. 452(g) requires operators, in periodically evaluating the integrity\nof the pipeline segments, to analyze all available information about the integrity of the entire\n\n\n\n13\npipeline system. This information includes data acquired in conjunction with other inspections\nand tests required under Part 195. This historical information is important to assessing the\nurrent condition of pipeline segments and evaluating the risks posed to high consequence area:\nhe Notice did not allege these violations although they more accurately reflect what\nRespondent failed to do. This item will be included in the Warning section of this document.\nThese findings of violation will be considered prior offenses in any subsequent enforcement\naction taken against Respondent.\nWITHDRAWAL OF ALLEGATIONS\nAs explained in the section above, the following allegations of violation have been withdrawn.\nThe following were withdrawn because Respondent demonstrated compliance with the cited\nregulation.\n• la - Respondent's pipelines were accurately reflected in the National Pipeline Mapping\nSystem.\n• 3c - Respondent's engineering standard is consistent with the rule's repair criteria.\n• 4 - Respondent's IMP has procedures for determining remedial actions.\n• 9a - IMP interim revisions are recorded.\nThe allegations in Notice items 3d, 5c and 9b were withdrawn because the incorrect citation was\nuse","truncated":true,"body_characters":61953}