{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 520095033","title":"SFPP, LP — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2009-09-10","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.402(c)(13), 195.422(a), 195.505(h).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520095033.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520095033.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520095033","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/520095033","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving SFPP, LP. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.402(c)(13),  195.422(a),  195.505(h). The case was opened on 2009-09-10 and is reported as closed as of 2010-12-13. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n520095033_FinalOrder_12132010.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520095033/520095033_FinalOrder_12132010.pdf\n\n520095033_FinalOrder_12132010_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520095033/520095033_FinalOrder_12132010_text.pdf\n\n520095033_NOPV PCO_09102009.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520095033/520095033_NOPV%20PCO_09102009.pdf\n\n520095033_NOPV PCO_09102009_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520095033/520095033_NOPV%20PCO_09102009_text.pdf\n\n520095033_operator response_10162009.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520095033/520095033_operator%20response_10162009.pdf\n\n520095033_FinalOrder_12132010_text.pdf\n\nDEC 13 2010\nMr. Ronald G. McClain\nVice President, Operations and Engineering\nKinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P.\n500 Dallas Street, Suite 1000\nHouston, TX 77002\nRe: CPF No. 5-2009-5033\nDear Mr. McClain:\nEnclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It withdraws one\nallegation of violation, makes two findings of violation, and finds that Kinder Morgan Energy\nPartners, L.P., has completed the actions specified in the Notice to comply with the pipeline\nsafety regulations. Therefore, this case is now closed. Service of the Final Order by certified\nmail is deemed effective upon the date of mailing, or as otherwise provided under 49 C.F.R.\n§ 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. Chris Hoidal, Director, Western Region, PHMSA\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED [7005 1160 0001 0041 0695]\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\n)\nIn the Matter of )\n)\nKinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., ) CPF No. 5-2009-5033\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nFINAL ORDER\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, a representative of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), conducted an investigation of an\naccident involving the pipeline system operated by SFPP, L.P., an operating partnership of\nKinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P. (Kinder Morgan or Respondent), in Indio, California. The\ninvestigation arose out of a release of approximately 750 barrels of diesel on June 4, 2008. The\nrelease occurred in the course of an attempt to replace a main line block valve.\nAs a result of the investigation, the Director, Western Region, OPS (Director), issued to\nRespondent, by letter dated September 10, 2009, a Notice of Probable Violation and Proposed\nCompliance Order (Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice proposed\nfinding that Kinder Morgan had violated 49 C.F.R. §§ 195.402(c)(13), 195.422(a), and\n195.505(h), and proposed ordering Respondent to take certain measures to correct the alleged\nviolations.\nKinder Morgan responded to the Notice by letter dated October 16, 2009 (Response). The\ncompany contested two of the allegations and objected to the corresponding terms of the\nproposed compliance order. The company did not contest the remaining allegation of violation\nand provided information on the steps it was taking to satisfy the corresponding compliance\nterms. Respondent did not request a hearing and therefore has waived its right to one.\nFINDINGS OF VIOLATION\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. Part 195, as follows:\nItem 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(13), which states in\nrelevant part:\n\n\n\n2\n§ 195.402 – Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) . . . .\n(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by\nparagraph (a) of this section must include procedures for the following to\nprovide safety during maintenance and normal operations:\n(1) . . . .\n(13) Periodically reviewing the work done by operator personnel to\ndetermine the effectiveness of the procedures used in normal operation\nand maintenance and taking corrective action where deficiencies are\nfound.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(13) by failing to\nperiodically review the effectiveness of its main line block valve replacement procedures. The\nNotice alleged that a “Root Cause analysis” of the release substantiated this allegation.\nAccording to the Notice, “This failure by [Kinder Morgan] to periodically review their main line\nblock valve replacement procedures to ensure they were effective contributed to the release of\npetroleum.”