# ALON USA, LP — Notice of Probable Violation

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** CPF 520045021
- **title:** ALON USA, LP — Notice of Probable Violation
- **source type:** enforcement
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** historical
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2004-07-12
- **effective on:** Not available
- **summary:** CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.452(b)(5), 195.452(c)(1)(iii), 195.452(f)(1), 195.452(g)(4), 195.452(i)(3), 195.452(j)(1), 195.452(k), 195.452(l)(1)(ii).
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- **source url:** https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/520045021
**body:**

Notice of Probable Violation involving ALON USA, LP. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.452(b)(5),  195.452(c)(1)(iii),  195.452(f)(1),  195.452(g)(4),  195.452(i)(3),  195.452(j)(1),  195.452(k),  195.452(l)(1)(ii). The case was opened on 2004-07-12 and is reported as closed as of 2009-12-10. Proposed civil penalty: $215,000. Assessed civil penalty: $200,000. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.

Official case documents:

520045021_Decision on the Petition for Reconsideration_10222009.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520045021/520045021_Decision%20on%20the%20Petition%20for%20Reconsideration_10222009.pdf

520045021_Decision on the Petition for Reconsideration_10222009_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520045021/520045021_Decision%20on%20the%20Petition%20for%20Reconsideration_10222009_text.pdf

520045021_FinalOrder_08062009.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520045021/520045021_FinalOrder_08062009.pdf

520045021_FinalOrder_08062009_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520045021/520045021_FinalOrder_08062009_text.pdf

520045021_FinalOrder_08062009_text.pdf

AUG 6 2009
Mr. Randy Hillman
Vice President of Pipelines
General Manager of Logistics and Utilities
Alon USA, LP
P.O. Box 1311
Big Spring, TX 79721
RE: CPF No. 5-2004-5021
Dear Mr. Hillman:
Enclosed is the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of violation
and assesses a civil penalty of $200,000. When the civil penalty has been paid, as determined by
the Director, Western Region, PHMSA, this enforcement action will be closed. Your receipt of
the Final Order constitutes service of that document under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Jeffrey D. Wiese
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety
Enclosure
cc: Mr. Chris Hoidal, Western Region Director, PHMSA
CERTIFIED MAIL – RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED [7005 0390 0005 6162 5647]



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590
______________________________
)
In the Matter of )
)
Alon USA, LP, ) CPF No. 5-2004-5021
)
Respondent. )
______________________________)
FINAL ORDER
From August 18 to 22, 2003, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, representatives of the Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS),
Western, Central, and Southwest Regions, in conjunction with the Texas Railroad Commission
(TRC), conducted an inspection of the pipeline Integrity Management Program (IMP) of Alon
USA, LP (Alon or Respondent), a company with crude oil refineries, pipeline facilities, and
refined-product marketing operations in several Western, Rocky Mountain, and Southwestern
states. This inspection, which occurred at the company’s refinery in Big Spring, Texas,1
included a review of the company’s IMP program for the 1,265 miles (279 miles of interstate and
986 miles of intrastate) pipelines that Alon was currently operating to transport crude oil and
refined-petroleum products.2
As a result of the August 2003 inspection, the Director, Western Region, OPS (Director), issued
to Respondent, by letter dated July 12, 2004, a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil
Penalty, and Proposed Compliance Order (Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the
Notice proposed finding that Respondent committed various violations of 49 C.F.R. § 195.452,
assessing Alon a civil penalty of $215,000 for 10 of the alleged violations, and ordering the
company to take certain actions to comply with the IMP regulations.
Alon responded to the Notice by letter dated August 11, 2004 (Response). It disputed nearly all
of the violations, requested that the proposed civil penalty be reduced or eliminated, and argued
that the proposed compliance order was not necessary. Respondent did not request a hearing
and, therefore, has waived its right to one.
1 In February 2002, OPS and TRC conducted a prior joint inspection of Alon’s Big Spring refinery. See, In the
Matter of Alon USA, C.P.F. 5-2002-5017 (Dec. 31, 2002).
2 PHMSA’s records indicate that after the August 2003 OPS inspection, Holly Energy Partners acquired Alon’s
only interstate hazardous liquid pipeline system, the Trust-River System. Nonetheless, Alon’s 2008 annual report
states that Respondent still operates 42 miles of pipelines used for the transportation of petroleum and other refined
products, that 21 miles of those pipelines are designated as segments that could affect High Consequence Areas
(HCAs), and that an additional four miles of non-HCA pipelines are also used in the transportation of crude oil.



