{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 520095009W","title":"HECO - HAWAIIAN ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC. — Warning Letter","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2009-02-19","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED warning letter citing 195.452(e)(1), 195.452(f)(3), 195.452(f)(4), 195.452(f)(5), 195.452(f)(6), 195.452(k).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520095009w.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520095009w.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520095009w","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/520095009W","body":"Warning Letter involving HECO - HAWAIIAN ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC.. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.452(e)(1),  195.452(f)(3),  195.452(f)(4),  195.452(f)(5),  195.452(f)(6),  195.452(k). The case was opened on 2009-02-19 and is reported as closed as of 2009-02-19. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n520095009W_warning letter_02192009.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520095009W/520095009W_warning%20letter_02192009.pdf\n\n520095009W_warning letter_02192009_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520095009W/520095009W_warning%20letter_02192009_text.pdf\n\n520095009W_warning letter_02192009_text.pdf\n\nWARNING LETTER\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nFebruary 19, 2009\nMr. Thomas Simmons\nVice President\nHawaiian Electric Company, Inc.\nP.O. Box 2750\nHonolulu, HI 96840-0001\nCPF 5-2009-5009W\nDear Mr. Simmons:\nOn July 29-30, 2008, a representative of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration (PHMSA), pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code, conducted an\ninspection of the Hawaiian Electric Company’s (HECO) Integrity Management Program\n(IMP) in Honolulu, Hawaii.\nAs a result of the inspection, it appears that you have committed probable violations of the\nPipeline Safety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations. The items inspected and\nthe probable violations are:\n1. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(f) What are the elements of an integrity management program? An integrity\nmanagement program begins with the initial framework. An operator must\ncontinually change the program to reflect operating experience, conclusions\ndrawn from results of the integrity assessments, and other maintenance and\nsurveillance data, and evaluation of consequences of a failure on the high\nconsequence area. An operator must include, at minimum, each of the following\nelements in its written integrity management program:\n\n\n\n(4) Criteria for remedial actions to address integrity issues raised by the\nassessment methods and information analysis (see paragraph (h) of this section);\nThe HECO’s in-line inspection (ILI) vendor specification required the ILI vendor to\nsubmit the Final Report within 60 days from the assessment date of October 17, 2007.\nHECO did not receive the Final Report until March 28, 2008.\n2. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(f) What are the elements of an integrity management program? An integrity\nmanagement program begins with the initial framework. An operator must\ncontinually change the program to reflect operating experience, conclusions\ndrawn from results of the integrity assessments, and other maintenance and\nsurveillance data, and evaluation of consequences of a failure on the high\nconsequence area. An operator must include, at minimum, each of the following\nelements in its written integrity management program:\n(3) An analysis that integrates all available information about the integrity of the\nentire pipeline and the consequences of a failure (see paragraph (g) of this\nsection);\n(g) What is an information analysis? In periodically evaluating the integrity of\neach pipeline segment (paragraph (j) of this section), an operator must analyze all\navailable information about the integrity of the entire pipeline and the\nconsequences of a failure. This information includes:\n(1) Information critical to determining the potential for, and preventing, damage\ndue to excavation, including current and planned damage prevention activities,\nand development or planned development along the pipeline segment;\n(2) Data gathered through the integrity assessment required under this section;\n(3) Data gathered in conjunction with other inspections, tests, surveillance and\npatrols required by this Part, including, corrosion control monitoring and\ncathodic protection surveys; and\n(4) Information about how a failure would affect the high consequence area, such\nas location of the water intake.\nThe HECO needs to implement a review of their data integration derived from their\nprevious ILI assessment results to strengthen the HECO integrity management\nperformance. The ILI results are critical to measure the effectiveness of their damage\nprevention program, i.e. corrosion growth rate, coating conditions, and etc…\n3. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(e) What are the risk factors for establishing an assessment schedule (for both the\nbaseline and continual integrity assessments)?\n2\n\n\n\n(1) An operator must establish an integrity assessment schedule that prioritizes\npipeline segments for assessment (see paragraphs (d) (1) and (j) (3) of this\nsection). An operator must base the assessment schedule on all risk factors that\nreflect the risk conditions on the pipeline segment. The factors an operator must\nconsider include, but are not limited to:\n(i) Results of the previous integrity assessment, defect type and size that the\nassessment method can detect, and defect growth rate;\n(ii) Pipe size, material, manufacturing information, coating type and condition,\nand seam type;\n(iii) Leak history, repair history and cathodic protection history;\n(iv) Product transported;\n(v) Operating stress level;\n(vi) Existing or projected activities in the area;\n(vii) Local environmental factors that could affect the pipeline (e.g., corrosivity of\nsoil, subsidence, climatic);\n(viii) geo-technical hazards; and\n(ix) Physical support of the segment such as by a cable suspension bridge.\n(2) Appendix C of this part provides further guidance on risk factors.\nThe HECO risk based analysis process based solely on using Subject Matter Experts\n(SME). The HECO needs to consider risk results in a more comprehensive manner to\nhelp assure risk reduction efforts are prioritized on the overall highest risk areas, i.e.\ndata driven risk based scenario.\n4. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(f) What are the elements of an integrity management program? An integrity\nmanagement program begins with the initial framework. An operator must\ncontinually change the program to reflect operating experience, conclusions\ndrawn from results of the integrity assessments, and other maintenance and\nsurveillance data, and evaluation of consequences of a failure on the high\nconsequence area. An operator must include, at minimum, each of the following\nelements in its written integrity management program:\n(6) Identification of preventive and mitigative measures to protect the high\nconsequence area (see paragraph (i) of this section);\n(i) What preventive and mitigative measures must an operator take to protect the\nhigh consequence area?