# BELLE FOURCHE PIPELINE CO — Notice of Probable Violation

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** CPF 520095042
- **title:** BELLE FOURCHE PIPELINE CO — Notice of Probable Violation
- **source type:** enforcement
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** historical
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2009-12-30
- **effective on:** Not available
- **summary:** CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.402(a), 195.402(c)(12), 195.402(c)(13), 195.404(b)(1), 195.404(c)(3), 195.406(b), 195.412(a), 195.420(b), 195.428(a), 195.428(d), 195.432(b), 195.436, 195.577(a), 195.579(a).
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- **markdown:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520095042.md
- **app url:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520095042
- **source url:** https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/520095042
**body:**

Notice of Probable Violation involving BELLE FOURCHE PIPELINE CO. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.402(a),  195.402(c)(12),  195.402(c)(13),  195.404(b)(1),  195.404(c)(3),  195.406(b),  195.412(a),  195.420(b),  195.428(a),  195.428(d),  195.432(b),  195.436,  195.577(a),  195.579(a). The case was opened on 2009-12-30 and is reported as closed as of 2012-06-26. Proposed civil penalty: $221,200. Assessed civil penalty: $131,900. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.

Official case documents:

520095042_closure letter_06262012.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520095042/520095042_closure%20letter_06262012.pdf

520095042_closure letter_06262012_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520095042/520095042_closure%20letter_06262012_text.pdf

520095042_Decision on the Petition for Reconsideration_03292012.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520095042/520095042_Decision%20on%20the%20Petition%20for%20Reconsideration_03292012.pdf

520095042_Decision on the Petition for Reconsideration_03292012_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520095042/520095042_Decision%20on%20the%20Petition%20for%20Reconsideration_03292012_text.pdf

520095042_Final Order_11212011.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520095042/520095042_Final%20Order_11212011.pdf

520095042_Final Order_11212011_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520095042/520095042_Final%20Order_11212011_text.pdf

520095042_nopv-pcp-pco_12302009.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520095042/520095042_nopv-pcp-pco_12302009.pdf

520095042_nopv-pcp-pco_12302009_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520095042/520095042_nopv-pcp-pco_12302009_text.pdf

520095042_nopv-pcp-pco_12302009_text.pdf

NOTICE OF PROBABLE VIOLATION
PROPOSED CIVIL PENALTY
and
PROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER
CERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
December 30, 2009
Mr. Tad True
Vice President, True Oil
Belle Fourche Pipeline Company
895 W. River Cross Road
P.O. Drawer 2360
Casper, WY 82602
CPF 5-2009-5042
Dear Mr. True:
On August 24-28, 2008, a representative of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA), pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code, inspected two of
your company’s pipeline systems, the Belle Fourche Pipeline and Sussex Diesel Pipeline in
Casper, Wyoming.
As a result of the inspection, it appears that you have committed probable violations of the
Pipeline Safety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations. The items inspected and the
probable violations are:
1. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a
manual of written procedures for conducting normal operation and maintenance
activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. This manual shall be
reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year,



and appropriate changes made as necessary to insure that the manual is effective.
This manual shall be prepared before initial operations of a pipeline system
commence, and appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and
maintenance activities are conducted.
BFPL records as well as conversations with BFPL personnel showed that the company had
not reviewed or revised its O&M Manual from 2005 to 2008. An operator is required to
perform those reviews and make appropriate changes once each calendar year, but at
intervals not exceeding 15 months.
2. §195.402 Procedural manual for operation, maintenance, and emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a
manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance
activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. This manual shall be
reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year,
and appropriate changes made as necessary to insure that the manual is effective.
This manual shall be prepared before initial operations of a pipeline commence, and
appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and maintenance
activities are conducted.
(c) Maintenance and Normal Operations. The manual required by paragraph (a) of
this section must include procedures for the following to provide safety during
maintenance and normal operations:
(12) Establishing and maintaining liaison with fire, police, and other appropriate
public officials to learn the responsibility and resources of each government
organization that may respond to a hazardous liquid or carbon dioxide pipeline
emergency and acquaint the officials with the operator’s ability in responding to a
hazardous liquid or carbon dioxide pipeline emergency and means of communication.
BFPL had not established and maintained liaison with fire, police or other appropriate
public officials along its pipeline system in Wyoming. BFPL’s Public Awareness Program
stated that the company would compile data (names, addresses, phone numbers, etc.)
pertaining to local fire, police, and other emergency and public officials that could be
involved with a response to a hazardous liquid pipeline emergency involving a BFPL
pipeline. However, BFPL had no documentation showing that the company had collected
such data or performed the required liaison activities. BFPL was issued a warning for a
similar citation in CPF 5-2007-5002.
3. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a
manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance
activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. This manual shall be
reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year,
and appropriate changes made as necessary to insure that the manual is effective.
This manual shall be prepared before initial operations of a pipeline commence, and
appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and maintenance
activities are conducted.
2