2
FINDINGS OF VIOLATION
Item 1 of the Notice alleged that Alon violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(b)(2), which states:
§ 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.
(a) ….
(b) What program and practices must operators use to manage
pipeline integrity? Each operator of a pipeline covered by this section
must:
(1) ….
(2) Include in the program an identification of each pipeline or
pipeline segment in the first column of the following table not later than
the date in the second column:
Pipeline Date
Category 1 December 31, 2001.
Category 2 November 18, 2002.
Category 3 Date the pipeline begins operation.
The Notice alleged that Alon violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(b)(2) by failing to identify all of the
covered segments in its pipeline system that could affect High Consequence Areas (HCAs)3 as of
August 2003, the date of the OPS inspection.4 Specifically, the Notice alleged that the TRC had
previously cited Respondent for committing a similar violation of its intrastate regulations and
that OPS had ordered the company to amend its written segment-identification procedures in a
December 31, 2002 Order Directing Amendment (ODA).
5
It further alleged that Alon’s first
contractor (Contractor A) failed to complete the pipeline segment-identification process by
December 31, 2001, the applicable deadline under the regulations; that Respondent was not
using the (albeit incomplete) results of Contractor A’s segment identification evaluation in its
current IMP; and that the company could not explain how Contractor A performed his segment-
identification evaluation or obtained his partial results. Finally, the Notice stated that Alon could
not verify the total mileage of interstate pipeline segments in its system that could affect HCAs.
3 An HCA is defined for purposes of Part 195 as a “commercially navigable waterway, . . . [a] high population area,
. . . [a]n other populated area, . . . [or] [a]n unusually sensitive area . . .” 49 C.F.R. § 195.450. A commercially
navigable waterway is “a waterway where a substantial likelihood of commercial navigation exists;” a high
population area is “an urbanized area, as defined and delineated by the Census Bureau, that contains 50,000 or more
people and has a population density of at least 1,000 people per square mile;” an other populated area is “a place, as
defined by the Census Bureau, that contains a concentrated population, such as an incorporated or unincorporated
city, town, village, or other designated residential or commercial area;” id., and an unusually sensitive area is “a
drinking water or ecological resource area that is unusually sensitive to environmental damage from a hazardous
liquid pipeline release.” 49 C.F.R. § 195.6.
4 Given the total pipeline mileage operated by Alon and the installation date of the lines in question, the company
had an obligation under § 195.452(b)(2) to identify all of its pipeline segments that could affect HCAs on or before
December 31, 2001. See 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(a)(1) (“Category 1 includes pipelines existing on May 29, 2001, that
were owned or operated by an operator who owned or operated a total of 500 or more miles of pipeline subject to
this part . . ”); see also 49 § C.F.R. 195.1(a)-(b) (defining scope of applicability of Part 195).
5 In the Matter of Alon USA, C.P.F. 5-2002-5017 (Dec. 31, 2002).



