# BRIDGER PIPELINE LLC — Notice of Probable Violation

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** CPF 520075003
- **title:** BRIDGER PIPELINE LLC — Notice of Probable Violation
- **source type:** enforcement
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** historical
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2007-02-02
- **effective on:** Not available
- **summary:** CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.204, 195.214(a), 195.230(b), 195.402(a), 195.402(c), 195.402(c)(12), 195.403(c), 195.410(a)(1), 195.422(a), 195.428(a), 195.440, 195.49, 195.579(c), 195.583(c).
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- **source url:** https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/520075003
**body:**

Notice of Probable Violation involving BRIDGER PIPELINE LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.204,  195.214(a),  195.230(b),  195.402(a),  195.402(c),  195.402(c)(12),  195.403(c),  195.410(a)(1),  195.422(a),  195.428(a),  195.440,  195.49,  195.579(c),  195.583(c). The case was opened on 2007-02-02 and is reported as closed as of 2010-11-10. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.

Official case documents:

520075003_closure letter_11102010.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520075003/520075003_closure%20letter_11102010.pdf

520075003_closure letter_11102010_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520075003/520075003_closure%20letter_11102010_text.pdf

520075003_Decision on Petition for Reconsideration_06162009.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520075003/520075003_Decision%20on%20Petition%20for%20Reconsideration_06162009.pdf

520075003_Decision on Petition for Reconsideration_06162009_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520075003/520075003_Decision%20on%20Petition%20for%20Reconsideration_06162009_text.pdf

520075003_FinalOrder_04022009.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520075003/520075003_FinalOrder_04022009.pdf

520075003_FinalOrder_04022009_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520075003/520075003_FinalOrder_04022009_text.pdf

520075003_Operator Response and Request For Hearing_03082007.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520075003/520075003_Operator%20Response%20and%20Request%20For%20Hearing_03082007.pdf

520075003_Petition For Reconsideration_04212009.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520075003/520075003_Petition%20For%20Reconsideration_04212009.pdf

520075003_Stay of Final Order_05082009.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520075003/520075003_Stay%20of%20Final%20Order_05082009.pdf

520075003_Stay of Final Order_05082009_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520075003/520075003_Stay%20of%20Final%20Order_05082009_text.pdf

BPL 5-2007-5003 NOPV-PCO 2-2-07.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520075003/BPL%205-2007-5003%20NOPV-PCO%202-2-07.pdf

bpl 5-2007-5003 nopv-pco 2-2-07_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520075003/bpl%205-2007-5003%20nopv-pco%202-2-07_text.pdf

520075003_FinalOrder_04022009_text.pdf

APR 2 2009
VIA CERTIFIED MAIL-RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED [7005 0390 0005 6163 7459]
Mr. Hank True
President
Bridger Pipeline Company, LLC
455 N. Poplar Street
P.O. Drawer 2360
Casper, WY 82602
Re: CPF No. 5-2007-5003
Dear Mr. True:
Enclosed is the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of violation
and specifies actions that need to be taken by Bridger to comply with the pipeline safety
regulations. When the terms of the compliance order have been completed, as determined by the
Director, Western Region, this enforcement action will be closed. Your receipt of this Final
Order constitutes service of that document under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Jeffrey D. Wiese
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety
Enclosure
cc: Chris Hoidal
Director, Western Region, PHMSA
Colin G. Harris, Esq.
Holme Roberts & Owen LLP
1801 13th St., Ste 300
Boulder, CO 80302-5387
Fax: (303) 866-0200



