# ROCKY MOUNTAIN PIPELINE SYSTEM, LLC — Notice of Probable Violation

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** CPF 520045001
- **title:** ROCKY MOUNTAIN PIPELINE SYSTEM, LLC — Notice of Probable Violation
- **source type:** enforcement
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** historical
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2004-02-18
- **effective on:** Not available
- **summary:** CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.452(b)(3), 195.452(e)(1), 195.452(f)(1), 195.452(f)(4), 195.452(f)(7), 195.452(f)(8), 195.452(i)(1), 195.452(j), 195.452(j)(1), 195.452(l).
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- **source url:** https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/520045001
**body:**

Notice of Probable Violation involving ROCKY MOUNTAIN PIPELINE SYSTEM, LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195,  195.452(b)(3),  195.452(e)(1),  195.452(f)(1),  195.452(f)(4),  195.452(f)(7),  195.452(f)(8),  195.452(i)(1),  195.452(j),  195.452(j)(1),  195.452(l). The case was opened on 2004-02-18 and is reported as closed as of 2008-01-09. Proposed civil penalty: $34,000. Assessed civil penalty: $7,000. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.

Official case documents:

520045001_final order_12112006.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520045001/520045001_final%20order_12112006.pdf

520045001_final order_12112006_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520045001/520045001_final%20order_12112006_text.pdf

CPF_NO_5-2004-5001.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520045001/CPF_NO_5-2004-5001.pdf

520045001_final order_12112006_text.pdf

U 5 Department
of Transportation
Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration
400 Seventh Street, S W
Washington, D C 20590
DEC 1 t
Mr. Jesse G. Metcalf
Vice President, Operations and Technical Services
Rocky Mountain Pipeline System LLC
555 17' Street
Suite 3310
Denver, CO 80202
RECEIVED
DEC 26 2006
Re: CPF No. 5-2004-5001
Dear Mr, Metcalf:
Enclosed is the Final Order issued by the Acting Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety
in the above-referenced case. The Final Order withdraws several of the allegations of violation
listed in the Notice of Probable Violation dated Feb. 18, 2004, makes findings of violation with
respect to some of the other allegations, specifies actions to be taken to comply with the pipeline
safety regulations, requires amendment of certain integrity management program procedures and
assesses a civil penalty of $7, 000. The penalty payment terms are set forth in the Final Order.
When the civil penalty is paid and the terms of the compliance order and amendment of
procedures are completed, as determined by the Director, Western Region, OPS, this
enforcement action will be closed. Your receipt of the Final Order constitutes service of that
document under 49 C. F. R. $ 190. 5.
Sincerely,
ames Reynolds
Pipeline Compliance Registry
Office of Pipeline Safety
Enclosure
CC. Robert Mindess
Senior Counsel
Pacific Energy GP, Inc.
5900 Cherry Avenue
Long Beach, CA 90805-4408
CERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT RE UESTED



DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION'
WASHINGTON, DC
In the Matter of
Rocky Mountain Pipeline System, )
Respondent.
)
)
)
)
)
CPF No. 5-2004-5001
FINAL ORDER
From February 24-27, 2003, representatives of the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), pursuant to
49 U. S. C. $ 60117, conducted an inspection of Rocky Mountain Pipeline System's (Respondent)
integrity management program at Respondent's offices in Denver, Colorado.
As a result of the inspection, the Director, Western Region, OPS, issued to Respondent, by letter
dated February 18, 2004, a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil Penalty, Proposed
Compliance Order and Notice of Amendment (Notice). In accordance with 49 C. F. R. $ 190. 207,
the Notice proposed finding Respondent had violated various regulatory provisions of 49 C. F. R.
$195. 452, proposed assessing a civil penalty of $34, 000 for the alleged violations, and proposed
that Respondent take certain measures to correct the alleged violations. The Notice also
proposed, in accordance with 49 C. F. R. $ 190. 237, that Respondent amend its integrity
management program procedures.
On March 9, 2004, Respondent requested a 60-day extension to respond to the Notice, which the
Regional Director granted on March 15, 2004. Respondent submitted its response to the Notice
on May 20, 2004 (Response). Respondent contested the allegations, submitted information to
explain the allegations and requested a hearing. A hearing was held in the Western Region,
' This case is no longer before the Research and Special Programs Administration, the agency
that initiated the case. Effective February 20, 2005, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA) w'as created to further the highest degree of safety in pipeline
transportation and hazardous materials transportation. See, section 108 of the Norman Y. Mineta
Research and Special Programs Improvement Act (Public Law 108-426, 118 Stat. 2423-2429
(November 30, 2004)). See also, 70 Fed. ~Re . 8299 (February 18, 2005) redelegating the
pipeline safety functions to the Administrator, PHMSA.



