# NORTHWEST PIPELINE LLC — Notice of Probable Violation

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** CPF 520071001
- **title:** NORTHWEST PIPELINE LLC — Notice of Probable Violation
- **source type:** enforcement
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** historical
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2007-01-29
- **effective on:** Not available
- **summary:** CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 192.905(a), 192.905(b), 192.907(a), 192.907(b), 192.909(a), 192.911(k), 192.911(m), 192.917(b), 192.917(e)(4), 192.921(b), 192.921(d), 192.925(b), 192.925(b)(1), 192.925(b)(1)(ii), 192.925(b)(2), 192.925(b)(3), 192.925(b)(3)(iii), 192.925(b)(4), 192.927(a), 192.935(a), 192.935(c), 192.937(b).
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**body:**

Notice of Probable Violation involving NORTHWEST PIPELINE LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 192.905(a),  192.905(b),  192.907(a),  192.907(b),  192.909(a),  192.911(k),  192.911(m),  192.917(b),  192.917(e)(4),  192.921(b),  192.921(d),  192.925(b),  192.925(b)(1),  192.925(b)(1)(ii),  192.925(b)(2),  192.925(b)(3),  192.925(b)(3)(iii),  192.925(b)(4),  192.927(a),  192.935(a),  192.935(c),  192.937(b). The case was opened on 2007-01-29 and is reported as closed as of 2012-07-09. Proposed civil penalty: $351,000. Assessed civil penalty: $306,000. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.

Official case documents:

520071001_ notice letter_01292007.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520071001/520071001_%20notice%20letter_01292007.pdf

520071001_ notice letter_01292007_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520071001/520071001_%20notice%20letter_01292007_text.pdf

520071001_closure letter_07092012.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520071001/520071001_closure%20letter_07092012.pdf

520071001_closure letter_07092012_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520071001/520071001_closure%20letter_07092012_text.pdf

520071001_Final Order_05022011.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520071001/520071001_Final%20Order_05022011.pdf

520071001_Final Order_05022011_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520071001/520071001_Final%20Order_05022011_text.pdf

520071001_Operator_Response_and_Requesting_Hearing_03012007.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520071001/520071001_Operator_Response_and_Requesting_Hearing_03012007.pdf

520071001_Final Order_05022011_text.pdf

MAY 02 2011
Mr. Randy Barnard
President
Williams Gas Pipeline
The Williams Companies, Inc.
2800 Post Oak Boulevard
Houston, TX 77056
RE: CPF No. 5-2007-1001
Dear Mr. Barnard:
Enclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of
violation, assesses a reduced civil penalty of $306,000, and specifies actions that need to be
taken by Williams Gas Pipeline to comply with the federal pipeline safety regulations. When the
civil penalty has been paid and the terms of the compliance order completed, as determined by
the Director, Western Region, this enforcement action will be closed. Service of the Final Order
by certified mail is deemed effective upon the date of mailing, or as otherwise provided under 49
C.F.R. § 190.5.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Jeffrey D. Wiese
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety
Enclosure
cc: Mr. Chris Hoidal, Director, Western Region, OPS
Ms. Teresa Silcox Torrey, Senior Counsel, Williams Gas Pipeline
296 Chipeta Way, Salt Lake City, UT 84108
CERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590
_________________________________________
In the Matter of )
Williams Gas Pipeline, ) CPF No. 5-2007-1001
a division of The Williams Companies, Inc., )
)
)
)
Respondent. )
_________________________________________ )
FINAL ORDER
On March 13-17 and March 27-30, 2006, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, a representative of the
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety
(OPS), conducted an on-site pipeline safety inspection of the facilities and records of Williams
Gas Pipeline’s Integrity Management Program (IMP) at its offices in Salt Lake City, Utah.
Williams Gas Pipeline (Williams or Respondent) is a division of The Williams Companies, Inc.,
a global energy company that transports approximately 12 percent of the natural gas consumed in
(1) Northwest Pipeline, with approximately 4,000 miles of pipeline running from Canada to the
Pacific Northwest; (2) Transco Pipeline, with approximately 12,800 miles of pipeline running
the United States.1 The inspection covered three gas transmission systems operated by Williams:
from Texas into the Southeast and Northeast; and (3) Gulfstream Pipeline, with approximately
700 miles of pipeline running from Alabama across the Gulf of Mexico to Florida.
As a result of the inspection, the Director, Western Region, OPS (Director), issued to
Respondent, by letter dated January 29, 2007, a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil
Penalty, and Proposed Compliance Order (Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the
Notice proposed finding that Respondent committed certain violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 192 and
assessing a civil penalty of $351,000 for the alleged violations. The Notice also proposed that
Respondent be required to take certain measures to correct the alleged violations. It also
proposed finding that Respondent had committed certain other probable violations of 49 C.F.R.
Part 192 and warning Respondent to take appropriate corrective action or be subject to future
enforcement action.
1 The Williams Companies’ website (http://www.williams.com/gas_pipeline/) (last accessed 3/15/11).



