{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 520045009","title":"PHILLIPS 66 PIPELINE LLC — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2004-03-22","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.308, 195.571, 195.573(e), 195.575(e), 195.577(a), 195.579(a).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520045009.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520045009.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520045009","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/520045009","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving PHILLIPS 66 PIPELINE LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195,  195.308,  195.571,  195.573(e),  195.575(e),  195.577(a),  195.579(a). The case was opened on 2004-03-22 and is reported as closed as of 2008-04-18. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n520045009_Final Order_09202006.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520045009/520045009_Final%20Order_09202006.pdf\n\n520045009_final order_09202006_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520045009/520045009_final%20order_09202006_text.pdf\n\nCPF_NO_5-2004-5009.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520045009/CPF_NO_5-2004-5009.pdf\n\n520045009_final order_09202006_text.pdf\n\nO\nU S Department\nof Transportation\nPipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration\nSEP 20 duo\nMs. Meg Yeage\nPresident\nConoco Phillips\n600 North Dairy Ashford\nTA 2010\nHouston, Texas 77079\nRe: CPF No. 5-2004-5009\nDear Ms. Yeage:\n400 Seventh Street, S W\nWashington, D C 20590\nEnclosed is the Final Order issued by the Acting Associate Administrator for Pipeline\nSafety in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of violation and specifies actions to be\ntaken to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. When the terms of the Compliance\nOrder are completed, as determined by the Director, Western Region, this enforcement action\nwill be closed. Your receipt of the Final Order constitutes service under 49 C. F. R. $ 190. 5.\nSincerely,\nJames Reynolds\nPipeline Compliance Registry\nPHMSA-Office of Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. Chris Hoidal, P. E.\n, Director, Western Region, PHMSA\nCERTIFIED MAIL — RETUR1V RECEIPT RE UESTED\n\n\n\nDEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, DC 20590\nIn the Matter of\nConocoPhillips,\nRespondent\nCPF No. 5-2004-5009\nFINAL ORDER\nOn August 11-15 and October 2, 2003, pursuant to 49 U. S. C. $ 60117, a representative of the\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration's {PHMSA's)' Office of Pipeline Safety\nconducted an on-site pipeline safety inspection of Respondent's Yellowstone Pipeline facilities\nin Montana and Idaho as well as manuals and records in Billings, Helena, and Missoula,\nMontana. As a result of the inspection, the Director, Western Region, issued to Respondent, by\nletter dated March 22, 2004, a Notice of Probable Violation and Proposed Compliance Order\n{Notice). In accordance with 49 C. F. R. $ 190. 207, the Notice proposed finding that Respondent\nhad violated 49 C. F. R. Part 195 and proposed ordering Respondent to take certain measures to\ncorrect the alleged violations. The Notice also warned Respondent to take appropriate corrective\naction on other cited items.\nRespondent responded to the Notice by letter dated April 28, 2005, later supplemented\n(Response). Respondent contested the allegations and offered information to explain the\nallegations. Respondent did not request a hearing, and therefore has waived its right to one.\nFINDINGS OF VIOLATION\n(Contested)\nItem 3 in the Notice alleged Respondent violated 49 C. F. R. $ 195. 571 by failing to properly\nconsider the voltage drop when measuring cathodic protection levels on its Yellowstone\nPipeline. The Notice alleged that Respondent could not provide documentation showing how\n' Effective February 20, 2005, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) succeeded\nResearch and Special Programs Administrat&on as the agency responsible for regulating safety in pipeline\ntransportation and hazardous materials transportation. See, section 108 of the Norman Y. Mineta Research and\nSpecial Programs Improvement Act (Public Law 108-426, 118 Stat. 2423-2429 (November 30, 2004)). See also, 70\nFed. Reg. 8299 (February 18, 2005) redelegating the pipeline safety authonties and functions to the PHMSA\nAdmimstrator.\n\n\n\nconsiderations for voltage drops have been accounted for when Respondent used a cathodic\nprotection adequacy criteria of an \"on\" potential at least as negative as 850 millivolts (mV) with\nrespect to a saturated copper/copper sulphate reference electrode.\n49 C. F. R. $ 195. 