OPS, on December 14, 2004. After the hearing, Respondent submitted a Closing Statement
dated March 16, 2005.
FINDINGS OF VIOLATION
As discussed below, the Notice alleged violations of the integrity management program (IMP)
requirements in 49 C. F. R. $195. 452. In general, Respondent questioned whether the allegations
had any basis in law, since many related to the level of detail in the IMP processes. Respondent
argued its IMP provided what the regulations literally require but that the procedures may lack
the detail necessary to satisfy some OPS inspectors. Respondent maintained OPS published a
protocol after the inspection that provided more guidance to operators on the level of detail
necessary in IMP procedures. The protocols Respondent refers to were first discussed at a public
workshop on July 23-24, 2002. The initial version of the protocols was posted on OPS's integrity
management website in conjunction with this workshop. A revised version was posted in January
2003. The inspection of Respondent's facilities took place in February 2003. Additionally,
beginning in October 2001, OPS posted answers to FAQs to give hazardous liquid operators
informal advice about how to carry out the IMP requirements. Thus, guidance was available to
Respondent before the OPS inspection.
Item 1 alleged three violations of $195. 452(f)(1), which requires an operator's integrity
management program (IMP) to have a process for identifying those pipeline segments in its
system that could affect a high consequence area. The Notice alleged—
~ Respondent could not assure all of its pipelines were accurately reflected in the National
Pipeline Mapping System (NPMS) (la);
~ Respondent had not identified pipeline facilities, such as breakout tanks and pump
stations, that could affect high consequence areas, as required by $195. 452(f)(3) (1b); and
~ Respondent's process for identifying pipeline segments could not ensure all segments
that could affect a high consequence area were identified (1 c).
With respect to la, Respondent maintained it had submitted its pipeline information to the
NPMS on June 9, 2003. The due date was June 17, 2003. Respondent has demonstrated it
provided the requisite information before the due date; therefore, I am withdrawing the allegation
of violation.
In its initial response to 1b, Respondent said it interpreted )195. 452(f)(3) to apply to pipeline
assets only. At the hearing, Respondent confirmed its IMP program at the time of the inspection
did not include non linear facilities, such as pump stations and breakout tanks. At the hearing
and in its post-hearing response, Respondent said it is surveying the locations and creating a
facility specific plan and methodology. Respondent said its next revision will include these
facilities and an expanded description of the methodology.
' Item Numbers refer to the items listed in the Notice dated Feb. 18, 2004.