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590
____________________________________
In the Matter of )
Bridger Pipeline Company, LLC, ) CPF No. 5-2007-5003
)
)
)
Respondent. )
____________________________________)
FINAL ORDER
On June 6-10, July 18-21, and August 15-18, 2005, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, a
representative of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s Office of
Pipeline Safety (PHMSA) conducted a safety inspection of the hazardous liquid pipeline systems
operated by Bridger Pipeline Company, LLC (Bridger or Respondent), and several related
companies in Montana and Wyoming.
Montana and North Dakota. As a result of the inspection, the Director, Western Region
(Director), issued a combined notice of probable violation and proposed compliance order (CPF
No. 5-2006-5004) by letter dated February 21, 2006, to one of the companies (Belle Fourche),
alleging violations of the hazardous liquid pipeline safety regulations with respect to the
inspected facilities. By letters dated May 26 and December 26, 2006, Belle Fourche objected to
the notice on the grounds that the individual companies were separate and distinct legal entities
and should be named separately.
1 Bridger operates crude oil transmission pipelines in
In response to those objections, the Director withdrew the original charges on February 2, 2007,
and, on the same date, issued separate enforcement documents to each company, including a
Notice of Probable Violation and Proposed Compliance Order (Notice) issued to Bridger in this
case.
committed certain violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 195 and proposed that Bridger take measures to
correct the alleged violations. In addition, pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 190.205, the Notice advised
Respondent to take appropriate corrective action to address several warning items or face future
potential enforcement action.
2 In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice proposed finding that Bridger had
1 The companies inspected were Bridger Pipeline Company, LLC, Belle Fourche Pipeline Company (Belle
Fourche), and Butte Pipeline Company (Butte). These companies share the same manual of operating procedures
and some of the same employees and officers.
2 The Director issued separate notices to Belle Fourche (CPF No. 5-2007-5002) and Butte (CPF No. 5-2007-5008).
This Final Order concerns only the Notice issued to Bridger. Final agency action has already been taken in the case
involving Belle Fourche. The case involving Butte is still pending at this time.



2
Bridger responded to the Notice by letter dated March 8, 2007 (Response). In its Response, the
company contested the allegations of violation and requested a hearing. In accordance with 49
C.F.R. § 190.211, a combined hearing was held on August 31, 2007, in Lakewood, Colorado,
with an attorney from the Office of Chief Counsel, PHMSA, presiding. Bridger, Belle Fourche,
and Butte were jointly represented by counsel at the hearing. After the hearing, the companies
submitted a single post-hearing brief (Brief) on October 11, 2007, and additional information by
letter dated December 21, 2007. To the extent that the issues raised at the hearing and in the
Brief relate to Bridger, they are addressed below.
As a preliminary matter, the parties agree that in making “Findings of Violation,” PHMSA
burden of production and the burden of persuasion. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs,
Dep’t of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 276 (1994). The standard of proof is the
traditional preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 102 (1981).
Respondent argues in its Brief that PHMSA failed to meet its burden of proof on all contested
Items in the Notice (i.e., Items 3, 4, 5, 10, 11, and 14). As discussed more fully below, I find that
PHMSA did in fact meet its burden of proof on all the charges.
carries the burden of proving the allegations set forth in the Notice.3 This includes both the
FINDINGS OF VIOLATION
The Notice alleged that Respondent committed violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 195, as follows:
Item 3: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.214, which provides:
§ 195.214 Welding procedures.
(a) Welding must be performed by a qualified welder in accordance with
welding procedures qualified under Section 5 of API 1104 or Section IX of the
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (incorporated by reference, see §195.3).
The quality of the test welds used to qualify the welding procedure shall be
determined by destructive testing.
(b) Each welding procedure must be recorded in detail, including the results of
the qualifying tests. This record must be retained and followed whenever the
procedure is used.
The Notice alleged that Bridger violated § 195.214 by failing to perform welding in accordance
with procedures that had been qualified by the use of test welds determined to be of acceptable
quality through destructive testing. Specifically, the Notice alleged that butt weld and fillet weld
procedures used by Respondent for integrity repairs on the Poplar pipeline in 2005 had not been
qualified through the use of destructive testing. During the inspection, the PHMSA inspector
3 Under the Administrative Procedure Act, “the proponent of a rule or order has the burden of proof . . . . A
sanction may not be imposed or rule or order issued except on consideration of the whole record or those parts
thereof cited by a party and supported by and in accordance with the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.”
5 U.S.C. § 556(d).