(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by paragraph (a) of
this section must include procedures for the following to provide safety during
maintenance and normal operations:
(13) Periodically reviewing the work done by operator to determine the effectiveness
of the procedures used in normal operation and maintenance and taking corrective
action where deficiencies are found.
BFPL had not been periodically reviewing the work completed by its personnel to
determine the effectiveness of their Pipeline Operations and Maintenance Manual (O&M
Manual). BFPL had a procedure for performing such reviews in Section 3.8 of the
“Organization and Responsibilities” section of the BFPL O&M Manual. Nonetheless, the
company had no record of those reviews at the time of the inspection. Section 195.404
requires that an operator maintain a record of each inspection and test required by subpart
F of Part 195 for at least 2 years or until the next inspection or test is performed, whichever
is longer. The absence of any records is a violation of the pipeline safety regulations and
BFPL’s own procedures. It also indicates that the required inspections did not occur,
which is consistent with statements made by the company’s operating personnel at the time
of the inspection.
4. §195.404 Maps and Records.
(b) Each operator shall maintain for at least 3 years daily operating records that
indicate-
(1) The discharge pressure at each pump station;
BFPL did not have a pressure recording device at the Guernsey Pump Station and the
company did not maintain any pressure discharge records for that facility. Each operator is
required to maintain at least 3 years’ worth of records documenting the daily discharge
pressures at each pump station.
5. §195.404 Maps and Records.
(c) Each operator shall maintain the following records for the periods specified;
(3) A record of each inspection and test required by this subpart shall be maintained
for at least 2 years or until the next inspection or test is performed, whichever is
longer.
BFPL’s tank data sheets showed that the Sussex breakout tank received an API Standard
653 out-of-service internal inspection in 2001. However, an inspection report was not in
BFPL’s files or otherwise available for review at the time of the inspection. The operator
is required to keep a complete record of inspections per Section 6 of API 653 until the next
inspection of its type is performed.
6. §195.406 Maximum operating pressure.
(b) No operator may permit the pressure in a pipeline during surges or other
variations from normal operations to exceed 110 percent of the operating pressure
limit established under paragraph (a) of this section. Each operator must provide
adequate controls and protective equipment to control the pressure within this limit.
3



BFPL had no safety device(s) installed at the Guernsey Pump Station to prevent
overpressuring of the pumping equipment and piping installed at that facility or of the
pipeline located downstream from that station. Each pipeline operator must provide
adequate controls and protective equipment to control the pressure within the maximum
operating pressure (MOP) during normal operations and 110% of MOP during abnormal
operations.
7. §195.412 Inspection of rights-of-way and crossings under navigable waters.
(a) Each operator shall, at intervals not exceeding 3 weeks, but at least 26 times each
calendar year, inspect the surface conditions on or adjacent to each pipeline right-of-
way. Methods of inspection include walking, driving, flying or other appropriate
mean of traversing the right-of-way.
BFPL did not inspect its pipeline right-of-way at the appropriate time intervals for the
Montana portion of the Bicentennial Line. The evidence shows that the required interval
was exceeded between March 24 and April 21, 2008, and between June 4 and July 5, 2008.
BFPL had records of over-flights occurring between these dates, but those records indicate
that the Montana portion of the Bicentennial line was not over-flown. In addition, the
recordkeeping process for right-of-way inspections made it difficult for BFPL to keep
track of inspection intervals for the various segments of its pipeline system, thereby
increasing the probability that a right-of-way inspection could be missed. An operator is
required to patrol all of their pipelines at an interval not exceeding 3 weeks but at least 26
times per year and to maintain a record of those patrols.
8. §195.420 Valve maintenance.
(b) Each operator shall, at intervals not exceeding 7 1/2 months, but at least twice
each calendar year, inspect each mainline valve to determine that it is functioning
properly.
BFPL failed to inspect numerous mainline valves at the required frequency from 2006 to
2007. BFPL records confirm the following 25 mainline valves were not inspected twice
during the 2006 calendar year:
Area Valve Designation Area Valve Designation
Shilight/Kaye 010-011 Donkey Creek 010-002
Shilight/Kaye 015-005 Donkey Creek 010-003
Shilight/Kaye 015-004 Donkey Creek 010-001
Shilight/Kaye 015-005 Donkey Creek 010-101
Shilight/Kaye 015-002 Sussex Products 069-0001
Shilight/Kaye Poison Draw 6” Tie In Sussex Products 069-0006 (6”)
Shilight/Kaye Poison Draw Line 8” Sussex Products 069-0006 (4”)
Shilight/Kaye 010-0056 Sussex Products 069-0007 (6”)
4



