{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 520071001","title":"NORTHWEST PIPELINE LLC — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2007-01-29","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 192.905(a), 192.905(b), 192.907(a), 192.907(b), 192.909(a), 192.911(k), 192.911(m), 192.917(b), 192.917(e)(4), 192.921(b), 192.921(d), 192.925(b), 192.925(b)(1), 192.925(b)(1)(ii), 192.925(b)(2), 192.925(b)(3), 192.925(b)(3)(iii), 192.925(b)(4), 192.927(a), 192.935(a), 192.935(c), 192.937(b).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520071001.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520071001.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520071001","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/520071001","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving NORTHWEST PIPELINE LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 192.905(a),  192.905(b),  192.907(a),  192.907(b),  192.909(a),  192.911(k),  192.911(m),  192.917(b),  192.917(e)(4),  192.921(b),  192.921(d),  192.925(b),  192.925(b)(1),  192.925(b)(1)(ii),  192.925(b)(2),  192.925(b)(3),  192.925(b)(3)(iii),  192.925(b)(4),  192.927(a),  192.935(a),  192.935(c),  192.937(b). The case was opened on 2007-01-29 and is reported as closed as of 2012-07-09. Proposed civil penalty: $351,000. Assessed civil penalty: $306,000. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n520071001_ notice letter_01292007.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520071001/520071001_%20notice%20letter_01292007.pdf\n\n520071001_ notice letter_01292007_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520071001/520071001_%20notice%20letter_01292007_text.pdf\n\n520071001_closure letter_07092012.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520071001/520071001_closure%20letter_07092012.pdf\n\n520071001_closure letter_07092012_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520071001/520071001_closure%20letter_07092012_text.pdf\n\n520071001_Final Order_05022011.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520071001/520071001_Final%20Order_05022011.pdf\n\n520071001_Final Order_05022011_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520071001/520071001_Final%20Order_05022011_text.pdf\n\n520071001_Operator_Response_and_Requesting_Hearing_03012007.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520071001/520071001_Operator_Response_and_Requesting_Hearing_03012007.pdf\n\n520071001_Final Order_05022011_text.pdf\n\nMAY 02 2011\nMr. Randy Barnard\nPresident\nWilliams Gas Pipeline\nThe Williams Companies, Inc.\n2800 Post Oak Boulevard\nHouston, TX 77056\nRE: CPF No. 5-2007-1001\nDear Mr. Barnard:\nEnclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of\nviolation, assesses a reduced civil penalty of $306,000, and specifies actions that need to be\ntaken by Williams Gas Pipeline to comply with the federal pipeline safety regulations. When the\ncivil penalty has been paid and the terms of the compliance order completed, as determined by\nthe Director, Western Region, this enforcement action will be closed. Service of the Final Order\nby certified mail is deemed effective upon the date of mailing, or as otherwise provided under 49\nC.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. Chris Hoidal, Director, Western Region, OPS\nMs. Teresa Silcox Torrey, Senior Counsel, Williams Gas Pipeline\n296 Chipeta Way, Salt Lake City, UT 84108\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n_________________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nWilliams Gas Pipeline, ) CPF No. 5-2007-1001\na division of The Williams Companies, Inc., )\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n_________________________________________ )\nFINAL ORDER\nOn March 13-17 and March 27-30, 2006, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, a representative of the\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety\n(OPS), conducted an on-site pipeline safety inspection of the facilities and records of Williams\nGas Pipeline’s Integrity Management Program (IMP) at its offices in Salt Lake City, Utah.\nWilliams Gas Pipeline (Williams or Respondent) is a division of The Williams Companies, Inc.,\na global energy company that transports approximately 12 percent of the natural gas consumed in\n(1) Northwest Pipeline, with approximately 4,000 miles of pipeline running from Canada to the\nPacific Northwest; (2) Transco Pipeline, with approximately 12,800 miles of pipeline running\nthe United States.1 The inspection covered three gas transmission systems operated by Williams:\nfrom Texas into the Southeast and Northeast; and (3) Gulfstream Pipeline, with approximately\n700 miles of pipeline running from Alabama across the Gulf of Mexico to Florida.\nAs a result of the inspection, the Director, Western Region, OPS (Director), issued to\nRespondent, by letter dated January 29, 2007, a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil\nPenalty, and Proposed Compliance Order (Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the\nNotice proposed finding that Respondent committed certain violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 192 and\nassessing a civil penalty of $351,000 for the alleged violations. The Notice also proposed that\nRespondent be required to take certain measures to correct the alleged violations. It also\nproposed finding that Respondent had committed certain other probable violations of 49 C.F.R.