{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 520091006W","title":"TALLGRASS INTERSTATE GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC — Warning Letter","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2009-08-18","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED warning letter citing 192.903, 192.911(k), 192.917(c), 192.917(d), 192.921(b), 192.947(d).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520091006w.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520091006w.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520091006w","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/520091006W","body":"Warning Letter involving TALLGRASS INTERSTATE GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 192.903,  192.911(k),  192.917(c),  192.917(d),  192.921(b),  192.947(d). The case was opened on 2009-08-18 and is reported as closed as of 2009-08-18. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n520091006W_warning letter_08182009.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520091006W/520091006W_warning%20letter_08182009.pdf\n\n520091006W_warning letter_08182009_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520091006W/520091006W_warning%20letter_08182009_text.pdf\n\n520091006W_warning letter_08182009_text.pdf\n\nWARNING LETTER\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nAugust 18, 2009\nMr. Dwayne Burton\nVP, Engineering Operations and Project Management\nKinder Morgan, Inc.\n500 Dallas Street, Suite 1000\nHouston, TX 77002\nCPF 5-2009-1006W\nDear Mr. Burton:\nOn March 30-April 3 and April 27-30, 2009, a representative of the Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration (PHMSA), pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code,\ninspected your Integrity Management Program in Lakewood, Colorado.\nAs a result of the inspection, it appears you have committed probable violations of the Pipeline\nSafety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations. The items inspected and the probable\nviolations are:\n1. §192.905 How does an operator identify a high consequence area?\n(a) General. To determine which segments of an operator's transmission pipeline\nsystem are covered by this subpart, an operator must identify the high consequence\nareas. An operator must use method (1) or (2) from the definition in § 192.903 to\nidentify a high consequence area. An operator may apply one method to its entire\npipeline system, or an operator may apply one method to individual portions of the\npipeline system. An operator must describe in its integrity management program\nwhich method it is applying to each portion of the operator's pipeline system. The\ndescription must include the potential impact radius when utilized to establish a high\nconsequence area. (See appendix E.I. for guidance on identifying high consequence\nareas.)\n\n\n\n§192.903 What definitions apply to this subpart?\nHigh consequence area means an area established by one of the methods described in\nparagraphs (1) or (2) as follows:\n(1) An area defined as—\n(i) A Class 3 location under §192.5; or\n(ii) A Class 4 location under §192.5; or\n(iii) Any area in a Class 1 or Class 2 location where the potential impact radius is\ngreater than 660 feet (200 meters), and the area within a potential impact circle\ncontains 20 or more buildings intended for human occupancy; or\n(iv) Any area in a Class 1 or Class 2 location where the potential impact circle\ncontains an identified site.\n(2) The area within a potential impact circle containing—\n(i) 20 or more buildings intended for human occupancy, unless the exception in\nparagraph (4) applies; or\n(ii) An identified site.\n(3) Where a potential impact circle is calculated under either method (1) or (2) to\nestablish a high consequence area, the length of the high consequence area extends\naxially along the length of the pipeline from the outermost edge of the first potential\nimpact circle that contains either an identified site or 20 or more buildings intended\nfor human occupancy to the outermost edge of the last contiguous potential impact\ncircle that contains either an identified site or 20 or more buildings intended for\nhuman occupancy. (See Figure E.I.A. in Appendix E.)\n(4) If in identifying a high consequence area under paragraph (1)(iii) of this\ndefinition or paragraph (2)(i) of this definition, the radius of the potential impact\ncircle is greater than 660 feet (200 meters), the operator may identify a high\nconsequence area based on a prorated number of buildings intended for human\noccupancy with a distance of 660 feet (200 meters) from the centerline of the pipeline\nuntil December 17, 2006. If an operator chooses this approach, the operator must\nprorate the number of buildings intended for human occupancy based on the ratio of\nan area with a radius of 660 feet (200 meters) to the area of the potential impact circle\n(i.e., the prorated number of buildings intended for human occupancy is equal to 20 x\n(660 feet) [or 200 meters]/potential impact radius in feet [or meters]**2).\n• Item 1A: §192.905(a) & §192.903\nThe regulations require an operator to identify high consequence areas using either method\n1 or method 2 as defined in §192.903. Structure polygons in the KMI GIS / Dataviewer\nsystem are mis-aligned from the structures and pipeline as shown by aerial photography.\nThis data inaccuracy could result in HCAs not being identified since the operator in this\ncase is using method 2 which requires structures to be counted inside the potential impact\ncircle.\nEvidence: Screen captures from Petris Data Viewer (HCA-StructureScreenCaptures.doc)\n2\n\n\n\n2. §192.921 How is the baseline assessment to be conducted?\n(b) Prioritizing segments. An operator must prioritize the covered pipeline segments\nfor the baseline assessment according to a risk analysis that considers the potential\nthreats to each covered segment. The risk analysis must comply with the\nrequirements in § 192.917.