Shilight/Kaye 101-006 Sussex Products 069-0007 (4”)
Shilight/Kaye 015-001 Sussex Products 069-0008
Shilight/Kaye 015-011
Shilight/Kaye 015-012
Shilight/Kaye 101-008
Shilight/Kaye 101-009
Shilight/Kaye 010-010
In addition, BFPL records show that inspections for the following 22 mainline valves
exceeded the 7 ½ month maximum inspection interval:
Valve Designation Period Days in excess
of 7 ½ months
010-001 June 1, 2006 to January 14, 2007 2
010-101 June 1, 2006 to January 14, 2007 2
015-002 June 7, 2006 to January 25, 2007 7
6” Tie In June 7, 2006 to January 25, 2007 7
8” Poison Draw Line June 7, 2006 to January 25, 2007 7
010-005 June 7, 2006 to January 25, 2007 7
010-006 June 7, 2006 to January 25, 2007 7
015-001 June 8, 2006 to January 25, 2007 6
010-008 May 23, 2006 to January 22, 2007 19
010-009 May 23, 2006 to January 22, 2007 19
010-010 May 23, 2006 to January 22, 2007 19
069-0001 April 20, 2006 to January 11, 2007 41
069-0003 October 8, 2006 to July 13, 2007 53
Incoming Trap October 8, 2006 to July 13, 2007 53
069-0004 March 2, 2006 to December 17, 2006 65
Outgoing Launcher March 2, 2006 to December 17, 2006 65
069-0005 March 2, 2006 to December 17, 2006 65
5



069-0007 April 10, 2006 to January 9, 2007 49
Iberline Incoming Trap April 10, 2006 to January 9, 2007 49
069-0007 April 10, 2006 to January 9, 2007 49
Iberline Outgoing Launcher April 10, 2006 to January 9, 2007 49
069-0008 April 10, 2006 to January 4, 2007 44
Each operator must inspect each mainline valve at least twice each calendar year at
intervals not exceeding 7 ½ months and maintain records of such inspections for at least 2
years.
9. §195.428 Overpressure safety devices and overfill protection systems.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, each operator shall, at
intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year, or in the case
of pipelines used to carry highly volatile liquids, at intervals not to exceed 7 ½
months, but at least twice each calendar year, inspect and test each pressure limiting
device, relief valve, pressure regulator, or other item of pressure control equipment to
determine that it is functioning properly, is in good mechanical condition, and is
adequate from the standpoint of capacity and reliability of operation for the service
in which it is used.
BFPL records established that a number of its pressure limiting devices were not inspected
and tested at the required frequency between the years 2006 to 2008. An operator is
required to inspect and test each item of pressure control equipment once each calendar
year not to exceed 15 months.
• Donkey Creek and Hwy 450 stations pressure controls were not tested and inspected in
the 2007 calendar year. Additionally, BFPL exceeded the 15-month interval for testing
and inspecting pressure controls at these stations by 68 and 98 days, respectively.
• Seiler station pressure controls exceeded the 15-month interval for testing and inspecting
in the 2007 calendar year by 120 days.
• At the time of this inspection, BFPL had not yet tested and inspected Sussex pump
station and Guernsey terminal for the 2008 calendar year, resulting in BFPL exceeding
the 15-month interval by a minimum of 145 and 105 days, respectively.
10. §195.428 Overpressure safety devices and overfill protection systems
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, each operator shall, at
intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year, or in the case
of pipelines used to carry highly volatile liquids, at intervals not to exceed 7 ½
months, but at least twice each calendar year, inspect and test each pressure limiting
device, relief valve, pressure regulator, or other item of pressure control equipment to
determine that it is functioning properly, is in good mechanical condition, and is
adequate from the standpoint of capacity and reliability of operation for the service
in which it is used.
6



