{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 520095042","title":"BELLE FOURCHE PIPELINE CO — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2009-12-30","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.402(a), 195.402(c)(12), 195.402(c)(13), 195.404(b)(1), 195.404(c)(3), 195.406(b), 195.412(a), 195.420(b), 195.428(a), 195.428(d), 195.432(b), 195.436, 195.577(a), 195.579(a).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520095042.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520095042.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520095042","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/520095042","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving BELLE FOURCHE PIPELINE CO. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.402(a),  195.402(c)(12),  195.402(c)(13),  195.404(b)(1),  195.404(c)(3),  195.406(b),  195.412(a),  195.420(b),  195.428(a),  195.428(d),  195.432(b),  195.436,  195.577(a),  195.579(a). The case was opened on 2009-12-30 and is reported as closed as of 2012-06-26. Proposed civil penalty: $221,200. Assessed civil penalty: $131,900. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n520095042_closure letter_06262012.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520095042/520095042_closure%20letter_06262012.pdf\n\n520095042_closure letter_06262012_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520095042/520095042_closure%20letter_06262012_text.pdf\n\n520095042_Decision on the Petition for Reconsideration_03292012.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520095042/520095042_Decision%20on%20the%20Petition%20for%20Reconsideration_03292012.pdf\n\n520095042_Decision on the Petition for Reconsideration_03292012_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520095042/520095042_Decision%20on%20the%20Petition%20for%20Reconsideration_03292012_text.pdf\n\n520095042_Final Order_11212011.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520095042/520095042_Final%20Order_11212011.pdf\n\n520095042_Final Order_11212011_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520095042/520095042_Final%20Order_11212011_text.pdf\n\n520095042_nopv-pcp-pco_12302009.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520095042/520095042_nopv-pcp-pco_12302009.pdf\n\n520095042_nopv-pcp-pco_12302009_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520095042/520095042_nopv-pcp-pco_12302009_text.pdf\n\n520095042_nopv-pcp-pco_12302009_text.pdf\n\nNOTICE OF PROBABLE VIOLATION\nPROPOSED CIVIL PENALTY\nand\nPROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nDecember 30, 2009\nMr. Tad True\nVice President, True Oil\nBelle Fourche Pipeline Company\n895 W. River Cross Road\nP.O. Drawer 2360\nCasper, WY 82602\nCPF 5-2009-5042\nDear Mr. True:\nOn August 24-28, 2008, a representative of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration (PHMSA), pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code, inspected two of\nyour company’s pipeline systems, the Belle Fourche Pipeline and Sussex Diesel Pipeline in\nCasper, Wyoming.\nAs a result of the inspection, it appears that you have committed probable violations of the\nPipeline Safety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations. The items inspected and the\nprobable violations are:\n1. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a\nmanual of written procedures for conducting normal operation and maintenance\nactivities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. This manual shall be\nreviewed at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year,\n\n\n\nand appropriate changes made as necessary to insure that the manual is effective.\nThis manual shall be prepared before initial operations of a pipeline system\ncommence, and appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and\nmaintenance activities are conducted.\nBFPL records as well as conversations with BFPL personnel showed that the company had\nnot reviewed or revised its O&M Manual from 2005 to 2008. An operator is required to\nperform those reviews and make appropriate changes once each calendar year, but at\nintervals not exceeding 15 months.\n2. §195.402 Procedural manual for operation, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a\nmanual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance\nactivities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. This manual shall be\nreviewed at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year,\nand appropriate changes made as necessary to insure that the manual is effective.\nThis manual shall be prepared before initial operations of a pipeline commence, and\nappropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and maintenance\nactivities are conducted.\n(c) Maintenance and Normal Operations. The manual required by paragraph (a) of\nthis section must include procedures for the following to provide safety during\nmaintenance and normal operations:\n(12) Establishing and maintaining liaison with fire, police, and other appropriate\npublic officials to learn the responsibility and resources of each government\norganization that may respond to a hazardous liquid or carbon dioxide pipeline\nemergency and acquaint the officials with the operator’s ability in responding to a\nhazardous liquid or carbon dioxide pipeline emergency and means of communication.