2
Williams responded to the Notice by letter dated, March 1, 2007 (Response). Respondent
contested several allegations, offered information and exhibits in support of its position, and
requested mitigation of the proposed penalty. Williams also raised a legal challenge that
PHMSA did not have authority, under the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 (PSIA) or
the Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement, and Safety Act of 2006 (PIPES), at the time of
the alleged violations to issue civil penalties or compliance orders in gas integrity management
cases. Respondent argued that the Notice constituted an illegal retroactive application of PSIA
and PIPES not expressly authorized or intended by Congress.
2
Williams requested a hearing, which was subsequently held on May 23, 2007, in Denver,
Colorado, with an attorney from the Office of Chief Counsel, PHMSA, presiding. After the
hearing, Respondent provided a post-hearing submission dated June 21, 2007 (Closing).
Authority of PHMSA to Enforce Integrity Management Regulations
PHMSA to act under § 60109(a)(2) to order an operator to revise its IMP with a Notice of
Amendment type of enforcement action (amend the program plans and procedures). Williams
further argued that the statute precludes or does not give PHMSA the authority to act under any
As a preliminary matter, Respondent argued that 49 U.S.C. § 60109(c)(9)(A)(iii)3 only permits
other section of Chapter 601 to enforce integrity management program regulations by issuing
compliance orders and civil penalties. Respondent also argued that Congress provided operators
a four-year period to go from an IMP framework to a fully thought out, robust IMP.
With the enactment of the PSIA, the U.S. Congress directed the Department of Transportation,
PHMSA, to establish and issue regulations detailing standards for the implementation of an
integrity management program. The PIPES Act of 2006 codified the integrity management
program.
The authority set forth in §§ 60119 and 60122 to enforce pipeline safety standards, laws and
regulations through compliance orders and civil penalties has been codified since 1979 and
nothing in PSIA or the PIPES Act affected this authority.
Any suggestion that, prior to the PIPES Act, section 60109(c)(9)(A)(iii) limited the agency’s
authority with respect to operator conduct and to only require an operator to amend an
inadequate or noncompliant integrity management program is therefore incorrect.
Considering the authority established in §§ 60118 and 60122; the legislative history of both
PSIA of 2002 and PIPES Act of 2006; and the legal issues presented, I find that PHMSA had the
authority and did properly exercise the full spectrum of enforcement tools upon a determination
that a risk analysis or integrity management program is inadequate or noncompliant.
2 Response, at 2-3.
3 Subsection 60109(c)(9)(A)(iii) states: “If the Secretary determines that a risk analysis or integrity management
program does not comply with the requirements of this subsection or regulations issued as described in paragraph
(2), has not been adequately implemented, or is inadequate for the safe operation of a pipeline facility, the Secretary
may conduct proceedings under this chapter.” (emphasis added)