\nPart 192 and warning Respondent to take appropriate corrective action or be subject to future\nenforcement action.\n1 The Williams Companies’ website (http://www.williams.com/gas_pipeline/) (last accessed 3/15/11).\n\n\n\n2\nWilliams responded to the Notice by letter dated, March 1, 2007 (Response). Respondent\ncontested several allegations, offered information and exhibits in support of its position, and\nrequested mitigation of the proposed penalty. Williams also raised a legal challenge that\nPHMSA did not have authority, under the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 (PSIA) or\nthe Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement, and Safety Act of 2006 (PIPES), at the time of\nthe alleged violations to issue civil penalties or compliance orders in gas integrity management\ncases. Respondent argued that the Notice constituted an illegal retroactive application of PSIA\nand PIPES not expressly authorized or intended by Congress.\n2\nWilliams requested a hearing, which was subsequently held on May 23, 2007, in Denver,\nColorado, with an attorney from the Office of Chief Counsel, PHMSA, presiding. After the\nhearing, Respondent provided a post-hearing submission dated June 21, 2007 (Closing).\nAuthority of PHMSA to Enforce Integrity Management Regulations\nPHMSA to act under § 60109(a)(2) to order an operator to revise its IMP with a Notice of\nAmendment type of enforcement action (amend the program plans and procedures). Williams\nfurther argued that the statute precludes or does not give PHMSA the authority to act under any\nAs a preliminary matter, Respondent argued that 49 U.S.C. § 60109(c)(9)(A)(iii)3 only permits\nother section of Chapter 601 to enforce integrity management program regulations by issuing\ncompliance orders and civil penalties. Respondent also argued that Congress provided operators\na four-year period to go from an IMP framework to a fully thought out, robust IMP.\nWith the enactment of the PSIA, the U.S. Congress directed the Department of Transportation,\nPHMSA, to establish and issue regulations detailing standards for the implementation of an\nintegrity management program. The PIPES Act of 2006 codified the integrity management\nprogram.\nThe authority set forth in §§ 60119 and 60122 to enforce pipeline safety standards, laws and\nregulations through compliance orders and civil penalties has been codified since 1979 and\nnothing in PSIA or the PIPES Act affected this authority.\nAny suggestion that, prior to the PIPES Act, section 60109(c)(9)(A)(iii) limited the agency’s\nauthority with respect to operator conduct and to only require an operator to amend an\ninadequate or noncompliant integrity management program is therefore incorrect.\nConsidering the authority established in §§ 60118 and 60122; the legislative history of both\nPSIA of 2002 and PIPES Act of 2006; and the legal issues presented, I find that PHMSA had the\nauthority and did properly exercise the full spectrum of enforcement tools upon a determination\nthat a risk analysis or integrity management program is inadequate or noncompliant.\n2 Response, at 2-3.\n3 Subsection 60109(c)(9)(A)(iii) states: “If the Secretary determines that a risk analysis or integrity management\nprogram does not comply with the requirements of this subsection or regulations issued as described in paragraph\n(2), has not been adequately implemented, or is inadequate for the safe operation of a pipeline facility, the Secretary\nmay conduct proceedings under this chapter.” (emphasis added)\n\n\n\n3\nFINDINGS OF VIOLATION\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. Part 192, as follows:\nItem 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.947(d) and 192.905(a),\nwhich state:\n§ 192.947 What records must an operator keep?\nAn operator must maintain, for the useful life of the pipeline, records that\ndemonstrate compliance with the requirements of this subpart. At minimum,\nan operator must maintain the following records for review during an\ninspection.\n(a) . . .\n(d) Documents to support any decision, analysis and process developed\nand used to implement and evaluate each element of the baseline assessment\nplan and integrity management program. Documents include those developed\nand used in support of any identification, calculation, amendment,\nmodification, justification, deviation and determination made, and any action\ntaken to implement and evaluate any of the program elements.\n§ 192.905(a) How does an operator identify a high consequence area?