\nIn its Response, Kinder Morgan objected to the allegation of violation. The company argued: 1)\nthat it has no “block valve replacement procedure;” 2) that it periodically reviews the\neffectiveness of its operating and maintenance (O&M) procedures, including the various\nprocedures implicated in the 2008 valve replacement attempt, and that OPS provided no\nevidence to substantiate that it did not conduct such reviews; and 3) that the Root Cause analysis\ndid not suggest that Kinder Morgan’s procedures were inadequate or ineffective, and did not find\nthat the company’s procedures were a cause of the accident.\nSection 195.402(c)(13) requires that an O&M manual contain procedures for periodically\nreviewing the work done by its personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of its operations and\nmaintenance procedures. OPS has alleged that Respondent did not have or follow such a\nprocedure for mainline block replacements, and that the company’s Root Cause analysis\nsubstantiates that allegation. However, Kinder Morgan has identified evidence in the record that\ncontradicts those allegations, including portions of the Root Cause analysis. Respondent has also\nprovided information about its procedures and methods for performing mainline valve block\nreplacements and performing periodic review of their effectiveness.\nAccordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I cannot conclude that Kinder Morgan\ncommitted the violations alleged in Item 1. Based upon the foregoing, I hereby order that Item 1\nbe withdrawn.\nItem 2: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.422(a), which states:\n§ 195.422 – Pipeline repairs.\n(a) Each operator shall, in repairing its pipeline systems, insure that the\nrepairs are made in a safe manner and are made so as to prevent damage to\npersons or property.\n\n\n\n3\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.422(a) by failing to ensure that\npipeline repairs were made in a safe manner and were made so as to prevent damage to persons\nor property. The June 4, 2008 release occurred while repairs were being conducted on\nRespondent’s pipeline. The Notice alleged that during these repairs, Kinder Morgan personnel\nfailed to properly support an upstream pipe vault, and that this failure caused the release.\nRespondent did not contest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, based upon a review of all\nof the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.422(a) by failing to ensure that\npipeline repairs were made in a safe manner and were made so as to prevent damage to persons\nor property.\nItem 3: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.505(h), which states:\n§ 195.505 – Qualification program.\nEach operator shall have and follow a written qualification program.\nThe program shall include provisions to:\n(a) . . . .\n(h) After December 16, 2004, provide training, as appropriate, to\nensure that individuals performing covered tasks have the necessary\nknowledge and skills to perform the tasks in a manner that ensures the safe\noperation of pipeline facilities; and\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.505(h) because its written operator\nqualification program did not ensure that individuals performing covered tasks had the necessary\nknowledge and skills to perform the tasks in a manner that ensured the safe operation of pipeline\nfacilities. Specifically, the Notice alleged that one of Kinder Morgan’s covered tasks is “motor\noperated valve replacement,” and that the operator qualification program did not provide for\nadequate training for this task. Specifically, the Notice alleged that the program did not ensure\nthat individuals performing motor operated valve replacement received training on stresses on\nsmall diameter piping, proper support, recognizing potential hazards of small diameter piping,\nvaults, and “lock out tag out” procedures.\nIn its Response, Kinder Morgan objected to this allegation of violation. The company stated,\nfirst of all, that it does not have a covered tasked entitled “motor operated valve replacement.”\nInstead, it said, the applicable covered task for the relevant task was “damage prevention during\nexcavation activities.” Respondent stated that this covered task, and the task-specific “abnormal\noperating condition,” were adequate, and that they addressed issues including pipeline\nsettlement, damaged pipe, initiating remedial action to address such threats, monitoring for\nsettlement during and after excavation activities, and improper support during excavation and\nbackfill.\nAccording to the company, contractors, not Kinder Morgan personnel, were conducting the\nrepair work at the time of the accident. Kinder Morgan stated that it evaluated the contractors’\noperator qualification program to ensure that it was compatible with Kinder Morgan’s and that\nthe means used to qualify individuals were acceptable. According to Respondent, both\ncontracting companies involved in the repairs used nationally recognized third-party training and\noperator qualification assessment programs.