\n§192.917 How does an operator identify potential threats to pipeline integrity and\nuse the threat identification in its integrity program?\n(4) ERW pipe. If a covered pipeline segment contains low frequency electric\nresistance welded pipe (ERW), lap welded pipe or other pipe that satisfies the\nconditions specified in ASME/ANSI B31.8S, Appendices A4.3 and A4.4, and any\ncovered or non-covered segment in the pipeline system with such pipe has\nexperienced seam failure, or operating pressure on the covered segment has increased\nover the maximum operating pressure experienced during the preceding five years,\nan operator must select an assessment technology or technologies with a proven\napplication capable of assessing seam integrity and seam corrosion anomalies. The\noperator must prioritize the covered segment as a high risk segment for the baseline\nassessment or a subsequent reassessment\n• Item 2A: §192.921(b) & §192.917(4)\nThe regulation requires the operator to include pipeline segments that contain low\nfrequency electric resistant welded (LFERW) pipe as a high risk segment in their baseline\nassessment plans (BAP) if the operator does not have a Subpart J hydrostatic test record to\nshow that the segment has been tested for this manufacturing defect. Furthermore, the\nregulation requires that these high risk segments be assessed in the top fifty percent (50%)\nof the BAP by 12/17/2007. The initial review indicated the following pipeline segments\nhad not been completely assessed as of this date:\n• KMIGT - 8 lines, 9 HCAs, 4706 feet of HCAs\n• KMTP & Tejas - 11 lines, 18 HCAs, 15421.9 feet of HCA\nFurther review showed that a very small amount of the HCA footage had not been\nassessed. It appears that this omission occurred due to deficiencies in the threat\nidentification and risk analysis process in that PIRAMID reflects a “zero score” for the\nmanufacturing defects attribute on LFERW and lap-weld pipe. In addition, no prior\nhydrostatic pressure test data can be substantiated to document that these manufacturing\ndefects are stable.\nEvidence: KMIGT BAP (IMP Appendix C); Tejas BAP (IMP Appendix D); KMIGT\nBAP (IMP Appendix G); ERW Pipe Summary (KM_ERW_PipeSummary.xls); ERW and\nManufacturing Threat Potential (ERWandMnfThreatPotential.xlsx)\n3\n\n\n\n3. §192.911 What are the elements of an integrity management program?\nAn operator's initial integrity management program begins with a framework (see §\n192.907) and evolves into a more detailed and comprehensive integrity management\nprogram, as information is gained and incorporated into the program. An operator\nmust make continual improvements to its program. The initial program framework\nand subsequent program must, at minimum, contain the following elements. (When\nindicated, refer to ASME/ANSI B31.8S (ibr, see § 192.7) for more detailed\ninformation on the listed element.)\n(a) An …\n(k) A management of change process as outlined in ASME/ANSI B31.8S, section 11.\n• Item 3A: §192.911(k) & ASME B31.8S-2001, section 11 (a)\nThe regulation requires that all programmatic changes be covered by the management of\nchange (MOC) process. The BAP changes are annually documented on a global basis\nrather that documenting the changed program elements for each pipeline segment.\nRequired MOC elements should include the reason for change, authority for approving\nchange, analysis of implications, and communication of change to affected parties.\nEvidence: MOC for 2007 BAP Revisions (BAP_RevisionsMOC2007.doc);\nMOC for 2008 BAP Revisions (BAP_RevisionsMOC2008.doc);\nIMP Section 5.6, Changes; O&M Procedure 155, Management of Change\n4. §192.917 How does an operator identify potential threats to pipeline integrity and use\nthe threat identification in its integrity program?\n(a) Threat identification. An operator must identify and evaluate all potential threats\nto each covered pipeline segment. Potential threats that an operator must consider\ninclude, but are not limited to, the threats listed in ASME/ANSI B31.8S (incorporated\nby reference, see §192.7), section 2, which are grouped under the following four\ncategories:\n(1) Time dependent threats such as internal corrosion, external corrosion, and stress\ncorrosion cracking;\n(2) Static or resident threats, such as fabrication or construction defects;\n(3) Time independent threats such as third party damage and outside force damage;\nand\n(4) Human error.\nASME B31.8S-2001, Section 5 Risk Assessment\n5.10 Prioritization for Prescriptive-Based and Performance-Based Integrity\nManagement Programs\nThe integrity plan shall also provide for the elimination of any specific threat from\nthe risk assessment. For a prescriptive integrity management program, the minimum\ndata required and the criteria for risk assessment in order to eliminate a threat from\nfurther consideration are specified in Non-mandatory Appendix A. Performance-\n4\n\n\n\nbased integrity management programs that use more comprehensive analysis\nmethods should consider the following in order to exclude a threat in a segment:\n(a) there is no history of a threat impacting the particular segment or pipeline\nsystem\n(b) the threat is not supported by applicable industry data or experience\n(c) the threat is not implied by related data elements\n(d) the threat is not supported by like/similar analyses\n(e) the threat is not applicable to system or segment operating conditions\nMore specifically, item (c) considers the application of related data elements to\nprovide an indication of a threat’s presence when other data elements may not be\navailable.\n• Item 4A: §192.947(d)\nThe regulation requires an operator to document why a covered segment may not be\nsubject to certain threats. This is done by an analysis justifying the elimination of the\nthreat in question. Kinder Morgan eliminated the threat of external corrosion on certain\ncovered segments without providing any documented justification for doing so. Therefore,\nKinder Morgan is eliminating the need to conduct assessments looking for external\ncorrosion on covered segments without providing a technical justification for doing so.