{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 520055020H","title":"CYPRESS INTERSTATE PIPELINE LLC — Corrective Action Order","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2005-04-21","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED corrective action order.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520055020h.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520055020h.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520055020h","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/520055020H","body":"Corrective Action Order involving CYPRESS INTERSTATE PIPELINE LLC. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2005-04-21 and is reported as closed as of 2010-03-17. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n520055020H_corrective action order_04212005.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520055020H/520055020H_corrective%20action%20order_04212005.pdf\n\n520055020h_corrective action order_04212005_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520055020H/520055020h_corrective%20action%20order_04212005_text.pdf\n\ncpf_520055020H.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520055020H/cpf_520055020H.pdf\n\n520055020h_corrective action order_04212005_text.pdf\n\nU, S. Department\nof Transportation\nPipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration\n400 Seventh Street, S W\nWashington, D. C 20590\nAPR 2 t I\nMr. Richard D. Kinder\nChairman, President, and CEO\nKinder Morgan Energy Partners, L. P.\n500 Dallas Street, Suite 1000\nHouston, TX 77002\nRe: CPF No. 5-2005-5020H\nDear Mr. Kinder:\nEnclosed is a Corrective Action Order issued by the Associate Administrator for Pipehne\nSafety in the above-referenced case. It requires you to take certain corrective actions, mcluding a\npressure reduction, with respect to yoiu LS-11/12/13 Rocklin, CA to Reno, NV hazardous liquid\npipehne. Service is being made by certified mail and facsimile. Your receipt of this Corrective\nAction Order constitutes service of that document under 49 C. F. R. ) 190. 5. The terms and\nconditions of this Corrective Action Order are effective upon receipt.\nSincerely,\n~es Reynolds\nPipehne Compliance Registry\nOffice of Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. Jerry Milhorn, Vice President, Operations\nMr. Thomas A. Bannigan, President, Products Pipehnes\nMr. Chris Hoidal, Regional Director, Western Region, OPS\nVIA CERTIFIED MAIL RETURN RECEIPT RE UKSTED AND TKLKCOPY\n\n\n\nDEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON) DC 20590\nIn the Matter of\n)\n)\nKinder Morgan Energy Partners, L. P.\n, )\n)\nRespondent.\n)\nCPF No. 5-2005-5020H\nCORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nPur ose and Back round\nThis Corrective Action Order is being issued, under authority of 49 U. S. C. $ 60112, to require\nKinder Morgan Energy Partners, L. P. (Respondent) to take the necessary corrective action to protect\nthe public, property, and the environment from potential hazards associated with a failure involving\nRespondent's LS-11/12/13 Rockhn, CA to Reno, NV (Rocklin-Reno) hazardous liquid pipeline\nAt an unknown date and time, a failure occurred on Respondent's Rocklin-Reno line in Placer\nCounty, CA resulting in the release of gasoline. The cause of failure has been preliminarily\nattributed to damage from wrinkle bends made dming construction of the pipeline. Dents and pipe\nassociated with the wrinkle bends indicate stress corrosion cracking (SCC), disbonded coating, and\ngeneral corrosion. Pursuant to 49 U. S, C. ) 60117, the Western Region, Office of Pipehne Safety\n(OPS) initiated an investigation of the incident. The California State Fire Marshal (CASFM), which\nhas authority to act as an mterstate agent for OPS, responded to the failure and continues\nparticipating in the mvestigation along with OPS inspectors.\nPreliminar Findin s\nAt an unknown date and time, Respondent's Rockhn-Reno hne experienced a failure m Placer\nCounty, CA resultmg m the release of an unknown quantity of refined petroleum products in\na snow-packed area of the Sierra Mountains approximately three miles west of Truckee, CA.\nThe failure site is located approximately at Mile Post 75. 95.\n~ Respondent became aware that the Rocklin-Reno line may have experienced a release at or\naround 11:15 A. M. PST on April 1, 2005, after a skier reported the smell of gasoline in the\nvicmity of the failure to authorities. Respondent shut down the Rocklin-Reno hne and reported\nthe possible failure to the National Response Center at 12:48 P. M. PST. At approximately 6:20\n\n\n\nP. M. PST, Respondent de-pressured and emptied the Rockhn-Reno hne by draining it downhill\ntoward the pipehne terminal in Reno, NV.\nAttempting to locate the source of the leak, Respondent began excavation activities in the\nvicinity of the suspected failure on the morning of April 2. Snow over the pipeline of depths\nexceeding twenty feet and blizzard conditions hampered access to the site and excavation\nactivities. On April 4, at approximately 6 P. M. PST, Respondent identified and confirmed the\nlocation of the failure at Mile Post 75. 95 after injecting a gas tracer into the line. A boulder was\nlocated over the pipeline in the immediate area of the identified failure location.