(d) After October 2, 2000, the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section
for inspection and testing of pressure control equipment apply to the inspection and
testing of overfill protection systems.
Conversations with BFPL personnel confirmed that the high-level alarms on the following
three breakout tanks associated with the Sussex Diesel Line had never been tested at the
prescribed intervals
▪ Sussex Pump Station Breakout Tank
▪ Davis Station (Tank 74) Breakout Tank
▪ Hawk Point Terminal Breakout Tank
Each operator must inspect and test overfill protection system on each breakout tank at
least once each calendar year at intervals not to exceed 15 months, and maintain records of
those inspections and tests for at least two years.
11. §195.432 Inspection of in-service breakout tanks.
(a) Except for breakout tanks inspected under paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section,
each operator shall, at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least each calendar
year, inspect each in-service breakout tank.
(b) Each operator shall inspect the physical integrity of in-service atmospheric and
low pressure steel aboveground breakout tanks according to section 4 of API
Standard 653. However, if structural conditions prevent access to the tank bottom,
the bottom integrity may be assessed according to a plan included in the operations
and maintenance manual under §195.402(c)(3).
BFPL’s tank data sheets verified that BFPL had never performed an External Tank
Inspection on the Sussex Breakout Tank. Because it appears this tank received an internal
inspection in 2001 this tank should have received an external inspection no later than 2006,
as well as the 5-year interval prescribed in API 653 Section 6.3.2.
12. §195.436 Security of facilities.
Each operator shall provide protection for each pumping station and breakout tank
area and other exposed facility (such as scraper traps) from vandalism and
unauthorized entry.
BFPL had no security fencing installed around the Donkey Creek Pump Station. Also 4.5
to 5 foot high security fencing around the Sussex Pump Station and Sussex Breakout Tank
was only made of 4 foot high 6 inch grid woven steel wire with 2 strands of barbed wire
above it. This type of fence will keep livestock out of the facility but it is not adequate to
prevent vandalism and unauthorized entry to the facility.
13. §195.577 What must I do to alleviate interference currents?
(a) For pipelines exposed to stray currents, you must have a program to identify, test
for, and minimize the detrimental effects of such currents.
BFPL’s cathodic protection monitoring records for the 12” Donkey Creek Pipeline in the
area in and around Guernsey station and Ft Laramie station for the 2006 calendar year
showed several test stations with high off levels. High off levels indicate that cathodic
7



protection interference currents may be adversely affecting a pipeline. Nonetheless, at the
time of the inspection, BFPL had not taken the appropriate steps to perform an interference
study to determine if there were interference currents on their pipeline or to mitigate any of
the interference currents that might exist. The Pipeline Safety Regulations require an
operator to identify, test for, and minimize the detrimental effects of stray currents.
14. §195.579 What must I do to mitigate internal corrosion?
(a) General. If you transport any hazardous liquid or carbon dioxide that would
corrode the pipeline, you must investigate the corrosive effect of the hazardous liquid
or carbon dioxide on the pipeline and take adequate steps to mitigate internal
corrosion.
Since 2006, BFPL has experienced at least three leaks due to internal corrosion, a
condition that may be the result of the corrosive effects of the crude oil that is being
shipped through its pipeline system. The Pipeline Safety Regulations require an operator
who transports a hazardous liquid that could corrode a pipe to investigate and take
adequate steps to mitigate that condition. Nonetheless, at the time of the inspection, BFPL
had not conducted such an investigation or taken any steps to mitigate that condition.
Proposed Civil Penalty
Under 49 United States Code, § 60122, you are subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $100,000
for each violation for each day the violation persists up to a maximum of $1,000,000 for any
related series of violations. The Compliance Officer has reviewed the circumstances and
supporting documentation involved in the above probable violations and has recommended that
you be preliminarily assessed a civil penalty of $221,200 as follows:
Item Number PENALTY
1 $37,100
5 $17,100
8 $30,800
9 $62,100
10 $30,800
11 $43,300
Warning Items
With respect to items 7 and, we have reviewed the circumstances and supporting documents
involved in this case and have decided not to conduct additional enforcement action or penalty
assessment proceedings at this time. We advise you to promptly correct these item(s). Be advised
that failure to do so may result in Belle Fourche Pipeline Company being subject to additional
enforcement action.
8



