{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 520055004","title":"CENEX PIPELINE LLC — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2005-02-09","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.1, 195.310(b)(9), 195.402(c)(13), 195.402(c)(4), 195.402(d)(5), 195.403(a)(6), 195.403(b)(2), 195.403(c), 195.404(a)(3), 195.428(a), 195.581(c)(2), 195.589(c).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520055004.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520055004.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520055004","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/520055004","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving CENEX PIPELINE LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195,  195.1,  195.310(b)(9),  195.402(c)(13),  195.402(c)(4),  195.402(d)(5),  195.403(a)(6),  195.403(b)(2),  195.403(c),  195.404(a)(3),  195.428(a),  195.581(c)(2),  195.589(c). The case was opened on 2005-02-09 and is reported as closed as of 2008-04-18. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n520055004_final order_04182008.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520055004/520055004_final%20order_04182008.pdf\n\n520055004_final order_04182008_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520055004/520055004_final%20order_04182008_text.pdf\n\n520055004_final order_04182008_text.pdf\n\nU S Department\nof Transportation\nPipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety\nAdministration\nAPR 1 8 lol18\nt200 New Jersey Ave S E\nWashington DC 20590\nMr. Dan Knepper\nVice President, Energy Operations\nFront Range Pipeline, LLC\n803 Highway 212 South\nLaurel, MT 59044\nRe: CPF No. 5-2005-5004\nDear Mr. Knepper.\nEnclosed is the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of violation\nand finds that you have completed the actions specified in the Notice required to comply with the\npipeline safety regulations. It also finds that you have addressed the inadequacies in your\nprocedures that were cited in the Notice of Amendment Therefore, this case is now closed.\nYour receipt of the Final Order constitutes service under 49 C. F. R $ 190. 5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter\nSmcerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Chris Hoidal\nDirector, Western Region, PHMSA\nCERTIFIED MAIL — RETURN RECEIPT RE UESTED\n\n\n\nU. S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D. C. 20590\nIn the Matter of\nFront Range Pipeline, LLC,\nformerly CHS, Inc.\n,\nRespondent\nCPF No. 5-2005-5004\nFINAL ORDER\nOn August 19, 2004 and between October 4 and 8, 2004 pursuant to 49 U, S C, ) 60117, a\nrepresentative of Western Region of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n(PHMSA), conducted an onsite pipeline safety inspection of Front Range Pipeline's (Front\nRange or Respondent) Tank 47, records, and manuals in Laurel, Montana, and its crude oil\npipeline facilities between the Canadian border and Cutbank, Montana.\nAs a result of the inspection, the Director, Western Region, of PHMSA's Office of Pipeline\nSafety (OPS), issued to Respondent, by letter dated February 9, 2005, a Notice of Probable\nViolation, Proposed Compliance Order, and Notice of Amendment (Notice). ' In accordance\nwith 49 C. F. R, ) 190 207, the Notice proposed finding that Respondent had committed violations\nof 49 C, F. R. ) 195. 1 and proposed ordering Respondent to take certain measures to correct the\nalleged violations. The Notice also proposed, in accordance with 49 C. F, R. ) 190. 237, that\nRespondent amend its written procedures and plans. The Notice further proposed finding that\nRespondent had committed certain other probable violations of 49 C. F. R. Part 195 and warning\nRespondent to take appropriate corrective action to address them or be subject to future\nenforcement action.\nRespondent responded to the Notice by letter dated April 1, 2005 (Response). Respondent did\nnot contest the allegations of violation but submitted copies of its amended procedures.\nRespondent did not request a hearing and therefore has waived its right to one.\n' The Notice of Probable Violation was addressed to CHS, Inc, the operator of the facilities that are the subject of\nthis Final Order Front Range now operates said facilities as a subsidiary of CHS, Inc\n\n\n\nFINDING OF VIOLATION\nPursuant to 49 C. F. R. $ 190. 