3
noted that Respondent’s welding procedures did not include results from destructive testing that
were required in order to qualify the procedures. Violation Report at 2 (Feb. 7, 2008).4
Bridger contended that testimony at the hearing showed the company “used procedures that had
been qualified by a predecessor operator of the pipeline. In any event, Bridger now has its own
qualified welding procedures.” Brief at 14. However, I can find no evidence in the record to
substantiate this claim. Both Respondent’s procedures and the procedures of the previous
operator are in the record, but neither includes any record of qualifications using destructive
testing. While Respondent stated in its Brief that testimony at the hearing showed Bridger used
procedures that had been qualified, the hearing officer noted that Respondent did not introduce
any evidence at the hearing to support this statement, and I find none in the record. Even if I
were to assume the previous operator did indeed qualify the procedures properly through the use
of destructive testing, the fact remains that Bridger failed to present any tangible evidence of
these tests and failed to retain any records of such tests, as required under § 195.214(b). Finally,
Bridger’s statements concerning its efforts to qualify the procedures after PHMSA’s inspection
are irrelevant to the determination of whether or not the company was in compliance at the time
of the inspection.
Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.214 by failing to perform welding in accordance with welding procedures that had been
qualified using test welds of acceptable quality, as determined by destructive testing.
Item 4: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.230, which states:
§ 195.230 Welds: Repair or removal of defects.
(a) Each weld that is unacceptable under § 195.228 must be removed or
repaired. Except for welds on an offshore pipeline being installed from a pipe lay
vessel, a weld must be removed if it has a crack that is more than 8 percent of the
weld length.
(b) Each weld that is repaired must have the defect removed down to sound
metal and the segment to be repaired must be preheated if conditions exist which
would adversely affect the quality of the weld repair. After repair, the segment of
the weld that was repaired must be inspected to ensure its acceptability.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated § 195.230 by failing to repair and re-inspect a weld
that was “unacceptable” under § 195.228. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Bridger rejected
weld XR-11 because it had a pinhole defect but failed to repair and re-inspect it.
the record included an inspection form utilized by Bridger’s radiographer that shows he had
determined this particular weld to be unacceptable. Violation Report Ex. 2. When questioned
about this during the PHMSA inspection, Respondent’s personnel were unable to produce any
record of the weld ever having been repaired and re-inspected. Violation Report at 3.
5 Evidence in
4 The inspector provided copies of Respondent’s procedures, dated February 2005, for the record. Violation Report
Ex. 1.
5 This weld was performed by Respondent’s personnel during a short segment replacement project on the Poplar
pipeline. It is not the same “weld XR-11” that was part of a 17,000-foot repair project on the same pipeline.



4
In its written submissions and at the hearing, Respondent presented several arguments why it had
not violated § 195.230. First, it argued that weld XR-11 should not be considered
“unacceptable.
” Brief at 3-4. Second, it argued that even if PHMSA now deemed the weld to be
unacceptable, Bridger had already repaired the weld. Brief at 4. Third, it argued that Bridger did
not have fair notice of the agency’s interpretation and application of this standard. Response
at 4.
As for Bridger’s first argument that weld XR-11 should not be considered “unacceptable,” the
company contends that neither the criteria for the acceptability of welds in § 195.228 nor Section
9 of American Petroleum Institute Welding Standard 1104 (API 1104), which is incorporated
therein, specify that pinholes are unacceptable. Respondent’s engineer testified in an affidavit
that “[s]ection 9.3 [of API 1104] lists and explains the defects that . . . may warrant rejection in
connection with radiographic testing. A ‘pinhole’ is not one of them.” Brief Ex. 6 at ¶ 26. In
addition, Respondent’s consultant expressed the opinion that “[t]he list of unacceptable defects
[in Section 9 of API 1104] does not include a ‘pinhole.’ Therefore . . . the mere fact that a
radiographer found a ‘pinhole’ . . . does not mean that the weld failed the acceptability criteria of
API-1104.” Brief Ex. 7 at ¶ 12. Because a pinhole is not listed as an unacceptable defect in
§ 195.228 or Section 9 of API 1104, Bridger argues that § 195.230 does not require that it be
repaired. Brief at 3.
Respondent is correct that neither §§ 195.230, 195.228, nor Section 9 of API 1104 expressly
states that a “pinhole” is an unacceptable weld defect.
company may reject a weld for any reason other than those explicitly referenced in Section 9.3.
Section 9.2 states:
6 Section 9, however, does provide that a
All nondestructive test methods are limited in the information that can be derived
from the indications they produce. The company may therefore reject any weld
that appears to meet these acceptance standards if, in its opinion, the depth of an
imperfection may be detrimental to the weld.
Accordingly, an operator may reject a weld if the company finds an imperfection that it considers
“detrimental to the weld,” even if the type of imperfection is not explicitly enumerated in Section
9 of API 1104.
This is precisely what Bridger did. The record clearly shows that the inspection was performed
by Bridger’s welding inspection contractor and that the contractor’s radiographer noted his
rejection of this particular weld on his inspection form. The form included a column labeled
“Weld Acceptability” and two columns beneath that column with headings of “Yes” and “No.”
Violation Report Ex. 2. The radiographer marked the “No” column under the “Weld
Acceptability” heading for weld XR-11, indicating that he had determined the weld was
unacceptable.
The radiographer also recorded, under the column entitled “Type of Defects in Rejectable
Welds,
” that the defect type was a pinhole. In his affidavit submitted by Respondent, the
radiographer acknowledged that he had “indicated that weld XR-11 was not acceptable.” Brief
6 In this case, radiographic testing was used by Respondent to examine weld XR-11. Brief at 3. Section 9.3 of API
1104 specifies acceptance standards for weld imperfections located by radiographic testing.