Proposed Compliance Order
With respect to items 2, 3, 4, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 pursuant to 49 United States Code § 60118,
the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration proposes to issue a Compliance Order
to Belle Fourche Pipeline Company. Please refer to the Proposed Compliance Order, which is
enclosed and made a part of this Notice.
Response to this Notice
Enclosed as part of this Notice is a document entitled Response Options for Pipeline Operators in
Compliance Proceedings. Please refer to this document and note the response options. Be
advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being
made publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for
confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document you must
provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for confidential
treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information qualifies for
confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b). If you do not respond within 30 days of receipt of
this Notice, this constitutes a waiver of your right to contest the allegations in this Notice and
authorizes the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety to find facts as alleged in this Notice
without further notice to you and to issue a Final Order.
In your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF 5-2009-5042 and for each document
you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.
Sincerely,
Chris Hoidal
Director, Western Region
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
Enclosures: Proposed Compliance Order
Response Options for Pipeline Operators in Compliance Proceedings
cc: PHP-60 Compliance Registry
PHP-500 G. Davis (#120773)
9



PROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER
Pursuant to 49 United States Code § 60118, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA) proposes to issue to Belle Fourche Pipeline Company (BFPL) a
Compliance Order incorporating the following remedial requirements to ensure the compliance of
BFPL with the pipeline safety regulations:
1. In regard to Item Number 2 of the Notice pertaining to the lack of the development of a list
of local fire, police, and other emergency and public officials:
BFPL must develop a list of local fire, police, and other emergency and public officials
that could potentially respond to an emergency associated with BFPL's hazardous liquid
pipelines in Wyoming. BFPL must then conduct periodic liaison activities with these
entities to .accomplish the following:
• Learn the responsibilities and resources of each entity.
• Acquaint each agency with BFPL's ability in responding to a hazardous liquid pipeline
emergency.
• Understand the means of communication that could be used between BFPL and each
entity in the event of a pipeline emergency.
2. In regard to Item Number 3 of the Notice pertaining to BFPL not reviewing the work done
by its personnel to determine the effectiveness of procedures:
BFPL must review the work done by its employees to determine the effectiveness of their
procedure and they must document such reviews.
3. In regard to Item Number 4 of the Notice pertaining to the lack of a pressure recording
device at the Guernsey Pump Station:
BFPL must install a pressure recording device at the Guernsey Pump Station to record the
discharge pressure of the station. BFPL must then retain the pressure records for a
minimum of three years.
4. In regard to Item Number 6 of the Notice pertaining to the lack of a safety device that
prevents overpressuring of pumping equipment at the Guernsey Pump Station:
BFPL must install an overpressure protection device at the Guernsey Pump Station that
prevents the Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) of the piping at the station and the
pipeline downstream from the station from being exceeded.
5. In regard to Item Number 10 of the Notice pertaining to the lack of inspection and testing
of high level alarms on three breakout tanks on the Sussex Diesel Line:
BFPL must inspect and test the high level alarms on the following tanks:
▪ Sussex Pump Station Breakout Tank (BOT)
▪ Davis Station (Tank 74) BOT
▪ Hawk Point Terminal BOT
6. In regard to Item Number 11 of the Notice pertaining to exceeding the maximum interval
of 5 years for an API Standard 653 External Inspection of the Sussex diesel BOT:
BFPL must conduct an API Standard 653 External Inspection on their Sussex diesel BOT.
10