\nOn April 5, Respondent removed and replaced a 14. 5-foot section of pipe containing the failure\nsite under the observation of the CASFM. Visual inspection of the removed pipe revealed\nmultiple dents ahgned in two axial rows on the top portion of the pipe. A crack found in one\nof the dents appeared to be the likely source of the leak.\nNo fires, injuries, or fatalities were reported in connection with the incident. Refined products\nwere released into headwater streams of Donner Creek, an area designated by pipeline safety\nregulations as unusually sensitive to environmental damage because of its connection to\ndrinking water resources and presence of certain ecological communities. Respondent used\nbooms to contain the spread of product into Donner Creek.\nRespondent's Rocklin-Reno line transports refined petroleum products including diesel fuel,\n~et fuel, and gasohne to tank farms, wholesalers, an airport, and defense facilities. Its total\nlength is approximately 120. 92 miles. Portions o f the pipehne traverse highways and are routed\nthough or near wildhfe habitats, drinking water resources, populated areas and bodies of water.\nRespondent sent the failed portion of the pipeline to Exponent Failure Analysis in Menlo Park,\nCA for metallurgical examination. Chain of custody of the pipe and the metallurgical\nexamination were observed by CASFM and OPS inspectors. Preliminarily, the cause of failure\nhas been attributed to damage from wrinkle bends made during construction of the pipeline\nDents and pipe associated with the wrinkle bends indicate stress corrosion cracking (SCC),\ndisbonded coating, and general corrosion.\nOn October 8, 2003, OPS issued an advisory bulletin to owners and operators of hazardous\nliquid and gas pipelines advising them to assess their pipelines for susceptibihty to SCC. The\nadvisory bulletin has been published in the Federal Register (58 Fed. Reg. 58166) and on the\nOPS website at http: //ops. dot. gov. The advisory bulletin contains detailed instructions on\nidentifying and addressing the SCC threat.\n~ The Rocklin-Reno pipeline contains pipe of varying diameter, wall thickness, grade, and\ncoating. The LS-12 portion of the Rockhn-Reno pipeline containing the failure site was\ninstalled in 1957 and is constructed of 8. 625-inch nominal diameter, 0. 250-inch wall thickness,\nX-46 grade, seamless pipe manufactured by National Tube. The Rockhn-Reno hne is\ncathodically protected by impressed current.\n\n\n\nThe maximum operating pressure (MOP) of the Rocklin-Reno line is 1920 psig at the Cisco\nGrove Pump Station, as estabhshed by hydostratic pressure test in 1957. At the time of\nnotification of the possibihty of failure, the pressure at the failure site is estimated to have been\n375 psig.\nRespondent performed internal inspections on the Rocklin-Reno line with deformation and\nmagnetic flux leakage in-line inspection tools in June 1997.\nIn March 1997, Respondent experienced a release approximately 800 feet from the current\nfailure site. The 1997 release was attnbuted to third party damage from the mstallation of fiber\noptic utility lines.\nRespondent resumed limited operation of the Rocklin-Reno line at approximately 4 P. M. PST\non Apnl 5, 2005 at a discharge pressure of approximately 1536 psig at its Cisco Grove Pump\nStation (80'/o of MOP).\nDetermination of Necessi for Corrective Action Order and Ri ht to Hearin\nSection 60112 of Title 49, United States Code, provides for the issuance of a Corrective Action\nOrder, after reasonable notice and the opportunity for a heanng, requiring corrective action, which\nmay mclude the suspended or restncted use of a pipeline facility, physical inspection, testing, repair,\nreplacement, or other action as appropriate. The basis for making the determination that a pipeline\nfacihty is hazardous, requinng corrective action, is set forth both in the above-referenced statute and\n49 C. F. R. $190. 233, a copy of which is enclosed.\nSection 60112, and the regulations promulgated thereunder, provides for the issuance of a Corrective\nAction Order without prior opportunity for notice and heanng upon a finding that failure to issue the\nOrder expeditiously will result in likely serious harm to life, property or the environment. In such\ncases, an opportunity for a hearing will be provided as soon as practicable after the issuance of the\nOrder.\nAfter evaluatmg the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, I find that the continued operation of\nRespondent's Rockhn-Reno hazardous liquid pipeline without corrective measures would be\nhazardous to life, property and the environment. Additionally, after considenng the age of the pipe,\nthe proximity of the pipeline to unusually sensitive area dnnking water and ecological resources and\npopulated areas, the combustible nature o f the products the pipeline transports, the pressure required\nfor transporting the material, prelimmary indications of SCC, general corrosion, and other damage\nat the failure site, and the ongomg investigation to make a final determination as to the cause of the\nfailure, I find that a failure to expeditiously issue this Order requiring immediate corrective action\nwould hkely result in senous harm to hfe, property, or the environment.