Section 195. 452 (f)(1) requires an identification of all pipeline segments that could affect a high
consequence area. Section 195. 452(f)(3) requires an operator to integrate all available
information concerning the entire pipeline. A pipeline is defined in )195. 2 to mean all parts of a
pipeline facility through which a hazardous liquid moves in transportation. Thus, I find
Respondent violated ))195. 452{f){1) and 195. 452{f){3) because its IMP failed to identify and
address all of its pipeline facilities.
In addressing 1c, Respondent maintained the allegations were unclear. Respondent believed all
of its segments are readily identifiable and segments that could affect high consequence areas are
identified on its maps. At the hearing, OPS explained Respondent's IMP did not have a process
for performing pipeline segment identification to ensure all segments that could affect high
consequence areas are included. Respondent maintained its maps provide adequate detail to
identify all of the pipeline segments that could affect high consequence areas. Respondent also
included a description of the methodology used to identify the segments.
Section 195. 453(f)(1) requires an operator to have a process for identifying which of the pipeline
segments in its system could affect a high consequence area. Sections 1. 3 -1. 3. 6 of Respondent's
IMP describe the Bass-Trigon RiskCat tool and the Integrity Assessment Program (IAP) risk
assessment model used in the identification process, factors used to identify segments, future
identification, data updates and incomplete data. Accordingly, I find Respondent did not violate
)195. 452(f)(I), because its IMP has a process for identifying those segments in its system that
could affect high consequence area. But this process is deficient and needs to be amended to
ensure safe operation of the pipeline system. Respondent's process needs to ensure the process
the consultant used applies to Respondent's system. The approach needs to be better described
and documented and include a method for reviewing the results provided by the consultant.
Thus, this item will be included in the Amendment section of this document.
Item 2 alleged three violations of 49 C. F. R. )195. 452(b)(3). The regulation requires a pipeline
operator to have in its integrity management program a plan to carry out the baseline assessment
of line pipe according to the baseline assessment plan requirements in )195. 452(c). The Notice
alleged—
~ Resporiderit's baseline assessment plan did not specify or technically justify the choice of
assessment methods {2a);
~ Documentation stated Respondent did not have pre-1970 electric resistance welded
(ERW) or lap welded pipe in its system, contrary to information presented to OPS
inspectors that this type of pipe was in the system. Respondent's assessment tools had
not considered the seam failure susceptibility of these types of pipe (2c); and
~ Respondent did not have a process for revising the baseline assessment plan {2d).
For 2a, Respondent initially responded that section 4. 10 of its IMP discussed available and
allowable methods of assessments. Respondent maintained it did not interpret the rule to require
an operator to specify or technically justify its choice of assessment methods.



At the hearing, OPS maintained Respondent's IMP did not show its decision making process on
determining assessment methods. In its closing statement, Respondent said it addressed OPS's
concerns by explaining sections 4. 10 and 4. 11 address the different assessment methods and
what conditions must exist to choose a method.
Respondent's IMP (section 4. 10) has procedures discussing assessment methods for the baseline
assessment. Thus, I do not find a violation of )195. 452{b){3). Although Respondent has
procedures, the procedures are very general statements about types of assessment methods.
Thus, this item will be included in the Amendment section of this Order because the procedures
are not adequate to ensure safe operation of Respondent's system. Respondent will be required
to further amend its procedures to provide more detailed information about how personnel are to
choose an integrity assessment method if certain conditions exist on a segment of line pipe.
With respect to 2c, Respondent acknowledged its IMP incorrectly indicated the system had no
pre-1970 ERW or lap welded pipe. Respondent maintained it has since corrected the statement
in its IMP (section 4. 10) and has implemented procedures for assessing and repairing this pipe.
At the hearing OPS and Respondent discussed whether Respondent had analyzed the risk
associated with this type of pipe. Respondent explained the database that performs its risk
analysis did consider the pipe and the risk algorithm shows the program used this information.
Section 195. 452(b)(3) requires an operator to have a baseline assessment plan that complies with
the baseline plan requirements in $195. 452(c). Section 195. 452(c)(1)(i) requires an operator to
use assessment methods capable of assessing seam integrity and of detecting corrosion and
deformation anomalies if the system has low frequency electric resistance welded (ERW) pipe or
lap welded pipe and the pipe is susceptible to longitudinal seam failure. Under )195. 303(d) all
pre-1970 ERW pipe and lap welded pipe is considered susceptible to longitudinal weld failure
unless an engineering analysis shows otherwise.
Respondent has demonstrated the statement in its IMP at the time of the inspection was an error
that has since been removed, Respondent's risk algorithm also includes an input field for pipe
seam design. But, according to Respondent's March 2005 closing statement, there were 35 miles
of lap welded pipe and 2. 25 miles of low frequency ERW pipe in its system. Yet, the modified
procedure Respondent submitted (Section 4. 10) only discusses what might happen if pipelines
acquired in the future contain low frequency ERW pipe. The procedure does not discuss how the
current pipe in the system will be addressed or how a newly acquired pipe with lap welded pipe
will be addressed.
Further, section 4. 10 only states appropriate assessment techniques will be evaluated for
effectiveness in managing the potential threat (i. e.
, susceptibility to longitudinal seam failure).
Respondent must either have its IMP provide for assessment methods that address seam issues as
specified in the regulation (i. e.
,
the assessment method must be capable of assessing seam
integrity and of detecting corrosion and deformation anomalies) or provide an engineering