7. In regard to Item Number 12 of the Notice pertaining to the lack of security fencing around
the Donkey Creek Pump Station and the inadequate security fencing around the Sussex
Pump Station and Sussex BOT:
BFPL must install security fencing around the Donkey Creek Pump Station that is a
minimum of six feet high and includes a minimum of 3 strands of barbed wire above the
fencing. Appropriate warning signs and operator contact information must be installed on
the fencing and all gates must be adequately locked.
In addition, BFPL must replace the security fencing around the Sussex Pump Station and
Sussex Breakout Tank with security fencing that is a minimum of six feet high and
includes a minimum of 3 strands of barbed wire above the fencing. Appropriate warning
signs and operator contact information must be installed on the fencing and all gates must
be adequately locked.
8. In regard to Item Number 13 of the Notice pertaining to High "Off' CP levels on the 12"
Donkey Creek Pipeline located between Guernsey station and Ft Laramie station:
BFPL must perform an interference study on the Donkey Creek Pipeline between
Guernsey station and Ft Laramie station and remediate any stray currents that are found.
9. In regard to Item Number 14 of the Notice pertaining to potentially corrosive crude oil
being shipped through the Belle Fourche Pipeline System may be causing internal
corrosion of the pipeline system:
BFPL must conduct an investigation to determine if crude oil being shipped through their
pipeline system is causing internal corrosion. If the investigation determines that the crude
oil is in fact causing internal corrosion, BFPL must take appropriate remedial actions to
prevent internal corrosion from continuing to occur in their pipeline system.
10. BFPL must complete the items described above within 60 days of receipt of the Final
Order.
11. Belle Fourche Pipeline Company shall maintain documentation of the safety improvement
costs associated with fulfilling this Compliance Order and submit the total to Chris Hoidal,
Director, Western Region, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. Costs
shall be reported in two categories: 1) total cost associated with preparation/revision of
plans, procedures, studies and analyses, and 2) total cost associated with replacements,
additions and other changes to pipeline infrastructure.
11

520095042_Decision on the Petition for Reconsideration_03292012_text.pdf

MAR 29 2012
Mr. Tad True
Vice President
Belle Fourche Pipeline Company
P.O. Box 2360
Casper, WY 82602
Re: CPF No. 5-2009-5042
Dear Mr. True:
Enclosed please find the decision on the petition for reconsideration filed by Belle Fourche
Pipeline Company in the above-referenced case. For the reasons set forth in the decision,
your petition to withdraw the findings of violation in Items 13 and 14 of the Final Order is
denied. In addition, your petition to withdraw the terms of the compliance order associated
with Item 14 is denied. Your petition to find that Belle Fourche has satisfied the terms of the
compliance order associated with Item 13 is granted. Service of this document by certified
mail is complete upon mailing as provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Jeffrey D. Wiese
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety
Enclosure
cc: Mr. Alan Mayberry, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, OPS
Mr. Chris Hoidal, Director, Western Region, OPS
Mr. Colin Harris, Holme Roberts & Owen LLP
1801 13th Street, Suite 300, Boulder, CO 80302-5259
CERTIFIED MAIL – RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED [71791000164203446319]



