{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 520085016H","title":"ALYESKA PIPELINE SERVICE CO — Corrective Action Order","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2008-06-20","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED corrective action order.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520085016h.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520085016h.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520085016h","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/520085016H","body":"Corrective Action Order involving ALYESKA PIPELINE SERVICE CO. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2008-06-20 and is reported as closed as of 2011-09-09. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n520085016H_Notice of Proposed Corrective Action Order_06202008.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520085016H/520085016H_Notice%20of%20Proposed%20Corrective%20Action%20Order_06202008.pdf\n\n520085016H_Post Hearing Decision_09092011.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520085016H/520085016H_Post%20Hearing%20Decision_09092011.pdf\n\n520085016H_Post Hearing Decision_09092011_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520085016H/520085016H_Post%20Hearing%20Decision_09092011_text.pdf\n\n520085016H_Post Hearing Decision_09092011_text.pdf\n\nSEP 09 2011\nMr. Mike Joynor\nSenior Vice President\nAlyeska Pipeline Service Company\nP.O. Box 196660\nAnchorage, AK 99519\nMr. John Mingé\nPresident\nBP Exploration (Alaska), Inc.\n900 E. Benson Blvd.\nAnchorage, AK 99508\nRe: CPF No. 5-2008-5016H\nDear Messrs. Joynor and Mingé:\nPlease find enclosed the Post-Hearing Decision Withdrawing the Notice of Proposed Corrective\nAction Order in the above-referenced matter. As a result of your companies’ replacement of the\ncrude oil pipeline between Skid 50 and Pump Station 1, the Decision finds that issuance of a\ncorrective action order is not necessary. As more fully explained in the document, the Notice of\nProposed Corrective Action Order issued on June 20, 2008, to Alyeska Pipeline Service\nCompany and BP Exploration (Alaska), Inc., is withdrawn and this enforcement action is now\nclosed. Service of this Decision by certified mail is deemed effective upon the date of mailing,\nor as otherwise provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. Chris Hoidal, Director, Western Region, PHMSA\nMr. Dennis Hinnah, Deputy Director, Western Region, PHMSA\nMs. Sheila Doody Bishop, Attorney, Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.\nMr. Randal Buckendorf, Senior Attorney, BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc.\nVIA CERTIFIED MAIL – RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED [7005 1160 0001 0075 9398]\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n___________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nAlyeska Pipeline Service Company, )\nand ) CPF No. 5-2008-5016H\nBP Exploration (Alaska), Inc., )\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\nRespondents. )\n___________________________________ )\nPOST-HEARING DECISION WITHDRAWING\nNOTICE OF PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nOn June 20, 2008, the Director, Western Region, Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), Pipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), issued a Notice of Proposed Corrective\nAction Order (Notice) under authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60112 alleging that continued operation of\na crude oil pipeline at the Prudhoe Bay Unit oil field in the North Slope Borough, Alaska, by\nAlyeska Pipeline Service Company (Alyeska) and BP Exploration (Alaska), Inc. (BPXA), would\nbe hazardous to life, property, and the environment without corrective measures. Alyeska\noperates the 800-mile Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) that transports crude oil from the\nNorth Slope to Valdez. BPXA operates approximately 150 miles of crude oil, natural gas liquids\nand natural gas pipelines in Alaska, and also has partial ownership of TAPS.1\nAt the time of the Notice, the 0.4-mile pipeline at issue (Affected Pipeline) transported the\ncombined output of crude oil—approximately 400,000 barrels per day—from the Prudhoe Bay\nUnit Western and Eastern Operating Areas to TAPS. The Affected Pipeline began at BPXA’s\nSkid 50 facility and ended at Alyeska’s Pump Station 1 of TAPS. The upstream section of the\nAffected Pipeline was operated by BPXA and the downstream section by Alyeska.\nThe Notice documented two prior failures on BPXA’s crude oil pipelines located just upstream\nof the Affected Pipeline that were caused by internal corrosion. The Notice alleged that the\nAffected Pipeline had similar operational and internal characteristics as the pipelines that failed,\nand proposed that Alyeska and BPXA (Respondents or Companies) be required to undertake\ncorrective measures on the Affected Pipeline similar to those previously imposed by PHMSA on\n1 This information is reported by Alyeska and BPXA pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 195.49.\n\n\n\n2\nwith a new pipeline.