\n(a) General. To determine which segments of an operator’s transmission\npipeline system are covered by this subpart, an operator must identify the high\nconsequence areas. An operator must use method (1) or (2) from the\ndefinition in §192.903 to identify a high consequence area. An operator may\napply one method to its entire pipeline system, or an operator may apply one\nmethod to individual portions of the pipeline system. An operator must\ndescribe in its integrity management program which method it is applying to\neach portion of the operator’s pipeline system. The description must include\nthe potential impact radius when utilized to establish a high consequence area.\n(See appendix E.I. for guidance on identifying high consequence areas.)\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.947(d) and 192.905(a) by failing\nto describe and document in its IMP which method it had applied to each portion of its pipeline\nsystem to identify High Consequence Area (HCA) segments.4\nThe Notice also alleged that\nWilliams had failed to maintain records to support any decision, analysis or process developed\nand used to implement its IMP. Specifically, it alleged that Respondent failed to keep\ndocuments supporting the process(es) that had been used to identify each HCA segment.\nAt the hearing, Williams acknowledged that its IMP procedures needed to include stronger\nlanguage stating what data and methodology were used for identifying HCAs, yet submitted page\n4 A “High Consequence Area” is defined as: 1) an offshore area; or any class location unit that has 10 or fewer\nbuildings intended for human occupancy; (2) any class location unit that has more than 10 but fewer than 46\nbuildings intended for human occupancy; (3) any class location unit that has 46 or more buildings intended for\nhuman occupancy; or (ii) An area where the pipeline lies within 100 yards (91 meters) of either a building or a\nsmall, well-defined outside area (such as a playground, recreation area, outdoor theater, or other place of public\nassembly) that is occupied by 20 or more persons on at least 5 days a week for 10 weeks in any 12-month period. 49\nC.F.R. 192.5 (b)(3); or (4) any class location unit where buildings with four or more stories above ground are\nprevalent. 49 C.F.R. 192.5 (b)(4).\n\n\n\n4\n1 of Chapter 4 of its IMP Overview to demonstrate its compliance with the regulations. OPS\nresponded by pointing out that while page 1indicated the use of Method 1 in identifying HCAs,5\nthe OPS inspection team had discovered indications that Method 2 was also used. OPS argued\nthat the inspection team found inconsistencies between Respondent’s summary and its actual\nprocedures.\nWilliams explained that the inconsistencies in Chapter 4 of its IMP Overview resulted from a\ntypographical error and that in addition to correcting this error, the company had revised its\nBaseline Assessment Plan (BAP) to include the correct method being used for each HCA.\nHowever, Respondent did not deny that it had failed to provide the OPS inspection team with\ndocumentation of the methods it had used to identify each HCA segment.\nAccordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Williams violated 49 C.F.R.\n§§ 192.947(d) and 192.905(a) by failing to describe and document in its IMP which methods it\nhad applied to each portion of its pipeline to identify HCA segments by the December 17, 2004\ndeadline (December 2004 Deadline) imposed under 49 C.F.R. § 192.907(a).\nItem 2A: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.905(a), which states:\n§ 192.905 How does an operator identify a high consequence area?\n(a) General. To determine which segments of an operator’s transmission\npipeline system are covered by this subpart, an operator must identify the high\nconsequence areas. An operator must use method (1) or (2) from the\ndefinition in §192.903 to identify a high consequence area. An operator may\napply one method to its entire pipeline system, or an operator may apply one\nmethod to individual portions of the pipeline system. An operator must\ndescribe in its integrity management program which method it is applying to\neach portion of the operator’s pipeline system. The description must include\nthe potential impact radius when utilized to establish a high consequence area.\n(See appendix E.I. for guidance on identifying high consequence areas.)\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.905(a) by failing to describe in its\nIMP which method it had applied to each portion of its pipeline to identify HCA segments.\nSpecifically, it alleged that the system maps and the GIS system used by Respondent failed to\nestablish a suitable means of documenting segment locations in HCAs. According to the Notice,\n5 Operators may identify HCAs using either of two methods:\no Method 1: A pipeline segment is located in a high consequence area if any of the following apply:\n A Class 3 location under 192.5; or\n A Class 4 location under 192.5; or\n Any area outside a Class 3 or Class 4 location where the potential impact radius is greater than 660\nfeet (200 meters), and the area within a potential impact circle contains 20 or more buildings\nintended for human occupancy; or\n The area within a potential impact circle containing an identified site.