analysis demonstrating the low frequency ERA pipe and lap welded pipe in Respondent's
system is not susceptible to longitudinal seam failure. And if not determined susceptible to
longitudinal seam failure, the procedures must describe the assessment method Respondent will
use to assess this pipe.
At the time of the inspection Respondent's procedure was inaccurate. As discussed above, the
revised procedure is still inaccurate and does not satisfy the regulation. Accordingly, I find
Respondent violated $195, 452(b)(3).
In response to 2d, Respondent initially said sections 2. 2, 2. 2. 3, 5 and Appendix H of its IMP
discuss how updates and modifications are to be made. Respondent believes OPS misinterpreted
th
the reference to version 5. 0 as being the 5 revision. Respondent explained the reference was an
archive reference inadvertently left in the document. At the hearing Respondent again explained
the reference to revision 5 was not a 5'" revision. Respondent further explained sections 2. 2,
2. 2. 3, chapter 5 and appendix H of its IMP describe in detail its process for updating and
modifying its IMP and Respondent will expand the description in the next IMP revision.
This allegation concerned Respondent's IMP not having a process for revising the baseline
assessment plan when changes to segment identification occur. This was not a
misunderstanding over whether Respondent had documented its IMP revisions. As part of the
requirement to have a baseline assessment plan that conforms with $195. 452(c), Respondent is to
document any changes or modification to the assessment plan. Changes include documenting
when new high consequence areas are identified and included in the baseline assessment plan.
(See $195. 452(d)(3)(ii). ) The IMP procedures Respondent submitted do not provide for this.
Accordingly, I find Respondent violated )195. 452(b)(3).
Item 3 alleged four violations of 49 C. F. R. $195. 452(f}(8). The regulation requires an operator's
IMP to have a process for review of integrity assessment results and information analysis by a
person qualified to evaluate the results and information. The Notice alleged Respondent's IMP—
~ did not have a process description for performing reviews of assessment results {3a);
~ did not have a process description for ensuring personnel performing these reviews are
qualified (3b);
~ had grading features in the appendix that did not correlate with the rule's repair criteria
(3c); and
~ defines discovery of a condition as occurring up to 30 days after final inspection results
are received {3d).
In addressing 3a, Respondent initially responded its IMP has procedures to review and integrate
integrity assessment results and to confirm assessment results. Respondent referenced several
sections in its IMP that Respondent maintained showed these processes.
At the hearing, Respondent described the process for reviewing integrity assessment results.



Respondent pointed to Section 4. 2 of its IMP, which refers to integrating and reviewing data to
develop a dig prioritization of the findings to confirm anomalies. Respondent agreed to rename
the section to more specifically identify the review process. Section 7. 0 discusses the quality
control plan for managing integrity assessment data.
The process flow charts for analyzing data, communication plan and the procedures describing
data integration and periodic maintenance are not relevant to this alleged violation. The
requirement to have a process for review of integrity results is separate from the requirement to
conduct a periodic information analysis. A process for a dig prioritization process is not the
same as a process for reviewing integrity assessment results. The dig prioritization program may
come after the review of the assessment results. Only section 7. 1 of the IMP Quality Control
plan on personnel qualifications includes a general statement that a Pacific Energy senior
engineer will review the assessment results.
I do not see that any of the IMP sections Respondent referenced describe a process of how
Respondent's personnel are to evaluate and validate the integrity assessment results.
Accordingly, I find Respondent violated )195. 452(f)(8).
In response to 3b, Respondent initially maintained it had not violated any regulation because
OPS had not cited any regulation requiring such material to be in its IMP. According to
Respondent, the regulation only requires the persons performing the assessment be qualified, and
Respondent's personnel are qualified because of their extensive experience. At the hearing OPS
clarified the allegation concerned whether Respondent's IMP has a process description for
ensuring personnel reviewing integrity assessments are qualified. Respondent maintained its
personnel who do these reviews are experienced and it also has a rigorous contractor
qualification process. Respondent said it revised section 7. 1 of its IMP to include information on
who will perform the assessment review.
OPS did not allege Respondent's personnel were not qualified; rather, the allegation concerned
the lack of a process to establish the qualifications of the person performing the review. As one
of the required IMP elements, a program must have a process for review of integrity assessment
results by a person qualified to evaluate the results. This is a two-part process: the review of the
integrity assessment results and the qualification of personnel who will be performing that
review.
I find Respondent violated )195. 452(f)(8) because, at the time of the inspection, its IMP did not
have a process for establishing the person's qualifications to perform the integrity results review.
Moreover, the revised procedure Respondent submitted in March 2005 still does not establish a
formal documented process for how Respondent establishes the reviewer is qualified.
With respect to 3c, Respondent maintained sections 4. 4 through 4. 8 set forth its repair criteria,
which are consistent with the IMP repair requirements. Respondent further maintained OPS
reviewed Respondent's Engineering Standard 9000 in a later inspection and found it complied