\nthe failed pipelines.2 of two options: they could either assess and repair the Affected Pipeline, or they could replace it\nIn particular, the Notice proposed that Respondents be required to take one\nEnforcement Proceeding\nSection 190.233, of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, authorizes the issuance of a corrective\naction order, after reasonable notice and opportunity for hearing, when a pipeline facility is\ndetermined to be hazardous to life, property, or the environment. A corrective action order\nrequires the facility’s operator to take corrective measures to address the hazardous condition,\nwhich may include suspended or restricted use of the facility, physical inspection, testing, repair,\nreplacement, or other appropriate action.\nWritten notice that OPS intends to issue a corrective action order must state the facts that support\nthe allegation that the facility is hazardous and provide the operator with an opportunity for a\nhearing. If a hearing is held, the presiding official must submit a timely post-hearing\nrecommendation to the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety as to whether or not a\ncorrective action order is warranted. If the Associate Administrator finds the facility is or would\nbe hazardous, the Associate Administrator issues a corrective action order. If the Associate\nAdministrator does not find the facility is or would be hazardous, the Associate Administrator\nwithdraws the allegation of the existence of a hazardous facility, and promptly notifies the\noperator in writing.\nOn June 20, 2008, OPS served written notice on Respondents that the agency intended to issue a\ncorrective action order for the Affected Pipeline. The Companies responded separately to the\nNotice by letters dated June 30, 2008. Both operators requested a hearing. Separate hearings\nwere held in accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.233(c), although representatives from both\nCompanies attended each hearing. The hearing for BPXA’s portion of the Affected Pipeline was\nheld December 10, 2008, and the hearing for Alyeska’s portion was held February 10, 2009.\nBoth hearings took place in Lakewood, Colorado, and were presided over by the same attorney\nin the Office of Chief Counsel, PHMSA, pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 190.233(c)(3). Respondents\nwere represented by counsel during the proceedings.\nAfter the hearings, Respondents provided separate written closing statements for the record,\ndated February 20, 2009. At the hearings and in their written statements, Respondents contested\nmany of the allegations in the Notice and presented evidence in support of their respective\npositions that the Affected Pipeline did not pose an imminent threat to people or the\nenvironment. Shortly after post-hearing statements were submitted, Respondents and OPS (the\nParties) requested that the Presiding Official suspend his recommendation for final action to\nallow the Parties to discuss a potential resolution to this matter. The Presiding Official granted\nthe request and temporarily suspended his recommendation.\n2 See In the Matter of BP Exploration (Alaska), Inc., Corrective Action Order, CPF No. 5-2006-5015H (Mar. 15,\n2006) as amended by Amendment No. 1 to Corrective Action Order (July 20, 2006), Amendment No. 2 to\nCorrective Action Order (Aug. 10, 2006), and Amendment No. 3 to Corrective Action Order (Apr. 27, 2007).\n\n\n\n3\nOn December 30, 2009, the Associate Administrator issued a statement to the Parties that\nPHMSA would continue to suspend its decision in this matter pending ongoing efforts by the\nRespondents to replace the Affected Pipeline. The Associate Administrator stated further that\nPHMSA would be prepared to withdraw the Notice in its entirety if the Respondents completed\nthe replacement by the end of calendar year 2010.\nCompletion of Pipeline Replacement and Withdrawal of Notice\nThe Director, Western Region, OPS, has confirmed that Respondents completed replacement of\nthe Affected Pipeline. BPXA performed a majority of the replacement work pursuant to an\nagreement between the Companies. PHMSA inspectors performed several on-site construction\ninspections, and confirmed the new pipeline was placed in service on November 13, 2010.\nPHMSA inspectors have also confirmed that construction of pig launchers and receivers for the\nnew pipeline were completed in February 2011.\nSince the Companies have successfully taken action to address the safety concerns expressed in\nthe Notice, the Director has recommended that it be withdrawn. For the above reasons, I hereby\nwithdraw the Notice issued to the Companies on June 20, 2008. The terms and conditions of this\nDecision are effective upon service in accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\n___________________________________ __________________\nJeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\n\n520085016H_Notice of Proposed Corrective Action Order_06202008.pdf\n\nU.S. Department\nof Transportation\nPipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration\n12300 W. Dakota Ave., Suite 110\nLakewood. CO 80228\nVIA FEDERAL EXPRESS AND FACSIMILE\nMr. Kevin Hostler President and Chief Executive Officer Alyeska Pipeline Service Company 900 E. Benson Boulevard Anchorage, AK 995 19 Mr. Doug Suttles\nPresident\nBP Exploration (Alaska), Inc.