\n(1) General requirements. An operator must take measures to prevent and\nmitigate the consequences of a pipeline failure that could affect a high\nconsequence area. These measures include conducting a risk analysis of the\npipeline segment to identify additional actions to enhance public safety or\nenvironmental protection. Such actions may include, but are not limited to,\nimplementing damage prevention best practices, better monitoring of cathodic\nprotection where corrosion is a concern, establishing shorter inspection intervals,\n3\n\n\n\ninstalling EFRDs on the pipeline segment, modifying the systems that monitor\npressure and detect leaks, providing additional training to personnel on response\nprocedures, conducting drills with local emergency responders and adopting\nother management controls.\n(2) Risk analysis criteria. In identifying the need for additional preventive and\nmitigative measures, an operator must evaluate the likelihood of a pipeline release\noccurring and how a release could affect the high consequence area. This\ndetermination must consider all relevant risk factors, including, but not limited\nto:\n(i) Terrain surrounding the pipeline segment, including drainage systems such as\nsmall streams and other smaller waterways that could act as a conduit to the high\nconsequence area;\n(ii) Elevation profile;\n(iii) Characteristics of the product transported;\n(iv) Amount of product that could be released;\n(v) Possibility of a spillage in a farm field following the drain tile into a waterway;\n(vi) Ditches along side a roadway the pipeline crosses;\n(vii) Physical support of the pipeline segment such as by a cable suspension\nbridge;\n(viii) Exposure of the pipeline to operating pressure exceeding established\nmaximum operating pressure.\nThe process description for the deciding to implement the HECO’s Preventive and\nMitigative Measures (P&MM) projects should show how their P&MM projects are\nintegrated into the risk model process. The risk model does not appear to be sensitive\nto the risk attributes impacted by the implementation of their P&MM projects.\n5. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(f) What are the elements of an integrity management program? An integrity\nmanagement program begins with the initial framework. An operator must\ncontinually change the program to reflect operating experience, conclusions\ndrawn from results of the integrity assessments, and other maintenance and\nsurveillance data, and evaluation of consequences of a failure on the high\nconsequence area. An operator must include, at minimum, each of the following\nelements in its written integrity management program:\n(5) A continual process of assessment and evaluation to maintain a pipeline's\nintegrity (see paragraph (j) of this section);\n(j) What is a continual process of evaluation and assessment to maintain a\npipeline's integrity?\n(1) General. After completing the baseline integrity assessment, an operator must\ncontinue to assess the line pipe at specified intervals and periodically evaluate the\nintegrity of each pipeline segment that could affect a high consequence area.\n4\n\n\n\n(2) Evaluation. An operator must conduct a periodic evaluation as frequently as\nneeded to assure pipeline integrity. An operator must base the frequency of\nevaluation on risk factors specific to its pipeline, including the factors specified in\nparagraph (e) of this section. The evaluation must consider the results of the\nbaseline and periodic integrity assessments, information analysis (paragraph (g)\nof this section), and decisions about remediation, and preventive and mitigative\nactions (paragraphs (h) and (i) of this section).\nHECO must ensure that a continual evaluation of their pipeline integrity is being\npursued. This means that all information regarding a pipeline’s integrity is being\ncontinually evaluated to determine impacts on reassessment schedules, assessment\nmethods, and other aspects of HECO’s Integrity Management Program. Specifically,\nPHMSA did not see how known coating conditions were being continually evaluated.\n6. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(f) What are the elements of an integrity management program? An integrity\nmanagement program begins with the initial framework. An operator must\ncontinually change the program to reflect operating experience, conclusions\ndrawn from results of the integrity assessments, and other maintenance and\nsurveillance data, and evaluation of consequences of a failure on the high\nconsequence area. An operator must include, at minimum, each of the following\nelements in its written integrity management program:\n(7) Methods to measure the program's effectiveness (see paragraph (k) of this\nsection);\n(k) What methods to measure program effectiveness must be used? An operator's\nprogram must include methods to measure whether the program is effective in\nassessing and evaluating the integrity of each pipeline segment and in protecting\nthe high consequence areas. See Appendix C of this part for guidance on methods\nthat can be used to evaluate a program's effectiveness.\n6. A. The HECO process did not adequately specify the collection of their performance\ndata at a frequency that will provide timely evaluation of the IM program, i.e. the\nperformance measures are only completed at three (3) year intervals.\n6. B. The results of their IM program effectiveness evaluation were not adequately\ncommunicated to the company personnel who need to make use of the information\ncontain a lot of good and factual information in the timely manner.\nUnder 49 United States Code, § 60122, you are subject to a civil penalty not to exceed\n$100,000 for each violation for each day the violation persists up to a maximum of $1,000,000\nfor any related series of violations. We have reviewed the circumstances and supporting\ndocuments involved in this case, and have decided not to conduct additional enforcement\n5\n\n\n\naction or penalty assessment proceedings at this time. We advise you to correct the items\nidentified in this letter. Failure to do so will result in Hawaiian Electric Company, Inc. being\nsubject to additional enforcement action.\nNo reply to this letter is required. If you choose to reply, in your correspondence please refer\nto CPF 5-2009-5009W. Be advised that all material you submit in response to this\nenforcement action is subject to being made publicly available. If you believe that any portion\nof your responsive material qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along\nwith the complete original document you must provide a second copy of the document with\nthe portions you believe qualify for confidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why\nyou believe the redacted information qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C.\n552(b).\nSincerely,\nChris Hoidal\nDirector, Western Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\ncc: PHP-60 Compliance Registry\nPHP-500 H. Nguyen (#121974)\n6","truncated":false,"body_characters":13727}