\no Method 2: A pipeline segment is located in a high consequence area if any of the following apply:\n The area within a potential impact circle contains 20 or more buildings intended for human\noccupancy; or\n The area within a potential impact circle contains an identified site.\n\n\n\n5\nWilliams’ personnel acknowledged during the OPS inspection that the accuracy of its pipe-\nsegment locating process ranged from survey quality to +/- 40 feet and that Respondent had not\ntaken any action to address these known inaccuracies in its HCA identification process.\nAt the hearing, Williams posed that it was unnecessary to account for uncertainties in its HCA\nidentification process. Respondent argued that § 192.905(a) did not require system maps or GIS\nsystems, nor did it address quality assurance methods. Respondent advised that every year it\nperformed a structure survey to review data on its GIS.\nIn response, OPS asserted that, during the March 13, 2006 inspection, Williams’ process for\nconversion from legacy alignment sheets and survey notes to GIS was discussed and fully\nexplained. OPS testified that discussions with Respondent included past and current processes\nand activities and focused on continuous improvement of centerline accuracy, including\ncollection of survey grade points, ortho-photo centerline and ortho-photo structure location\ncorrections. OPS also testified that Engineering Services Management of Change (MOC) and\nannual update processes were shared and discussed on March 16, 2006, to further reinforce\ncontinuous improvement processes related to GIS centerline data integrity and related facility\ndrawings. OPS explained that the issue was the need to factor uncertainty into HCA\nidentification and to document a suitable means of delineating segment locations.\nIn response and in support of its position, Williams introduced INGAA’s letter to Stacey Gerard,\nformer Associate Administrator of PHMSA, as documentation that the application of uncertainty\nfactors to the identification of HCAs was “overkill,\n” based on the ratio of assessment of non-\ncovered segments to covered segment miles. Respondent argued that it had discussed and\ndescribed this process to the OPS inspection team.\nOPS responded that the company’s identification process was inadequate and still under\ndevelopment, at a time when a more mature process should have been in place. Based upon its\ninspection and review of Chapter 4 of Respondent’s IMP Overview, OPS contended that\nHCA identification process. OPS staff testified that during the inspection, Respondent had not\ndescribed the PIR of the method used to establish HCAs and that the inspection team had found\nno documentation that Williams had considered additional buffers to account for potential\npipeline location inaccuracies. Furthermore, OPS explained that many HCAs had not been\nWilliams had applied no safety factors to the calculation of potential impact radii6 (PIRs) in the\nidentified when inspectors reviewed the company’s alignment sheets.\nAccordingly, after considering all the evidence, I find that Williams violated 49 C.F.R.\n§ 192.905(a) by failing to describe in its IMP which method it had applied to each portion of its\npipeline to identify HCA segments, in that the inaccurate maps and electronic GIS system used\nby the company failed to properly document segment locations.\nItem 2B: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.905(b), which states:\n6 “Potential impact radius” is defined in § 191.903 as the radius of a circle within which the potential failure of a\npipeline could have significant impact on people or property.\n\n\n\n6\n§ 192.905 How does an operator identify a high consequence area?\n(a) . . .\n(b)(1) Identified sites. An operator must identify an identified site, for\npurposes of this subpart, from information the operator has obtained from\nroutine operation and maintenance activities and from public officials with\nsafety or emergency response or planning responsibilities who indicate to the\noperator that they know of locations that meet the identified site criteria.\nThese public officials could include officials on a local emergency planning\ncommission or relevant Native American tribal officials.\n(2) If a public official with safety or emergency response or planning\nresponsibilities informs an operator that it does not have the information to\nidentify an identified site, the operator must use one of the following sources,\nas appropriate, to identify these sites.\n(i) Visible marking (e.g., a sign); or\n(ii) The site is licensed or registered by a Federal, State, or local\ngovernment agency; or\n(iii) The site is on a list (including a list on an internet web site) or map\nmaintained by or available from a Federal, State, or local government agency\nand available to the general public.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.905(b) by failing to use certain\ninformation available to it in cases where public officials with safety or emergency response or\nplanning responsibilities had informed the company that they did not have information\ndelineating identified sites. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Williams had failed, by the\nDecember 2004 Deadline, to use visible markings, licensing or registration by a governmental\nagency, or listing on the Internet or other public available maps maintained by governmental\nentities to delineate identified sites in lieu of obtaining relevant information from public officials.\nIn addition, it alleged that Williams did not have procedures on how it located identified sites\nusing such alternative sources of information. During the OPS inspection, the inspector\nconducted a review of Respondent’s procedures, including IM Procedure 10.09.01.10,\nEstablishing Class and HCA Location, Section 8.1.10, and alleged that they did not address the\nneed to use these other information sources.\nAs for the first allegation, Williams acknowledged at the hearing that it had not been able, by the\nDecember 2004 Deadline, to secure information on potential identified sites with its April 2005\nmail-out to public officials having safety or emergency response or planning responsibilities.\nRespondent argued nevertheless that the regulation did not require that a mail-out be undertaken\nto public officials for the purposes of obtaining identified site information. It also reiterated its\nposition that it had not been informed by any public official that it lacked sufficient information\nto identify an identified site. Respondent further advised that it had completed a pilot project to\n192), which is a query from available lists, and had found the results to be insufficiently\naccurate.\nevaluate the use of Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)7 codes (Method 3 suggested in Part\n7 SIC Codes are used to create targeted mailing lists by industry type.\n\n\n\n7\nI find that although Williams had some documentation showing potential identified sites through\nthe use of alignment sheets, there were no dates on these sheets earlier than 2006; therefore,\nthese sheets are not probative of whether or not the company used such information prior to the\nDecember 2004 Deadline. I also find that even if Respondent had other marked-up alignment\nsheets prior to 2006, they were not provided at the time of the inspection, during the hearing, or\nwith the Closing.\nThere is no evidence in the record that Respondent had made any effort to obtain information\nfrom public officials to gather data on potential identified sites prior to the December 2004\nDeadline. Williams testified that it had used “visible markings such as signs” to delineate\nidentified sites; however, such information is only allowed under the regulation to be used to the\nextent that the operator is unable to obtain information from public officials. The intent of the\nregulation is to require operators to seek information from public officials who are better\ninformed than operators about where identified sites are located, how to avoid damaging such\nsites, how to recognize and report emergencies that may arise, and how to protect isolated\npopulation areas located near pipelines. It is only when such information is unavailable from\npublic officials that operators may use other data sources to delineate identified sites.\nAs for the second allegation that it lacked proper procedures for using alternative information\n§ 192.905 defining the term “identified sites” and stating: “This year we’ll also have to locate\n“high consequence areas”\ncalled identified sites. We will be required to locate these all the way\nout to the 660” line.” These Field Instructions, however, do not contain detailed procedures\ndescribing the use of alternative information sources.\nsources, Williams submitted a copy of its 2004 Field Instructions,8 which quoted language from\nAccordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.\n§ 192.905(b), by failing to use alternative sources of information to identify HCAs after being\nunable to obtain information from public officials regarding identified sites, by the December\n2004 Deadline.\nItem 3: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.907(a), which states:\n§ 192.907 What must an operator do to implement this subpart?\n(a) General. No later than December 17, 2004, an operator of a covered\npipeline segment must develop and follow a written integrity management\nprogram that contains all the elements described in § 192.911 and that\naddresses the risks on each covered transmission pipeline segment. The initial\nintegrity management program must consist, at a minimum, of a framework\nthat describes the process for implementing each program element, how\nrelevant decisions will be made and by whom, a time line for completing the\nwork to implement the program element, and how information gained from\nexperience will be continuously incorporated into the program. The\nframework will evolve into a more detailed and comprehensive program. An\noperator must make continual improvements to the program.\n8 Closing, DVD, at 47.