\n900 E. Benson Boulevard\nAnchorage, AK 99501\nRe: CPF No. 5-2008-5016H\nGentlemen:\nEnclosed is a Notice of Proposed Corrective Action Order (Notice) issued in the above-\nreferenced case. The Notice proposes that Alyeska Pipeline Service Company and BP\nExploration (Alaska), Inc. take certain measures with respect to their respective portions of the\ncrude oil pipeline that connects Skid 50 to Pump Station 1 at Prudhoe Bay. Service is being\nmade by Federal Express and facsimile. Your receipt of this Notice constitutes service of that\ndocument under 49 C.F.R. 5 190.5.\nWe look forward to a successful resolution of the potentially hazardous conditions posed by\nthis pipeline. Please direct any questions on this matter to me at (720) 963-3 160.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely, & Tu\nChris Hoidal\nDirector, Western Region\nEnclosures: Notice of Proposed Corrective Action Order\n49 C. F. R. $190.233\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWESTERN REGION\nLAKEWOOD, CO 80228\nIn the Matter of\nAlyeska Pipeline Service Company\nand\nBP Exploration (Alaska), Inc.,\nRespondents.\nCPF NO. 5-2008-501 6H\nNOTICE OF PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nBackground and Purpose\nThis Notice of Proposed Corrective Action Order (\"Notice\") is issued in reference to a hazardous\nliquid pipeline operated in part by BP Exploration (Alaska), Inc. (\"BPXA\") and in part by The\nAlyeska Pipeline Service Company (\"Alyeska\"), at the Prudhoe Bay Unit oil field in the North\nSlope Borough, near Deadhorse, Alaska. This short but critical pipeline (\"Affected Pipeline\")\ntransports the combined output of crude oil-approximately 400,000 barrels per day-from the\nPrudhoe Bay Unit Western Operating Area (\"WOA\") and the Prudhoe Bay Unit Eastern\nOperating Area (\"EOA\") to the Trans Alaska Pipeline System (\"TAPS\"). The Affected Pipeline\nbegins at BPXA's Skid 50 facility and ends at Alyeska's Pump Station 1 of TAPS. The\nupstream section is operated by BPXA and the downstream section is operated by Alyeska.\nIn March and August 2006, two crude oil pipelines located just upstream of Skid 50 and operated\nby BPXA failed and caused spills of crude oil on the tundra of the North Slope of Alaska. The\nMarch failure occurred on the WOA crude oil transit pipeline and resulted in a spill of an\nestimated 212,252 gallons of oil. The August failures occurred on the EOA crude oil pipeline\nand resulted in a spill of an estimated 966 gallons of oil. Both lines have similar operational and\ninternal characteristics to the Affected Pipeline.\n\n\n\nIn response to the 2006 WOA and EOA failures, PHMSA issued a Corrective Action Order and\nthree subsequent Amendments to BPXA in 2006 and 2007 (\"BPXA CAO.)\"' The Pipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety Administration (\"PHMSA\" or \"the agency\") and BPXA agree that\ninternal corrosion was a cause of the 2006 failures and that roughly sixteen (16) miles of WOA\nand EOA pipeline have ultimately needed replacement in order to effectively address future\ncorrosion risks on those lines. This replacement work is currently underway and is scheduled for\ncompletion by the end of 2008.\nA purpose of this Notice is to address corrosion risks on the Affected Pipeline to prevent similar\nfailures. Specifically, PHMSA proposes that BPXA and Alyeska be required to undertake\nmeasures similar to those imposed by PHMSA in the BPXA CAO to either assess and repair or\nreplace the Affected Pipeline. The Affected Pipeline has never been fully assessed and its\ncondition remains largely unknown.\nPHMSA issues this Notice of Proposed Corrective Action Order, in accordance with 49 U.S.C.\n5 601 12, to BPXA and Alyeska (collectively, \"Respondents\"), notifying them of the agency's\npreliminary findings regarding the Affected Pipeline and proposing that Respondents take certain\ncorrective measures with respect to the Affected Pipeline that PHMSA deems necessary to\nprotect life, property, and the environment from potential hazards associated with the Affected\nPipeline.\nBecause Respondents each operate a portion of the Affected Pipeline, PHMSA encourages\nRespondents to develop a joint and coordinated plan to accomplish the corrective measures\nproposed in this Notice.\nPreliminary Findings\nFailures of Pipelines Similar to the Affected Pipeline\nPHMSA began an investigation of the 2006 WOA pipeline failure immediately after\nlearning of the incident. On March 15, 2006, PHMSA issued a Corrective Action Order\nfinding that the continued operation of three hazardous liquid pipelines BPXA\noperates-the WOA, EOA and Lisbume pipelines (\"Subject Pipelinesn)-would be\nhazardous to life, property, and the environment, if certain corrective measures were not\ntaken. The CAO set forth preliminary findings based on PHMSA's initial investigation\nof the failure and required, among other actions, that BPXA perfom certain cleaning\npigging and smart pigging of the Subject Pipelines. PHMSA amended the CAO three\ntimes based upon its ongoing investigation of the March failure and the subsequent\nAugust 2006 failures and PHMSA's finding that the Subject Pipelines would continue to\nbe hazardous to life, property, and the environment without additional corrective\nmeasures.