with the rule's requirements, At the hearing, Respondent maintained OPS misunderstood the
purpose of the engineering standard.
After further review, OPS agrees Respondent's engineering standard 9000 is not inconsistent
with the repair criteria. Respondent uses the standard in addition to the repair criteria. The
standard helps categorize the anomalies into subcategories to prioritize the conditions for repair.
Accordingly, I am withdrawing the allegation of violation.
For 3d, Respondent initially responded that its program and other documents reflect an
appropriate response to discovery of a condition. At the hearing, OPS argued Respondent's
procedure on discovery conflicted with the rule's requirements and implied a longer period for
discovery. Respondent maintained it addressed these concerns by explaining its bid form
requires contractors to release their final reports for Respondent to meet the 180-day deadline. In
its closing statement, Respondent included amended section 4. 3, which Respondent maintained
clarifies information must be received no later than 180 days after the assessment.
Section 195. 452(f)(8) concerns the requirement to have a process for review of integrity
assessment results and information analysis by a qualified person. But the allegation concerns
the requirements on discovery of a condition in $195, 452(h)(2). Thus, I am withdrawing this
allegation of violation because the regulation cited does not relate to the alleged problem.
Furthermore, Respondent's revised procedure appears to satisfy OPS's concern about clarifying
when discovery of a condition occurs to be consistent with the regulation.
Item 4 alleged Respondent had violated 49 C. F. R. $195. 452(f)(4), which requires an operator's
IMP to have criteria for remedial actions to address integrity issues raised by the assessment and
information analysis. The Notice alleged Respondent's process description in its program did not
have sufficient detail on criteria for determining remedial actions Respondent would take to
address integrity issues.
In its initial Response, Respondent said its repair criteria are in section 4. 0 of its IMP and the
criteria are consistent with the criteria in the IMP regulation. At the hearing OPS explained that
Respondent's repair criteria did not have sufficient detail for determining remedial actions.
Respondent explained its IMP has the repair criteria in sections 4. 4 through 4. 8 and an
engineering standard in Appendix C. Its OAM manual also has references to the process
description for determining remedial actions. Respondent said it revised its IMP to reference the
0&M Manual.
I am withdrawing this allegation of violation because Respondent's IMP had the procedures,
albeit they needed to reference other documents. The revised procedures Respondent submitted
provide more detail.
Item 5 alleged three violations of 49 C. F. R. $195. 452(e)(I). This regulation requires an operator
to develop an assessment schedule based on risk factors reflecting the risk conditions on the