571 requires that cathodic protection monitoring criteria must meet the\nrequirements of NACE Standard RP0169-96, \"Control of External Corrosion on Underground or\nSubmerged Metallic Piping Systems, \" paragraphs 6. 2 and 6. 3. NACE RP0169 Section 6 allows\nfor an operator to use -850 mV potential with cathodic protection applied and voltage drops\nconsidered, typically known as the \"on\" method. An \"on\" potential taken with cathodic\nprotection current applied is made up of both the polarized potential of the structure being\nprotected as well as the voltage drop caused by the soils resistance to the protective current being\napplied. The voltage drop magnitude of an \"on\" potential can be so high that the polarized\npotential part of the \"on\" potential is not adequate to provide corrosion protection to the\nstructure. Therefore, an operator is required to consider those voltage drops to insure that there\nis still sufficient cathodic protection current reaching the structure to provide protection from\ncorrosion. RP0169 Section 6 allows the operator to account for those voltage drops in several\nways including measurement or calculation of voltage drops, evaluation of physical evidence of\ncorrosion and/or evaluation of the cathodic protection system. Prudent industry practice is that\nwhen potential measurements are more negative than 850 mV and voltage drops have been\naccounted for, potentials measured may be used to monitor the cathodic protection system for a\nperiod of time or until there is a significant change in the environment, structural, coating, or\ncathodic protection system parameters. 2\nIn its April 28, 2004 Response, Respondent argues that sustaining \"on\" readings of at least as\nnegative as 850 mV is taking voltage drops into consideration. Respondent contends that this\ninformation was made available to PHMSA during the 2003 inspection in support of this\nargument.\nIn Respondent's case, it appears unclear as to how voltage drops are considered and how \"on\"\npotentials were used for monitoring. During the 2003 inspection, cathodic protection records\nconsisted of \"on\" pipe to soil measurements taken along the pipeline during the 2002 and 2003\nyears. Though other information may have been available for review, PHMSA would still have\nhad to integrate the pig logs, the rectifier readings, the exposed pipe reports, the historic cathodic\nprotection levels, and other data at each test station to determine if \"on\" levels taken in 2002 and\n2003 did demonstrate the adequacy of corrosion control measures. However, that is\nRespondent's responsibility under 49 C. F. R. $ 195. 589 and not the PHMSA inspector.\nRespondent's records do not clearly indicate how voltage drops. are considered nor do they\nindicate \"on\" potentials being used to monitor each test station. Accordingly, I find that\nRespondent violated 49 C. F. R. $ 195. 571 as alleged in the Notice.\nItem 5 in the Notice alleged Respondent violated 49 C. F. R. $ 195. 575(e) by failing to install any\nfault current or lightning protection on its pipeline where it is in close proximity to electrical\ntransmission tower footings. The Notice alleged that Respondent provided no evidence that\n' See NACE Standard TM0497-97, \"Measurement Techniques Related to Criteria for Cathodic Protection on\nUnderground or Submerged Metallic Piping Systems. \"\n\n\n\nYellowstone Pipeline is protected from fault currents or lightning from several adjacent electrical\ntower footings in the Heights area of Billings, Montana.\n49 C. F. R. $ 195. 575(e) requires that an operator must protect their pipeline against damage from\nfault currents or lightning imposed from electrical transmission tower footings.\nIn its April 28, 2004 Response, Respondent states that it considered the existing rectifiers and\nassociated groundbeds to be a form of protection from fault currents and lightning.\nRespondent's supplement provided its procedures for \"Ground Fault & Lightning Protection\" to\nPHMSA. Those procedures stated that \"Any existing ground mats or ground rods as well as/or\nany existing rectifier and its associated groundbed (within one mile of the influenced section),\nwhich are electrically tied to a section of pipeline seeing AC influences or a section of pipeline in\nclose proximity to a high voltage power line tower footing or ground, are considered to provide\nprotection against ground faults and lightning strikes. \"\nDuring the 2003 inspection, data obtained indicates that the nearest rectifier is approximately\nthree miles from the beginning of this line segment that is in close proximity to tower footings.\nIn this case, the distance to the nearest rectifier is further than one mile, exceeding the criteria in\nRespondent's procedures; furthermore, this segment of pipeline crosses through several\nresidences in a populated area of Billings, Montana.