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590
____________________________________
In the Matter of )
Belle Fourche Pipeline Company, ) CPF No. 5-2009-5042
)
)
)
Petitioner. )
____________________________________)
DECISION ON PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION
On November 21, 2011, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. §§ 60118 and 60122, the Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) issued a Final Order in this proceeding finding that
Belle Fourche Pipeline Company (BFPL or Petitioner) committed nine violations of the pipeline
safety regulations in 49 C.F.R. Part 195. The Final Order assessed a civil penalty of $131,900
for four of the violations and ordered BFPL to take certain corrective measures (Compliance
Order). BFPL operates approximately 600 miles of pipeline in Montana, North Dakota, and
Wyoming transporting crude oil and refined petroleum products.1
BFPL submitted a Petition for Reconsideration of the Final Order dated December 9, 2011
(Petition). In its Petition, BFPL requested reconsideration of Items 13 and 14 in the Final Order,
which had found that BFPL violated 49 C.F.R. §§ 195.577(a) and 195.579(a), respectively.
Petitioner also requested a stay of the terms of the Compliance Order associated with those items
pending the issuance of a decision on its Petition. PHMSA granted the stay on
2
January 13, 2012.
Pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 190.215, a respondent may petition for reconsideration of a final order
that has been issued pursuant to § 190.213. Section 190.215 provides that PHMSA does not
consider repetitious information or arguments, but may consider additional facts or arguments if
the Petitioner submits a valid reason explaining why such information was not presented prior to
issuance of the final order. PHMSA may grant or deny, in whole or in part, a petition for
reconsideration without further proceedings, but may request additional information or comment
as deemed appropriate.
1 This information is reported by BFPL as required by 49 C.F.R. § 195.49. On its website, the company states that
it operates 1,500 miles of pipeline. http://www.truecos.com/BFPL (last accessed Mar. 8, 2012).
2 The Final Order did not assess civil penalties for Items 13 and 14. On December 19, 2011, BFPL submitted
payment in full of the civil penalties assessed in the Final Order for Items 8, 9, 10, 11.



2
Item 13: The Final Order determined that BFPL violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.577(a), which states:
§ 195.577 What must I do to alleviate interference currents?
(a) For pipelines exposed to stray currents, you must have a program
to identify, test for, and minimize the detrimental effects of such currents.
The Final Order determined that BFPL failed to have and implement a program to identify, test
for, and minimize the detrimental effects of stray currents on the company’s pipeline. As stated
in the Order, the operator’s cathodic protection survey records from January 2006 to December
2008 showed there were areas on its pipeline with high “off” levels, indicative of interference
currents that could have an adverse effect on the pipeline. BFPL could not produce a
documented interference study or any other evidence to demonstrate the company took action in
accordance with § 195.577(a) to test the interference currents that were detected during the
surveys to determine whether any effects were adverse to the pipeline and to mitigate detrimental
effects.
In its Petition, BFPL acknowledged that § 195.577(a) requires companies to identify, test for,
and minimize the detrimental effects of electrical current flowing from an external source to the
affected pipeline.
company argued that there was insufficient evidence of a violation presented by OPS, and that
the evidence of compliance presented by BFPL was not properly considered.
3 Petitioner disagreed, however, that BFPL violated this requirement. The
First, BFPL argued that the finding of violation was in error because the evidence presented by
OPS did not support the finding. Specifically, Petitioner stated that the cathodic protection
survey records from 2006 to 2008 were not sufficient evidence to prove a violation.
4
As noted in the Final Order, BFPL’s survey records from 2006-2008 indicated that its pipeline
was exposed to interference currents. Under § 195.577(a), the company was required to identify,
test for, and minimize the detrimental effects of those stray currents. Despite the indications of
interference currents, BFPL did not produce any evidence to demonstrate that it had taken action
during the time period in question to conduct tests to determine whether the interference currents
were adversely affecting the pipeline.5 These facts constituted sufficient evidence for PHMSA
to find that BFPL violated § 195.577(a).
Second, Petitioner argued that the company’s survey records from 2006-2008 demonstrated that
the company did, in fact, have a program to identify and test for interference currents. Petitioner
stated “[t]he whole purpose of the surveys” was to identify and test for interference currents,
citing testimony it offered at the hearing.6
Petitioner claimed that this evidence was not
addressed in the Order.
3 Petition at 2.
4 Petition at 2.
5 BFPL conducted a close interval survey in July 2009, but as stated in the Final Order, the survey was performed
after the OPS inspection, and therefore did not demonstrate compliance for the time period in question.
6 Petition at 3.