3
Respondent disputed these allegations in its Response. Specifically, Alon argued that it had
identified all of its pipeline segments that could affect HCAs by December 27, 2001, four days
before the applicable regulatory deadline. Respondent also argued that it was using the data
derived from Contractor A’s segment identification evaluation in its IMP, and was augmenting
that data on the basis of a revised stream-and-waterway-transport methodology, developed by a
subsequent contractor (Contractor B). Alon further argued that a description of Contractor A’s
segment-identification methodology was on file with the company at the time of the OPS
inspection but acknowledged that Contractor A could not provide a supporting rationale for that
methodology when requested. Finally, Respondent argued that it received an updated analysis of
its HCA pipeline mileage, as well as other related data, on April 17, 2002, but that OPS rejected
that information as based upon Contractor A’s flawed methodology.
Respondent’s arguments are not persuasive. The December 2002 ODA found that, as of
February 2002, the date of a prior OPS-TRCC joint inspection and some two months after the
deadline in § 195.452(b)(2) for identifying all could-affect HCA segments for Category 1
in its Response in this proceeding that Contractor A could not provide a supporting rationale for
his methodology or reproduce his own results on request, and that “[a]t the time of the August[]
2003 inspection,” Contractor B “had just completed the segment identification process using
stream and waterway transport modeling.” Thus, there is no dispute that Alon’s written
procedures for performing the segment-identification process did not comply with the IMP
pipelines, Alon’s segment-identification procedures were still inadequate.6 Alon also admitted
regulations as of December 31, 2001, thereby invalidating any evaluation actually conducted
pursuant to those procedures as of the 2001 deadline. Similarly, there is also no dispute that
Alon’s new consultant, Contractor B, did not complete its subsequent segment-identification
evaluation until well after that deadline. Accordingly, upon consideration of all of the evidence,
I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(b)(2) by failing to identify all of its pipeline
segments that could affect HCAs on or before December 31, 2001.
Item 2 of the Notice alleged that Alon violated 49 C.F.R. §§ 195.452(b)(1) and (4)-(5), which
state:
§ 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.
(a) ….
(b) What program and practices must operators use to manage
pipeline integrity? Each operator of a pipeline covered by this section
must:
(1) Develop a written integrity management program that addresses
the risks on each segment of pipeline in the first column of the following
table not later than the date in the second column:
Pipeline Date
Category 1 March 31, 2002.
6 OPS also notified Alon, by letter dated October 14, 2003, that the segment identification procedures reviewed
during the August 2003 inspection were not the same as the procedures it submitted several months earlier in
response to the December 2002 ODA. The company responded to that letter by providing OPS with yet another
version of those procedures, dated November 11, 2003.



4
(2)
(4) Include in the program a framework that--
(i) Addresses each element of the integrity management program
assessment and evaluation under paragraph (j) of this section;...
under paragraph (f) of this section, including continual integrity
(5) Implement and follow the program.
The Notice alleged that Alon violated 49 C.F.R. §§ 195.452(b)(1) and (4)-(5) by failing to
develop, implement, and follow a written IMP on or before the applicable deadline of March 31,
2002, or by the date of the August 2003 inspection. Specifically, the Notice stated that Alon
issued a draft IMP on August 13, 2003, less than one week before the OPS inspection, but that
Respondent could not demonstrate, through adequate documentation, that it had adopted or
implemented a compliant IMP by March 31, 2002.
Alon disputed these allegations in its Response. Specifically, Respondent argued that OPS
actually reviewed the third edition of its IMP, not an early draft, during the August 2003
inspection. Alon submitted three versions of its written IMP to support these assertions, dated
February 17, 2002, March 18, 2002, and August 13, 2003, respectively.
These arguments are not persuasive. In fact, the evidence submitted by Alon (i.e., the various
to develop, implement, and follow a written IMP on or before March 31, 2002. With respect to
editions of its IMP) only serves to confirm the allegations in the Notice. Alon had an obligation
development, Respondent's February 17, 2002 IMP was clearly inadequate. That is reflected in
the findings of the December 2002 ODA and confirmed on further review in this proceeding.
Indeed, the February 2002 IMP omits certain necessary information and admittedly relies in
other instances on unverified information? Alon's March 18, 2002 IMP suffers from many of
these same inadequacies.
In addition to inadequate development of an IMP, there is also no evidence that Alon actually
implemented any version of it from March 31, 2002, the deadline for initially developing the
program, until the date of the August 2003 OPS inspection? In fact, the OPS inspector noted in
his report from the August 2003 inspection that "the first traceable iota of movement with
respect to Alon's [IMP] in the previous 16 months" occurred when the company hired its new
" Response at Attachment 2.0, pp. 17-18, 20. For instance, under the subheading "Evolving Risk Analysis
coefficients." Id. at 17. Similarly, under "What are the risk factors for establishing an assessment schedule (for both
Capabilities," the February 2002 IMP simply states "*** Discuss linear model" and **** Table of risk factor
the baseline and continual integrity assessments)," it notes «***Discuss limitations," «***Discuss arbitrary selection
more complicated risk analysi[s.]" Id. at 18. Finally, under the subheading for "Computerized Records," the
of parameters," «***Discuss confirmation of the risk model," "Discuss model by risk analysis," and ****Discuss
February 2002 IMP twice states, in conjunction with a listed procedure, "Confirm this is so." Id. at 20.
& Response at Attachment 2.1, pp. 32 (notation to insert missing schedule for baseline evaluation), 56 (notation to
insert missing American Petroleum Institute Standard).
' See 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(1) (requiring an operator to maintain records of "actions taken ... to implement... each
element" of an IMP).