\nBFPL had not established and maintained liaison with fire, police or other appropriate\npublic officials along its pipeline system in Wyoming. BFPL’s Public Awareness Program\nstated that the company would compile data (names, addresses, phone numbers, etc.)\npertaining to local fire, police, and other emergency and public officials that could be\ninvolved with a response to a hazardous liquid pipeline emergency involving a BFPL\npipeline. However, BFPL had no documentation showing that the company had collected\nsuch data or performed the required liaison activities. BFPL was issued a warning for a\nsimilar citation in CPF 5-2007-5002.\n3. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a\nmanual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance\nactivities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. This manual shall be\nreviewed at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year,\nand appropriate changes made as necessary to insure that the manual is effective.\nThis manual shall be prepared before initial operations of a pipeline commence, and\nappropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and maintenance\nactivities are conducted.\n2\n\n\n\n(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by paragraph (a) of\nthis section must include procedures for the following to provide safety during\nmaintenance and normal operations:\n(13) Periodically reviewing the work done by operator to determine the effectiveness\nof the procedures used in normal operation and maintenance and taking corrective\naction where deficiencies are found.\nBFPL had not been periodically reviewing the work completed by its personnel to\ndetermine the effectiveness of their Pipeline Operations and Maintenance Manual (O&M\nManual). BFPL had a procedure for performing such reviews in Section 3.8 of the\n“Organization and Responsibilities” section of the BFPL O&M Manual. Nonetheless, the\ncompany had no record of those reviews at the time of the inspection. Section 195.404\nrequires that an operator maintain a record of each inspection and test required by subpart\nF of Part 195 for at least 2 years or until the next inspection or test is performed, whichever\nis longer. The absence of any records is a violation of the pipeline safety regulations and\nBFPL’s own procedures. It also indicates that the required inspections did not occur,\nwhich is consistent with statements made by the company’s operating personnel at the time\nof the inspection.\n4. §195.404 Maps and Records.\n(b) Each operator shall maintain for at least 3 years daily operating records that\nindicate-\n(1) The discharge pressure at each pump station;\nBFPL did not have a pressure recording device at the Guernsey Pump Station and the\ncompany did not maintain any pressure discharge records for that facility. Each operator is\nrequired to maintain at least 3 years’ worth of records documenting the daily discharge\npressures at each pump station.\n5. §195.404 Maps and Records.\n(c) Each operator shall maintain the following records for the periods specified;\n(3) A record of each inspection and test required by this subpart shall be maintained\nfor at least 2 years or until the next inspection or test is performed, whichever is\nlonger.\nBFPL’s tank data sheets showed that the Sussex breakout tank received an API Standard\n653 out-of-service internal inspection in 2001. However, an inspection report was not in\nBFPL’s files or otherwise available for review at the time of the inspection. The operator\nis required to keep a complete record of inspections per Section 6 of API 653 until the next\ninspection of its type is performed.\n6. §195.406 Maximum operating pressure.\n(b) No operator may permit the pressure in a pipeline during surges or other\nvariations from normal operations to exceed 110 percent of the operating pressure\nlimit established under paragraph (a) of this section. Each operator must provide\nadequate controls and protective equipment to control the pressure within this limit.\n3\n\n\n\nBFPL had no safety device(s) installed at the Guernsey Pump Station to prevent\noverpressuring of the pumping equipment and piping installed at that facility or of the\npipeline located downstream from that station. Each pipeline operator must provide\nadequate controls and protective equipment to control the pressure within the maximum\noperating pressure (MOP) during normal operations and 110% of MOP during abnormal\noperations.\n7. §195.412 Inspection of rights-of-way and crossings under navigable waters.\n(a) Each operator shall, at intervals not exceeding 3 weeks, but at least 26 times each\ncalendar year, inspect the surface conditions on or adjacent to each pipeline right-of-\nway. Methods of inspection include walking, driving, flying or other appropriate\nmean of traversing the right-of-way.