\nEvidence: KMI IMP BAPs (Appendix C – K).\n5. §192.917 How does an operator identify potential threats to pipeline integrity and use\nthe threat identification in its integrity program?\n(c) Risk assessment. An operator must conduct a risk assessment that follows\nASME/ANSI B31.8S, section 5, and considers the identified threats for each covered\nsegment. An operator must use the risk assessment to prioritize the covered segments\nfor the baseline and continual reassessments (§ § 192.919, 192.921, 192.937), and to\ndetermine what additional preventive and mitigative measures are needed (§ 192.935)\nfor the covered segment.\nASME B31.8S-2001, Section 5 Risk Assessment\n5.3 Risk Assessment Objectives\nFor application to pipelines and facilities, risk assessment\nhas the following objectives:\n(a) prioritization of pipelines/segments for scheduling integrity assessments and\nmitigating action\n(b) assessment of the benefits derived from mitigating action\n(c) determination of the most effective mitigation measures for the identified\nthreats\n(d) assessment of the integrity impact from modified inspection intervals\n(e) assessment of the use of or need for alternative inspection methodologies\n5\n\n\n\n(f) more effective resource allocation.\nRisk assessment provides a measure that evaluates both the potential impact of\ndifferent incident types and the likelihood that such events may occur. Having such a\nmeasure supports the integrity management process by facilitating rational and\nconsistent decisions. Risk results are used to identify locations for integrity\nassessments and resulting mitigative action. Examining both primary risk factors\n(likelihood and consequences) avoids focusing solely on the most visible or frequently\noccurring problems while ignoring potential events that could cause significantly\ngreater damage. Conversely, the process also avoids focusing on less likely\ncatastrophic events while overlooking more likely scenarios.\n• Item 5A: §192.917(c) & ASME B31.8S-2001, section 5 Risk Assessment\nThe regulation requires that the operator’s conduct a risk assessment in order to prioritize\nthe baseline and continual assessments. Kinder Morgan’s PIRAMID program generates\nthreat values for equipment failure, incorrect operations, and SCC, however, this data is\nnot used to establish that these potential threats exist on a segment. Furthermore, this\npractice is inconsistent in that these values are then used in the risk summation process to\ngenerate risk prioritization rankings. Additionally, PIRAMID does not generate risk scores\nfor segments having manufacturing defects such as LFERW or lap-welded pipe; PIRAMID\nreflects a “zero score” for the manufacturing defects attributed to LFERW and lap-weld\npipe. Therefore, their Risk Assessment process is not producing fully supported and\nconsistent decisions.\nEvidence: Review of the Top 20 HCA for each entity (ala Tejas - line 66) with threat\ndrivers (Tejas_Top20.xls, and others).\n6. §192.947 What records must an operator keep?\nAn operator must maintain, for the useful life of the pipeline, records that\ndemonstrate compliance with the requirements of this subpart. At minimum, an\noperator must maintain the following records for review during an inspection.\n(d) Documents to support any decision, analysis and process developed and used to\nimplement and evaluate each element of the baseline assessment plan and integrity\nmanagement program. Documents include those developed and used in support of\nany identification, calculation, amendment, modification, justification, deviation and\ndetermination made, and any action taken to implement and evaluate any of the\nprogram elements;\n6\n\n\n\n• Item 6A: §192.947(d)\nThe regulation requires that decisions and analysis that are necessary to carry out the\nrequirements of an integrity management program must be documented and retained for\nthe life of the pipeline. The preventive and mitigative measures that Kinder Morgan\nselected for implementation are not identified in the review documentation on a covered\nsegment-by-covered-segment basis. For example, covered segments with casings have gas\nleakage surveys over the entire length of the segment. Segments requiring these surveys\nare not identified.\nEvidence: Discuss Threats/P&MMs for North Region Area – District 309 to 201\n(PMM309-311NorthRegion.doc).\nUnder 49 United States Code, § 60122, you are subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $100,000\nfor each violation for each day the violation persists up to a maximum of $1,000,000 for any\nrelated series of violations. We have reviewed the circumstances and supporting documents\ninvolved in this case, and have decided not to conduct additional enforcement action or penalty\nassessment proceedings at this time. We advise you to correct the items identified in this letter.\nFailure to do so will result in Kinder Morgan, Inc. being subject to additional enforcement action.\nNo reply to this letter is required. If you choose to reply, in your correspondence please refer to\nCPF 5-2009-1006W. Be advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement\naction is subject to being made publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your\nresponsive material qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the\ncomplete original document you must provide a second copy of the document with the portions\nyou believe qualify for confidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the\nredacted information qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b).\nSincerely,\nChris Hoidal\nDirector, Western Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\ncc: PHP-60 Compliance Registry\nPHP-500 J. Gilliam (#123448)\n7","truncated":false,"body_characters":17129}