{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 520095011W","title":"HAWAII ELECTRIC LIGHT — Warning Letter","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2009-02-19","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED warning letter citing 195.452(d)(1), 195.452(e)(1), 195.452(f)(1), 195.452(f)(3), 195.452(f)(5), 195.452(f)(6), 195.452(f)(7).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520095011w.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520095011w.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520095011w","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/520095011W","body":"Warning Letter involving HAWAII ELECTRIC LIGHT. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.452(d)(1),  195.452(e)(1),  195.452(f)(1),  195.452(f)(3),  195.452(f)(5),  195.452(f)(6),  195.452(f)(7). The case was opened on 2009-02-19 and is reported as closed as of 2009-02-19. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n520095011W_warning letter_02192009.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520095011W/520095011W_warning%20letter_02192009.pdf\n\n520095011W_warning letter_02192009_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520095011W/520095011W_warning%20letter_02192009_text.pdf\n\n520095011W_warning letter_02192009_text.pdf\n\nWARNING LETTER\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nFebruary 19, 2009\nMr. Norman Verbanic, Jr.\nProduction Manager\nHawaiian Electric Light Company, Inc.\n54 Halekauila Street\nHilo, HI 96721-1027\nCPF 5-2009-5011W\nDear Mr. Verbanic:\nBetween August 1 and 4, 2008, a representative of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration (PHMSA), pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code, conducted an\ninspection of the Hawaiian Electric Light Company’s (HELCO) Integrity Management Program\n(IMP) in Hilo, Hawaii.\nAs a result of the inspection, it appears that you have committed probable violations of the\nPipeline Safety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations. The items inspected and the\nprobable violations are:\n1. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\nf) What are the elements of an integrity management program? An integrity\nmanagement program begins with the initial framework. An operator must\ncontinually change the program to reflect operating experience, conclusions drawn\nfrom results of the integrity assessments, and other maintenance and surveillance\ndata, and evaluation of consequences of a failure on the high consequence area. An\noperator must include, at minimum, each of the following elements in its written\nintegrity management program:\n\n\n\n(1) A process for identifying which pipeline segments could affect a high\nconsequence area;\nAt the time of the inspection, there is no documentation to indicate that the HELCO did\nsubmit their geospatial to the National Pipeline Mapping System (NPMS) by July 17,\n2003. It is our understanding that the HELCO is currently working with the depository to\nupdate their pipeline system in the NPMS.\n2. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(d) When must operators complete baseline assessments? Operators must complete\nbaseline assessments as follows:\n(1) Time periods. Complete assessments before the following deadlines:\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\nThen complete\nbaseline And assess at\nassessments not least 50 percent\nlater than the of the line pipe\nIf the pipeline is following date on an expedited\naccording to a basis, beginning\nschedule that with the highest\nprioritizes risk pipe, not\nassessments later than:\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\nCategory 1 March 31, 2008 September 30, 2004.\nCategory 2 February 17, 2009 August 16, 2005.\nCategory 3 Date the pipeline Not applicable.\nbegins operation.\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\nHELCO’s risk model indicates that the segment 1.B. of their Fuel Oil Pipeline is the\nhighest risk segment; however, it did not schedule to be assessed accordingly. In addition,\nthere is no documentation to indicate that their 2005 annual report was submitted.\n3. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(f) What are the elements of an integrity management program? An integrity\nmanagement program begins with the initial framework. An operator must\ncontinually change the program to reflect operating experience, conclusions drawn\nfrom results of the integrity assessments, and other maintenance and surveillance\ndata, and evaluation of consequences of a failure on the high consequence area. An\noperator must include, at minimum, each of the following elements in its written\nintegrity management program:\n2\n\n\n\n(3) An analysis that integrates all available information about the integrity of the\nentire pipeline and the consequences of a failure (see paragraph (g) of this section);\n(g) What is an information analysis? In periodically evaluating the integrity of each\npipeline segment (paragraph (j) of this section), an operator must analyze all\navailable information about the integrity of the entire pipeline and the consequences\nof a failure. This information includes:\n(1) Information critical to determining the potential for, and preventing, damage\ndue to excavation, including current and planned damage prevention activities, and\ndevelopment or planned development along the pipeline segment;\n(2) Data gathered through the integrity assessment required under this section;\n(3) Data gathered in conjunction with other inspections, tests, surveillance and\npatrols required by this Part, including, corrosion control monitoring and cathodic\nprotection surveys; and\n(4) Information about how a failure would affect the high consequence area, such as\nlocation of the water intake.