{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 520045025","title":"HARVEST ALASKA, LLC — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2004-08-31","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.452(c)(1), 195.452(e), 195.452(e)(1), 195.452(f)(1), 195.452(f)(4), 195.452(f)(8), 195.452(i)(1).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520045025.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520045025.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520045025","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/520045025","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving HARVEST ALASKA, LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.452(c)(1),  195.452(e),  195.452(e)(1),  195.452(f)(1),  195.452(f)(4),  195.452(f)(8),  195.452(i)(1). The case was opened on 2004-08-31 and is reported as closed as of 2010-03-02. Proposed civil penalty: $19,000. Assessed civil penalty: $0. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n520045025_FinalOrder_04172009.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520045025/520045025_FinalOrder_04172009.pdf\n\n520045025_FinalOrder_04172009_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520045025/520045025_FinalOrder_04172009_text.pdf\n\n520045025_FinalOrder_04172009_text.pdf\n\nAPR 17 2009\nMr. Rodney H. Ficken, Manager\nCook Inlet Pipe Line Company\n909 West 9th Avenue\nAnchorage, AK 99501\nMs. Rebecca Roberts, President\nChevron Pipe Line Company\n4800 Fournace Place, Room E328F\nBellaire, TX 77401\nRe: CPF No. 5-2004-5025\nDear Mr. Ficken and Ms. Roberts:\nEnclosed is the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It withdraws most of the\nallegations of violation and all proposed civil penalties, makes a finding of violation, and specifies\ncertain actions that need to be taken by the current operator of the Cook Inlet Pipe Line, Chevron\nPipe Line Company, to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. The Final Order also makes a\nfinding of inadequate procedures and requires amendment of certain Integrity Management\nProgram procedures.\nWhen the terms of the compliance order have been completed and the procedures satisfactorily\namended, as determined by the Director, Western Region, this enforcement action will be closed.\nYour receipt of the Final Order constitutes service of that document under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nPlease note that originals of the Final Order are being sent to both Cook Inlet Pipe Line Company\nand Chevron Pipe Line Company.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Chris Hoidal, Director, Western Region, PHMSA\nCERTIFIED MAIL – RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED [7005 1160 0001 0047 7049]\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n______________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nCook Inlet Pipe Line Company, ) CPF No. 5-2004-5025\nRespondent, )\nand )\n)\n)\n)\n)\nChevron Pipe Line Company. )\n______________________________)\nFINAL ORDER\nOn December 4-5, 2003, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, a representative of the Research and\npipeline safety inspection of the Integrity Management Program (IMP) of Cook Inlet Pipe Line\nCompany (CIPL or Respondent) at its offices in Anchorage, Alaska. The CIPL pipeline system\nincludes a 20-inch crude oil pipeline running approximately 42 miles between the Granite Point\nTank Farm and the Drift River Terminal and a 12-inch pipeline connecting the 20-inch line to the\nWest Foreland pump station. The system is located on the west side of Cook Inlet in Alaska. In\n2006, PHMSA was notified that Chevron Pipe Line Company (Chevron), the co-owner of CIPL,\nnow operates the facilities that are the subject of this proceeding.\nSpecial Programs Administration (RSPA)1 , Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), conducted an on-site\nAs a result of the inspection, the Director, Western Region, OPS (Director), issued to CIPL, by\nletter dated August 31, 2004, a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil Penalty, Proposed\nCompliance Order, and Notice of Amendment (Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207,\nthe Notice proposed finding that CIPL committed certain violations of 49 C.F.R. § 195.452,\nproposed assessing a civil penalty of $19,000 for the alleged violations, and proposed ordering\nCIPL to take certain measures to correct the alleged violations. The Notice also proposed, in\naccordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.237, that Respondent be required to amend its IMP procedures.