3
FINDINGS OF VIOLATION
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. Part 192, as follows:
Item 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.947(d) and 192.905(a),
which state:
§ 192.947 What records must an operator keep?
An operator must maintain, for the useful life of the pipeline, records that
demonstrate compliance with the requirements of this subpart. At minimum,
an operator must maintain the following records for review during an
inspection.
(a) . . .
(d) Documents to support any decision, analysis and process developed
and used to implement and evaluate each element of the baseline assessment
plan and integrity management program. Documents include those developed
and used in support of any identification, calculation, amendment,
modification, justification, deviation and determination made, and any action
taken to implement and evaluate any of the program elements.
§ 192.905(a) How does an operator identify a high consequence area?
(a) General. To determine which segments of an operator’s transmission
pipeline system are covered by this subpart, an operator must identify the high
consequence areas. An operator must use method (1) or (2) from the
definition in §192.903 to identify a high consequence area. An operator may
apply one method to its entire pipeline system, or an operator may apply one
method to individual portions of the pipeline system. An operator must
describe in its integrity management program which method it is applying to
each portion of the operator’s pipeline system. The description must include
the potential impact radius when utilized to establish a high consequence area.
(See appendix E.I. for guidance on identifying high consequence areas.)
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.947(d) and 192.905(a) by failing
to describe and document in its IMP which method it had applied to each portion of its pipeline
system to identify High Consequence Area (HCA) segments.4
The Notice also alleged that
Williams had failed to maintain records to support any decision, analysis or process developed
and used to implement its IMP. Specifically, it alleged that Respondent failed to keep
documents supporting the process(es) that had been used to identify each HCA segment.
At the hearing, Williams acknowledged that its IMP procedures needed to include stronger
language stating what data and methodology were used for identifying HCAs, yet submitted page
4 A “High Consequence Area” is defined as: 1) an offshore area; or any class location unit that has 10 or fewer
buildings intended for human occupancy; (2) any class location unit that has more than 10 but fewer than 46
buildings intended for human occupancy; (3) any class location unit that has 46 or more buildings intended for
human occupancy; or (ii) An area where the pipeline lies within 100 yards (91 meters) of either a building or a
small, well-defined outside area (such as a playground, recreation area, outdoor theater, or other place of public
assembly) that is occupied by 20 or more persons on at least 5 days a week for 10 weeks in any 12-month period. 49
C.F.R. 192.5 (b)(3); or (4) any class location unit where buildings with four or more stories above ground are
prevalent. 49 C.F.R. 192.5 (b)(4).



4
1 of Chapter 4 of its IMP Overview to demonstrate its compliance with the regulations. OPS
responded by pointing out that while page 1indicated the use of Method 1 in identifying HCAs,5
the OPS inspection team had discovered indications that Method 2 was also used. OPS argued
that the inspection team found inconsistencies between Respondent’s summary and its actual
procedures.
Williams explained that the inconsistencies in Chapter 4 of its IMP Overview resulted from a
typographical error and that in addition to correcting this error, the company had revised its
Baseline Assessment Plan (BAP) to include the correct method being used for each HCA.
However, Respondent did not deny that it had failed to provide the OPS inspection team with
documentation of the methods it had used to identify each HCA segment.
Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Williams violated 49 C.F.R.
§§ 192.947(d) and 192.905(a) by failing to describe and document in its IMP which methods it
had applied to each portion of its pipeline to identify HCA segments by the December 17, 2004
deadline (December 2004 Deadline) imposed under 49 C.F.R. § 192.907(a).
Item 2A: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.905(a), which states:
§ 192.905 How does an operator identify a high consequence area?
(a) General. To determine which segments of an operator’s transmission
pipeline system are covered by this subpart, an operator must identify the high
consequence areas. An operator must use method (1) or (2) from the
definition in §192.903 to identify a high consequence area. An operator may
apply one method to its entire pipeline system, or an operator may apply one
method to individual portions of the pipeline system. An operator must
describe in its integrity management program which method it is applying to
each portion of the operator’s pipeline system. The description must include
the potential impact radius when utilized to establish a high consequence area.
(See appendix E.I. for guidance on identifying high consequence areas.)
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.905(a) by failing to describe in its
IMP which method it had applied to each portion of its pipeline to identify HCA segments.
Specifically, it alleged that the system maps and the GIS system used by Respondent failed to
establish a suitable means of documenting segment locations in HCAs. According to the Notice,
5 Operators may identify HCAs using either of two methods:
o Method 1: A pipeline segment is located in a high consequence area if any of the following apply:
 A Class 3 location under 192.5; or
 A Class 4 location under 192.5; or
 Any area outside a Class 3 or Class 4 location where the potential impact radius is greater than 660
feet (200 meters), and the area within a potential impact circle contains 20 or more buildings
intended for human occupancy; or
 The area within a potential impact circle containing an identified site.
o Method 2: A pipeline segment is located in a high consequence area if any of the following apply:
 The area within a potential impact circle contains 20 or more buildings intended for human
occupancy; or
 The area within a potential impact circle contains an identified site.