\n\n\n\n8\nItem 3 of the Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.907(a) by failing to meet\nthe December 2004 Deadline for developing and following a written IMP that contained all the\nelements described in § 192.911 and that addressed the risks on each covered transmission\npipeline segment. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Williams’ records revealed that, as of\nApril and May 2005, the company’s HCA identification process was still incomplete. For\nexample, it alleged that public officials had not been contacted for the location of identified sites\nuntil April 2005.\nAt the hearing, Respondent repeated its response to Item 2B above and argued that as of the\nDecember 2004 Deadline, public officials had not provided any information on identified sites.\nIt further argued that § 192.907(a) did not require that a mail-out be undertaken to public\nofficials for the purposes of obtaining identified site information. Instead, the company indicated\nthat it had identified HCAs in Class 1 and 2 areas by the December 2004 Deadline using\ninformation obtained from routine operation and maintenance activities.\nOPS responded that Williams did not even start to contact public officials until 2005, after the\nDecember 2004 Deadline. OPS argued that because Respondent had not sought information on\nidentified sites from public officials in a timely manner, its delineation of identified sites was\nincomplete as of the December 2004 Deadline.\nAfter considering all the evidence, I find that none of the documentation submitted by\nRespondent during the hearing or in the company’s Closing demonstrates that the identified sites\nwere properly delineated prior to the December 2004 Deadline. Therefore, I find Respondent\nviolated 49 C.F.R. § 192.907(a), by failing to develop and follow a written IMP by the December\n2004 Deadline that contained all the elements described in § 192.911 and that addressed the risks\non each covered transmission pipeline segment.\nItem 4: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.905(a), as quoted above,\nby failing to properly identify HCA areas using one of the methods described in paragraphs (1)\nor (2) (Methods 1 and 2) below from the definition of “High Consequence Area” provided in\n§ 192.903. That section states, in relevant part:\n§ 192.903 What definitions apply to this subpart?\nThe following definitions apply to this subpart: . . .\nHigh consequence area means an area established by one of the methods\ndescribed in paragraphs (1) or (2) as follows:\n(1) An area defined as\n(i) A Class 3 location under §192.5; or\n(ii) A Class 4 location under §192.5; or\n(iii) Any area in a Class 1 or Class 2 location where the potential impact\nradius is greater than 660 feet (200 meters), and the area within a potential\nimpact circle contains 20 or more buildings intended for human occupancy; or\n(iv) Any area in a Class 1 or Class 2 location where the potential impact\ncircle contains an identified site.\n(2) The area within a potential impact circle containing\n(i) 20 or more buildings intended for human occupancy, unless the\nexception in paragraph(4) applies; or\n(ii) An identified site.\n\n\n\n9\n(3) Where a potential impact circle is calculated under either method (1) or\n(2) to establish a high consequence area, the length of the high consequence\narea extends axially along the length of the pipeline from the outermost edge of\nthe first potential impact circle that contains either an identified site or 20 or\nmore buildings intended for human occupancy to the outermost edge of the last\ncontiguous potential impact circle that contains either an identified site or 20 or\nmore buildings intended for human occupancy. (See figure E.I.A. in appendix\nE.)….\nIdentified site means each of the following areas:\n(a) An outside area or open structure that is occupied by twenty (20) or\nmore persons on at least 50 days in any twelve (12)-month period. (The days\nneed not be consecutive.) Examples include but are not limited to, beaches,\nplaygrounds, recreational facilities, camping grounds, outdoor theaters,\nstadiums, recreational areas near a body of water, or areas outside a rural\nbuilding such as a religious facility; or\n(b) A building that is occupied by twenty (20) or more persons on at least\nfive (5) days a week for ten (10) weeks in any twelve (12)-month period. (The\ndays and weeks need not be consecutive.) Examples include, but are not\nlimited to, religious facilities, office buildings, community centers, general\nstores, 4-H facilities, or roller skating rinks;…\nItem 4A of the Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.905(a) by failing to\nproperly apply Method 1 in delineating HCAs, insofar as the full length of Class 3 and 4\nlocations9 was not included in the HCAs. Specifically, the Notice alleged that the OPS\nfull length of its Class 3 and 4 locations within HCA boundaries and that therefore these\ninspection10 had revealed that, in an effort to use Method 1, Williams had failed to include the\nlocations were not properly scheduled for assessment or repairs.