5
Ex. 5. Since it was Bridger’s own contractor who determined that XR-11 was “unacceptable”
under § 195.228 and API 1104, the company was required under § 195.230 to repair and re-
inspect the weld to ensure integrity.
As for Respondent’s second argument that the company had in fact repaired the weld, Bridger
acknowledged that it did not have a record of the repair and that such lack of documentation was
most likely due to a clerical error. Response at 4. The company argued, however, that normal
company practice was to grind down and repair pinhole imperfections in welds. Id. Bridger also
submitted several affidavits of persons familiar with the matter who attested that weld XR-11
had “likely” been repaired. The affidavit of the radiographer who personally examined weld
and affidavit of another employee, who had spoken to the weld foreman of the repair project,
XR-11 indicated that he “believe[s] that weld XR-11 was repaired.”7 Brief Ex. 5. The testimony
indicated:
He [the weld foreman] informed me that it was the practice on this project to
grind down any “pinhole” anomalies, at which point the weld was not [sic] longer
considered to be rejectable by T&K. [He also] informed me that it was likely that
XR-11 was ground down, and mistakenly not noted in writing by the inspector on
the applicable T&K worksheet or any subsequent document.
Brief Ex. 6 at 4.
8
While such statements may be helpful in determining the company’s standard practices, I find
them unpersuasive in this case. First, there is no definitive statement in the record that the repair
was actually made. More importantly, Bridger has no documentation of the repair having been
made, even though the company was or should have been fully aware of its obligation under 49
C.F.R. § 195.266 to maintain a complete record of all girth welds, including the disposition of
each rejected weld. The absence of any record of a repair and re-inspection in this case, when
coupled with the lack of other tangible evidence or conclusive testimony, is telling.
Finally, Respondent argued that PHMSA is attempting to punish the company for violating a
standard without providing fair notice of the agency’s prospective interpretation or application of
such standard. According to Bridger, it would violate due process to hold the company liable
under PHMSA’s interpretation of § 195.230 without fair notice. Response at 4.
Respondent is correct that governmental agencies may not violate a person’s right of due process
by depriving such person of property without providing a minimum level of “fair notice” as to
what may constitute a violation of law. “Due process requires that parties receive fair notice
before being deprived of property . . . . In the absence of notice—for example, where the
regulation is not sufficiently clear to warn a party about what is expected of it—an agency may
not deprive a party of property by imposing civil or criminal liability.” Gen. Elec. Co. v. U.S.
EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1328-29 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted). See also, United States v. Chrysler Corp., 158 F.3d 1350, 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1998);
7 In its Brief at 4, Bridger misidentified this individual as “the welder who made weld XR-11” when in fact the
individual was the inspector of the weld, according to the individual’s own affidavit.
8 It is not clear from the record how long ago the witness actually spoke to the weld foreman. Respondent was not
able to locate the foreman to offer testimony in this case. Brief at 8.