\nBFPL did not inspect its pipeline right-of-way at the appropriate time intervals for the\nMontana portion of the Bicentennial Line. The evidence shows that the required interval\nwas exceeded between March 24 and April 21, 2008, and between June 4 and July 5, 2008.\nBFPL had records of over-flights occurring between these dates, but those records indicate\nthat the Montana portion of the Bicentennial line was not over-flown. In addition, the\nrecordkeeping process for right-of-way inspections made it difficult for BFPL to keep\ntrack of inspection intervals for the various segments of its pipeline system, thereby\nincreasing the probability that a right-of-way inspection could be missed. An operator is\nrequired to patrol all of their pipelines at an interval not exceeding 3 weeks but at least 26\ntimes per year and to maintain a record of those patrols.\n8. §195.420 Valve maintenance.\n(b) Each operator shall, at intervals not exceeding 7 1/2 months, but at least twice\neach calendar year, inspect each mainline valve to determine that it is functioning\nproperly.\nBFPL failed to inspect numerous mainline valves at the required frequency from 2006 to\n2007. BFPL records confirm the following 25 mainline valves were not inspected twice\nduring the 2006 calendar year:\nArea Valve Designation Area Valve Designation\nShilight/Kaye 010-011 Donkey Creek 010-002\nShilight/Kaye 015-005 Donkey Creek 010-003\nShilight/Kaye 015-004 Donkey Creek 010-001\nShilight/Kaye 015-005 Donkey Creek 010-101\nShilight/Kaye 015-002 Sussex Products 069-0001\nShilight/Kaye Poison Draw 6” Tie In Sussex Products 069-0006 (6”)\nShilight/Kaye Poison Draw Line 8” Sussex Products 069-0006 (4”)\nShilight/Kaye 010-0056 Sussex Products 069-0007 (6”)\n4\n\n\n\nShilight/Kaye 101-006 Sussex Products 069-0007 (4”)\nShilight/Kaye 015-001 Sussex Products 069-0008\nShilight/Kaye 015-011\nShilight/Kaye 015-012\nShilight/Kaye 101-008\nShilight/Kaye 101-009\nShilight/Kaye 010-010\nIn addition, BFPL records show that inspections for the following 22 mainline valves\nexceeded the 7 ½ month maximum inspection interval:\nValve Designation Period Days in excess\nof 7 ½ months\n010-001 June 1, 2006 to January 14, 2007 2\n010-101 June 1, 2006 to January 14, 2007 2\n015-002 June 7, 2006 to January 25, 2007 7\n6” Tie In June 7, 2006 to January 25, 2007 7\n8” Poison Draw Line June 7, 2006 to January 25, 2007 7\n010-005 June 7, 2006 to January 25, 2007 7\n010-006 June 7, 2006 to January 25, 2007 7\n015-001 June 8, 2006 to January 25, 2007 6\n010-008 May 23, 2006 to January 22, 2007 19\n010-009 May 23, 2006 to January 22, 2007 19\n010-010 May 23, 2006 to January 22, 2007 19\n069-0001 April 20, 2006 to January 11, 2007 41\n069-0003 October 8, 2006 to July 13, 2007 53\nIncoming Trap October 8, 2006 to July 13, 2007 53\n069-0004 March 2, 2006 to December 17, 2006 65\nOutgoing Launcher March 2, 2006 to December 17, 2006 65\n069-0005 March 2, 2006 to December 17, 2006 65\n5\n\n\n\n069-0007 April 10, 2006 to January 9, 2007 49\nIberline Incoming Trap April 10, 2006 to January 9, 2007 49\n069-0007 April 10, 2006 to January 9, 2007 49\nIberline Outgoing Launcher April 10, 2006 to January 9, 2007 49\n069-0008 April 10, 2006 to January 4, 2007 44\nEach operator must inspect each mainline valve at least twice each calendar year at\nintervals not exceeding 7 ½ months and maintain records of such inspections for at least 2\nyears.\n9. §195.428 Overpressure safety devices and overfill protection systems.\n(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, each operator shall, at\nintervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year, or in the case\nof pipelines used to carry highly volatile liquids, at intervals not to exceed 7 ½\nmonths, but at least twice each calendar year, inspect and test each pressure limiting\ndevice, relief valve, pressure regulator, or other item of pressure control equipment to\ndetermine that it is functioning properly, is in good mechanical condition, and is\nadequate from the standpoint of capacity and reliability of operation for the service\nin which it is used.\nBFPL records established that a number of its pressure limiting devices were not inspected\nand tested at the required frequency between the years 2006 to 2008. An operator is\nrequired to inspect and test each item of pressure control equipment once each calendar\nyear not to exceed 15 months.\n• Donkey Creek and Hwy 450 stations pressure controls were not tested and inspected in\nthe 2007 calendar year. Additionally, BFPL exceeded the 15-month interval for testing\nand inspecting pressure controls at these stations by 68 and 98 days, respectively.\n• Seiler station pressure controls exceeded the 15-month interval for testing and inspecting\nin the 2007 calendar year by 120 days.\n• At the time of this inspection, BFPL had not yet tested and inspected Sussex pump\nstation and Guernsey terminal for the 2008 calendar year, resulting in BFPL exceeding\nthe 15-month interval by a minimum of 145 and 105 days, respectively.