5
Williams’ personnel acknowledged during the OPS inspection that the accuracy of its pipe-
segment locating process ranged from survey quality to +/- 40 feet and that Respondent had not
taken any action to address these known inaccuracies in its HCA identification process.
At the hearing, Williams posed that it was unnecessary to account for uncertainties in its HCA
identification process. Respondent argued that § 192.905(a) did not require system maps or GIS
systems, nor did it address quality assurance methods. Respondent advised that every year it
performed a structure survey to review data on its GIS.
In response, OPS asserted that, during the March 13, 2006 inspection, Williams’ process for
conversion from legacy alignment sheets and survey notes to GIS was discussed and fully
explained. OPS testified that discussions with Respondent included past and current processes
and activities and focused on continuous improvement of centerline accuracy, including
collection of survey grade points, ortho-photo centerline and ortho-photo structure location
corrections. OPS also testified that Engineering Services Management of Change (MOC) and
annual update processes were shared and discussed on March 16, 2006, to further reinforce
continuous improvement processes related to GIS centerline data integrity and related facility
drawings. OPS explained that the issue was the need to factor uncertainty into HCA
identification and to document a suitable means of delineating segment locations.
In response and in support of its position, Williams introduced INGAA’s letter to Stacey Gerard,
former Associate Administrator of PHMSA, as documentation that the application of uncertainty
factors to the identification of HCAs was “overkill,
” based on the ratio of assessment of non-
covered segments to covered segment miles. Respondent argued that it had discussed and
described this process to the OPS inspection team.
OPS responded that the company’s identification process was inadequate and still under
development, at a time when a more mature process should have been in place. Based upon its
inspection and review of Chapter 4 of Respondent’s IMP Overview, OPS contended that
HCA identification process. OPS staff testified that during the inspection, Respondent had not
described the PIR of the method used to establish HCAs and that the inspection team had found
no documentation that Williams had considered additional buffers to account for potential
pipeline location inaccuracies. Furthermore, OPS explained that many HCAs had not been
Williams had applied no safety factors to the calculation of potential impact radii6 (PIRs) in the
identified when inspectors reviewed the company’s alignment sheets.
Accordingly, after considering all the evidence, I find that Williams violated 49 C.F.R.
§ 192.905(a) by failing to describe in its IMP which method it had applied to each portion of its
pipeline to identify HCA segments, in that the inaccurate maps and electronic GIS system used
by the company failed to properly document segment locations.
Item 2B: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.905(b), which states:
6 “Potential impact radius” is defined in § 191.903 as the radius of a circle within which the potential failure of a
pipeline could have significant impact on people or property.