\n1 See In the Matter of BP Exploration (Alaska), Inc., Corrective Action Order, CPF No. 5-2006-5015H, (Pipeline\nand Hazardous Materials Safety Admin. Mar. 15, 2006) as amended by Amendment No. 1 to Corrective Action\nOrder (July 20, 2006), Amendment No. 2 to Corrective Action Order (Aug. 10, 2006), and Amendment No. 3 to\nCorrective Action Order (Apr. 27, 2007).\n\n\n\nIn .the course of investigating the WOA and EOA failures, PHMSA found that they\nresulted, in part, from internal corrosion that had reduced the thickness of the pipeline\nwalls. PHMSA also found that certain common operating and internal characteristics\nwere relevant to the failures. These characteristics include, but are not limited to: a lack\nof routine cleaning pigging; low crude oil flow velocities; the corrosivity of the materials\ntransported (including water and sediments); the tendency of sediments and water to drop\nout of the low flow velocity crude oil stream onto the bottom inside surface of the\npipelines; the presence of accumulated water and sediments inside the pipelines;\noperation in similar environmental conditions; and ineffective corrosion inhibitor and\npipeline assessment programs.\n3. The Affected Pipeline shares the common operating and internal characteristics listed\nabove with the EOA and WOA pipelines. However, whereas the WOA and EOA\npipelines were cleaned and smart pigged (albeit very infrequently prior to the 2006\nfailures), the Affected Pipeline has never been cleaned or smart pigged.\n4. It is well known that low crude oil flow velocities often cause the accumulation of water\nand solids inside pipelines. BPXA has reported periodic upset conditions in which water\nhas been released into the WOA and EOA. It is likely that some of this water has entered\ninto and accumulated in the Affected Pipeline. BPXA has also reported that Gama Ray\nscans of its portion of the Affected Pipeline indicate the presence of accumulated solids\nin the line. Therefore, it is likely that solids have also accumulated in the Alyeska-\noperated section of the Affected Pipeline.\n5. The accumulation of water and solids in the bottom of the Affected Pipeline increases the\nrisk of internal corrosion and spills of oil, particularly when water and solids are not\nremoved by the use of cleaning pigs. As PHMSA noted in Amendment No. 3 to the\nCAO, the accumulation of water and solids was a factor in the 2006 WOA and EOA\nfailures.\nThe Affected Pipeline\n6. The Affected Pipeline is approximately 0.4 miles in length and located approximately 12\nmiles from Deadhorse, Alaska. The upstream section is a 34-inch line operated by BPXA\nand known as \"OT 501.\" OT 501 originates at Skid 50, runs beneath the Spine Road,\nand ends at a welded pipe joint in the vicinity of an insulating flange approximately\n1,600 feet downstream from Skid 50. The downstream section, a 36-inch line known as\nthe Greater Prudhoe Bay Connecting Pipeline (\"GPB CP\"), is operated by Alyeska, and\noriginates at the welded pipe joint. The GPB CP runs mostly underground, is partially\nencased in concrete, and ends at Pump Station 1 approximately 660 feet downstream.\n7. During the course of it's investigations of the 2006 pipeline failures and the Agency's\noversight of the BPXA CAO, PHMSA became concerned about the safety of the\nAffected Pipeline because of its shared operating and internal characteristics to the failed\n\n\n\nWOA and EOA pipelines, as described above, and because the Affected Pipeline had not\nbeen cleaned or internally inspected.\n8. As a result of these concerns, in the summer of 2006, PHMSA, by way of Item 34 of the\nBPXA CAO, required BPXA to submit information detailing the results of assessments\nand testing of the Affected Pipeline, then referred to by BPXA as OT 501, as well as\nplans for future assessment and testing. On September 8, 2006, BPXA provided\nresponsive information. In its Response, BPXA provided information about OT 50 1 and\nthe results of external assessments that the company had conducted. BPXA indicated\nthat OT 501 transported oil from Skid 50 to Pump Station 1 but did not indicate that there\nwas another section of the Affected Pipeline that was operated by Alyeska.\n9. In the summer of 2006, PHMSA, by way of Items 17 and 23 of the BPXA CAO, also\nrequired BPXA to submit information on its plans for the repair or replacement of WOA\nand EOA. In the fall of 2006, BPXA indicated that it would replace several segments of\nthe Prudhoe Bay Unit pipelines. In January 2007, BPXA provided details regarding the\nnature and scope of the replacement project, including its plans to replace the entire\nAffected Pipeline (including the section operated by Alyeska) by the end of 2008.