\n10. §195.428 Overpressure safety devices and overfill protection systems\n(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, each operator shall, at\nintervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year, or in the case\nof pipelines used to carry highly volatile liquids, at intervals not to exceed 7 ½\nmonths, but at least twice each calendar year, inspect and test each pressure limiting\ndevice, relief valve, pressure regulator, or other item of pressure control equipment to\ndetermine that it is functioning properly, is in good mechanical condition, and is\nadequate from the standpoint of capacity and reliability of operation for the service\nin which it is used.\n6\n\n\n\n(d) After October 2, 2000, the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section\nfor inspection and testing of pressure control equipment apply to the inspection and\ntesting of overfill protection systems.\nConversations with BFPL personnel confirmed that the high-level alarms on the following\nthree breakout tanks associated with the Sussex Diesel Line had never been tested at the\nprescribed intervals\n▪ Sussex Pump Station Breakout Tank\n▪ Davis Station (Tank 74) Breakout Tank\n▪ Hawk Point Terminal Breakout Tank\nEach operator must inspect and test overfill protection system on each breakout tank at\nleast once each calendar year at intervals not to exceed 15 months, and maintain records of\nthose inspections and tests for at least two years.\n11. §195.432 Inspection of in-service breakout tanks.\n(a) Except for breakout tanks inspected under paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section,\neach operator shall, at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least each calendar\nyear, inspect each in-service breakout tank.\n(b) Each operator shall inspect the physical integrity of in-service atmospheric and\nlow pressure steel aboveground breakout tanks according to section 4 of API\nStandard 653. However, if structural conditions prevent access to the tank bottom,\nthe bottom integrity may be assessed according to a plan included in the operations\nand maintenance manual under §195.402(c)(3).\nBFPL’s tank data sheets verified that BFPL had never performed an External Tank\nInspection on the Sussex Breakout Tank. Because it appears this tank received an internal\ninspection in 2001 this tank should have received an external inspection no later than 2006,\nas well as the 5-year interval prescribed in API 653 Section 6.3.2.\n12. §195.436 Security of facilities.\nEach operator shall provide protection for each pumping station and breakout tank\narea and other exposed facility (such as scraper traps) from vandalism and\nunauthorized entry.\nBFPL had no security fencing installed around the Donkey Creek Pump Station. Also 4.5\nto 5 foot high security fencing around the Sussex Pump Station and Sussex Breakout Tank\nwas only made of 4 foot high 6 inch grid woven steel wire with 2 strands of barbed wire\nabove it. This type of fence will keep livestock out of the facility but it is not adequate to\nprevent vandalism and unauthorized entry to the facility.\n13. §195.577 What must I do to alleviate interference currents?\n(a) For pipelines exposed to stray currents, you must have a program to identify, test\nfor, and minimize the detrimental effects of such currents.\nBFPL’s cathodic protection monitoring records for the 12” Donkey Creek Pipeline in the\narea in and around Guernsey station and Ft Laramie station for the 2006 calendar year\nshowed several test stations with high off levels. High off levels indicate that cathodic\n7\n\n\n\nprotection interference currents may be adversely affecting a pipeline. Nonetheless, at the\ntime of the inspection, BFPL had not taken the appropriate steps to perform an interference\nstudy to determine if there were interference currents on their pipeline or to mitigate any of\nthe interference currents that might exist. The Pipeline Safety Regulations require an\noperator to identify, test for, and minimize the detrimental effects of stray currents.\n14. §195.579 What must I do to mitigate internal corrosion?\n(a) General. If you transport any hazardous liquid or carbon dioxide that would\ncorrode the pipeline, you must investigate the corrosive effect of the hazardous liquid\nor carbon dioxide on the pipeline and take adequate steps to mitigate internal\ncorrosion.\nSince 2006, BFPL has experienced at least three leaks due to internal corrosion, a\ncondition that may be the result of the corrosive effects of the crude oil that is being\nshipped through its pipeline system. The Pipeline Safety Regulations require an operator\nwho transports a hazardous liquid that could corrode a pipe to investigate and take\nadequate steps to mitigate that condition. Nonetheless, at the time of the inspection, BFPL\nhad not conducted such an investigation or taken any steps to mitigate that condition.