5
consultant some two weeks prior to that inspection. Accordingly, upon consideration of all of
the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. §§ 195.452(b)(1) and (4)-(5) by failing to
develop an adequate written IMP on or before March 31, 2002, and to implement and follow an
adequate written IMP from that date until the August 2003 OPS inspection.
Item 3 of the Notice alleged that Alon violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(f)(2) and (c)(1), which
state, in relevant part:
§ 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.
(a) . . .
(f) What are the elements of an integrity management program? An
integrity management program begins with the initial framework. An operator
must continually change the program to reflect operating experience, conclusions
drawn from results of the integrity assessments, and other maintenance and
surveillance data, and evaluation of consequences of a failure on the high
consequence area. An operator must include, at minimum, each of the following
elements in its written integrity management program:
(1) . . .
(2) A baseline assessment plan meeting the requirements of paragraph (c)
of this section . . .
The Notice alleged that Alon violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(f)(2) by failing to include a compliant
Baseline Assessment Plan (BAP) in its IMP. Specifically, the Notice stated that Respondent
lacked a BAP (or any of the information that must be included in one) at the time of the
inspection. The Notice also stated that Alon’s personnel informed the OPS inspection team that
the development of its BAP could not be completed until its new consultant, Contractor B, had
finished the revised segment identification evaluation.
Alon admitted in its Response that “[a]t the time of the August 2003 inspection, [it only] had a
limited documented [BAP],” and that it “couldn’t complete a fully documented risk[-]based
consideration of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(f)(2) by
assessment until the HCA identification analysis had been updated . . .”10 Accordingly, upon
failing to include a compliant BAP in its IMP as of the date of the OPS inspection.
Items 4(a), (b), and (c) of the Notice alleged that Alon violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(e)(1) and
(g)(1)-(4), which state, in relevant part:
§ 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.
(a) . . .
(e) What are the risk factors for establishing an assessment schedule (for
both the baseline and continual integrity assessments)?
(1) An operator must establish an integrity assessment schedule that
prioritizes pipeline segments for assessment (see paragraphs (d)(1) and (j)(3) of
this section). An operator must base the assessment schedule on all risk factors
that reflect the risk conditions on the pipeline segment. The factors an operator
must consider include, but are not limited to:
10 Response at 5.