\nSpecifically, BPXA indicated that the Affected Pipeline would be replaced with a new\npipeline of a uniform diameter, equipped with facilities to enable the line to be readily\nassessed with smart pigs and cleaned with cleaning pigs. PHMSA reflected this\ncommitment in Item 35 of the BPXA CAO by requiring BPXA to report monthly on the\nprogress of pipeline replacement and to provide notice of any material changes to the\nscope, design elements, or schedule of BPXA's plans for replacement.\n10. Replacement of the Affected Pipeline with a new, piggable line would likely eliminate\nmany of the corrosion-related risks on the Affected Pipeline. In the alternative, full\ninspection, repair, maintenance and work to make the existing Affected Pipeline\npiggable, may eliminate such corrosion-related risks.\n11. By letter dated January 29, 2008, BPXA reiterated its desire to replace the Affected\nPipeline to ExxonMobil Production Company (\"Exxon\"), one of the Working Interest\nOwners (\"Owners\") of the Prudhoe Bay BPXA expressed its belief that \"[tlhe\npipeline between Skid 50 and Pump Station 1 is one of the most important sections of\npipeline on the North Slope. The entire flow from the Prudhoe Bay Unit is transported\nthrough this pipeline just before it enters the Trans Alaska Pipeline.\"\n12. In the fall and winter of 2007, BPXA indicated to PHMSA that it was working to obtain\ncertain approvals for its plan to replace the Affected Pipeline.\n13. On February 10, 2008, however, BPXA notified PHMSA by letter3 that it had suspended\nplans to replace the Affected Pipeline. BPXA later explained that it was suspending its\nreplacement plans because it had not been able to obtain funding approval from all of the\n2 The Owners consist of several oil companies who jointly own the Prudhoe Bay Unit facilities. BPXA operates the\nfacilities on behalf of the Owners pursuant to a written agreement.\n3 Pursuant to Item 35 of the BPXA CAO.\n\n\n\nOwners. Upon receiving this news, PHMSA requested4 and received5 additional\ninformation from Respondents regarding the specifications and condition of their\nrespective sections of the Affected Pipeline.\n14. By letter dated, March 28, 2008, BPXA provided PHMSA re-submitted assessment\ninformation on several spot locations along OT 501 that it had complied in 2006 using\nNon-Destructive Evaluation (\"NDE\") tools applied to the exterior of the pipeline. The\n2006 information included assessment results indicating that OT 501 had two (2)\nindications of internal corrosion with wall loss up to 40% and eight (8) indications of\ninternal corrosion with wall loss up to 20%. The 2006 information also revealed two (2)\nindications of external corrosion with wall loss up to 40% and nineteen (19) indications\nof external corrosion with wall loss up to 20%.\n15. BPXA has recently informed PHMSA that the company has performed additional testing\n,on the Affected Pipeline but has neither provided any data to PHMSA nor submitted\nspecific details on the assessment techniques or equipment used. Therefore, the actual\ncondition of the OT 501 section of the Affected Pipeline remains unknown.\n16. By letter dated February 4, 2008 to Alyeska, BPXA indicated its intent to develop a joint\nplan with Alyeska to fully assess the integrity of the Affected Pipeline.\n17. By letter dated April 25, 2008, Alyeska indicated it had assessed the GPB CP section of\nthe Affected Pipeline with NDE tools applied to the exterior of the pipeline. The\nassessments were conducted at two sites along the pipeline at above- and below-ground\nlocations. Alyeska indicated that it discovered external corrosion of up to 24% wall loss\nand internal corrosion that it characterized as \"light density corrosion pitting.\" Alyeska\nreported that the external corrosion indications had been remediated.\n18. Except for the two inspection sites, most of the GPB CP section of the Affected Pipeline\nhas not been assessed. Therefore the condition of the section as a whole remains\nunknown.\n19. In its April 25, 2008 letter, Alyeska indicated that, upon learning that BPXA had\nsuspended its plan to replace the entire Affected Pipeline, Alyeska had initiated an\nengineering design process for replacement of its GPB CP section. The company\nindicated that it may replace the GPB CP in 2009.\n20. By letter dated April 3, 3008, Alyeska indicated that the GPB CP is constructed from 36-\ninch nominal diameter, 0.375-inch wall thickness, Grade API-5L X60 (consisting of both\nAT and CT line classes), dual submerged arc welded (\"DSAW\") pipe of unknown\nmanufacture or date with a thin film epoxy coating, and an AnodeFlex impressed current\ncathodic protection system. Alyeska indicated that the date of construction of GPB CP is\nPHMSA sent information requests to BPXA by letters dated Feb. 7 and Mar. 18, 2008, and to Alyeska by letters\ndated Mar. 27 and Apr. 11,2008.\nPHMSA received responses to its information requests from BPXA by letters dated Feb. 15 and Mar. 18, 2008, and\nfrom Alyeska by letters dated Apr. 3,25 and June 2,2008.