pipe ine segmen .
line segment. The regulations list certain risk factors an operator must consider. The Notice
alleged Respondent—
~ had not documented its risk analysis process description (5a);
~ needed to establish a process for populating data fields in the risk model with values
based on the best available information (Sb); and
~ did not have a process for analyzing the risk of pipeline facilities {5c}.
In response to 5a, Respondent initially maintained OPS had not cited any regulation to support
the allegation and in any event, section 3. 2, 2 of its IMP has all the variable definitions. At the
hearing OPS explained Respondent had not documented the risk analysis process in sufficient
detail, particularly how it was using the information from the Bass Trigon algorithm model.
Respondent maintained it allayed this concern by explaining Appendix K to its IMP contains the
Bass-Trigon methodology user implementation manual for the software program. Respondent
said it reviews the results of the program and runs them through its management of change.
Sections 3. 2. 2, 3. 2. 3, 3. 2. 4 and 6. 1. 3 explain how the information is used. In its closing
statement, Respondent submitted a revised section 3. 2. 2, which Respondent said now includes
definitions of the variables.
Section 195. 452(e)(1) requires an operator to use risk factors in establishing the assessment
schedule for the baseline and continuing integrity assessments. Thus, an operator must have a
process escri i
rocess describing the risk analysis it is using to support its assessment schedule. Respondent
has a basic procedure describing its risk algorithm. Thus, I do not find Respondent violated
$195. 452(e)(1). But, the procedure still lacks sufficient detail to be adequate. Information, such
as the basis for risk categories and variable weights, needs to be documented. Thus, this item
will be included in the Amendment section of this Order.
To address 5b, Respondent initially responded that its risk model was populated with the best
information available and its IMP addresses the need to include the most current data in the
database on a continuing basis. At the hearing OPS maintained that Respondent had not
documented the process for populating the risk model data fields. Respondent explained that
Appendix K to its IMP has the user implementation manual and the specifics on how the
information is used is in sections 3. 2. 2, 3. 2. 3, 3. 2. 4 and 6. 1. 3 of the IMP. Respondent further
said it revised section 3. 2. 2 to include definitions of the variables and will expand on the
description in its next revision.
The requirement in $ 195. 452(e)(1) to establish an assessment schedule based on risk factors
implies the necessity for the operator to use the best available data. Without this data, there is no
assurance the prioritization process reflects the actual risk conditions. Because Respondent has a
process describing its risk algorithm that helped generate its assessment schedule, I do not find a
violation of $195. 452(e)(l). Nevertheless, this item will be included in the Amendment section
of this Order because the process is lacking sufficient detail to be considered adequate.
Respondent must ensure its IMP procedure provides for including historical data as well as



current data and input from subject matter experts, and keeping this information updated on a
continuing basis. For example, as discussed at the informal hearing, Respondent had not
included historical information from the previous operator into its risk model.
In response to 5c, Respondent said it understood OPS was concerned Respondent did not have a
documented process for analyzing the risk posed by the non-linear portions of Respondent's
pipeline facilities, Respondent maintained it was the first company required to perform a risk
assessment of its facilities. Respondent explained it has ongoing surveys to address non linear
facilities. When these surveys are completed, Respondent will perform HAZOP studies to assess
the risk and create programs for the facilities. Respondent will include the expanded process
description in its next IMP revision.
Contrary to Respondent's assertion about being the first cited for this failure, it has been standard
practice during an IMP inspection for an OPS inspector to determine if an operator has identified
and evaluated the risks of facilities that can affect high consequence areas. OPS has taken action
against operators who do not have a process for doing so.
Nevertheless, I do not find this failure was a violation of )195. 452{e){1). Respondent's failure to
include its pipeline facilities, such as pump stations and break out tanks, should have been cited
as a violation of $195. 452(b)(I) — not having a program that addresses risk on each segment of
pipeline, or of $195. 452(f)(3) and 195. 452(g) — not fulfilling the data and information analysis
and integration requirements. Since Respondentwasnotcited forviolatingtheseregulations, I
cannot make a finding of violation. This item will be placed in the warning section of this
document.
Item 6 alleged Respondent's integrity management program did not provide sufficient details on
the methods Respondent would use in evaluating additional preventive and mitigative measures,
in violation of 49 C. F. R. $195. 452(i)(I).
In its Response, Respondent said it believed section 4. 8 of its IMP adequately discusses
preventive and mitigative measures. At the hearing, Respondent explained Appendix J contains
more detail on the methods it uses. Section 4. 8 further discusses the methods and their
appropriate and effective use. Respondent said its next IMP revision will include more of its
thought processes on how it decides among the different methods and include references to its
operator qualification plan and operations manual.
Because Respondent has a procedure in its IMP for addressing additional preventive and
mitigative measures, I do not find a violation of $195. 452(i)(1). Respondent did not provide
Appendix J. Thus, I cannot determine if the procedure provides sufficient detail to be adequate
to protect the high consequence areas. Therefore, this item will remain in the Amendment
section of this Order,
Item 7 alleged three violations of 49 C. F. R. )$195. 452(e)(1) and (j)(1). The Notice alleged