\nFinally, the Notice proposed finding that the company had committed certain IMP procedures.\nFinally, the Notice proposed finding that the company had committed certain other probable\nviolations of 49 C.F.R. § 192.452 and warning it to take appropriate corrective action or be subject\nto future enforcement action. By letter dated September 21, 2004, CIPL requested and\nsubsequently received additional time to respond to the Notice. CIPL responded to the Notice by\nletter dated October 28, 2004 (Response), providing information on its IMP, contesting all of the\n1 On November 30, 2004, the Norman Y. Mineta Research and Special Programs Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 108-\n426, 118 Stat. 2423, created the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) and transferred the\nauthority of RSPA exercised under chapter 601 of title 49, United States Code, to the Administrator of PHMSA. See\nalso, 70 Fed. Reg. 8299, 8301-8302 (2005) (delegating authority to the Administrator of PHMSA).\n\n\n\n2\nallegations, and requesting a hearing. A hearing was subsequently held on May 5, 2005, in\nAnchorage, Alaska, with an attorney from the Office of Chief Counsel, PHMSA, serving as\npresiding official.\nFINDING OF VIOLATION\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. Part 195, as follows:\nItem 1(f): The Notice alleged that CIPL violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(f)(1), which states:\n§ 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(a)….\n(f) What are the elements of an integrity management program? An integrity\nmanagement program begins with the initial framework. An operator must\ncontinually change the program to reflect operating experience, conclusions\ndrawn from results of the integrity assessments, and other maintenance and\nsurveillance data, and evaluation of consequences of a failure on the high\nconsequence area. An operator must include, at minimum, each of the following\nelements in its written integrity management program:\n(1) A process for identifying which pipeline segments could affect a high\nconsequence area;…\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.452(f)(1) by failing to include in its\nIMP an adequate process for identifying which pipeline segments in its system “could affect” a\nwaterway HCA in Cook Inlet. Certain shipping lanes within Cook Inlet have been identified as part\nHigh Consequence Area (HCA).2 Specifically, the Notice alleged that CIPL did not provide\nsufficient justification that a spill from the CIPL pipeline could not affect a commercially navigable\nof a commercially navigable waterway HCA.\nCIPL used a 1991 spill modeling report (1991 Report) as the basis for identifying whether any of its\npipeline segments could affect this commercially navigable waterway HCA.3\nThe Notice alleged\nthat the 1991 Report failed to show that the Company’s pipeline system could not affect this\ncommercially navigable waterway HCA because it: (1) failed to address oil dispersion\ncharacteristics in certain conditions; (2) only addressed near-shore oil migration and failed to\neffectively address open-water oil migration in outgoing tides during adverse weather conditions;\n(3) was indeterminate with regard to oil dispersion patterns; and (4) failed to include worst-case\nconditions in the model input parameters, and instead, included subjective assumptions for tidal\ninfluence, average flow speed, wind conditions, direction of net circulation, etc.\n2 The process of identifying pipeline segments that “could affect” HCAs is the first step in establishing the initial\nframework of an IMP. An HCA is defined as: (1) a commercially navigable waterway, which means a waterway where\na substantial likelihood of commercial navigation exists; (2) a high population area, which means an urbanized area, as\ndefined and delineated by the Census Bureau, that contains 50,000 or more people and has a population density of at\nleast 1,000 people per square mile; (3) an other populated area, which means a place, as defined and delineated by the\nCensus Bureau, that contains a concentrated population, such as an incorporated or unincorporated city, town, village,\nor other designated residential or commercial area; (4) an unusually sensitive area, as defined in\n§ 195.6. See, 49 C.F.R. § 195.450.\n3 Notice, at 2. CIPL provided OPS with a copy of an April 15, 1991, report, entitled “Cook Inlet Spill Prevention and\nResponse Inc., Spill Modeling, Technical Manual P10.”