6
§ 192.905 How does an operator identify a high consequence area?
(a) . . .
(b)(1) Identified sites. An operator must identify an identified site, for
purposes of this subpart, from information the operator has obtained from
routine operation and maintenance activities and from public officials with
safety or emergency response or planning responsibilities who indicate to the
operator that they know of locations that meet the identified site criteria.
These public officials could include officials on a local emergency planning
commission or relevant Native American tribal officials.
(2) If a public official with safety or emergency response or planning
responsibilities informs an operator that it does not have the information to
identify an identified site, the operator must use one of the following sources,
as appropriate, to identify these sites.
(i) Visible marking (e.g., a sign); or
(ii) The site is licensed or registered by a Federal, State, or local
government agency; or
(iii) The site is on a list (including a list on an internet web site) or map
maintained by or available from a Federal, State, or local government agency
and available to the general public.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.905(b) by failing to use certain
information available to it in cases where public officials with safety or emergency response or
planning responsibilities had informed the company that they did not have information
delineating identified sites. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Williams had failed, by the
December 2004 Deadline, to use visible markings, licensing or registration by a governmental
agency, or listing on the Internet or other public available maps maintained by governmental
entities to delineate identified sites in lieu of obtaining relevant information from public officials.
In addition, it alleged that Williams did not have procedures on how it located identified sites
using such alternative sources of information. During the OPS inspection, the inspector
conducted a review of Respondent’s procedures, including IM Procedure 10.09.01.10,
Establishing Class and HCA Location, Section 8.1.10, and alleged that they did not address the
need to use these other information sources.
As for the first allegation, Williams acknowledged at the hearing that it had not been able, by the
December 2004 Deadline, to secure information on potential identified sites with its April 2005
mail-out to public officials having safety or emergency response or planning responsibilities.
Respondent argued nevertheless that the regulation did not require that a mail-out be undertaken
to public officials for the purposes of obtaining identified site information. It also reiterated its
position that it had not been informed by any public official that it lacked sufficient information
to identify an identified site. Respondent further advised that it had completed a pilot project to
192), which is a query from available lists, and had found the results to be insufficiently
accurate.
evaluate the use of Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)7 codes (Method 3 suggested in Part
7 SIC Codes are used to create targeted mailing lists by industry type.



7
I find that although Williams had some documentation showing potential identified sites through
the use of alignment sheets, there were no dates on these sheets earlier than 2006; therefore,
these sheets are not probative of whether or not the company used such information prior to the
December 2004 Deadline. I also find that even if Respondent had other marked-up alignment
sheets prior to 2006, they were not provided at the time of the inspection, during the hearing, or
with the Closing.
There is no evidence in the record that Respondent had made any effort to obtain information
from public officials to gather data on potential identified sites prior to the December 2004
Deadline. Williams testified that it had used “visible markings such as signs” to delineate
identified sites; however, such information is only allowed under the regulation to be used to the
extent that the operator is unable to obtain information from public officials. The intent of the
regulation is to require operators to seek information from public officials who are better
informed than operators about where identified sites are located, how to avoid damaging such
sites, how to recognize and report emergencies that may arise, and how to protect isolated
population areas located near pipelines. It is only when such information is unavailable from
public officials that operators may use other data sources to delineate identified sites.
As for the second allegation that it lacked proper procedures for using alternative information
§ 192.905 defining the term “identified sites” and stating: “This year we’ll also have to locate
“high consequence areas”
called identified sites. We will be required to locate these all the way
out to the 660” line.” These Field Instructions, however, do not contain detailed procedures
describing the use of alternative information sources.
sources, Williams submitted a copy of its 2004 Field Instructions,8 which quoted language from
Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.
§ 192.905(b), by failing to use alternative sources of information to identify HCAs after being
unable to obtain information from public officials regarding identified sites, by the December
2004 Deadline.
Item 3: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.907(a), which states:
§ 192.907 What must an operator do to implement this subpart?
(a) General. No later than December 17, 2004, an operator of a covered
pipeline segment must develop and follow a written integrity management
program that contains all the elements described in § 192.911 and that
addresses the risks on each covered transmission pipeline segment. The initial
integrity management program must consist, at a minimum, of a framework
that describes the process for implementing each program element, how
relevant decisions will be made and by whom, a time line for completing the
work to implement the program element, and how information gained from
experience will be continuously incorporated into the program. The
framework will evolve into a more detailed and comprehensive program. An
operator must make continual improvements to the program.
8 Closing, DVD, at 47.