Respondent's IMP-
+did not describe in detail the process for continual evaluation and assessment, and did
not include a justification for establishing the 5-year and 3-year (bare pipe) reassessment
intervals (7a);
~ did not describe a methodology for choosing reassessment methods (7b); and
~ did not address OPS notification for reassessment interval extension (7c).
Section 195. 452(e)(1) requires an operator to establish an integrity assessment schedule that
prioritizes the pipeline segments for assessment, based on all risk factors applicable to each
segment. Section 195. 452(j)(1) requires continual assessment and evaluation of each covered
pipeline segment.
In response to 7a, Respondent said its reassessment intervals are directly from the regulation.
Respondent explained it selected the 5-year interval as an initial reassessment period in the
absence of historical data and experience demonstrating a different interval is warranted. At the
hearing Respondent explained sections 4. 11 and 4. 12 of its IMP address the reassessment
intervals and how changes are handled in the assessment schedule.
Section 195. 452 (j)(I) requires an operator to establish continual assessment at specified
intervals. Per $195. 452(j)(3) intervals are not to exceed five years, but are to be based on the
risk the line pipe poses to the high consequence area.
Section 4. 11 of Respondent's IMP sets a five-year reassessment period for all segments except
those with bare pipe. It does not appear the schedule accounted for the risk each segment poses
to the high consequence area. Respondent's procedures show no process for determining which
segments are of higher risk or of any basis why all segments pose the same risk and are to be
assessed at five-year intervals. Respondent's procedures must include justification for the
determinations made to implement its program. Accordingly, I find Respondent violated
)$195. 452 (e)(1) and (j)(1).
For 7b, Respondent initially argued its IMP discussed available and allowable methods to
conduct an integrity assessment. Respondent does not interpret the regulation to require an
operator to specify or justify the choice of assessment method. In its post-hearing submittal,
Respondent maintained sections 4. 10-4. 11 of its IMP address the different assessment methods
available and what conditions must exist to choose one method over another. Respondent
further explained it uses a combination of methods for different situations and plans to describe
its methodology in more detail in its next IMP revision.
Sections 4. 10-4. 11 of Respondent's IMP include statements on current assessment technology
and preferred assessment methods. Respondent does not have a process for personnel to
determine which assessment method is preferable in defined circumstances. Further, the
program does not describe a methodology for choosing integrity reassessment methods. Section
195. 452(j)(5) allows an operator to use certain methods to assess the line pipe. To carry out the



required continual integrity reassessments per )195. 452(j)(1), Respondent must have procedures
describing how its employees are to choose an assessment method based on the line segment
conditions and the information analysis Respondent is required to conduct.
Accordingly, I find Respondent did not violate )195. 452{j)(1) because its IMP has procedures
for reassessment and lists assessment methods. But, as described, the procedures are not
adequate to ensure safe operation of the pipeline system. Thus, this item will be included in the
Amendment section of this Order requiring amendment of certain IMP procedures.
In response to 7c, Respondent explained it does not intend to deviate from the reassessment
interval it had established. Respondent maintained it did not include an extensive write up to
avoid the implication an extension is an acceptable practice. Respondent thought it obvious one
would have to communicate with OPS to request an extension. Respondent said it would revise
section 4. 12 addressing assessment schedule changes to include such language.
The regulations require reassessment at intervals based on the risk each line segment poses to the
high consequence areas but no longer than five years. An interval can extend longer than five-
years in limited situations requiring OPS notification and adequate justification supporting the
extension. Interval extensions are optional. Thus, I do not find a violation of $195. 452{j)(1)
because Respondent's procedures on reassessment do not provide for an extension.
Although Respondent stated it has no intention of deviating from the 5-year interval,
circumstances, such as unavailable technology, may prevent Respondent from completing the
assessment within that period. And as the IMP matures, Respondent may determine it can justify
a longer interval on certain segments. Its IMP procedures should explain the circumstances in
which an interval extension is allowed, the type of supporting documentation needed and how to
notify OPS. Procedures should not assume employees know the proper method of notification.
Accordingly, this item will remain in the Amendment section of this Order.
Item 8 alleged Respondent violated 49 C. F. R. )195. 452{f)(7) because its integrity management
program did not define the process for applying performance metrics to evaluate program
effectiveness. Section 195. 452(f)(7) requires an operator's integrity management program to
have methods to measure the program's effectiveness.
Respondent initially maintained the regulation merely requires the IMP set forth methods to
measure the program's effectiveness, and its section 5. 2. 3 meets this requirement. At the hearing
Respondent said it understood OPS's concern was whether the IMP provides adequate detail on
how performance metrics will be evaluated. Respondent explained section 5. 2. 3 contains a
process for reevaluating the program's effectiveness and it has added the performance metrics in
ASME B31. G. Respondent said it would include an expanded description of the process in its
next revision.
Section 5. 2. 3 of Respondent's IMP is written in the future tense. The section says Respondent