\n\n\n\n3\nIn its Response, CIPL argued that it did not need to have an IMP because its analyses indicated that\nits pipeline could not affect any HCAs. CIPL explained that it relied upon the advice of planners\nand scientists familiar with spill modeling, in conjunction with the 1991 report, as the basis for\ndetermining that “oil spilled at CIPL’s facilities would not impact the shipping lanes in Cook\nInlet.”4 CIPL also provided an email from an employee of Cook Inlet Spill Prevention & Response,\nsimply stated, without any analysis, that spilled oil would be caught in rip tides and would not\nInc. (CISPRI), as further evidence that the shipping lanes would not be impacted.5 The email\nimpact the shipping lanes.\nInherent in the process for determining whether a pipeline segment could affect an HCA is the need\nfor a rigorous analysis that considers a wide range of parameters and conditions. If certain types of\nweather, tidal or other conditions are not fully considered, “could-affect” pipeline segments might\nbe overlooked.\nDuring the hearing, CIPL repeated the statements in the CISPRI email and made conclusory\nstatements that various experts believed spilled oil would not reach the shipping lanes due to the\neffect of rip tides.6 CIPL neither addressed OPS’ allegations that the company did not account for a\nfull range of tidal, weather and other conditions necessary to understand where spilled oil could go,\nnor provided any technical support or analysis for its position. Furthermore, the company’s own\n1991 Report contradicts the company’s position by noting that “tidal rips have only limited and\nlocal effects for spills during high wind events.”7 Also, at the hearing, CIPL acknowledged that it\nonly used “typical wind and tidal conditions” in its spill modeling.8\nAccordingly, upon consideration of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.452(f)(1) by failing to include in its IMP an adequate process for identifying which CIPL\npipeline segments could affect an HCA.\nWITHDRAWAL OF ALLEGATIONS\nItems 1(a), 1(b), 2, 3(a), 3(b), 3(c), 3(d), 4(a), 4(b), 5(a), 5(b), 5(c), 6, 7(a) and 7(b) proposed that\nCIPL violated numerous requirements of 49 C.F.R. § 195.452, by failing to properly develop and\nimplement an IMP, as more fully described in the Notice.\nIn its Response and at the hearing, CIPL argued that all of the Items in the Notice should be\nwithdrawn because none of its pipeline segments could affect an HCA and therefore the company\ndid not need to have an IMP at all. CIPL argued that its risk assessment showed that its pipelines\ncould not affect any of the numerous HCAs located near Cook Inlet. Pursuant to § 195.452(a), only\npipeline segments that “could affect” an HCA must be included in an operator’s IMP.\nThe Director has reviewed the information and analyses provided by CIPL and has recommended\nwithdrawal of the above-listed Items. CIPL presented convincing evidence that, at the time of the\ninspection, its pipeline could not affect the Tyonek Other Populated Area (OPA) HCA and certain\n4 Response, at 7.\n5 November 25, 2003 email from Victoria Askin (CISPRI) to James A. Shew (CIPL).\n6 CIPL Hearing Presentation, at 13.\n7 1991 Report, at 5.\n8 Id.\n\n\n\n4\nrespectively. Items 2 through 7 in the Notice were all based upon the assumption that CIPL\ndrinking-water Unusually Sensitive Area (USA)9 HCAs, as addressed in Items 1(a) and 1(b),\noperated one or more pipeline segments that “could affect” HCAs.\nOn the basis that CIPL has shown that its pipeline could not affect the OPA and USA HCAs\ndescribed above, and because there is uncertainty about whether other HCAs could be affected, I\norder that Notice Items 1(a), 1(b), 2, 3(a), 3(b), 3(c), 3(d), 4(a), 4(b), 5(a), 5(b), 5(c), 6, 7(a) and\n7(b) be withdrawn. However, if Respondent’s continuing risk assessment shows that any of its\npipeline segments could affect an HCA, the requirements addressed in these withdrawn items, as\nwell as other IMP requirements, may need to be addressed.\nAlthough CIPL has shown that its pipeline could not affect certain HCAs, the company has not\nshown that the pipeline might not affect other HCAs or that it need not have an IMP. CIPL’s\nprocesses for identifying which pipeline segments could affect an HCA remain inadequate.\nRespondent must therefore conduct further analyses and amend its procedures, as discussed more\nfully below.\nWITHDRAWAL OF PENALTIES\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60122, Respondent is subject to an administrative civil penalty not to exceed\n$100,000 per violation for each day of the violation, up to a maximum of $1,000,000 for any related\nseries of violations.