6
(i) Results of the previous integrity assessment, defect type and size that
the assessment method can detect, and defect growth rate;
(ii) Pipe size, material, manufacturing information, coating type and
condition, and seam type;
(iii) Leak history, repair history and cathodic protection history;
(iv) Product transported;
(v) Operating stress level;
(vi) Existing or projected activities in the area;
(vii) Local environmental factors that could affect the pipeline (e.g.,
corrosivity of soil, subsidence, climatic);
(viii) Geo-technical hazards; and
(ix) Physical support of the segment such as by a cable suspension bridge.
(2) . . .
(g) What is an information analysis? In periodically evaluating the
integrity of each pipeline segment (paragraph (j) of this section), an operator must
analyze all available information about the integrity of the entire pipeline and the
consequences of a failure. This information includes:
(1) Information critical to determining the potential for, and preventing,
damage due to excavation, including current and planned damage prevention
activities, and development or planned development along the pipeline segment;
(2) Data gathered through the integrity assessment required under this
section;
(3) Data gathered in conjunction with other inspections, tests, surveillance
and patrols required by this Part, including, corrosion control monitoring and
cathodic protection surveys; and
(4) Information about how a failure would affect the high consequence
area, such as location of the water intake.
Item 4(a) of the Notice alleged that Alon violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(e)(1) and (g)(1)-
(4) by failing to establish an integrity assessment schedule that prioritized its pipeline
segments for assessment on the basis of all risk factors and by failing to analyze all
available information about the integrity of its entire pipeline system and the
consequences of a failure. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Alon presented the OPS
inspection team with a draft risk assessment method that had been copied verbatim from
a textbook. The Notice also alleged that the company provided the inspection team with
a risk-factor form (a document that it planned to use to collect information on its pipeline
system) that was inconsistent with its draft risk assessment methodology. Finally, the
Notice alleged that Alon could not demonstrate how it planned to use any of the data
gathered from the risk-factor form in its IMP.
Alon admitted in its Response that it presented OPS with a draft risk assessment method
taken verbatim from a textbook but “only as an example of the type of risk assessment
tool being developed for [it] at the time.”11
Respondent admitted, in other words, that it
had not developed and was not implementing a compliant risk assessment method as of
11 Response at 7 (emphasis added).



7
the date of the OPS inspection. Alon also necessarily acknowledged, by implication, that
it failed to develop an integrity assessment schedule based upon a valid risk assessment
methodology. Accordingly, I find that Alon violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(e)(1) and
(g)(1)-(4) by failing to develop and perform a compliant risk assessment and information
integration analysis in establishing its BAP schedule.
Item 4(b) of the Notice likewise alleged that Alon violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(e)(1) by
failing to establish an integrity assessment schedule that prioritized its pipeline segments
for assessment based on all risk factors that reflect the risk conditions on the pipeline
segment. In particular, the Notice alleged that Alon limited its risk assessment method to
only those pipeline segments that could affect HCAs, instead of collecting and integrating
information on its entire pipeline system, including breakout tanks and pump stations.
In its Response, Alon argued that its risk assessment method included pump stations at
the time of the inspection. Respondent acknowledged, however, that its analysis did not
include breakout tanks until after the OPS inspection. On the basis of the latter
admission, and upon consideration of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated
49 C.F.R. § 195.452(e)(1) by failing to have a risk assessment method that incorporated
the collection and integration of information on its entire pipeline system for use in
establishing a compliant integrity assessment schedule.
Item 4(c) of the Notice similarly alleged that Alon violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(e)(1) by
failing to establish an integrity assessment schedule that prioritized its pipeline segments
for assessment based on all risk factors that reflect the risk conditions on the pipeline
segment. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Respondent’s IMP provided no guidance
or information on the assignment of risk scores based on the subjective risk-assessment-
method inputs. The Notice further stated that without such guidance, Alon’s risk-scores
(and any prioritization of its pipeline segments for integrity assessment on the basis
thereof) would vary and be unreliable over time.
In its Response, Alon argued that its IMP included written assessment questions and
formatted responses that dealt with risk ranking and submitted documentation of its
written procedure.12 Respondent did not, however, dispute the allegation that the former
written procedure was not in place at the time of the OPS inspection. In addition, the
document Alon submitted did not indicate the effective date of the procedure.13
Accordingly, upon consideration of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49
C.F.R. § 195.452(e)(1) by failing to include proper guidance in its IMP on the assignment
of risk scores based on the subjective risk-assessment-method inputs for use in
establishing a compliant integrity assessment schedule.
12 Response at Attachment 4.3.
13 Moreover, at least some of the questions listed on the written procedure of record are in need of further
clarification. For example, the form asks, without further guidance, whether relationship with local authorities is
“excellent,” “good,” or “poor,” and whether the pipe material looks “excellent,” “good,” or “poor ”. Response at
Attachment 4.3, pp. 5, 6.