12
will create a plan that includes performance measures. This section also gives suggested
performance measures from ASME 831. 8, rather than actually incorporating the measures into
the program. Respondent's IMP needs an established process not one Respondent plans to
establish at some future date. Accordingly, I find Respondent violated 49 C. F. R.
5195. 452(f)(7).
Item 9 alleged two violations of 49 C. F. R. $195. 452(1)(I)(ii), which requires an operator to
maintain certain records to establish compliance with the IMP requirements. The Notice alleged
Respondent—
~ had not recorded revisions to its integrity management program (9a); and
~ had not analyzed pipeline integrity information inherited from BP, the previous owner of
certain pipeline segments (9b).
In response to 9a, Respondent reiterated the IMP's reference to version 5 was not a fifth revision
but a reference to a plan draft and plan footer used for internal circulation. OPS agrees
Respondent tracked the program changes. Accordingly, I am withdrawing this allegation of
violation.
For 9b, Respondent argued OPS had not cited a regulation requiring the specified action.
Respondent maintained the regulation does not require any specified level of review.
Respondent explained it was not trying to present BP's past assessments as part of Respondent's
qualified baseline assessment. Rather, Respondent used the fact of previous assessments in its
risk ranking algorithm. At the hearing OPS explained Respondent was not analyzing the
historical information from the previous owner. Respondent said the algorithm used to
determine ranking of the pipeline segments took into account this information but Respondent
chose not to use the information in its baseline assessment. Respondent believed it better to start
with a fresh baseline assessment.
The regulation OPS cited addresses the requirement to maintain for review documents to support
actions Respondent takes to implement and evaluate each element required in an IMP.
Respondent had information from the previous operator concerning internal inspection runs but
could not demonstrate it was integrating this information into its IMP and analyzing the
information. Thus, I do not find Respondent violated $195. 452(1)(1)(ii), because it had the
records for review.
Rather, Respondent's failure was not the lack of records to support its action but that Respondent
failed to integrate this information into its IMP. Section 195. 452(e)(1) requires operators, in
establishing a baseline integrity assessment schedule, to base the schedule on certain factors,
including the results of previous integrity assessments. Section 195. 452(f)(3) requires operators
to include in their IMP an analysis that integrates all available information about the integrity of
the entire pipeline. Section 195. 452(g) requires operators, in periodically evaluating the integrity
of the pipeline segments, to analyze all available information about the integrity of the entire



13
pipeline system. This information includes data acquired in conjunction with other inspections
and tests required under Part 195. This historical information is important to assessing the
urrent condition of pipeline segments and evaluating the risks posed to high consequence area:
he Notice did not allege these violations although they more accurately reflect what
Respondent failed to do. This item will be included in the Warning section of this document.
These findings of violation will be considered prior offenses in any subsequent enforcement
action taken against Respondent.
WITHDRAWAL OF ALLEGATIONS
As explained in the section above, the following allegations of violation have been withdrawn.
The following were withdrawn because Respondent demonstrated compliance with the cited
regulation.
• la - Respondent's pipelines were accurately reflected in the National Pipeline Mapping
System.
• 3c - Respondent's engineering standard is consistent with the rule's repair criteria.
• 4 - Respondent's IMP has procedures for determining remedial actions.
• 9a - IMP interim revisions are recorded.
The allegations in Notice items 3d, 5c and 9b were withdrawn because the incorrect citation was
use
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