\nProposed Civil Penalty\nUnder 49 United States Code, § 60122, you are subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $100,000\nfor each violation for each day the violation persists up to a maximum of $1,000,000 for any\nrelated series of violations. The Compliance Officer has reviewed the circumstances and\nsupporting documentation involved in the above probable violations and has recommended that\nyou be preliminarily assessed a civil penalty of $221,200 as follows:\nItem Number PENALTY\n1 $37,100\n5 $17,100\n8 $30,800\n9 $62,100\n10 $30,800\n11 $43,300\nWarning Items\nWith respect to items 7 and, we have reviewed the circumstances and supporting documents\ninvolved in this case and have decided not to conduct additional enforcement action or penalty\nassessment proceedings at this time. We advise you to promptly correct these item(s). Be advised\nthat failure to do so may result in Belle Fourche Pipeline Company being subject to additional\nenforcement action.\n8\n\n\n\nProposed Compliance Order\nWith respect to items 2, 3, 4, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 pursuant to 49 United States Code § 60118,\nthe Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration proposes to issue a Compliance Order\nto Belle Fourche Pipeline Company. Please refer to the Proposed Compliance Order, which is\nenclosed and made a part of this Notice.\nResponse to this Notice\nEnclosed as part of this Notice is a document entitled Response Options for Pipeline Operators in\nCompliance Proceedings. Please refer to this document and note the response options. Be\nadvised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being\nmade publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document you must\nprovide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for confidential\ntreatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b). If you do not respond within 30 days of receipt of\nthis Notice, this constitutes a waiver of your right to contest the allegations in this Notice and\nauthorizes the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety to find facts as alleged in this Notice\nwithout further notice to you and to issue a Final Order.\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF 5-2009-5042 and for each document\nyou submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.\nSincerely,\nChris Hoidal\nDirector, Western Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nEnclosures: Proposed Compliance Order\nResponse Options for Pipeline Operators in Compliance Proceedings\ncc: PHP-60 Compliance Registry\nPHP-500 G. Davis (#120773)\n9\n\n\n\nPROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER\nPursuant to 49 United States Code § 60118, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration (PHMSA) proposes to issue to Belle Fourche Pipeline Company (BFPL) a\nCompliance Order incorporating the following remedial requirements to ensure the compliance of\nBFPL with the pipeline safety regulations:\n1. In regard to Item Number 2 of the Notice pertaining to the lack of the development of a list\nof local fire, police, and other emergency and public officials:\nBFPL must develop a list of local fire, police, and other emergency and public officials\nthat could potentially respond to an emergency associated with BFPL's hazardous liquid\npipelines in Wyoming. BFPL must then conduct periodic liaison activities with these\nentities to .accomplish the following:\n• Learn the responsibilities and resources of each entity.\n• Acquaint each agency with BFPL's ability in responding to a hazardous liquid pipeline\nemergency.\n• Understand the means of communication that could be used between BFPL and each\nentity in the event of a pipeline emergency.\n2. In regard to Item Number 3 of the Notice pertaining to BFPL not reviewing the work done\nby its personnel to determine the effectiveness of procedures:\nBFPL must review the work done by its employees to determine the effectiveness of their\nprocedure and they must document such reviews.\n3. In regard to Item Number 4 of the Notice pertaining to the lack of a pressure recording\ndevice at the Guernsey Pump Station:\nBFPL must install a pressure recording device at the Guernsey Pump Station to record the\ndischarge pressure of the station. BFPL must then retain the pressure records for a\nminimum of three years.\n4. In regard to Item Number 6 of the Notice pertaining to the lack of a safety device that\nprevents overpressuring of pumping equipment at the Guernsey Pump Station:\nBFPL must install an overpressure protection device at the Guernsey Pump Station that\nprevents the Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) of the piping at the station and the\npipeline downstream from the station from being exceeded.\n5. In regard to Item Number 10 of the Notice pertaining to the lack of inspection and testing\nof high level alarms on three breakout tanks on the Sussex Diesel Line:\nBFPL must inspect and test the high level alarms on the following tanks:\n▪ Sussex Pump Station Breakout Tank (BOT)\n▪ Davis Station (Tank 74) BOT\n▪ Hawk Point Terminal BOT\n6. In regard to Item Number 11 of the Notice pertaining to exceeding the maximum interval\nof 5 years for an API Standard 653 External Inspection of the Sussex diesel BOT:\nBFPL must conduct an API Standard 653 External Inspection on their Sussex diesel BOT.