{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 520080004W","title":"TESORO REFINING & MARKETING COMPANY, LLC — Warning Letter","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2008-03-13","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED warning letter citing 192.917(c), 192.935(a), 192.937(b), 192.947, 192.947(d).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520080004w.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520080004w.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520080004w","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/520080004W","body":"Warning Letter involving TESORO REFINING & MARKETING COMPANY, LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 192.917(c),  192.935(a),  192.937(b),  192.947,  192.947(d). The case was opened on 2008-03-13 and is reported as closed as of 2008-03-13. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n520080004W_warning letter_03132008.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520080004W/520080004W_warning%20letter_03132008.pdf\n\n520080004w_warning letter_03132008_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520080004W/520080004w_warning%20letter_03132008_text.pdf\n\n520080004w_warning letter_03132008_text.pdf\n\nSENT TO COMPLIANCE REGISTR\nHardcopy Electronically\nit of Copies i /Date~Iotr\nU. S Department\nof Transportation\nPipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration\n12300 W Dakota Ave, Suite 110\nLakewood, CO 80228\nWARNING LETTER\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT RK UESTED\nMarch 13, 2008\nMr. John W. Moore\nV. P. Pipelines, Terminals, Trucking, and Rail (PTTR)\nTesoro Los Angeles Refinery\n2101 E Pacific Coast Highway\nWilmington, CA, 90748\nCPF 5-200S-0004W\nDear Mr. Moore:\nOn December 17 through December 20, 2007, a representative of the Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration (PHMSA), pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code,\ninspected Tesoro Los Angeles Refinery's procedures and records for your Integrity\nManagement Program (IMP) in Los Angeles, California.\nAs a result of the inspection, it appears you have committed probable violations of the Pipeline\nSafety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations. The items inspected and the\nprobable violations are:\n$192. 947 What records must an operator keep?\n$192. 947 (d) Documents to support any decision, analysis and process developed\nand used to implement and evaluate each element of the baseline assessment plan\nand integrity management program. Documents include those developed and used\nin support of any identification, calculation, amendment, modification, justification,\ndeviation and determination made, and any action taken to implement and evaluate\nany of the program elements;\n\n\n\n$192. 905 (a) GeneraL To determine which segments of an operator's transmission\npipeline system are covered by this subpart, an operator must identify the high\nconsequence areas. An operator must use method (1) or (2) from the definition in g\n192. 903 to identify a high consequence area. An operator may apply one method to\nits entire pipeline system, or an operator may apply one method to individual\nportions of the pipeline system. An operator must describe in its integrity\nmanagement program which method it is applying to each portion of the operator's\npipeline system. The description must include the potential impact radius when\nutilized to establish a high consequence area. (See appendix E. I. for guidance on\nidentifying high consequence areas. )\nThe Tesoro IMP does not include maps or other sufficiently detailed records of the\nlocation of High Consequence Areas (HCAs) on the pipeline.\nEvidence: Tesoro did not have any documentation to show that a system map was\navailable to identify any of the HCA along their pipeline system.\n$192. 917 How does an operator identify potential threats to pipeline integrity and\nuse the threat identification in its integrity program?\n(c) Risk assessment. An operator must conduct a risk assessment that follows\nASME/ANSI B31. SS, section 5, and considers the identified threats for each\ncovered segment. An operator must use the risk assessment to prioritize the\ncovered segments for the baseline and continual reassessments ($192. 919, $192. 921,\ng 192. 937), and to determine what additional preventive and mitigative measures\nare needed (g 192. 935) for the covered segment.\nThe Tesoro IMP does not define or document clearly the process for periodic evaluation\nof pipeline integrity (using updated risk assessments, integrity assessment results, etc. ).\nEvidence: The IMP does not require or define periodic evaluations.\n$192. 937 What is a continual process of evaluation and assessment to maintain a\npipeline's integrity?\n(b) Evaluation. An operator must conduct a periodic evaluation as frequently as\nneeded to assure the integrity of each covered segment. The periodic evaluation\nmust be based on a data integration and risk assessment of the entire pipeline as\nspecified in g 192. 917. For plastic transmission pipelines, the periodic evaluation is\nbased on the threat analysis specified in g 192. 917(d) For all other transmission\npipelines, the evaluation must consider the past and present integrity assessment\nresults, data integration and risk assessment information (g 192. 917), and decisions\nabout remediation (g 192. 933) and additional preventive and mitigative actions (g\n192. 935). An operator must use the results from this evaluation to identify the\nthreats specific to each covered segment and the risk represented by these threats.\n\n\n\nThe IMP does not require the integrity evaluation to be conducted annually. Although\nShell analysts performed a \"data integration\" following the ILI in 2006, the pipeline's\nrisk assessment has not been updated since.\nEvidence: No risk assessments conducted since 2004, despite additional information and\npipe condition changes. Next risk assessment is scheduled for 2012.\n$192. 935 What additional preventive and mitigative measures must an operator\ntake?\n(a) General requirements. An operator must take additional measures beyond\nthose already required by Part 192 to prevent a pipeline failure and to mitigate the\nconsequences of a pipeline failure in a high consequence area. An operator must\nbase the additional measures on the threats the operator has identified to each\npipeline segment. (See g 192. 917) An operator must conduct, in accordance with\none of the risk assessment approaches in ASME/ANSI B31. SS (incorporated by\nreference, see g 192. 7), section 5, a risk analysis of its pipeline to identify additional\nmeasures to protect the high consequence area and enhance public safety. Such\nadditional measures include, but are not limited to, installing Automatic Shut-off\nValves or Remote Control Valves, installing computerized monitoring and leak\ndetection systems, replacing pipe segments with pipe of heavier wall thickness,\nproviding additional training to personnel on response procedures, conducting\ndrills with local emergency responders and implementing additional inspection and\nmaintenance programs.