\n49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.225 require that, in determining the amount of the civil\npenalty, I consider the following criteria: the nature, circumstances, and gravity of the violation,\nincluding adverse impact on the environment; the degree of Respondent’s culpability; the history of\nRespondent’s prior offenses; the Respondent’s ability to pay the penalty and any effect that the\npenalty may have on its ability to continue doing business; and the good faith of Respondent in\nattempting to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. In addition, I may consider the economic\nbenefit gained from the violation without any reduction because of subsequent damages, and such\nother matters as justice may require.\nThe Notice proposed a total civil penalty of $19,000 for various violations of 49 C.F.R. § 195.452,\nfor Respondent’s failure to properly develop and implement an IMP, as more fully described in the\nNotice. Except for Item 1(f), all of the allegations of violation with associated penalties have been\nwithdrawn.\nRegarding Item 1(f), Respondent violated § 195.452(f)(1) by failing to include in its IMP an\nadequate process for identifying which pipeline segments could affect an HCA. In its Response and\nat the hearing, Respondent presented credible information showing that it had made a good faith\neffort to comply with the regulation. Although its spill modeling was inadequate, Respondent\nconscientiously performed a thorough assessment of the potential effects that its pipeline could\nhave on the OPA and drinking water HCAs. Based upon such efforts, I find that it is appropriate to\nwithdraw the proposed penalty for Item 1(f).\n9 USA means a drinking water or ecological resource area that is unusually sensitive to environmental damage from a\nhazardous liquid pipeline release. 49 C.F.R. § 195.6. The regulation includes additional detailed information and\ndefinitions on USAs.\n\n\n\n5\nCOMPLIANCE ORDER\nThe Notice proposed a compliance order with respect to Items 1(a), 1(b), 1(f), 2, 3(a), 3(b), 4(a),\n5(a), 5(c), 6 and 7(a) in the Notice for violations of 49 C.F.R. § 195.452. Except for Item 1(f), all of\nthe associated allegations of violation have been withdrawn. As the current operator of the CIPL\npipeline facility, Chevron is responsible for the compliance requirements set out below.\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60118(a), each person who engages in the transportation of hazardous liquids or\nwho owns or operates a pipeline facility is required to comply with the applicable safety standards\nestablished under chapter 601. Pursuant to the authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60118(b) and 49 C.F.R.\n§ 190.217, Chevron is ordered to take the following actions to ensure compliance with the pipeline\nsafety regulations applicable to its operations. Regarding Notice Item 1(f), Chevron must —\n1. Update its oil spill models and procedures for identification of segments that could affect\nHCAs by taking into account a full variety of weather, tidal and other conditions.\n2. On the basis of the updated spill models and other revised IMP procedures, identify and\ninclude in its IMP all pipeline segments that could affect the commercially navigable\nwaterway or any other HCA in Cook Inlet.\n3. Within 60 days of receipt of this Final Order, perform the work listed above and submit\ndocumentation and revised procedures to the Director, Western Region, Office of Pipeline\nSafety, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, 12300 West Dakota Ave.,\nSuite 110, Lakewood, Colorado 80228.\n4. Maintain documentation of the costs associated with fulfilling this compliance order and\nsubmit the total to the Director, Western Region, OPS.\nThe Director may grant an extension of time to comply with any of the required items upon a\nwritten request timely submitted by the Respondent demonstrating good cause for an extension.\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in administrative assessment of civil penalties not to\nexceed $100,000 for each violation for each day the violation continues or in referral to the\nAttorney General for appropriate relief in a district court of the United States.\nAMENDMENT OF PROCEDURES\nThe Notice alleged inadequacies in Respondent’s IMP procedures and proposed to require\namendment of the company’s procedures to comply with the requirements of 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.452(f)(1). As the current operator of the CIPL pipeline facility, Chevron is responsible for\nmaking the amendments set forth below.