\n10\n\n\n\n7. In regard to Item Number 12 of the Notice pertaining to the lack of security fencing around\nthe Donkey Creek Pump Station and the inadequate security fencing around the Sussex\nPump Station and Sussex BOT:\nBFPL must install security fencing around the Donkey Creek Pump Station that is a\nminimum of six feet high and includes a minimum of 3 strands of barbed wire above the\nfencing. Appropriate warning signs and operator contact information must be installed on\nthe fencing and all gates must be adequately locked.\nIn addition, BFPL must replace the security fencing around the Sussex Pump Station and\nSussex Breakout Tank with security fencing that is a minimum of six feet high and\nincludes a minimum of 3 strands of barbed wire above the fencing. Appropriate warning\nsigns and operator contact information must be installed on the fencing and all gates must\nbe adequately locked.\n8. In regard to Item Number 13 of the Notice pertaining to High \"Off' CP levels on the 12\"\nDonkey Creek Pipeline located between Guernsey station and Ft Laramie station:\nBFPL must perform an interference study on the Donkey Creek Pipeline between\nGuernsey station and Ft Laramie station and remediate any stray currents that are found.\n9. In regard to Item Number 14 of the Notice pertaining to potentially corrosive crude oil\nbeing shipped through the Belle Fourche Pipeline System may be causing internal\ncorrosion of the pipeline system:\nBFPL must conduct an investigation to determine if crude oil being shipped through their\npipeline system is causing internal corrosion. If the investigation determines that the crude\noil is in fact causing internal corrosion, BFPL must take appropriate remedial actions to\nprevent internal corrosion from continuing to occur in their pipeline system.\n10. BFPL must complete the items described above within 60 days of receipt of the Final\nOrder.\n11. Belle Fourche Pipeline Company shall maintain documentation of the safety improvement\ncosts associated with fulfilling this Compliance Order and submit the total to Chris Hoidal,\nDirector, Western Region, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. Costs\nshall be reported in two categories: 1) total cost associated with preparation/revision of\nplans, procedures, studies and analyses, and 2) total cost associated with replacements,\nadditions and other changes to pipeline infrastructure.\n11\n\n520095042_Decision on the Petition for Reconsideration_03292012_text.pdf\n\nMAR 29 2012\nMr. Tad True\nVice President\nBelle Fourche Pipeline Company\nP.O. Box 2360\nCasper, WY 82602\nRe: CPF No. 5-2009-5042\nDear Mr. True:\nEnclosed please find the decision on the petition for reconsideration filed by Belle Fourche\nPipeline Company in the above-referenced case. For the reasons set forth in the decision,\nyour petition to withdraw the findings of violation in Items 13 and 14 of the Final Order is\ndenied. In addition, your petition to withdraw the terms of the compliance order associated\nwith Item 14 is denied. Your petition to find that Belle Fourche has satisfied the terms of the\ncompliance order associated with Item 13 is granted. Service of this document by certified\nmail is complete upon mailing as provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. Alan Mayberry, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, OPS\nMr. Chris Hoidal, Director, Western Region, OPS\nMr. Colin Harris, Holme Roberts & Owen LLP\n1801 13th Street, Suite 300, Boulder, CO 80302-5259\nCERTIFIED MAIL – RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED [71791000164203446319]\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nBelle Fourche Pipeline Company, ) CPF No. 5-2009-5042\n)\n)\n)\nPetitioner. )\n____________________________________)\nDECISION ON PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION\nOn November 21, 2011, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. §§ 60118 and 60122, the Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration (PHMSA) issued a Final Order in this proceeding finding that\nBelle Fourche Pipeline Company (BFPL or Petitioner) committed nine violations of the pipeline\nsafety regulations in 49 C.F.R. Part 195. The Final Order assessed a civil penalty of $131,900\nfor four of the violations and ordered BFPL to take certain corrective measures (Compliance\nOrder). BFPL operates approximately 600 miles of pipeline in Montana, North Dakota, and\nWyoming transporting crude oil and refined petroleum products.1\nBFPL submitted a Petition for Reconsideration of the Final Order dated December 9, 2011\n(Petition). In its Petition, BFPL requested reconsideration of Items 13 and 14 in the Final Order,\nwhich had found that BFPL violated 49 C.F.R. §§ 195.577(a) and 195.579(a), respectively.