\n(b) Third party damage and outside force damage—\n(1) Third party damage. An operator must enhance its damage prevention\nprogram, as required under $192. 614 of this part, with respect to a covered\nsegment to prevent and minimize the consequences of a release due to third party\ndamage. Enhanced measures to an existing damage prevention program include, at\na minimum-\n(i) Using qualified personnel (see f 192. 915) for work an operator is conducting\nthat could adversely affect the integrity of a covered segment, such as marking,\nlocating, and direct supervision of known excavation work.\n(ii) Collecting in a central database information that is location specific on\nexcavation damage that occurs in covered and non covered segments in the\ntransmission system and the root cause analysis to support identification of\ntargeted additional preventative and mitigative measures in the high consequence\nareas. This information must include recognized damage that is not required to be\nreported as an incident under part 191.\n(iii) Participating in one-call systems in locations where covered segments are\npresent.\n(iv) Monitoring of excavations conducted on covered pipeline segments by pipeline\npersonnel. If an operator finds physical evidence of encroachment involving\nexcavation that the operator did not monitor near a covered segment, an operator\nmust either excavate the area near the encroachment or conduct an above ground\n\n\n\nsurvey using methods defined in NACE RP-0502-2002 (incorporated by reference,\nsee $192. 7). An operator must excavate, and remediate, in accordance with\nANSI/ASME B31. 8S and $192. 933 any indication of coating holidays or\ndiscontinuity warranting direct examination.\n(2) Outside force damage. If an operator determines that outside force (e. g. ,\nearth\nmovement, floods, unstable suspension bridge) is a threat to the integrity of a\ncovered segment, the operator must take measures to minimize the consequences to\nthe covered segment from outside force damage. These measures include, but are\nnot limited to, increasing the frequency of aerial, foot or other methods of patrols,\nadding external protection, reducing external stress, and relocating the line.\n(c) Automatic shut-off valves (ASV) or Remote control valves (RCV). If an\noperator determines, based on a risk analysis, that an ASV or RCV would be an\nefficient means of adding protection to a high consequence area in the event of a gas\nrelease, an operator must install the ASV or RCV. In making that determination,\nan operator must, at least, consider the following factors-swiftness of leak\ndetection and pipe shutdown capabilities, the type of gas being transported,\noperating pressure, the rate of potential release, pipeline profile, the potential for\nignition, and location of nearest response personnel.\nThe Tesoro IMP does not include a risk-based evaluation to determine if automatic shut-\noff valves or remote control valves should be added to the line to protect HCAs.\nEvidence: The IMP does not include a requirement to perform this analysis.\n$192. 947 What records must an operator keep?\nAn operator must maintain, for the useful life of the pipeline, records that\ndemonstrate compliance with the requirements of this subpart. At minimum, an\noperator must maintain the following records for review during an inspection.\n(a) A written integrity management program in accordance with g 192. 907;\n(b) Documents supporting the threat identification and risk assessment in\naccordance with g 192. 917;\n(c) A written baseline assessment plan in accordance with g 192. 919;\n(d) Documents to support any decision, analysis and process developed and used to\nimplement and evaluate each element of the baseline assessment plan and integrity\nmanagement program. Documents include those developed and used in support of\nany identification, calculation, amendment, modification, justification, deviation\nand determination made, and any action taken to implement and evaluate any of\nthe program elements;\n(e) Documents that demonstrate personnel have the required training, including a\ndescription of the training program, in accordance with g 192. 915;\n(f) Schedule required by g 192. 933 that prioritizes the conditions found during an\nassessment for evaluation and remediation, including technical justifications for the\nschedule.\n\n\n\n(g) Documents to carry out the requirements in g 192. 923 through g 192. 929 for a\ndirect assessment plan;\n(h) Documents to carry out the requirements in g 192. 931 for confirmatory direct\nassessment;\n(i) Verification that an operator has provided any documentation or notification\nrequired by this subpart to be provided to OPS, and when applicable, a State\nauthority with which OPS has an interstate agent agreement, and a State or local\npipeline safety authority that regulates a covered pipeline segment within that\nState.\nRecords have not been maintained on HCA identification results, remediation decisions,\nand preventive and mitigative measure decisions.\nEvidence: These records were not available to the inspection team and could not be\nobtained by Tesoro.\nUnder 49 United States Code, $ 60122, you are subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $100, 000\nfor each violation for each day the violation persists up to a maximum of $1, 000, 000 for any\nrelated series of violations. We have reviewed the circumstances and supporting documents\ninvolved in this case, and have decided not to conduct additional enforcement action or penalty\nassessment proceedings at this time. We advise you to correct the item(s) identified in this\nletter. Failure to do so will result in Tesoro being subject to additional enforcement action.\nNo reply to this letter is required. If you choose to reply, in your correspondence please refer to\nCPF 5-200S-0004W. Be advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement\naction is subject to being made publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your\nresponsive material qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U. S. C. 552(b), along with the\ncomplete original document you must provide a second copy of the document with the portions\nyou believe qualify for confidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe\nthe redacted information qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U. S, C. 552(b).\nSincerely,\nChris 'dal\nDirector, Western Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\ncc: PHP-60 Compliance Registry\nPHP-500 J. Gilliam (¹120054)\nBernadette Frieh, PTTR Environmental Compliance Manager","truncated":false,"body_characters":13065}