8
Item 5 of the Notice alleged that Alon violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(l)(1), which states,
in relevant part:
§ 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.
(a) . . .
(l) What records must be kept?
(1) An operator must maintain for review during an inspection:
(i) A written integrity management program in accordance with
paragraph (b) of this section.
(ii) Documents to support the decisions and analyses, including any
modifications, justifications, variances, deviations and determinations made,
and actions taken, to implement and evaluate each element of the integrity
management program listed in paragraph (f) of this section.
The Notice alleged that Alon violated 49 C.F.R. 195.452(l)(1) by failing to maintain
proper documentation of the decisions and analyses, including any modifications,
justifications, variances, deviations and determinations made, and actions taken, to
implement and evaluate each element of its IMP. Specifically, the Notice stated that
Alon failed to properly document the modifications it had previously made to its
February 2002 IMP and that it lacked a procedure for tracking such changes.
In its Response, Alon disputed these allegations. In particular, Respondent argued that it
had documented the changes made to its February 2002 IMP and that it had a procedure
in place for making, implementing, and tracking such changes as of the date of the
inspection. In support of its position, Alon submitted its written procedure for
documenting changes to its IMP14 and a Master Change Log showing the changes that
had been made to its IMP since July 3, 2003.15
This evidence, however, is not persuasive. First, the written procedure submitted by
Alon is dated August 13, 2003, less than a week prior to the OPS inspection, and no other
evidence exists that contradicts the OPS inspector’s allegation that an adequate procedure
was not in effect as of March 31, 2002, the date required under the regulation. Moreover,
even if Alon had a written procedure in effect at that time, the Master Change Log makes
no mention of the decisions, analyses, and actions the company had taken in transitioning
from the February 2002 IMP to the March 2002 IMP. On the contrary, the first notation
in the Master Change Log is dated July 2003, more than a year after Alon had
transitioned from its February 2002 IMP to its March 2002 IMP. Furthermore, the
Master Change Log characterizes the March 2002 edition as Alon’s “[o]riginal” IMP,
even though the company argued in its Response that the February 2002 IMP was the
first written edition of that program. In other words, there is no evidence that Alon had a
recordkeeping procedure prior to August 2003, even though the regulation required one
as of March 31, 2002, or that the company followed such a procedure if in effect during
that time period. Accordingly, upon consideration of the evidence of record, I find that
14 Response at Attachment 5.0.
15 Response at Attachment 5.1.



9
Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(l)(1) by failing to maintain documents
supporting the decisions, analyses, and actions taken in modifying its February 2002
IMP.
Items 6(a), (b), and (c) of the Notice alleged that Alon had violated 49 C.F.R.
§195.452(f)(3) and (g)(1)-(4), which state, in relevant part:
§ 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.
(a) . . .
(f) What are the elements of an integrity management program?
An integrity management program begins with the initial framework. An
operator must continually change the program to reflect operating
experience, conclusions drawn from results of the integrity assessments,
and other maintenance and surveillance data, and evaluation of
consequences of a failure on the high consequence area. An operator
must include, at minimum, each of the following elements in its written
integrity management program:
(1) . . .
(3) An analysis that integrates all available information about the
integrity of the entire pipeline and the consequences of a failure (see
paragraph (g) of this section); . . .
(g) What is an information analysis? In periodically evaluating
the integrity of each pipeline segment (paragraph (j) of this section), an
operator must analyze all available information about the integrity of the
entire pipeline and the consequences of a failure. This information
includes:
(1) Information critical to determining the potential for, and
preventing, damage due to excavation, including current and planned
damage prevention activities, and development or planned development
along the pipeline segment;
(2) Data gathered through the integrity assessment required
under this section;
(3) Data gathered in conjunction with other inspections, tests,
surveillance and patrols required by this Part, including, corrosion
control monitoring and cathodic protection surveys; and
(4) Information about how a failure would affect the high
consequence area, such as location of the water intake.
Item 6(a) of the Notice alleged that Alon violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(f)(3) by failing to
include in its IMP an analysis that integrated all available information about the integrity
of its entire pipeline and the consequences of a failure. Specifically, the Notice alleged
that Respondent’s IMP did not include a compliant procedure for gathering, analyzing,
and disseminating relevant information and findings on the integrity of each pipeline
segment that could affect HCAs. For example, it alleged that Alon had not correlated the
results of in-line inspection (ILI) tool runs on the Amdel Pipeline to determine if any of
the dents that had been detected involved metal loss and had not compared the results of
those ILI assessments to other information about that pipeline system.