6
Trinity Broad. of Fla., Inc. v. FCC, 211 F.3d 618, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2000). When an agency
interprets a regulation through enforcement rather than pre-enforcement efforts, the issue of
notice rests on “whether the regulated party received, or should have received, notice of the
agency’s interpretation in the most obvious way of all: by reading the regulations. If, by
reviewing the regulations and other public statements issued by the agency, a regulated party
acting in good faith would be able to identify, with ‘ascertainable certainty,’ the standards with
which the agency expects parties to conform, then the agency has fairly notified a petitioner of
the agency’s interpretation.” Gen. Elec. Co., 53 F.3d at 1329.9
In this case, I find, as a matter of law, that Bridger received fair notice of the conduct that was
required of the company. Section 195.230 is clear on its face and provided Bridger with
adequate notice that each unacceptable weld must either be removed or repaired and re-
inspected. Section 195.228, and Section 9 of API 1104, incorporated therein, are also quite clear
that a company may deem a weld unacceptable on its own or for a variety of explicitly
enumerated reasons. In this case, Bridger itself determined that weld XR-11 was unacceptable;
therefore, the company was required to address the weld accordingly. Having considered all of
the evidence and issues presented, I find Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.230 by failing to
repair a weld that the company had determined was unacceptable.
Item 5: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(1), which states:
§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and
emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a
manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance
activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies . . . . [A]ppropriate
parts shall be kept at locations where operations and maintenance activities are
conducted . . . .
(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by
paragraph (a) of this section must include procedures for the following to provide
safety during maintenance and normal operations:
(1) Making construction records, maps, and operating history available as
necessary for safe operation and maintenance . . . .
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated § 195.402 by failing to make updated maps and
alignment sheets available as necessary for safe operation and maintenance of the Poplar
pipeline. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Bridger maintained only one set of updated
alignment sheets, which showed new crossings and other changes to the facility, and kept those
documents at the Glendive office rather than making them available to personnel performing
operations and maintenance functions in the field. It was impractical for PHMSA’s inspector to
include a copy of the alignment sheets in the record, but he noted that Bridger’s supervisor
9 Such “ascertainable certainty” may not be possible where an agency has given conflicting public interpretations of
a regulation. In addition, even in those situations where an “agency does not issue contradictory public statements,
it may fail to give sufficient fair notice to justify a penalty if the regulation is so ambiguous that a regulated party
cannot be expected to arrive at the correct interpretation using standard tools of legal interpretation, must therefore
look to the agency for guidance, and the agency failed to articulate its interpretation before imposing a penalty.”
United States v. Lachman, 387 F.3d 42, 57-58 (1st Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).