\nPetitioner also requested a stay of the terms of the Compliance Order associated with those items\npending the issuance of a decision on its Petition. PHMSA granted the stay on\n2\nJanuary 13, 2012.\nPursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 190.215, a respondent may petition for reconsideration of a final order\nthat has been issued pursuant to § 190.213. Section 190.215 provides that PHMSA does not\nconsider repetitious information or arguments, but may consider additional facts or arguments if\nthe Petitioner submits a valid reason explaining why such information was not presented prior to\nissuance of the final order. PHMSA may grant or deny, in whole or in part, a petition for\nreconsideration without further proceedings, but may request additional information or comment\nas deemed appropriate.\n1 This information is reported by BFPL as required by 49 C.F.R. § 195.49. On its website, the company states that\nit operates 1,500 miles of pipeline. http://www.truecos.com/BFPL (last accessed Mar. 8, 2012).\n2 The Final Order did not assess civil penalties for Items 13 and 14. On December 19, 2011, BFPL submitted\npayment in full of the civil penalties assessed in the Final Order for Items 8, 9, 10, 11.\n\n\n\n2\nItem 13: The Final Order determined that BFPL violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.577(a), which states:\n§ 195.577 What must I do to alleviate interference currents?\n(a) For pipelines exposed to stray currents, you must have a program\nto identify, test for, and minimize the detrimental effects of such currents.\nThe Final Order determined that BFPL failed to have and implement a program to identify, test\nfor, and minimize the detrimental effects of stray currents on the company’s pipeline. As stated\nin the Order, the operator’s cathodic protection survey records from January 2006 to December\n2008 showed there were areas on its pipeline with high “off” levels, indicative of interference\ncurrents that could have an adverse effect on the pipeline. BFPL could not produce a\ndocumented interference study or any other evidence to demonstrate the company took action in\naccordance with § 195.577(a) to test the interference currents that were detected during the\nsurveys to determine whether any effects were adverse to the pipeline and to mitigate detrimental\neffects.\nIn its Petition, BFPL acknowledged that § 195.577(a) requires companies to identify, test for,\nand minimize the detrimental effects of electrical current flowing from an external source to the\naffected pipeline.\ncompany argued that there was insufficient evidence of a violation presented by OPS, and that\nthe evidence of compliance presented by BFPL was not properly considered.\n3 Petitioner disagreed, however, that BFPL violated this requirement. The\nFirst, BFPL argued that the finding of violation was in error because the evidence presented by\nOPS did not support the finding. Specifically, Petitioner stated that the cathodic protection\nsurvey records from 2006 to 2008 were not sufficient evidence to prove a violation.\n4\nAs noted in the Final Order, BFPL’s survey records from 2006-2008 indicated that its pipeline\nwas exposed to interference currents. Under § 195.577(a), the company was required to identify,\ntest for, and minimize the detrimental effects of those stray currents. Despite the indications of\ninterference currents, BFPL did not produce any evidence to demonstrate that it had taken action\nduring the time period in question to conduct tests to determine whether the interference currents\nwere adversely affecting the pipeline.5 These facts constituted sufficient evidence for PHMSA\nto find that BFPL violated § 195.577(a).\nSecond, Petitioner argued that the company’s survey records from 2006-2008 demonstrated that\nthe company did, in fact, have a program to identify and test for interference currents. Petitioner\nstated “[t]he whole purpose of the surveys” was to identify and test for interference currents,\nciting testimony it offered at the hearing.6\nPetitioner claimed that this evidence was not\naddressed in the Order.\n3 Petition at 2.\n4 Petition at 2.\n5 BFPL conducted a close interval survey in July 2009, but as stated in the Final Order, the survey was performed\nafter the OPS inspection, and therefore did not demonstrate compliance for the time period in question.\n6 Petition at 3.\n\n\n\n3\nThe Final Order specifically addressed this position taken by the operator and the evidence it\noffered in support. For example, the Final Order noted that “BFPL claimed the reports used by\nPHMSA in support of the allegation demonstrated this program was in place and implemented.”7\nWhile the survey report records showed Petitioner could apparently detect interference currents\non its pipeline, the Order concluded that the records themselves did not demonstrate compliance\nwith § 195.577(a) because, among other things, BFPL never actually tested the interference\ncurrents during the time period in question to determine if they were detrimental.8\nBFPL argued in its Petition that it was not necessary for the company to test the interference\ncurrents because testimony in the record “unarguably shows” that the interference currents were\nnot detrimental to the pipeline.