10
In its Response, Alon stated that its metal loss repair criteria exceeded the applicable
regulatory requirements. The strictness of Respondent’s metal loss criteria is, however,
not relevant to the violation alleged in the Notice, namely, that Alon lacked a process for
integrating such ILI data upon its receipt. Alon also admitted that it had not developed
any dent repair criteria until the adoption of its February 2002 IMP, and that it did not
correlate the dent and metal loss data from these ILI tool runs until after the August 2003
OPS inspection.16
Accordingly, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 95.452(f)(3)
by failing to include in its IMP an analysis that integrates all available information about
the integrity of its entire pipeline and the consequences of a failure.
Item 6(b) of the Notice similarly alleged that Alon violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452 (g)(1)-
(4) by failing to include in its written IMP an adequate procedure for analyzing all
available information about the integrity of its entire pipeline and the consequences of a
failure. Specifically, the Notice stated the Respondent lacked a compliant procedure for
collecting and integrating field input and local knowledge on potential changes to
pipeline segments that could affect HCAs. For example, the Notice explained that Alon’s
IMP failed to specify the methods and personnel responsible for gathering such
information, and that the program did not include a process for recording and
disseminating that information.
Alon disputed this allegation in its Response, contending that it had a written procedure
in place at the time of the OPS inspection for collecting and using data on potential
changes to pipeline segments in HCAs. However, a review of Alon’s supporting
documentation17
shows that, while there was a procedure in place at that time, it failed to
address any of the deficiencies cited in the Notice. Indeed, that procedure neither
identifies the methods used nor the company personnel responsible for collecting data on
pipeline segments in HCAs. Nor does it include a meaningful description of the process
for recording or disseminating that information. Accordingly, I find that Respondent
violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(g)(1)-(4) by failing to include in its written IMP an
adequate procedure for analyzing all available information about the integrity of the
entire pipeline and the consequences of a failure.
Item 6(c) of the Notice similarly alleged that Alon violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(g)(1)-
(4) by failing to include in its written IMP an adequate procedure for analyzing all
available information about the integrity of its entire pipeline and the consequences of a
failure. In particular, the Notice stated that its IMP did not include any consideration of
the risks associated with the operation—or the consequences of a failure—of pump
stations or breakout tanks.
Respondent disputed this allegation in its Response. Specifically, Alon stated that its
written IMP covered pump stations at the time of the OPS inspection. The company
acknowledged, however, that it later revised some of its assumptions on the consequences
16 Response at Attachment 6.0 (relating to the correlation of dent and metal loss data dated December 8, 2003).
17 Response at Attachment 6.1, IMP-1.02-002 (revised as of August 13, 2003).



11
of a pump station failure and that it did not include breakout tanks in its IMP until after
the OPS inspection.
Upon consideration of all the evidence of record, including Alon’s admission that its IMP
did not include breakout tanks at the time of the OPS inspection, I find that Respondent
violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(g)(1)-(4) by failing to include in its written IMP an
adequate procedure for analyzing all available information about the integrity of its entire
pipeline and the consequences of a failure.
Items 7(b) of the Notice alleged that Alon violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(i)(2), which
states:
§ 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.
(a) . . .
(i) What preventive and mitigative measures must an operator take
to protect the high consequence area?
(1) . . .
(2) Risk analysis criteria. In identifying the need for additional
preventive and mitigative measures, an operator must evaluate the
likelihood of a pipeline release occurring and how a release could affect the
high consequence area. This determination must consider all relevant risk
factors, including, but not limited to: . . .
The Notice alleged that Alon violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(i)(2) by failing to perform a proper
risk analysis to identify the need for additional preventive and mitigative measures to protect
HCAs. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Respondent did not adequately consider in its draft
risk assessment the consequences of pipeline releases and how such releases could affect HCAs.
Respondent disputed this allegation in its Response, contending that its Automated Risk
Assessment Tool (ARAT) “uses the impact to HCAs as the consequence for the occurrence of a
threat” and the development of “threat lists” to determine the possible events that might occur
and to develop preventive and mitigative measures. Alon also noted that at the time of the OPS
inspection, it had a written procedure on preventative and mitigative measures.18
These arguments, however, are not responsive to the allegation in the Notice. First, the ARAT
system was not operational at the time of the August 2003 OPS inspection and, therefore, is not
relevant. Second, the written procedure on preventative and mitigative measures that
Respondent submitted only addressed the potential consequences of a failure in a cursory
fashion. Third, and most importantly, that procedure relied on the same flawed methodologies—
i.e., the inadequate identification of pipeline segments that could affect HCAs, the lack of
integrated information on the integrity of its pipeline system, and inadequate risk assessments—
described at length in the prior sections of this Final Order. Accordingly, upon consideration of
all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(i)(2) by failing to
18 Response at 11 and Attachment 7.1, IMP-4.001-010, Rev. 1.