\n\n\n\n4\nAlthough it appears that OPS listed the applicable covered task by the wrong name, that does not\naffect the substance of the allegations. The facts of the accident suggest that the individuals\nperforming the “damage prevention during excavation activities” covered task were not\nadequately trained, and that this lack of training contributed directly to the accident. According\nto the “Root Cause analysis” contained in an email dated June 5, 2008, “basic or root causes” of\nthe accident included, for example: 1) Failure to recognize the general hazard of working around\na live, small diameter pressure line; 2) Failure to recognize the potential hazard associated with\nthe pipe vault bearing on the small diameter sensing line; 3) Failure to initiate lockout, tag-out\nprocedures to de-energize and isolate the system; 4) Failure to isolate or remove the small\npressure piping; and 5) Failure to support the valve vault properly when its supporting soil was\nremoved. Furthermore, one of the “recommendations and action items” in the document was,\n“Review contractor selection processes for potential improvements related to experience,\nincident history and safety performance.” Finally, although the supervising inspector was\nqualified for the applicable covered task, his qualification was revoked after the accident. This\nevidence tends to demonstrate that the individuals performing the repairs were not adequately\ntrained. The company acknowledged as much in its Response, stating, “Kinder Morgan does not\ndisagree that this accident demonstrates the need for additional training for the individuals\ninvolved.”\nKinder Morgan argued that its “damage prevention during excavation activities” covered task\naddressed the areas in which the individuals were allegedly inadequately trained. This may be\ntrue, although the company did not submit documentation to demonstrate this. However, it\nappears from the Response that Kinder Morgan relied on the contractors’ operator qualification\nprogram to ensure that the individuals performing this covered task were adequately trained.\nBased on the evidence in the record, it is apparent that they were not adequately trained.\nOperators cannot, through the use of contractors, evade the requirement to have and to follow an\noperator qualification program that has provisions for adequate training. The contractors\ninvolved in the repairs qualify as “individuals performing covered tasks” for the purposes of\n§ 195.505(h), and the evidence suggests that they were not provided training to ensure they had\n“the necessary knowledge and skills to perform the tasks in a manner that ensures the safe\noperation of pipeline facilities.” Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I\nconclude that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.505(h).\nThe findings of violation as to Items 2 and 3 will be considered a prior offense in any subsequent\nenforcement action taken against Respondent.\nCOMPLIANCE ORDER\nThe Notice proposed a compliance order with respect to Items 1, 2, and 3 in the Notice for\nviolations of 49 C.F.R. §§ 195.402(c)(13), 195.422(a), and 195.505(h), respectively. Under 49\nU.S.C. § 60118(a), each person who engages in the transportation of hazardous liquids or who\nowns or operates a pipeline facility is required to comply with the applicable safety standards\nestablished under chapter 601.\n\n\n\n5\nBecause I ordered that Item 1 be withdrawn, the compliance terms proposed in the Notice for\nthat Item are not included in this Order.\nThe Director indicates that Respondent has taken the following actions specified in the proposed\ncompliance order:\n1. With respect to the violation of § 195.422(a) (Item 2), Respondent reviewed the nine\naction items in the Root Cause analysis to ensure that they are adequate and are being\nimplemented.\n2. With respect to the violation of § 195.505(h) (Item 3), Respondent revised its\noperator qualification program to ensure that individuals receive additional training in\nregard to motor operated valve replacement, minimizing stresses on small diameter\npiping, providing proper pipeline support, recognizing potential hazards of small\ndiameter piping and vaults, and implementing “lock out tag out” procedures.\nAccordingly, I find that compliance has been achieved with respect to these violations.\nTherefore, the compliance terms proposed in the Notice are not included in this Order.\nUnder 49 C.F.R. § 190.215, Respondent has a right to submit a Petition for Reconsideration of\nthis Final Order. The petition must be sent to: Associate Administrator, Office of Pipeline\nSafety, PHMSA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, East Building, 2nd Floor, Washington, DC\n20590, with a copy sent to the Office of Chief Counsel, PHMSA, at the same address. PHMSA\nwill accept petitions received no later than 20 days after receipt of service of this Final Order by\nthe Respondent, provided they contain a brief statement of the issue(s) and meet all other\nrequirements of 49 C.F.R. § 190.215. Unless the Associate Administrator, upon request, grants a\nstay, the terms and conditions of this Final Order are effective upon service in accordance with\n49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\n___________________________________ __________________________\nJeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety","truncated":false,"body_characters":15316}