\n9 Petitioner cited a statement by its witness that the pipelines in\nthe area are all tied together with either piping, electrical grounding, or bonds. Petitioner argued\nthere was no need to conduct additional tests or mitigation “because any issues had already been\nmitigated.”10 Petitioner claimed this evidence was not acknowledged or refuted in the Order.\nThe Final Order specifically discussed BFPL’s claim that it knew the source of the current and\nthat it was not detrimental.\n11 The Order quoted the company’s own Brief, which recited the\ntestimony of its witness that the pipelines in the area “are tied together with either piping,\nFinal Order determined, however, that the company’s assumption that interference currents were\nnot detrimental was not an excuse for failing to conduct the testing required under the regulation.\nBFPL provided no evidence that it performed an analysis during the time period in question to\nconfirm that interference currents were not detrimental to the pipeline.\nelectrical grounding between the different pipeline companies in the area, or by bonds.”12 The\nLastly, Petitioner argued that it was improper for the Final Order to include a statement that\nBFPL failed to follow written procedures for determining if the stray currents had detrimental\neffects. Petitioner claimed the issue of “written procedures” was never raised at the hearing.\n13\nThe Notice of Probable Violation provided sufficient notice to BFPL that the company had\nallegedly violated the requirement in § 195.577(a) to identify, test for, and minimize the\ndetrimental effects of interference currents.\n14\nWhether or not BFPL had adequate written\nprocedures in place for these activities, the company violated § 195.577(a) by failing to test the\ninterference currents to determine if they were detrimental to the pipeline facility.\n7 Final Order at 16.\n8 Although Petitioner is correct that the testimony it offered on this point was not quoted in the Order, the testimony\nonly repeated the claim advanced by the company, namely that “[t]he survey reports used by [PHMSA] inspectors . .\n. is conclusive evidence that Belle Fourche implements this program.” BFPL’s Hearing Exhibit 10 at ¶3.\n9 Petition at 3.\n10 Petition at 3.\n11 Final Order at 15.\n12 Final Order at 15, (quoting BFPL’s Post-hearing Brief at 22 (Oct. 11, 2010), which cited Hearing Ex. 10 at ¶4).\n13 Petition at 4. See also Final Order at 16. Petitioner submitted copies of its written procedures.\n14 Petitioner’ program under § 195.577 must be in writing in accordance with § 195.402(c)(3).\n\n\n\n4\nFor the above reasons, I confirm that BFPL committed a violation of § 195.577(a). BFPL’s\npetition to withdraw the finding of violation for Item 13 is denied.\nIn its Petition, BFPL argued that the close interval survey (CIS) it performed in July 2009 should\nbe found to have satisfied the terms of the Compliance Order associated with Item 13.\n15 In its\npost-hearing submission, OPS “agree[d] that the performance of that CIS renders the proposed\nfurther action to remediate this compliance item. BFPL’s request that PHMSA find it has\ncompliance order unnecessary.”16 For these reasons, I find there is no need for BFPL to take\nsatisfied the compliance terms associated with Item 13 is granted.\nItem 14: The Final Order determined that BFPL violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.579(a), which states:\n§ 195.579 What must I do to mitigate internal corrosion?\n(a) General. If you transport any hazardous liquid or carbon dioxide\nthat would corrode the pipeline, you must investigate the corrosive effect\nof the hazardous liquid or carbon dioxide on the pipeline and take\nadequate steps to mitigate internal corrosion.\nThe Final Order found that BFPL had failed to investigate the corrosive effect of the hazardous\nliquid it transported and to take adequate steps to mitigate internal corrosion. As stated in the\nOrder, BFPL’s pipeline system experienced at least three pipeline leaks between 2006 and 2008\nthat were caused by internal corrosion, but the company never investigated the corrosive effect\nof the product or mitigated the internal corrosion.\nIn its Petition, BFPL did not disagree that the company never investigated the corrosive effect of\nthe product or mitigated internal corrosion. Petitioner argued, however, the regulation did not\nrequire the company to conduct an investigation in the first place. Petitioner stated that the\nregulation “does not impose an absolute obligation” on all operators to conduct an internal\ncorrosion study, but only in cases where “such liquid ‘would’ corrode the pipeline” is an\nregulation in a way that requires the company to conduct an internal corrosion study irrespective\nused guidance to broaden the regulatory requirement beyond the text of the regulation.\ninvestigation required.17 Petitioner claimed the Final ","truncated":true,"body_characters":133250}