\n\n\n\nunknown. The established maximum operating pressure of the GPB CP is 275 psi for the\nAT line class pipe and 720 psi for the CT line class pipe, established by original design\ncriteria.\n21. According to BPXA's September 8,2006 letter, as resent on March 28, 2008, the OT 501\nwas constructed in 1977 from uncoated 34-inch nominal diameter, 0.375-inch wall\nthickness, Grade API-5L X52 DSAW pipe that the company believes was manufactured\nby Sumitomo. According to BPXA, the established maximum operating pressure of OT\n501 is 500 psi (de-rated from 720 psi in 1999). BPXA indicated its belief that the\nmaximum operating pressure was established by hydrostatic test.\n22. Respondents indicate that they operate the Affected Pipeline at approximately 100 psi.\n23. The Affected Pipeline traverses an ecological Unusually Sensitive Area (\"USA\") and is\nin close proximity to a drinking water USA. The OT 501 section crosses under the Spine\nRoad, a heavily travelled access road for the Prudhoe Bay Unit. Area population\nincludes workers and others at Pump Station 1 and those travelling the Spine Road.\n24. The Affected Pipeline operates at less than 20% of the specified maximum yield strength\n(\"SMYS\") and is therefore defined as a low-stress pipeline under 49 C.F.R. 9 195.2.\nFederal hazardous liquid pipeline safety regulations (49 C.F.R. Part 195) currently do not\napply to the Affected Pipeline under the exemption in 49 C.F.R. 9 195.1 for onshore low-\nstress pipelines located in rural areas, outside waterways currently used for commercial\nnavigation which do not transport highly volatile liquids. However, this exemption will\nsoon be narrowed as a result of recent changes to Part 1 9 5 . ~\nAllegation of Hazardous Condition and Right to Hearing\nSection 601 12 of Title 49, United States Code, provides for the issuance of a corrective action\norder, after reasonable notice and the opportunity for a hearing, requiring corrective action,\nwhich may include the suspended or restricted use of a pipeline facility, physical inspection,\ntesting, repair, replacement, or other action, as appropriate. The basis for making the\ndetermination that a pipeline facility is or would be hazardous, requiring corrective action, is set\nforth both in the above-referenced statute and 49 C.F.R. § 190.233, a copy of which is enclosed.\nAfter evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, I find that the Affected Pipeline\noperated by Respondents is a \"pipeline facility,\" as defined in 49 U.S.C. § 60101 et seq.,\nnotwithstanding the current inapplicability of the pipeline safety regulations at 49 C.F.R. Part\n195.' It is a \"pipeline facility\" because it is used in the transportation of hazardous liquid by\n6 Effective July 3, 2008, the Affected Pipeline will become subject to 49 C.F.R. Part 195 pursuant to the adoption of\na final rule eliminating the exemption for certain low-stress pipelines. See Protecting Unusually Sensitive Areas\nFrom Rural Onshore Hazardous Liquid Gathering Lines and Low-Stress Lines, 73 Fed. Reg. 3 1,634 (June 3,2008)\n(to be codified at 49 C.F.R. Part 195). Tlie requirements of this Notice are in addition to and do not replace any\nrequirements that may apply to the Affected Pipeline as a result of the final rule.\n7 See Id.\n\n\n\npipeline in or affecting interstate commerce and is not used to move hazardous liquid through\ngathering lines in a rural area; onshore production, refining, or manufacturing facilities; or\nstorage or in-plant piping systems associated with onshore production, refining, or\nmanufacturing facilities.\nAdditionally, considering the age of the pipe involved, the hazardous nature of the product\ntransported; the mostly unknown condition the pipeline; known indications of internal and\nexternal corrosion; the corrosive effects of the materials transported (including sediments and\nwater); low crude oil flow velocities; the tendency of sediments and water to drop out of low\nflow velocity crude oil; the known presence of accumulated sediments and the likely presence of\naccumulated water; the fact that the pipeline has never been cleaned or internally inspected since\nit was constructed roughly thirty (30) years ago; the fact that the pipeline does not currently have\nthe capability to be pigged; the design and operational similarities of the pipeline to nearby\nBPXA pipelines that have failed, in part, due to corrosion; the location of the pipeline in an\necological unusually sensitive area; the close proximity of the pipeline to workers and others at\nPump Station 1 and the heavily travelled Spine Road, an unusually sensitive drinking water area,\nand other environmentally sensitive areas; it appears that the continued operation of the Affected\nPipeline without corrective measures would be hazardous to life, property, and the environment.\nAccordingly, PHMSA issues this Notice of Proposed Corrective Action Order to notify\nRespondents of the agency's intent to issue a corrective action order and to propose that\nRespondents take measures specified herein to protect life, property, and the environment.