12
conduct a proper risk analysis to identify the need for additional preventative and mitigative
measures to protect HCAs.
Item 8 of the Notice alleged that Alon violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(j)(1), which states, in
relevant part:
§ 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.
(a) . . .
(j) What is a continual process of evaluation and assessment to
maintain a pipeline's integrity?
(1) General. After completing the baseline integrity assessment, an
operator must continue to assess the line pipe at specified intervals and
periodically evaluate the integrity of each pipeline segment that could affect a
high consequence area.
The Notice alleged that Alon violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(j)(1) by failing to specify in its IMP a
time frame, after completing its BAP, for continuing to assess the line pipe at specified intervals
and to periodically re-evaluate the integrity of each pipeline segment that could affect an HCA.
The Notice further alleged that Alon failed to include a time frame in which to conduct an
evaluation to determine whether reassessments should be performed at shorter intervals.19
Respondent disputed this allegation in its Response, contending that its IMP now includes
the allegation that no such procedure existed at the time of the OPS inspection. In addition,
unlike some of the other written procedures submitted by Respondent, the one at issue here
includes no effective date. Thus, there is no evidence in the record that contradicts the OPS
inspector’s allegation that Alon’s IMP included no such time frame during the inspection.
Accordingly, upon consideration of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.
criteria for requiring reassessments within a shorter interval.20 Alon has not, however, refuted
§ 195.452(j)(1) by failing to include in its IMP a time frame, after completing its BAP, for
continuing to assess the line pipe at specified intervals and to periodically re-evaluate the
integrity of each pipeline segment that could affect an HCA.
These findings of violation will be considered prior offenses in any subsequent enforcement
action taken against Respondent.
WITHDRAWAL OF ALLEGATION
Items 7(a) of the Notice alleged that Alon violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(i)(3), which
states:
§ 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.
(a) . . .
19 See 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(j)(2)-(3).
20 Response at Attachment 8.0, IMP-4.01-009.



13
(i) What preventive and mitigative measures must an operator take
to protect the high consequence area?
(1) . . .
(3) Leak detection. An operator must have a means to detect leaks
on its pipeline system. An operator must evaluate the capability of its leak
detection means and modify, as necessary, to protect the high consequence
area. An operator's evaluation must, at least, consider, the following factors-
length and size of the pipeline, type of product carried, the pipeline's
proximity to the high consequence area, the swiftness of leak detection,
location of nearest response personnel, leak history, and risk assessment
results.
The Notice alleged that Alon violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(i)(3) by failing to conduct a proper
risk analysis to determine what additional preventive and mitigative measures might be needed
to protect HCAs. Specifically, the Notice stated that Alon’s risk analysis did not adequately
evaluate the capability of its leak detection system. In support of that allegation, the Notice cited
Respondent’s purported failure to consider an incident that occurred on February 11, 2001, and
to determine whether that incident justified making any changes to its leak detection system.
Respondent disputed these allegations in its Response. After noting that the February 2001
of the leak showed that the affected line did not experience any concurrent decrease in operating
pressure and that the leak would not have been detected by a lower alarm set point. Therefore,
Response contended that this incident did not warrant any changes to its leak detection system.
In addition, Respondent alleged that the OPS inspectors did not ask for or review any of the
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
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