\nThere is no documentation to indicate that the other pertinent data was integrated in a\ntimely manner during an evaluation of the assessment results. The HELCO needs to\nimplement a review of their data integration derived from their assessment results to\nstrengthen the HELCO integrity management performance.\n4. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(e) What are the risk factors for establishing an assessment schedule (for both the\nbaseline and continual integrity assessments)?\n(1) An operator must establish an integrity assessment schedule that prioritizes\npipeline segments for assessment (see paragraphs (d) (1) and (j) (3) of this section).\nAn operator must base the assessment schedule on all risk factors that reflect the\nrisk conditions on the pipeline segment. The factors an operator must consider\ninclude, but are not limited to:\n(i) Results of the previous integrity assessment, defect type and size that the\nassessment method can detect, and defect growth rate;\n(ii) Pipe size, material, manufacturing information, coating type and condition, and\nseam type;\n(iii) Leak history, repair history and cathodic protection history;\n(iv) Product transported;\n(v) Operating stress level;\n(vi) Existing or projected activities in the area;\n(vii) Local environmental factors that could affect the pipeline (e.g., corrosivity of\nsoil, subsidence, climatic);\n(viii) geo-technical hazards; and\n(ix) Physical support of the segment such as by a cable suspension bridge.\n(2) Appendix C of this part provides further guidance on risk factors.\n3\n\n\n\n4. A. HELCO did not adequately consider all the required risk factors from their pipeline,\ni.e. paraffin, coating condition, field input, and etc…\n4. B. There is no documentation to indicate that the HELCO did conduct a periodically\nevaluation of their risk model.\n5. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(f) What are the elements of an integrity management program? An integrity\nmanagement program begins with the initial framework. An operator must\ncontinually change the program to reflect operating experience, conclusions drawn\nfrom results of the integrity assessments, and other maintenance and surveillance\ndata, and evaluation of consequences of a failure on the high consequence area. An\noperator must include, at minimum, each of the following elements in its written\nintegrity management program:\n(5) A continual process of assessment and evaluation to maintain a pipeline's\nintegrity (see paragraph (j) of this section);\n(j) What is a continual process of evaluation and assessment to maintain a pipeline's\nintegrity?\n(1) General. After completing the baseline integrity assessment, an operator must\ncontinue to assess the line pipe at specified intervals and periodically evaluate the\nintegrity of each pipeline segment that could affect a high consequence area.\n(2) Evaluation. An operator must conduct a periodic evaluation as frequently as\nneeded to assure pipeline integrity. An operator must base the frequency of\nevaluation on risk factors specific to its pipeline, including the factors specified in\nparagraph (e) of this section. The evaluation must consider the results of the baseline\nand periodic integrity assessments, information analysis (paragraph (g) of this\nsection), and decisions about remediation, and preventive and mitigative actions\n(paragraphs (h) and (i) of this section).\n(3) Assessment intervals. An operator must establish five-year intervals, not to\nexceed 68 months, for continually assessing the line pipe's integrity. An operator\nmust base the assessment intervals on the risk the line pipe poses to the high\nconsequence area to determine the priority for assessing the pipeline segments. An\noperator must establish the assessment intervals based on the factors specified in\nparagraph (e) of this section, the analysis of the results from the last integrity\nassessment, and the information analysis required by paragraph (g) of this section.\n5. A. HELCO must ensure that a continual evaluation of their pipeline integrity is being\npursued. This means that all information (for instance the risk score was not adjusted\nafter the 2004 assessment) regarding a pipeline’s integrity is being continually evaluated\nto determine impacts on reassessment schedules, assessment methods, and other aspects of\nHELCO’s Integrity Management Program. In addition, the high potential pipe-to-soil\nreadings on their pipeline were identified from the corrosion report; however, the\nweighting factor from the risk model was not adjusted for their corrosion control program.\n4\n\n\n\n5. B. There is no documentation to indicate that the periodic evaluations were adequately\nfollowed and/or the results were adequately documented.\n5. C. The HELCO procedures did specify that it will reassess their pipeline at least every\nfive (5) year intervals; however, the HELCO did not consider all the relevant information,\ni.e. paraffin, coating conditions, and etc…to develop the reassessment interval.\n6. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(f) What are the elements of an integrity management program? An integrity\nmanagement program begins with the initial framework. An operator must\ncontinually change the program to reflect operating experience, conclusions drawn\nfrom results of the integrity assessments, and other maintenance and surveillance\ndata, and evaluation of consequences of a failure on the high consequence area. An\noperator must include, at minimum, each of the following elements in its written\nintegrity management program:\n(6) Identification of preventive and mitigative measures to protect the high\nconsequence area (see paragraph (i) of this section);\n(i) What preventive and mitigative measures must an operator take to protect the\nhigh consequence area?