8
Item 3 of the Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.907(a) by failing to meet
the December 2004 Deadline for developing and following a written IMP that contained all the
elements described in § 192.911 and that addressed the risks on each covered transmission
pipeline segment. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Williams’ records revealed that, as of
April and May 2005, the company’s HCA identification process was still incomplete. For
example, it alleged that public officials had not been contacted for the location of identified sites
until April 2005.
At the hearing, Respondent repeated its response to Item 2B above and argued that as of the
December 2004 Deadline, public officials had not provided any information on identified sites.
It further argued that § 192.907(a) did not require that a mail-out be undertaken to public
officials for the purposes of obtaining identified site information. Instead, the company indicated
that it had identified HCAs in Class 1 and 2 areas by the December 2004 Deadline using
information obtained from routine operation and maintenance activities.
OPS responded that Williams did not even start to contact public officials until 2005, after the
December 2004 Deadline. OPS argued that because Respondent had not sought information on
identified sites from public officials in a timely manner, its delineation of identified sites was
incomplete as of the December 2004 Deadline.
After considering all the evidence, I find that none of the documentation submitted by
Respondent during the hearing or in the company’s Closing demonstrates that the identified sites
were properly delineated prior to the December 2004 Deadline. Therefore, I find Respondent
violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.907(a), by failing to develop and follow a written IMP by the December
2004 Deadline that contained all the elements described in § 192.911 and that addressed the risks
on each covered transmission pipeline segment.
Item 4: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.905(a), as quoted above,
by failing to properly identify HCA areas using one of the methods described in paragraphs (1)
or (2) (Methods 1 and 2) below from the definition of “High Consequence Area” provided in
§ 192.903. That section states, in relevant part:
§ 192.903 What definitions apply to this subpart?
The following definitions apply to this subpart: . . .
High consequence area means an area established by one of the methods
described in paragraphs (1) or (2) as follows:
(1) An area defined as
(i) A Class 3 location under §192.5; or
(ii) A Class 4 location under §192.5; or
(iii) Any area in a Class 1 or Class 2 location where the potential impact
radius is greater than 660 feet (200 meters), and the area within a potential
impact circle contains 20 or more buildings intended for human occupancy; or
(iv) Any area in a Class 1 or Class 2 location where the potential impact
circle contains an identified site.
(2) The area within a potential impact circle containing
(i) 20 or more buildings intended for human occupancy, unless the
exception in paragraph(4) applies; or
(ii) An identified site.



9
(3) Where a potential impact circle is calculated under either method (1) or
(2) to establish a high consequence area, the length of the high consequence
area extends axially along the length of the pipeline from the outermost edge of
the first potential impact circle that contains either an identified site or 20 or
more buildings intended for human occupancy to the outermost edge of the last
contiguous potential impact circle that contains either an identified site or 20 or
more buildings intended for human occupancy. (See figure E.I.A. in appendix
E.)….
Identified site means each of the following areas:
(a) An outside area or open structure that is occupied by twenty (20) or
more persons on at least 50 days in any twelve (12)-month period. (The days
need not be consecutive.) Examples include but are not limited to, beaches,
playgrounds, recreational facilities, camping grounds, outdoor theaters,
stadiums, recreational areas near a body of water, or areas outside a rural
building such as a religious facility; or
(b) A building that is occupied by twenty (20) or more persons on at least
five (5) days a week for ten (10) weeks in any twelve (12)-month period. (The
days and weeks need not be consecutive.) Examples include, but are not
limited to, religious facilities, office buildings, community centers, general
stores, 4-H facilities, or roller skating rinks;…
Item 4A of the Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.905(a) by failing to
properly apply Method 1 in delineating HCAs, insofar as the full length of Class 3 and 4
locations9 was not included in the HCAs. Specifically, the Notice alleged that the OPS
full length of its Class 3 and 4 locations within HCA boundaries and that therefore these
inspection10 had revealed that, in an effort to use Method 1, Williams had failed to include the
locations were not properly scheduled for assessment or repairs.
At the hearing, Respondent asserted that it had correctly applied Method 1, but acknowledged
that not all HCAs had been identified as of the OPS IMP audit in March 2006. The company
advised that data was still being analyzed and HCA determinations were still pending.
Williams also acknowledged that the HCA boundaries were shorter than the Class 3 dimensions
but disagreed with OPS’ assertion that a portion of the HCAs had therefore not been properly
scheduled for assessment or repair. Williams contended that when it undertook External
Corrosion Direct Assessment (ECDA), it would visit each site to confirm the actual, required
9 A Class 3 location is defined as: (i) any class location unit that has 46 or more buildings intended for human
occupancy; or (ii) an area where the pipeline lies within 100 yards (91 meters) of either a building or a small, well-
defined outside area (such as a playground, recreation area, outdoor theater, or other place of public assembly) that
is occupied by 20 or more persons on at least 5 days a week for 10 weeks in any 12-month period. (The days and
weeks need not be consecutive.) 49 C.F.R. § 192.5 (b)(3).
A Class 4 location is any class location unit where buildings with four or more stories above ground are prevalent.
49 C.F.R. § 192.5(b)(4).
10 The OPS inspection included a review of Respondent’s Alignment Sheet, Location Class Determination and
Qualification Record, MP 1782.125 to 1783.750, Somerset and Middlesex Counties, NJ Main Line, and DOT-NJ-8.
Pipeline Safety Violation Report, at 10.