\nAt the hearing, Respondent asserted that it had correctly applied Method 1, but acknowledged\nthat not all HCAs had been identified as of the OPS IMP audit in March 2006. The company\nadvised that data was still being analyzed and HCA determinations were still pending.\nWilliams also acknowledged that the HCA boundaries were shorter than the Class 3 dimensions\nbut disagreed with OPS’ assertion that a portion of the HCAs had therefore not been properly\nscheduled for assessment or repair. Williams contended that when it undertook External\nCorrosion Direct Assessment (ECDA), it would visit each site to confirm the actual, required\n9 A Class 3 location is defined as: (i) any class location unit that has 46 or more buildings intended for human\noccupancy; or (ii) an area where the pipeline lies within 100 yards (91 meters) of either a building or a small, well-\ndefined outside area (such as a playground, recreation area, outdoor theater, or other place of public assembly) that\nis occupied by 20 or more persons on at least 5 days a week for 10 weeks in any 12-month period. (The days and\nweeks need not be consecutive.) 49 C.F.R. § 192.5 (b)(3).\nA Class 4 location is any class location unit where buildings with four or more stories above ground are prevalent.\n49 C.F.R. § 192.5(b)(4).\n10 The OPS inspection included a review of Respondent’s Alignment Sheet, Location Class Determination and\nQualification Record, MP 1782.125 to 1783.750, Somerset and Middlesex Counties, NJ Main Line, and DOT-NJ-8.\nPipeline Safety Violation Report, at 10.\n\n\n\n10\nlength of pipe to be inspected. At that point, the company would assess the entire length of the\nHCA. Respondent further contended that when using in-line inspection (ILI), it analyzed data\nfor the entire ILI run, not just for the HCA areas.\nIn its Closing, Williams posed that not correctly identifying the length of the Class 3 and 4\nlocations used in Method 1 was irrelevant since it visited each site to confirm the actual, required\nlength of the pipe to be inspected and then the entire length of the HCA would be assessed. For\nECDA, Respondent stated that the length of the HCA segments was also irrelevant because the\ncompany performed actual field measurements. The company further posed that it treated\nimmediate repair conditions in non-covered segments the same as those in covered segments.\nOPS countered that the issue was not whether Williams took alternative measures to protect the\nintegrity of the pipeline, but, rather, whether the company properly used Method 1 under\n§ 192.905(a) to identify HCAs. In addition, OPS noted that the company’s repair procedures did\nnot include a specific timeframe for repairing immediate conditions in non-covered segments.\nTherefore, if an immediate condition were located just outside an HCA segment that should have\nincluded the condition, then the condition would not get repaired in a timely manner.\nAccordingly, based upon the company’s own admission and a review of all of the evidence, I\nfind that Williams violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.905(a), by failing to adequately establish HCA areas\nusing Method 1, as described in § 192.903.\nItem 4B of the Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.905(a), as quoted above,\nby failing to properly identify HCA areas using Method 1, as described in the definition of “High\nConsequence Area” under § 192.903. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Williams failed to\nproperly identify HCAs under that portion of Method 1 which calls for the identification of areas\n“in a Class 1 or Class 2 location where the potential impact circle contains an identified site.”\nsites on Williams’ Transco system that the company had failed to include in HCAs. The Notice\nalleged that the HCA identification process was flawed insofar as the company’s field personnel\nwere not even trained in the HCA identification process until well after the December 2004\nAccording to the Notice, documentation reviewed during the inspection 11 showed identified\nDeadline.\nAt the hearing, Williams indicated that training was an ongoing part of its continuous\nimprovement process and that in February 2004, its field personnel had been given instructions\non locating and reporting structures along the pipeline. The company further contended that it\nhad completed company-wide training that restated IMP requirements such as collecting\ninformation on identified sites and that the April-June 2005 training mentioned by the OPS\ninspection team was additional training that covered the entire IM program. In its Closing,\nRespondent provided a copy of its 2004 Field Instructions.\n12\n11 Respondent’s Alignment Sheet, Location Determination and Pipeline Qualification Record, MP 1408.000 to\n1410.87, Pittsylvania County, VA, Main Line, DOT-V-9. Respondent’s Alignment Sheet, Location Determination\nand Pipeline Qualification Record, MP 1457.375 to 1459.375, Appomattox, VA, Main Line, and DOT-V-25B.\nViolation Report, pp. 12 and 45.\n12 Closing, at 47.