\n(1) General requirements. An operator must take measures to prevent and mitigate\nthe consequences of a pipeline failure that could affect a high consequence area.\nThese measures include conducting a risk analysis of the pipeline segment to identify\nadditional actions to enhance public safety or environmental protection. Such actions\nmay include, but are not limited to, implementing damage prevention best practices,\nbetter monitoring of cathodic protection where corrosion is a concern, establishing\nshorter inspection intervals, installing EFRDs on the pipeline segment, modifying the\nsystems that monitor pressure and detect leaks, providing additional training to\npersonnel on response procedures, conducting drills with local emergency\nresponders and adopting other management controls.\n(2) Risk analysis criteria. In identifying the need for additional preventive and\nmitigative measures, an operator must evaluate the likelihood of a pipeline release\noccurring and how a release could affect the high consequence area. This\ndetermination must consider all relevant risk factors, including, but not limited to:\n(i) Terrain surrounding the pipeline segment, including drainage systems such as\nsmall streams and other smaller waterways that could act as a conduit to the high\nconsequence area;\n(ii) Elevation profile;\n(iii) Characteristics of the product transported;\n(iv) Amount of product that could be released;\n(v) Possibility of a spillage in a farm field following the drain tile into a waterway;\n(vi) Ditches along side a roadway the pipeline crosses;\n(vii) Physical support of the pipeline segment such as by a cable suspension bridge;\n(viii) Exposure of the pipeline to operating pressure exceeding established maximum\noperating pressure.\n5\n\n\n\n6. A. There is no documentation to indicate that the timely evaluation of P&MM was\nadequately performed. In addition, the HELCO did not adequately document additional\ncandidates for P&MM.\n6. B. There is no documentation to indicate that all the required risk factors were\nadequately considered in the P&MM evaluation process.\n6. C. There is no documentation to indicate that their EFRD and leak detection were\nevaluated.\n7. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(f) What are the elements of an integrity management program? An integrity\nmanagement program begins with the initial framework. An operator must\ncontinually change the program to reflect operating experience, conclusions drawn\nfrom results of the integrity assessments, and other maintenance and surveillance\ndata, and evaluation of consequences of a failure on the high consequence area. An\noperator must include, at minimum, each of the following elements in its written\nintegrity management program:\n(7) Methods to measure the program's effectiveness (see paragraph (k) of this\nsection);\n(k) What methods to measure program effectiveness must be used? An operator's\nprogram must include methods to measure whether the program is effective in\nassessing and evaluating the integrity of each pipeline segment and in protecting the\nhigh consequence areas. See Appendix C of this part for guidance on methods that\ncan be used to evaluate a program's effectiveness.\n7. A. There is no documentation to indicate that an IM program effectiveness evaluation\nwas adequately performed and/or the results were adequately documented annually. In\naddition, the management team was not adequately involved in the key aspects of the\nimplementation on the program evaluation.\n7. B. The HELCO did not have an adequate set of the performance metric data to address\na segment specific issues or problems.\n7. C. HELCO’s root cause analysis was not adequately integrated into their IM program.\nThe analysis currently used by the HELCO is not referenced in its IMP to ensure a process\nfor an effective root cause analysis and lessons learned.\nUnder 49 United States Code, § 60122, you are subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $100,000\nfor each violation for each day the violation persists up to a maximum of $1,000,000 for any\nrelated series of violations. We have reviewed the circumstances and supporting documents\ninvolved in this case, and have decided not to conduct additional enforcement action or penalty\n6\n\n\n\nassessment proceedings at this time. We advise you to correct the items identified in this letter.\nFailure to do so will result in Hawaiian Electric Light Company, Inc. being subject to additional\nenforcement action.\nNo reply to this letter is required. If you choose to reply, in your correspondence please refer to\nCPF 5-2009-5011W. Be advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement\naction is subject to being made publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your\nresponsive material qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the\ncomplete original document you must provide a second copy of the document with the portions\nyou believe qualify for confidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the\nredacted information qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b).\nSincerely,\nChris Hoidal\nDirector, Western Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\ncc: PHP-60 Compliance Registry\nPHP-500 H. Nguyen (#121975)\n7","truncated":false,"body_characters":16378}