\nRespondent additionally provided the \"AC Electrical Interference Analysis Billings/Yellowstone\n10\" Pipeline\" report prepared by ARK Engineering and Technical Services, Inc, dated December\n13, 2004. In that report ARK Engineering did an alternating current (AC) interference study of\nthe area of concern. This study and subsequent analysis found that the worst case fault currents\nfrom the adjacent electrical transmission lines in the Heights area of Billings, Montana would\ninduce a coating stress voltage of 1260 V. That report also states that coating damage can occur\nwhen coating stress voltages are greater than 5000 V on pipelines coated with fusion bonded\nepoxy and when these voltages are between 1000 V and 2000 V for bitumen coated pipelines.\nAlthough the report concludes that no additional mitigation methods are required at this time on\nthis section of pipeline, that conclusion is based on the assumption that the pipeline is coated\nwith fusion bonded epoxy. Respondent's personnel informed the PHMSA inspector that this\npipeline segment is coated with coal tar enamel, a bitumen based coating. Therefore, it appears\nthat this report calls for some type of mitigating action to minimize coating stress voltages that\ncould be induced from fault currents.\nAccordingly, I find that Respondent violated 49 C. F. R. $ 195. 575(e) as alleged in Item 5 of the\nNotice.\nItem 6 in the Notice alleged Respondent violated 49 C. F. R. $ 195. 577(a) by failing to provide\nprotection from current induced upon the Yellowstone Pipeline from adjacent electrical\ntransmission power lines in the Heights area of Billings, Montana. The Notice alleged that the\nAC pipe to soil readings at the time of this inspection showed an induced AC voltage on the\npipeline of 5V.\n\n\n\nIt its April 28, 2004 Response, Respondent stated that no AC potential readings taken on the\nYellowstone Pipeline at the time of the 2003 inspection were above 5V AC, which is less than\nthe 15V AC action level defined in their procedures. Therefore, Respondent contends that\nprovisions at this location are adequate. In its procedure MPR-4006, \"High Voltage AC Power\nLines — Influence on Pipelines — Safety Precautions and Corrosion Mitigation Considerations\"\n(Effective Date 2004-05-26\" submitted to PHMSA on May 26, 2004, Respondent considers\nreadings above 15 V AC to be detrimental both because of worker safety and pipeline corrosion.\nAlthough Respondent submitted \"AC Electrical Interference Analysis Billings/Yellowstone 10\"\nPipeline\" report to also address Notice Item 6, that study only investigated the induced AC\nvoltages on the Yellowstone Pipeline and not the AC current density. In addition, this report\nconcluded that touch voltages present no apparent personal safety concerns.\nAccording to NACE Corrosion 2004 Paper 04206, \"AC Corrosion: Corrosion Rate and\nMitigation Requirements\" by Mark Yunovick and Neil G. Thompson of CC Technologies\nLaboratories, Inc.\n,\n\"The mitigation threshold of 15 V recommended in NACE RP0177 for safety\nconcerns is not necessarily sufficient to mitigate AC corrosion. \" That is, although maintaining\ninduced current potentials below 15 V AC is primarily a safety level to provide shock protection\nto individuals working on the pipeline per NACE Standard RP0177-2000, \"Mitigation of\nAlternating Current and Lightning Effects on Metallic Structures and Corrosion Control\nSystems, \" it is questionable as to whether this is an acceptable level to prevent corrosion.\nFurthermore, the NACE AC Corrosion 2004 Paper 04206 gives guidance that mitigation criteria\nshould put the emphasis on mitigating the AC current density, rather than the AC voltage.\nHere, an AC current density study was not done on this segment of pipeline and, thus, it cannot\nbe determined if induced AC voltages/currents present a corrosion hazard.\nAccordingly, I find that Respondent violated 49 C. F. R. $ 195. 577 as alleged in Item 6 of the\nNotice.\nThese findings of violation will be considered prior offenses in any subsequent enforcement\naction taken against Respondent.\nCOMPLIANCE ORDER\nThe Notice proposed a Compliance Order with respect to Items 3, 5, and 6 in the Notice. Under\n49 U. S. C. $ 60118(a), each person who engages in the transportation of hazardous liquids or who\nowns or operates a pipeline facility is required to comply with the applicable safety standards\nestablished under Chapter 601. Pursuant to the authority of 49 U. S. C. $ 60118(b) and 49 C. F. R.\n$ 190. 