\n\n\n\n11\nOPS responded that although the 2004 Field Instructions acknowledged identified sites must be\nidentified, Williams did not provide evidence at the time of the inspection that any identified\nsites had actually been identified. OPS testified that its inspection had revealed a company e-\nmail sent in February 2004, entitled “2004 House Count Instructions.” OPS asserted that an\nexamination of the document showed that the 2004 Field Instructions were not training materials\nand did not indicate that Respondent’s employees had actually been trained to delineate\nidentified sites.\nAfter considering all the evidence, I find that the field instructions that were provided as part of\nthe Closing were not provided to the OPS inspection team at the time of the audit. Although\nRespondent’s 2004 Field Instructions acknowledged that identified sites must be identified, I see\nno evidence showing that any sites had actually been identified or that actual training had been\nprovided to company personnel, as would be reflected by sign-in sheets or similar\ndocumentation. I also find that Respondent’s personnel collected information on identified sites\nprior to being properly trained.\nAs a result, Respondent failed to properly identify HCA areas using Method 1 in its HCA\nidentification process, as there was no evidence that Williams considered identified sites that lay\nwithin the potential impact circle of the Class 1 and 2 locations. Accordingly, upon review of all\nof the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.905(a) by failing to properly use\nMethod 1, as described in § 192.903, to include certain identified sites in its HCAs.\nItem 4C of the Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.905(a), as quoted\nabove, by failing to properly identify HCA areas using Method 1, as described in the definition\nof “High Consequence Area” under § 192.903. Specifically, it alleged that Williams improperly\napplied Method 1 by failing to designate certain outdoor areas and buildings as “identified sites.”\nSection 192.903 provides that “[a]n outside area or open structure that is occupied by twenty (20)\nor more persons on at least 50 days in any twelve (12)-month period” shall be considered an\n“identified site.” In addition, it provides that “[a] building that is occupied by twenty (20) or\nmore persons on at least five (5) days a week for ten (10) weeks in any twelve (12)-month\nperiod” shall also be considered an identified site.\nThe Notice alleged that Williams’ procedure, WGP IMP Overview Chapter 4, Section 4.8,\ndefined the term “day” as a continuous 8-hour period, for purposes of determining whether\nstructures or outdoor areas qualified as identified sites. This definition, OPS asserted, was\ninconsistent with the regulation, insofar as the 20-or-more-persons criterion applied to the\npresence of people at a particular location at any point in time, not just for a continuous 8-hour\nperiod. For example, using the definition of “day” set forth in Respondent’s procedure, a picnic\narea would have to sustain 20 or more persons on site for eight hours a day, five days a week, for\n10 weeks (i.e., 50 days) in any 12-month period.\nAt the hearing, Respondent argued that its current Procedure 10.09.01.10 met the requirements\nof §§ 192.903 and 192.905, which do not specify the length of a day. The company argued that\nthe terms “day” and “occupied” in the regulation were nebulous and not clearly defined in 49\nC.F.R. Part 192. In support of its position, Williams suggested that PHMSA’s published\nguidance document, FAQ #211, directly asked for clarification but that the agency had pointedly\nsteered clear of the issue and declined to define the length of a day.\n\n\n\n12\nRespondent’s argument is specious. While it is correct that § 192.903 does not specify how\nmany hours constitute a “day” for purposes of designating identified sites,13 such detail is\nunnecessary. The FAQ #211 guidance document explicitly states that a site is considered an\nidentified site if 20 or more persons occupy it for any length of time, unless they are in transit. I\nfail to see any ambiguity in the regulation. If a site is normally occupied for one hour or 23\nhours per day, it is still considered a “day” for purposes of determining whether to classify the\narea as an identified site. By requiring that a site be occupied for at least eight hours per day,\nRespondent’s procedure greatly reduces the number of sites with outdoor gathering areas or\nbuildings that qualify for the additional protections required for HCAs. I do not believe such a\nprocedure is consistent with the purpose or intent of the term “identified site” in § 192.903.14\nAccordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49\nC.F.R. § 192.905(a) by failing to adequately use Method 1, as described in the definition of\n“High Consequence Area” under § 192.903, to designate certain outdoor areas and buildings as\nidentified sites.\nItem 4D of the Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.905(a), as quoted above,\nby failing to properly designate HCA areas, as defined under § 192.903. Specifically, it alleged\nthat Williams failed to apply the axial extension of the potential ","truncated":true,"body_characters":176452}