213 and U. S. C. $ 60122, I find that Respondent violated the\nfollowing section of 49 C. F R. Part 195, as more fully described m the Notice:\nNotice Item 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C. F. R. ) 195. 1(c), which states:\n49 C. F. R. g 195. 1 Applicability.\n(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, this part applies to pipeline\nfacilities and the transportation of hazardous liquids or carbon dioxide associated with\nthose facilities in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, includmg pipeline facilities\non the Outer Continental Shelf. . . . .\n(c) Breakout tanks subject to this part must comply with requirements that apply\nspecifically to breakout tanks and, to the extent applicable, with requirements that apply\nto pipeline systems and pipeline facilities. If a conflict exists between a requirement that\napplies specifically to breakout tanks and a requirement that applies to pipelme systems\nor pipeline facilities, the requirement that apphes specifically to breakout tanks\nprevails. . . . . .\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent had failed to consider its Tank No, 74 to be a breakout tank\nand therefore had failed to meet the various requirements for breakout tanks under Part 195. A\nbreakout tank is a tank used to relieve surges in a hazardous liquid pipeline system or to receive\nand store hazardous liquid transported by a pipeline for rein~ection or continued transportation by\npipeline, 49 C. F. R. ) 195. 2. The Notice alleged that \"Tank 74 receives crude oil from the CHS\nFront Range pipeline terminus pressiue relief. \" In its Response, Respondent did not contest that\nTank 74 is a breakout tank.\nThis finding of violation will be considered a prior offense in any subsequent enforcement action\ntaken against Respondent,\nCOMPLIANCE ORDER\nThe Notice proposed a Compliance Order with respect to Item 1 in the Notice for violation of 49\nC, F. R. $ 195. 1. Under 49 U. S, C. $ 60118(a), each person who engages in the transportation of\nhazardous liquids or who owns or operates a pipeline facility is required to comply with the\napplicable safety standards estabhshed under chapter 601. The Director has indicated that\nRespondent has taken certain corrective measures to bring the specified matter into compliance\nwith $ 195. 1. Since compliance has been achieved with respect to this violation, it is\nunnecessary to include the proposed compliance terms in this Order.\nAMENDMENT OF PROCEURES\nWith respect to items 3, 4, 6, and 9, the Notice alleged certain inadequacies in Respondent's\nOperations, Maintenance, and Emergencies Manual (Manual) and proposed to require that\nRespondent amend it to comply with 49 C. F. R. )) 195. 402 — 195. 404. Specifically:\n\n\n\nItem 3 of the Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C. F. R. $ 195. 402(c)(4) because its\nManual did not identify areas that would require an immediate response by the operator to\nprevent hazards to the public if the facilities failed or malfunctioned.\nItem 4 of the Notice alleged that the Respondent violated 49 C. F. R. $ 195. 402(c)(13) because its\nManual did not require periodic review of work done by the operator during normal operations to\ndetermine the effectiveness of the company's procedures.\nItem 6 of the Notice alleged that the Respondent violated 49 C F. R ) 195. 403(a)(1)-(6) by\nfailing to establish and conduct a continuing training program to instruct operating and\nmaintenance personnel in emergency procedures.\nItem 9 of the Notice alleged that the Respondent violated 49 C. F. R. $ 195. 404(a)(3) because its\nManual failed to include the proper maximum operating pressure for the 10-inch pipeline\ninstalled in 1985 that runs from the Canadian border to the Santa Rita pump station.\nRespondent did not contest the proposed Notice of Amendment but provided amended\nprocedures, which the Director has reviewed and approved. Accordmgly, based on the results of\nthis review, I find that Respondent's original procedures and plans were inadequate to ensure\nsafe operation of its pipeline system but that Respondent has corrected the identified\ninadequacies. Therefore, no need exists to issue an order directing amendment.