7
informed him that the set of alignment sheets at the Glendive office was the only updated (i.e.,
accurate) copy for the Poplar pipeline. Violation Report at 4.
In its Response, the company stated only that “[a]lignment sheets have been disseminated and
Bridger is engaged in an ongoing process of updating.” Response at 5. In its Brief, Respondent
contended that the requirements of the regulation were met by keeping the updated maps at the
Glendive office,
“where pipeline operations and maintenance are based.” Brief at 14.
Under § 195.402(a) and (c)(1), as quoted above, persons performing operations and maintenance
activities in the field, such as excavation activities that require precisely locating underground
facilities, must have current maps of the pipeline facility on hand when those activities are being
conducted. Performing such activities without any maps or with outdated or inaccurate maps
increases the chances that a pipeline will be struck and damaged, causing a release of product
harmful to the public and environment. The evidence shows that Bridger had only one set of
current alignment sheets and that set did not leave the Glendive office. Accordingly, after
considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(1) by
failing to make current maps available as necessary for the safe operation and maintenance of the
Poplar pipeline.
Item 10: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.422(a), which states:
§ 195.422 Pipeline repairs.
(a) Each operator shall, in repairing its pipeline systems, insure that the repairs
are made in a safe manner and are made so as to prevent damage to persons or
property.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated § 195.422(a) by failing to ensure that integrity
repairs performed on the Poplar pipeline in 2005 were made in a safe manner. Specifically, it
alleged that Bridger failed to use a nondestructive testing (NDT) method to examine sleeve-to-
pipe fillet welds associated with type-B repair sleeves. The Notice also alleged that industry
practice has been to use NDT to ensure that type-B repair sleeves are installed in a safe manner.
The Notice alleged further that Respondent’s repair records did not even indicate whether visual
examinations of such welds had been performed.
During the PHMSA inspection, the inspector noted that Bridger had made repairs using type-B
sleeves, but there was no record that such repairs had been visually inspected or tested using
NDT. The inspector documented statements made by two of Respondent’s employees that the
company had visually inspected the welds but did not need to perform NDT because such testing
had been performed on two sleeve repairs on another pipeline operated by a sister company and
that such tests had been successful. Violation Report at 5.
Bridger raised several defenses to Item 10. First, it contended that the company ensured type-B
repair sleeves were installed in a safe manner by using fully qualified welders and procedures, by
visually inspecting the welds, and by performing a
post-repair hydrostatic test of the pipeline. Response at 6. Second, it argued that PHMSA failed
to provide the company with fair notice of the agency’s interpretation and application of this
NDT standard.



8
As for Bridger’s first defense that the company ensured the repairs were made in a safe manner,
the company presented one of its engineers, who stated that he had been told by the welding
testified that, to his knowledge, the company had used qualified welders and procedures and that
the company had performed a hydrostatic test on the pipeline. Id. at ¶¶ 8 and 10. Respondent
maintained these measures constituted compliance with § 195.422 and American Society of
Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Standard B31.4, which Respondent referred to as “the relevant
professional code governing pipeline transportation systems.
Respondent contended that Section 451.6.3 of ASME B31.4 “allows for ‘other methods’ along
with visual inspection” to ensure the safety of repair welds and that Respondent chose
hydrostatic testing in addition to visual inspection. Response at 6.
foreman that all of the welds were visually inspected. Brief Ex. 6 at ¶ 9.10 The witness also
” Response at 5. In particular,
With regard to the use of qualified workers and procedures, Respondent is correct to point out
that these are critical for ensuring repairs are made in a safe manner. However, the use of
qualified workers and procedures is not a substitute for post-repair examination. The use of
qualified workers and procedures only serve prospectively to make it more likely that repairs will
be made safely in the future. The use of post-repair examinations is also needed to ensure that
repairs were in fact made safely. Moreover, I have found that Bridger did not use qualified
welding procedures when performing fillet welds on the Poplar pipeline in 2005 (see Item 3 of
this Order).
With regard to the visual examinations and hydrotest, I find little support in the record for
Respondent’s assertion that it conducted visual examinations of these repair welds, other than
second-hand accounts and hearsay. Even if visual examinations were performed, they do not
provide enough information on their own to determine whether repair welds were properly
performed. For that reason, another type of post-repair examination method is required. While
Respondent asserted that the leading industry standard accepts the use of hydrostatic testing in
addition to visual examinations in such circumstances, the standard actually states that “[w]elds
should also be examined by at least one other nondestructive examination method” in addition to
visual examinations. ASME B31.4 § 451.6.3(b) (2002) (emphasis added). Rather than utilize
another method of NDT, as recommended in the leading industry standard, Respondent instead
chose to hydrotest the pipeline.
At the hearing, the Director explained that hydrostatic testing is not a suitable process for
determining the soundness of a type-B sleeve repair. This is because hydrotests are not capable
of testing the integrity of the fillet welds on a type-B repair sleeve. In fact, Respondent informed
PHMSA, by letter dated December 21, 2007, that it had recently performed NDT on several
type-B repair sleeves from the 2005 repair project at issue in this case and found some sleeves
had cracks in the pipe-to-sleeve fillet weld that had not been detected by Bridger during any of
its previous post-repair examination methods, including the hydrostatic test. Respondent also
determined that six of the twelve excavated repairs were not made in their intended locations.
The cracks in the repair welds and the incorrect locations of the repair sleeves are further
indications that the repairs were not performed in a safe manner.
10 The date this witness spoke to the foreman is not evident in the record, but it was likely years ago, since
Respondent was not able to locate the foreman to testify. Brief at 8.