\n\n\n\nAccordingly, this Corrective Action Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued without\nprior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Order are effective upon\nreceipt.\nWithm 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may request a hearing, to be held as soon as\npracticable, by notifying the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, delivered\npersonally, by mail or by telecopy at (202) 366-4566. The hearing will be held in Lakewood, CO\nor Washington, DC on a date that is mutually convenient to OPS and Respondent.\nAfter receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, OPS may identify\nother corrective measures that need to be taken. In that event, Respondent will be notified of any\nadditional measures required and amendment of this Order will be considered. To the extent\nconsistent with safety, Responder t will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to\nthe imposition of any additional corrective measures.\nRe nired Corrective Action\nPursuant to 49 U. S. C. $ 60112, I hereby order IQnder Morgan Energy Partners, L. P. to immediately\ntake the following corrective actions with respect to its Rockhn-Reno hazardous hquid pipeline:\n1. Do not exceed 80 percent (80%) of the actual operating pressure in effect at the Cisco Grove\nPump Station just prior to the April 1, 2005 notification of possible failure. Specifically, the\ndischarge pressure is not to exceed 1536 psig at the Cisco Grove Pump Station. If the ongoing\ninvestigation reveals that the operating pressure of 1536 psig cannot be sustained because of\nsafety concerns, the Director, Western Region, may require a pressure reduction based on the\nactual operating pressure at the failure site just prior to the April 1, 2005 notification of possible\nfailure. This pressure restriction will remain in effect until written approval to increase the\npressure or return the pipeline to its pre-failure operating pressure is obtained from the Director,\nWestern Region, OPS.\n2. Re-evaluate the data from the in-hne inspection tool runs performed in 1997, including\ninformation obtained from the resulting excavations, for the purpose of determining whether\nany anomalies were present that could have contributed to the failure and whether any other\nanomalies of a similar magnitude are present elsewhere on the pipehne. Make the 1997 in-hne\ninspection results available to OPS or its representative. Re-evaluation must occur within 14\ndays of receipt of this Order. Make timely repairs as required by the pipeline safety regulations\nand in accordance with your approved repair procedures.\n3. Within 45 days of receipt of this Order, perform confirmatory digs on a statistically significant\nsample of locations (a minimum of 10 sites) to corroborate the data obtained from the\n1997 in-line inspection tool run. Use criteria (e. g. , change in elevation, pipeline alignment,\nlocations of known geological instabihty) to ensure that locations with dents, wrinkles, ripples,\nbuckles, and other flaws are identified.\n\n\n\nA. Evaluate excavated pipe sections for evidence of dents or wrinkles, corrosion, disbonded\ncoating, and any crack-hke features, including SCC.\nB. Make timely repairs as required by the pipeline safety regulations and in accordance with\nyour approved repair procedures.\nC. Provide field non-destructive testing results, including the correlation of predicted dent\ndepth from the 1997 in-line inspections and actual field measurements, to the Director,\nWestern Region, OPS.\n4. Within 90 days of receipt of this Order, perform an in-line inspection of the Rocklin-Reno\npipeline with a deformation tool capable of characterizing dent geometry and depth through\ndirect mechamcal measurement. The tool must utilize sufficient sensors to calculate pipe wall\nstrain. Prior to performing the inline inspection and other actions required by this item, submit\nthe proposed action to the Director, Western Region, OPS, for approval.\nA. Evaluate and remediate any anomalies identified as required by the pipehne safety\nregulations and in accordance with your approved repair procedures.\nB. Perform representative digs of anomalies identified to verify and assess the characteristics\nfound in accordance with Item 3C.\n5 Submit all required information to: Director, Western Region, Office of Pipehne Safety, Golden\nHills Center, Suite A-250, 12600 West Colfax Avenue, Lakewood, CO 80215-3736.\n6. The Director, Western Region, OPS may grant an extension of time for comphance with any\nof the terms of this Order for good cause. A request for an extension must be in writing.\nThe corrective actions required by this Corrective Action Order are in addition to and do not waive\nany requirements that apply to the pipeline under 49 C. F. R. Part 195, including the integrity\nmanagement program regulations.\nRespondent may appeal any decision of the Director to the Associate Administrator for Pipehne\nSafety. Decisions of the Associate Administrator shall be final.\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties of not more than\n$100, 000 per day and in referral to the Attorney General for appropriate rehef in United States\nDistri ourt.\nS ceyGer rd\nAsk ci e Administrator\nfor ipehne Safety\nDate ssued","truncated":false,"body_characters":15309}