\nResponse to this Notice\nEither Respondent may request a hearing on this Notice, to be held as soon as practicable, by\nnotifying the Director, Western Region, PHMSA, 12300 West Dakota Avenue, Suite 110,\nLakewood, CO 80228 (\"Director\") in writing within ten (10) days of service of this notice.\nFailure to submit such written notification waives the opportunity for a hearing and allows the\nAssociate Administrator for Pipeline Safety (\"Associate Administrator\") to proceed to determine\nwhether or not a corrective action order is required in accordance with 49 C.F.R. 5 190.233. If a\nhearing is requested by either Respondent, it will be held in Lakewood, Colorado or Washington,\nD.C., on a date that is mutually convenient for both of the Respondents and for PHMSA.\nAs soon as practicable after the conclusion of a hearing, or if no hearing is requested, the\nAssociate Administrator will determine whether or not a corrective action order is required. If he\ndecides that the pipeline facility is or would be hazardous to life, property, or the environment,\nthe Associate Administrator shall issue a corrective action order in accordance with 49 C.F.R. 5\n190.233. If he does not decide that the pipeline facility is or would be hazardous to life,\nproperty, or the environment, then he shall withdraw the allegation of the existence of a\nhazardous condition contained in this Notice and promptly notify the Respondents in writing.\n\n\n\nProposed Corrective Action\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. 8 601 12 and 49 C.F.R. 8 190.233, PHMSA proposes to issue to Alyeska\nand BPXA a corrective action order incorporating the following remedial requirements with\nrespect to the Affected Pipeline. The order shall require that Respondents must -\nI. Plan for Safe Transportation\n1. 2. 3. Within thirty (30) days after the CAO is issued, determine to either fully assess, repair,\nand conduct other work on the Affected Pipeline (\"Option A\"), or to replace the\nAffected Pipeline (\"Option B\"), as detailed more fully below, and submit a written\nnotification to the Director indicating which Option has been selected. Perform the\nrequirements of the selected Option, as detailed more fully below.\nOption A-Assessment, Repair and Other Work on Affected Pipeline\nFull Assessment: Within sixty (60) days after the CAO is issued, develop and submit\nfor approval, in accordance with Item 2 of the Other Requirements and Terms listed\nbelow (\"Approval Procedure\"), a written plan for assessment of the Affected Pipeline\nfor internal and external corrosion and any other anomalies that could affect the\nintegrity of the line. The plan shall provide for the completion of assessment of 100%\nof the length and circumference of the Affected Pipeline within six (6) months after the\nCAO is issued. The plan shall propose and describe the specific assessment tools that\nRespondents seek to use. The proposed assessment tools shall be capable of detecting\ninternal and external corrosion features and other damage, and determining, at a\nminimum, the percentage metal loss, areal extent, and geometry of any corrosion\nfeatures or other damage. The plan shall include provisions to ensure that such\nassessment is performed, verified, and recorded in accordance with established industry\npractices and shall provide for submission of assessment results to the Director within\nten (10) days of receipt of such assessment results by Respondents. Implement the plan\nupon approval.\nInitial Repairs: Document and repair all defects and other conditions on the Affected\nPipeline defined under 49 C.F.R. 8 195.452(h)(4)(i) through (iv), on a schedule that at a\nminimum, comports with the deadlines set out in 49 C.F.R. €j 195.452(h)(4), and in a\nmanner consistent with ASME B-31.4, but make all repairs within twelve (12) months\nafter the CAO is issued. Make all repairs in compliance with 49 C.F.R. 3 195.422.\nExtract, record and provide to the Director dimensional data of all anomalies found,\nincluding data on distances from upstream and downstream girth welds, position,\nminimum and maximum remaining wall thickness, and remedial actions taken. As\nrepairs are made, submit monthly reports to the Director documenting each repair made\nwith respect to each anomaly.\nMake Line Piggable: Within sixty (60) days after the CAO is issued, develop and\nsubmit for approval, in accordance with the Approval Procedure, a written plan for\n\n\n\n4. 5. 6. 7. 8. making the Affected Pipeline piggable, such that cleaning and smart pigs may be used\non the Affected Pipeline on a routine basis. The plan shall provide for the installation\nand operational status of pig launcher(s) and receiver(s) on the Affected Pipeline within\ntwelve (12) months after the CAO is issued. Implement the plan upon approval.\nCleaning Pigging: Within sixty (60) days after the CAO is issued, develop and submit\nfor approval, in accordance with the Approval Procedure, a written plan for running\ncleaning pigs on the Affected Pipeline at regular intervals not to exceed three (3)\nmonths. Implement such plan upon approval, after making the Affected Pipeline\npiggable as required by Item 3 above.