3
The Final Order specifically addressed this position taken by the operator and the evidence it
offered in support. For example, the Final Order noted that “BFPL claimed the reports used by
PHMSA in support of the allegation demonstrated this program was in place and implemented.”7
While the survey report records showed Petitioner could apparently detect interference currents
on its pipeline, the Order concluded that the records themselves did not demonstrate compliance
with § 195.577(a) because, among other things, BFPL never actually tested the interference
currents during the time period in question to determine if they were detrimental.8
BFPL argued in its Petition that it was not necessary for the company to test the interference
currents because testimony in the record “unarguably shows” that the interference currents were
not detrimental to the pipeline.
9 Petitioner cited a statement by its witness that the pipelines in
the area are all tied together with either piping, electrical grounding, or bonds. Petitioner argued
there was no need to conduct additional tests or mitigation “because any issues had already been
mitigated.”10 Petitioner claimed this evidence was not acknowledged or refuted in the Order.
The Final Order specifically discussed BFPL’s claim that it knew the source of the current and
that it was not detrimental.
11 The Order quoted the company’s own Brief, which recited the
testimony of its witness that the pipelines in the area “are tied together with either piping,
Final Order determined, however, that the company’s assumption that interference currents were
not detrimental was not an excuse for failing to conduct the testing required under the regulation.
BFPL provided no evidence that it performed an analysis during the time period in question to
confirm that interference currents were not detrimental to the pipeline.
electrical grounding between the different pipeline companies in the area, or by bonds.”12 The
Lastly, Petitioner argued that it was improper for the Final Order to include a statement that
BFPL failed to follow written procedures for determining if the stray currents had detrimental
effects. Petitioner claimed the issue of “written procedures” was never raised at the hearing.
13
The Notice of Probable Violation provided sufficient notice to BFPL that the company had
allegedly violated the requirement in § 195.577(a) to identify, test for, and minimize the
detrimental effects of interference currents.
14
Whether or not BFPL had adequate written
procedures in place for these activities, the company violated § 195.577(a) by failing to test the
interference currents to determine if they were detrimental to the pipeline facility.
7 Final Order at 16.
8 Although Petitioner is correct that the testimony it offered on this point was not quoted in the Order, the testimony
only repeated the claim advanced by the company, namely that “[t]he survey reports used by [PHMSA] inspectors . .
. is conclusive evidence that Belle Fourche implements this program.” BFPL’s Hearing Exhibit 10 at ¶3.
9 Petition at 3.
10 Petition at 3.
11 Final Order at 15.
12 Final Order at 15, (quoting BFPL’s Post-hearing Brief at 22 (Oct. 11, 2010), which cited Hearing Ex. 10 at ¶4).
13 Petition at 4. See also Final Order at 16. Petitioner submitted copies of its written procedures.
14 Petitioner’ program under § 195.577 must be in writing in accordance with § 195.402(c)(3).



4
For the above reasons, I confirm that BFPL committed a violation of § 195.577(a). BFPL’s
petition to withdraw the finding of violation for Item 13 is denied.
In its Petition, BFPL argued that the close interval survey (CIS) it performed in July 2009 should
be found to have satisfied the terms of the Compliance Order associated with Item 13.
15 In its
post-hearing submission, OPS “agree[d] that the performance of that CIS renders the proposed
further action to remediate this compliance item. BFPL’s request that PHMSA find it has
compliance order unnecessary.”16 For these reasons, I find there is no need for BFPL to take
satisfied the compliance terms associated with Item 13 is granted.
Item 14: The Final Order determined that BFPL violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.579(a), which states:
§ 195.579 What must I do to mitigate internal corrosion?
(a) General. If you transport any hazardous liquid or carbon dioxide
that would corrode the pipeline, you must investigate the corrosive effect
of the hazardous liquid or carbon dioxide on the pipeline and take
adequate steps to mitigate internal corrosion.
The Final Order found that BFPL had failed to investigate the corrosive effect of the hazardous
liquid it transported and to take adequate steps to mitigate internal corrosion. As stated in the
Order, BFPL’s pipeline system experienced at least three pipeline leaks between 2006 and 2008
that were caused by internal corrosion, but the company never investigated the corrosive effect
of the product or mitigated the internal corrosion.
In its Petition, BFPL did not disagree that the company never investigated the corrosive effect of
the product or mitigated internal corrosion. Petitioner argued, however, the regulation did not
require the company to conduct an investigation in the first place. Petitioner stated that the
regulation “does not impose an absolute obligation” on all operators to conduct an internal
corrosion study, but only in cases where “such liquid ‘would’ corrode the pipeline” is an
regulation in a way that requires the company to conduct an internal corrosion study irrespective
used guidance to broaden the regulatory requirement beyond the text of the regulation.
investigation required.17 Petitioner claimed the Final 
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