217, Respondent is ordered to take the following actions to ensure compliance with the\npipeline safety regulations applicable to its operations. Respondent must—\nWith respect to Item 3, pertaining to voltage drop consideration on the Yellowstone\nPipeline, develop a procedure for monitoring cathodic protection that incorporates\nmethods to be used to determine if one of the criteria listed in paragraph 6. 2 of NACE\nStandard RP0169-96 has been met.\n\n\n\nWith respect to Item 5, pertaining to fault currents or lightning from adjacent\nelectrical transmission lines in the Heights area of Billings, Montana, protect the\npipeline against damage from fault currents or lightning along this segment as well as\nany other segments that are close to electrical transmission tower footings;\n3. With respect to Item 6, pertaining to the area of AC influence in the Heights area of\nBillings, Montana, develop a program to identify, test for, and minimize detrimental\neffects of currents induced upon the pipeline from adjacent electrical transmission\npower lines;\nWithin 30 days of receipt of this Final Order, complete the above items;\nRespondent shall maintain documentation of the safety improvement costs associated\nwith fulfilling this Compliance Order and submit the total to Director, Western\nRegion, PHMSA. Costs shall be reported in two categories: 1) total cost associated\nwith preparation/revision of plans, procedures, studies and analyses, and 2) total cost\nassociated with replacements, additions and other changes to pipeline infrastructure;\nand\nSubmit documentation of procedures, costs and evidence of actions taken to the\nDirector, Western Region, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration,\n12300 West Dakota Avenue, Suite 110, Lakewood, Colorado 80228. Please refer to\nCPF No. 5-2004-5009 on any correspondence or communication in these matters.\nThe Director, Western Region, may grant an extension of time to comply with any of the\nrequired items upon a written request timely submitted by the Respondent demonstrating good\ncause for an extension.\nFailure to comply with this Final Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties of not\nmore than $100, 000 per day, or in the referral of the case for judicial enforcement.\nWARNING ITEMS\nThe Notice did not propose a civil penalty or corrective action for Items 1 and 2 in the Notice but\nwarned Respondent that it should take appropriate corrective action to correct the items.\nItem 1, as more fully described in the Notice, was for failing to test tie-ins in accordance with\n49 C. F. R. gg 195. 308. Respondent stated in its response that the six-foot segment of pipe in\nquestion was installed before the pipeline was hydrostatically tested on April 10, 2003.\nHowever, information from the 2003 inspection of the Yellowstone Pipeline showed that the six-\nfoot pipe segment in question was installed on April 11, 2003, one day after the hydrostatic test\nwas completed for the pipeline. This six-foot pipe segment replaced piping that included a\nfitting used for the April 10, 2003 hydrostatic test. There is no definitive evidence that this piece\nof pipe was pressure tested prior to being installed on April 11, 2003.\n\n\n\nItem 2, as more fully described in the Notice, was for failing to take corrective action to mitigate\ncorrosive activity in accordance with 49 C. F. R. $$ 195. 402 and 195. 579. This item was\nuncontested and Respondent provided documentation indicating it was addressing this internal\ncorrosion issue.\nItems 1 and 2 in the Notice are considered to be warning items. Respondent is warned that if it\ndoes not take appropriate action to correct these items, enforcement action will be taken if a\nsubsequent inspection reveals a violation.\nWITHDRAWAL OF WARNING ITEM\nItem 4 in the Notice cited that Respondent's records showed that there were low cathodic\nprotection readings at MP 3. 7 on the Alkali Creek to Laurel segment in both 2002 and 2003\nyears. Respondent presented data, indicating that it was following up on the low cathodic\nprotection potentials at MP 3. 7 on the Alkali Creek to Laurel segment after the first low reading\nwas taken in 2002, which was prior to the 2003 PHMSA inspection. Based on this information, I\nam withdrawing this warning item.\nUnder 49 C. F. R. $ 190. 215, Respondent has a right to submit a Petition for Reconsideration of\nthis Final Order. The petition must be received within 20 days of Respondent's receipt of this\nFinal Order and must contain a brief statement of the issue(s). The terms of the order, including\nany required corrective action, remain in full effect unless the Associate Administrator, upon\nrequest, grants a stay. The terms and conditions of this Final Order are effective on receipt.\neo ore L. Willke\nActing Associate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nDate Issued","truncated":false,"body_characters":18361}