\nInternal Assessment: Within sixty (60) days after the CAO is issued, develop and\nsubmit for approval, in accordance with the Approval Procedure, a written plan for\ninternal assessment of the Affected Pipeline, using calibrated smart pigs, within three\n(3) months after making the Affected Pipeline piggable as required by Item 3, and\nsubsequently at regular intervals not to exceed three (3) years. As part of the plan,\nrecord the differences between inline inspection data and actual \"as found\" data for all\nanomalies and integrate such data in future analyses, mapping corrosion growth, and\nconfirming data gathered by inline inspection tools. Implement the plan upon approval.\nFuture Repair: Document and repair all defects and other conditions, discovered from\nthe regular inline inspection required by Item 5, defined under 49 C.F.R. 5\n195.452(h)(4)(i) through (iv) on a schedule that at a minimum, comports with the\ndeadlines set out in 49 C.F.R. 5 195.452(h)(4) and in a manner consistent with ASME\nB-3 1.4.\nPatrols: Perform daily patrols of the Affected Pipeline with survey equipment capable\nof detecting hydrocarbons until the repair requirements of Item 2 are completed.\nFluid Testing: Within thirty (30) days after the CAO is issued, conduct all necessary\ntests to determine the corrosivity of the fluid exiting the Affected Pipeline, record the\nresults of such tests, and make operational and any other necessary changes to mitigate\nfluid corrosivity and make effective the corrosion inhibitor mix at mitigating the\ncorrosion growth. Changes may include, but not be limited to, increasing or changing\ncorrosion inhibitor concentrations or types. Within thirty (30) days of conducting the\nfluid tests, submit to the Director the testing results and a report describing any changes\nmade as a result of the required tests. Notify the Director of any subsequent operational\nor other changes made to mitigate fluid corrosivity and verify the effectiveness of the\ncorrosion inhibitor mix at mitigating corrosion growth.\n\n\n\n2. 3. 4. 6. Option B-Replacement of the Affected Pipeline\nReplacement Plan: Within sixty (60) days after the CAO is issued, develop and\nsubmit for approval, in accordance with the Approval Procedure, a written plan for\nreplacement of the Affected Pipeline. The plan shall include milestones for the\ncompletion of critical construction elements and for the beginning of operations. The\nplan shall provide for replacement of the Affected Pipeline, within twelve (12) months\nafter the CAO is issued, with an operational pipeline that includes functional\nlauncher(s) and receiver(s) (\"Replacement Pipeline\") such that the pipeline can be\nroutinely cleaned with cleaning pigs and internally inspected with smart pigs. Provide\nmonthly updates of the progress of replacement. Implement the plan upon approval.\nCleaning Pigging: Within sixty (60) days after the CAO is issued, develop and submit\nfor approval, in accordance the Approval Procedure, a written plan for running cleaning\npigs on the Replacement Pipeline at regular intervals, not to exceed three (3) months.\nImplement the plan upon approval.\nContinuing Internal Assessment: Within sixty (60) days after the CAO is issued,\ndevelop and submit for approval, in accordance with the Approval Procedure, a written\nplan for the use of calibrated smart pigs to conduct internal inspections of the\nReplacement Pipeline beginning within one (1) year of commencing operation of the\nReplacement Pipeline, and continuing at regular intervals of not more than three (3)\nyears. Implement the plan upon approval.\nPatrols: Perform daily patrols of the Affected Pipeline with survey equipment capable\nof detecting hydrocarbons until the repair requirements of Item 1 are completed.\nFluid Testing: Within thirty (30) days after the CAO is issued, conduct all necessary\ntests to determine the corrosivity of the fluid exiting the Affected Pipeline, record the\nresults of such tests, and make operational and any other necessary changes to mitigate\nfluid corrosivity and make effective the corrosion inhibitor mix at mitigating the\ncorrosion growth. Changes may include, but not be limited to, increasing or changing\ncorrosion inhibitor concentrations or types. Within thirty (30) days of conducting the\nfluid tests, submit to the Director the testing results and a report describing any changes\nmade as a result of the required tests. Notify the Director of any subsequent operational\nor other changes made to mitigate fluid corrosivity and verify the effectiveness of the\ncorrosion inhibitor mix at mitigating corrosion growth.\nDe-Oiling: Within three (3) months of the shut-down of the Affected Pipeline in\npreparation for replacement activities, complete de-oiling and render safe the Affected\nPipeline in accordance with the provisions for abandonment set forth in 49 C.F.R. 5\n195.402(~)(10), and remove any remaining hydrocarbons, sludge, and other solids from\nthe pipelines. After the shut-down of the Affected Pipeline in preparation for\nreplacement activities, submit monthly written s","truncated":true,"body_characters":55623}