9
While NDT may be an appropriate method to ensure type-B repair sleeves are installed in a safe
manner, the text of § 195.422(a) does not explicitly require the use of NDT to determine the
safety of such repairs. As Respondent correctly notes, § 195.422(a) is a performance-based
regulation that requires a specified minimum level of safety for pipeline repairs but does not
prescribe a specific process or method to be used for each type of repair. With regard to the
repairs at issue in this case, the question is whether Respondent used an evaluation process
capable of ensuring that type-B repair sleeves were installed in a safe manner. For the reasons
expressed above, I find the methods used by Respondent to determine the safety of those repairs
were inadequate to comply with § 195.422(a).
As for Bridger’s second argument that PHMSA failed to provide fair notice of its interpretation
and application of this regulation to require NDT, Respondent argued that it “could not have
reasonably ascertained that OPS now considers NDT to be a mandatory requirement under 49
C.F.R. § 195.422(a),” because the regulation, on its face, imposes no such requirement. Brief
at 10.
Bridger has clearly misinterpreted the agency’s application of § 195.422 in this case. As
explained above, PHMSA does not take the position that NDT, specifically, is a mandatory
requirement of the regulation. Rather, the agency notes the industry practice has been to use
NDT to meet the performance-based regulation for the type of pipeline repair at issue in this
case. It is clear from the text of § 195.422(a) that in order to ensure a particular pipeline repair
has been made in a safe manner, an operator must use an evaluation method that is capable of
making that determination. As a matter of law, therefore, I find that Bridger had fair notice of
the requirement within § 195.422(a) that it use an evaluation method capable of determining
type-B sleeve repairs were made in a safe manner. Unfortunately, for the reasons expressed
above, the methods of evaluation used by Bridger were insufficient to comply with this
requirement.
Respondent’s assertion that the company was not aware NDT was the “industry standard” is
specious, as Bridger itself cited the ASME B31.4 standard, which states explicitly that repair
welds should be examined by NDT. Whether or not NDT is the industry standard, however, is
ultimately irrelevant because § 195.422(a) does not bind Respondent to the industry standard.
Respondent may comply with the regulation by using one or more evaluation methods capable of
determining that “the repairs are made in a safe manner;” but the operator must be able to
demonstrate the chosen method is capable of making such a determination. In this case, I find
Bridger’s chosen evaluation method was not capable of demonstrating the repairs were made
safely.
Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence and arguments presented, I find Respondent
violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.422(a) by failing to ensure that type-B repairs sleeves were completed
in a safe manner.
Item 11: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.428(a), which states:
§ 195.428 Overpressure safety devices and overfill protection systems.
(a) [E]ach operator shall, at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least
once each calendar year . . . inspect and test each pressure limiting device, relief
valve, pressure regulator, or other item of pressure control equipment to