10
length of pipe to be inspected. At that point, the company would assess the entire length of the
HCA. Respondent further contended that when using in-line inspection (ILI), it analyzed data
for the entire ILI run, not just for the HCA areas.
In its Closing, Williams posed that not correctly identifying the length of the Class 3 and 4
locations used in Method 1 was irrelevant since it visited each site to confirm the actual, required
length of the pipe to be inspected and then the entire length of the HCA would be assessed. For
ECDA, Respondent stated that the length of the HCA segments was also irrelevant because the
company performed actual field measurements. The company further posed that it treated
immediate repair conditions in non-covered segments the same as those in covered segments.
OPS countered that the issue was not whether Williams took alternative measures to protect the
integrity of the pipeline, but, rather, whether the company properly used Method 1 under
§ 192.905(a) to identify HCAs. In addition, OPS noted that the company’s repair procedures did
not include a specific timeframe for repairing immediate conditions in non-covered segments.
Therefore, if an immediate condition were located just outside an HCA segment that should have
included the condition, then the condition would not get repaired in a timely manner.
Accordingly, based upon the company’s own admission and a review of all of the evidence, I
find that Williams violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.905(a), by failing to adequately establish HCA areas
using Method 1, as described in § 192.903.
Item 4B of the Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.905(a), as quoted above,
by failing to properly identify HCA areas using Method 1, as described in the definition of “High
Consequence Area” under § 192.903. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Williams failed to
properly identify HCAs under that portion of Method 1 which calls for the identification of areas
“in a Class 1 or Class 2 location where the potential impact circle contains an identified site.”
sites on Williams’ Transco system that the company had failed to include in HCAs. The Notice
alleged that the HCA identification process was flawed insofar as the company’s field personnel
were not even trained in the HCA identification process until well after the December 2004
According to the Notice, documentation reviewed during the inspection 11 showed identified
Deadline.
At the hearing, Williams indicated that training was an ongoing part of its continuous
improvement process and that in February 2004, its field personnel had been given instructions
on locating and reporting structures along the pipeline. The company further contended that it
had completed company-wide training that restated IMP requirements such as collecting
information on identified sites and that the April-June 2005 training mentioned by the OPS
inspection team was additional training that covered the entire IM program. In its Closing,
Respondent provided a copy of its 2004 Field Instructions.
12
11 Respondent’s Alignment Sheet, Location Determination and Pipeline Qualification Record, MP 1408.000 to
1410.87, Pittsylvania County, VA, Main Line, DOT-V-9. Respondent’s Alignment Sheet, Location Determination
and Pipeline Qualification Record, MP 1457.375 to 1459.375, Appomattox, VA, Main Line, and DOT-V-25B.
Violation Report, pp. 12 and 45.
12 Closing, at 47.