\nWARNING ITEMS\nWith respect to Items 2, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, and 12, the Notice alleged probable violations of Part 195\nbut did not propose a civil penalty or compliance order for these items, Therefore, these items\nare considered warning items. The warnings were for:\n49 C. F, R. ) 195. 310(b)(9) notice Item 2) — Respondent's failure to include in its testing records\na profile showing elevation and test sites for the section of pipeline from the Canadian border to\nthe Santa Rita pump station. The regulations require a profile where the elevation difference in a\nsection exceeds 100 feet. Respondent's pressure test records for this section indicate an\nelevation difference of 618 feet.\n49 C. F. R. ) 195 402(d)(5) (Notice Item 5) — Respondent's failure to document in its Manual any\nreview of abnormal operating conditions to determme the effectiveness of the company's\nprocedures for controlling abnormal operation and taking corrective action where deficiencies\nare found.\n49 C. F. R. 195. 403(b)(1)-(2) (Notice Item 7) — Respondent's failure to demonstrate through its\nrecords that it had engaged in a review with personnel of their performance in meeting training\nprogram objectives and the company's failure to demonstrate that it had made appropriate\nchanges to its emergency response training program to ensure its effectiveness. Respondent's\nrecords did not contain any records of an annual review of its emergency response personnel's\nperformance to ensure the adequacy of their emergency response training.\n\n\n\n49 C. F. R. $ 403(c) (Notice Item 8) — Respondent's failure to demonstrate through its records that\nit had verified that supervisors maintained a thorough knowledge of that portion of the $ 195, 402\nprocedures for which they were responsible. Although Respondent's training procedures gave\nguidance for annual verification of each supervisor's knowledge of procedures, Respondent had\nno records indicating that managers had actually verified each supervisor's knowledge of such\nprocedures.\n49 C. F. R. ) 195. 428(a) (Notice Item 10) — Respondent's failure to inspect and test at intervals of\neach calendar year not to exceed 15 months each relief valve to determine whether it was\nfunctioning properly, was in good mechanical condition, and was adequate from the standpoint\nof capacity and reliability of operation for the service in which it was used. At the time of the\ninspection, the Flex Flow relief valve on the Cutbank Tank Hill had not been tested at the proper\nintervals.\n49 C. F. R. $ 195. 581(c)(1)-(2) (Notice Item 11) — Respondent's failure to protect against\natmospheric corrosion for portions of pipelines in soil-to-air interfaces or to show that corrosion\nwould only be a light surface oxide or that it would not affect safe operation. Piping associated\nwith Tank 10 at the Santa Rita pump station was resting directly on the ground with no\nadditional coating for protection against soil abrasion. Areas where pipe rests directly on the\nground are considered soil-to-air interfaces,\n49 C. F. R. () 195 195, 583(c) and 195. 589(c) (Notice Item 12) — Respondent's failure to protect\nagainst atmospheric corrosion and failure to maintain corrosion control records of each analysis,\ncheck, demonstration, inspection, investigation, review, survey, and test to detail the accuracy of\ncorrosion control measures. Respondent's atmospheric corrosion investigation records of certain\nvalves north of the Santa Rita station indicated that there was atmospheric corrosion present. At\nthe time of the inspection, no corrosion control measures action had been taken.\nHaving considered such information, I find, pursuant to 49 C. F. R, ( 109 205, that probable\nviolations of 49 C. F. R. $ 195. 310(b)(9) (Notice Item 2), 49 C. F. R. ) 195. 402(d)(5) (Notice Item\n5), 49 C. F. R. 195. 403(b)(1)-(2) (Notice Item 7), 49 C. F. R. ) 403(c) (Notice Item 8), 49 C. F. R. (\n195. 428(a) (Notice Item 10), 49 C. F, R. ) 195, 581(c)(1)-(2) (Notice Item 11), and 49 C. F. R )$\n195. 195. 583(c) and 195. 589(c) (Notice Item 12) have occurred and Respondent is hereby\nadvised to correct such conditions. In the event that PHMSA finds a violation for any of these\nitems in a subsequent inspection, Respondent may be subject to future enforcement action.\nThe terms and conditions of this Final Order shall be effective upon receipt,\nAPR 1 8 N08\nDate Issued\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety","truncated":false,"body_characters":12430}