\nNotice Item 1(d) alleged that CIPL’s processes and procedures failed to specify how the company\nwould utilize feedback from field activities that could potentially result in the identification of new\nor extended “could affect” pipe segments. Field activities can identify population growth along the\npipeline, stream flooding, earthquake damage, and other changes that potentially affect whether a\n\n\n\n6\npipeline segment could affect an HCA. In its Response, CIPL stated that it would review and revise\nits IMP procedures accordingly.\nNotice Item 1(e) alleged that CIPL’s IMP procedures were inadequate because they did not include\na sensitivity analysis based on a range of pipeline break sizes and response times for the 12 streams\ncrossed by the CIPL pipeline system. The Notice stated that such analysis was required in order to\nconservatively assess possible spill volumes and the spread of any spills that reached Cook Inlet.\nThis analysis is necessary in order to determine whether the pipeline could affect any Cook Inlet\nHCAs. In its Response, CIPL stated that it would review and revise its IMP procedures\naccordingly.\nAlthough the company agreed to modify its procedures, CIPL argued that amendments to its\nprocedures were not required because it did not need to have an IMP. As discussed above, I have\nfound that CIPL needs to conduct an adequate risk assessment to determine whether it has any\n“could affect” segments.\nAccordingly, I find that CIPL’s procedures were inadequate to assure safe operation of its pipeline\nsystem. Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60108(a) and 49 C.F.R. § 190.237, Chevron is ordered to make the\nfollowing changes to its procedures affecting Cook Inlet Pipe Line. Chevron must—\n1. Amend its IMP procedures to specify how the company will incorporate information from\nfield operations and other information sources into the IMP; and which company personnel\nare responsible for gathering and integrating such information, and communicating it to the\ncompany IMP team.\n2. Amend its IMP procedures to include provisions for performing a sensitivity analysis based\non a range of pipeline break sizes and response times for the 12 CIPL pipeline system\nstream crossings.\n3. The revised sensitivity analysis shall conservatively assess the Cook Inlet HCA impacts that\ncould result from predicted oil spill volumes and spread extents.\n4. Submit the amended procedures to the Director within 30 days following receipt of this\nOrder.\nThe Director may grant an extension of time to comply with any of the required Compliance\nOrder or Amendment of Procedure items upon a written request timely submitted by Chevron\ndemonstrating good cause for an extension.\nWARNING ITEM\nWith respect to Item 1(c), the Notice alleged a probable violations of § 195.452(f)(1) but did not\npropose a civil penalty or compliance order for these items. Therefore, this is considered to be a\nwarning item. The warning was for:\n49 C.F.R. § 195.452(f)(1) ─ CIPL’s alleged failure to provide specificity in its\nwritten IMP procedures for segment identification.\n\n\n\n7\nIn its Response, CIPL indicated that it would revise its IMP to include more specific procedures on\nsegment identification. Having considered such information, I find, pursuant to 49 C.F.R. §\n190.205, that a probable violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(f)(1) has occurred and Respondent is\nhereby advised to correct such condition. In the event that OPS finds a violation for this item in a\nsubsequent inspection, Chevron may be subject to future enforcement action.\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in administrative assessment of civil penalties not to\nexceed $100,000 for each violation for each day the violation continues or in referral to the\nAttorney General for appropriate relief in a district court of the United States.\nUnder 49 C.F.R. § 190.215, Respondent has a right to submit a Petition for Reconsideration of this\nFinal Order. The petition must be received within 20 days of Respondent’s receipt of this Final\nOrder and must contain a brief statement of the issue(s). The terms of the order, including any\nrequired corrective action and amendment of procedures, shall remain in full force and effect unless\nthe Associate Administrator, upon request, grants a stay. The terms and conditions of this Final\nOrder shall be effective upon receipt.\n___________________________________ __________________________\nJeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety","truncated":false,"body_characters":22014}