11
OPS responded that although the 2004 Field Instructions acknowledged identified sites must be
identified, Williams did not provide evidence at the time of the inspection that any identified
sites had actually been identified. OPS testified that its inspection had revealed a company e-
mail sent in February 2004, entitled “2004 House Count Instructions.” OPS asserted that an
examination of the document showed that the 2004 Field Instructions were not training materials
and did not indicate that Respondent’s employees had actually been trained to delineate
identified sites.
After considering all the evidence, I find that the field instructions that were provided as part of
the Closing were not provided to the OPS inspection team at the time of the audit. Although
Respondent’s 2004 Field Instructions acknowledged that identified sites must be identified, I see
no evidence showing that any sites had actually been identified or that actual training had been
provided to company personnel, as would be reflected by sign-in sheets or similar
documentation. I also find that Respondent’s personnel collected information on identified sites
prior to being properly trained.
As a result, Respondent failed to properly identify HCA areas using Method 1 in its HCA
identification process, as there was no evidence that Williams considered identified sites that lay
within the potential impact circle of the Class 1 and 2 locations. Accordingly, upon review of all
of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.905(a) by failing to properly use
Method 1, as described in § 192.903, to include certain identified sites in its HCAs.
Item 4C of the Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.905(a), as quoted
above, by failing to properly identify HCA areas using Method 1, as described in the definition
of “High Consequence Area” under § 192.903. Specifically, it alleged that Williams improperly
applied Method 1 by failing to designate certain outdoor areas and buildings as “identified sites.”
Section 192.903 provides that “[a]n outside area or open structure that is occupied by twenty (20)
or more persons on at least 50 days in any twelve (12)-month period” shall be considered an
“identified site.” In addition, it provides that “[a] building that is occupied by twenty (20) or
more persons on at least five (5) days a week for ten (10) weeks in any twelve (12)-month
period” shall also be considered an identified site.
The Notice alleged that Williams’ procedure, WGP IMP Overview Chapter 4, Section 4.8,
defined the term “day” as a continuous 8-hour period, for purposes of determining whether
structures or outdoor areas qualified as identified sites. This definition, OPS asserted, was
inconsistent with the regulation, insofar as the 20-or-more-persons criterion applied to the
presence of people at a particular location at any point in time, not just for a continuous 8-hour
period. For example, using the definition of “day” set forth in Respondent’s procedure, a picnic
area would have to sustain 20 or more persons on site for eight hours a day, five days a week, for
10 weeks (i.e., 50 days) in any 12-month period.
At the hearing, Respondent argued that its current Procedure 10.09.01.10 met the requirements
of §§ 192.903 and 192.905, which do not specify the length of a day. The company argued that
the terms “day” and “occupied” in the regulation were nebulous and not clearly defined in 49
C.F.R. Part 192. In support of its position, Williams suggested that PHMSA’s published
guidance document, FAQ #211, directly asked for clarification but that the agency had pointedly
steered clear of the issue and declined to define the length of a day.



12
Respondent’s argument is specious. While it is correct that § 192.903 does not specify how
many hours constitute a “day” for purposes of designating identified sites,13 such detail is
unnecessary. The FAQ #211 guidance document explicitly states that a site is considered an
identified site if 20 or more persons occupy it for any length of time, unless they are in transit. I
fail to see any ambiguity in the regulation. If a site is normally occupied for one hour or 23
hours per day, it is still considered a “day” for purposes of determining whether to classify the
area as an identified site. By requiring that a site be occupied for at least eight hours per day,
Respondent’s procedure greatly reduces the number of sites with outdoor gathering areas or
buildings that qualify for the additional protections required for HCAs. I do not believe such a
procedure is consistent with the purpose or intent of the term “identified site” in § 192.903.14
Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49
C.F.R. § 192.905(a) by failing to adequately use Method 1, as described in the definition of
“High Consequence Area” under § 192.903, to designate certain outdoor areas and buildings as
identified sites.
Item 4D of the Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.905(a), as quoted above,
by failing to properly designate HCA areas, as defined under § 192.903. Specifically, it alleged
that Williams failed to apply the axial extension of the potential 
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