10
determine that it is functioning properly, is in good mechanical condition, and is
adequate from the standpoint of capacity and reliability of operation for the
service in which it is used.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated § 195.428(a) by failing to inspect and test certain
pressure control equipment on the Poplar pipeline to determine that such equipment was
functioning properly, was in good mechanical condition, and adequate in terms of capacity and
reliability of operation. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Bridger failed to test or calibrate
“transducers that transmit data” to the company’s Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) center. The Notice alleged that such devices were part of the company’s pressure
control system and therefore had to be inspected and tested periodically under § 195.428(a). The
Director’s Violation Report also referenced an enforcement action brought against the previous
operator of the Poplar pipeline in 2004 for the same issue. Violation Report at 6.11
Bridger raised several defenses to Item 11. First, the company argued that the requirements in
§ 195.428(a) do not apply to pressure “transmitters,” which the company termed the equipment
at issue in the Notice. Response at 7. Second, the company argued that Bridger did not have fair
notice of this interpretation and application of § 195.428(a). Id.
As a general matter, the parties discussed at the hearing whether a distinction could be drawn
between the terms “transducer” and “transmitter” and, if so, whether that distinction had any
bearing on the allegation. A “transducer” is a generic term referring to a device that reads data in
one form (for example, pipeline pressure measured in pounds) and translates that data into an
electronic signal that can be transmitted, usually by wire. A “transmitter” is an electronic
assembly with a transducer at the front end and that transmits the signal. Although there is a
technical distinction between the two terms, in this case the terms refer to the same piece of
equipment that, for ease of discussion, I will refer to simply as a “pressure transmitter.”
The company offered several reasons why § 195.428(a) does not apply to pressure transmitters.
First, it explained that Bridger’s pipeline uses on-site devices that are “hard-wired to
mechanically shut down the system locally and independently of the SCADA system” when
pressure reaches a certain level. Brief at 12. Respondent distinguished those devices from
pressure transmitters that send pressure data to a SCADA center, arguing that the regulation only
applies to local mechanical devices and not to pressure transmitters.
While Respondent is correct to point out that local mechanical pressure control equipment is
covered by § 195.428(a), the regulation is not so limited as to exclude other types of devices
used to monitor and control operating pressure on a pipeline. By its terms, § 195.428(a) requires
“each pressure limiting device, relief valve, pressure regulator, or other item of pressure control
equipment” to be tested and inspected at specified intervals. The regulation does not explicitly
define “pressure control equipment,” but the ordinary meaning of those terms would include
devices used to control pipeline operating pressure. The requirements within § 195.428(a) do not
distinguish between local and remote control devices, nor does the regulation differentiate
between devices used to control emergency overpressures and those used to control pressure
during normal operations.
11 In the Matter of Shell Pipeline Company L.P., CPF No. 5-2004-5020, Warning Letter (Sept. 23, 2004).



11
Regulated hazardous liquid pipelines have controls and protective equipment to control pressure
during emergency pressure surges and other variations from normal operations. See
§ 195.406(b). A pipeline operator may establish set points for the activation of emergency
shutdown and overpressure devices as high as 110% of the established maximum operating
pressure (MOP) of a pipeline. Id. During normal operations, however, pipeline operators utilize
electronic pressure monitoring equipment to assist in operating the pipeline within the
established MOP. When pressure transmitters are used to monitor pipeline pressure, the
transmitters send pressure data to a program logic computer or SCADA control center where
persons and computers make operational decisions based on such data. Safe operation of a
pipeline facility depends on the accuracy of the pressure data being transmitted.
If pressure transmitters are not calibrated, they may send inaccurate pressure data to the program
logic computer or SCADA center, potentially resulting in the operation of a pipeline at a pressure
higher than intended, perhaps even higher than the MOP, without the controller’s knowledge. In
fact, erroneous pressure data may result in a pipeline being operated at an unsafe pressure as high
as 110% of MOP without the controller’s knowledge and without triggering any automatic
remote or local emergency overpressure protection devices. Regular operation of a pipeline
above MOP is a significant safety risk to the public, employees, and the environment, and is not
permitted by the pipeline safety regulations. See § 195.406(a). For these reasons, regular testing
and calibration of pressure transmitters that send pressure signals to on-site devices and to off-
site locations that control pipeline pressure is important for public safety and is a requirement
under § 195.428(a).
Second, Respondent argued that PHMSA’s interpretation of § 195.428(a) to include pressure
transmitters would logically require the agency to extend the applicability of the regulation to all
other SCADA-related equipment, such as computers, software, alarms, displays, databases, and
even satellite communications. Brief at 12. PHMSA has never suggested or actually applied the
regulation so broadly as to require annual testing of all SCADA-related equipment. In addition,
it would be neither logical nor necessary to extend the application of the regulation to every
component arguably associated with a SCADA system. On the other hand, pressure transmitters
that actually monitor pipeline pressure, convert such data to electronic signals, and transmit such
data to an operator’s SCADA system reasonably fall within the scope of the regulation. For
these reasons, I find Respondent’s arg
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