{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 520105001","title":"ALYESKA PIPELINE SERVICE CO — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2010-02-02","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.402.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520105001.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520105001.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520105001","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/520105001","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving ALYESKA PIPELINE SERVICE CO. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulation as 195.402. The case was opened on 2010-02-02 and is reported as closed as of 2011-07-29. Proposed civil penalty: $41,300. Assessed civil penalty: $0. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n520105001_Final Order_07292011.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520105001/520105001_Final%20Order_07292011.pdf\n\n520105001_Final Order_07292011_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520105001/520105001_Final%20Order_07292011_text.pdf\n\n520105001_NOPV PCP_02022010.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520105001/520105001_NOPV%20PCP_02022010.pdf\n\n520105001_NOPV PCP_02022010_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520105001/520105001_NOPV%20PCP_02022010_text.pdf\n\n520105001_Final Order_07292011_text.pdf\n\nJUL 29 2011\nMr. Mike Joynor\nSenior Vice President, Operations\nAlyeska Pipeline Service Company\n900 East Benson Boulevard\nP.O. Box 19660\nAnchorage, Alaska 99519-6660\nRe: CPF No. 5-2010-5001\nDear Mr. Joynor:\nEnclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It withdraws the\nallegation of violation and the proposed civil penalty of $41,300. Therefore, this enforcement\naction is now closed. Service of the Final Order by certified mail is deemed effective upon the\ndate of mailing, or as otherwise provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. Alan Mayberry, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, Pipeline Safety\nMr. Chris Hoidal, Director, Western Region, PHMSA\nMr. Dennis Hinnah, Deputy Director, Western Region, PHMSA\nMs. Sheila Doody Bishop, Esq., Counsel for Alyeska Pipeline Service Company\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED [7005 1160 0001 0075 9282]\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\n)\nIn the Matter of )\n)\nAlyeska Pipeline Service Company, ) CPF No. 5-2010-5001\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nFINAL ORDER\nOn January 15, 2009, Alyeska Pipeline Service Company (Alyeska or Respondent), the operator\nof the Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS), an 800-mile-long hazardous liquid pipeline system,\nexperienced a tank overpressure and vapor-relief event at Pump Station #1 (PS-1), the central\ncollection point for crude oil being transported by TAPS from the North Slope of Alaska\n(Incident). PS-1 received an influx of natural gas from one of BP Exploration Alaska, Inc.’s\n(BPXA) oil transit lines (OTLs) as a result of pigging operations. 1 This event caused the relief\nvents on Alyeska’s Breakout Tanks TK-110 and TK-111 to open and release flammable vapors.2\nOn March 13, 2009, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, a representative of the Pipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS),\nconducted an investigation of the Incident. As a result of the investigation, the Director, Western\nRegion, OPS (Director), issued to Respondent, by letter dated February 2, 2010, a Notice of\nProbable Violation and Proposed Civil Penalty (Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R.\n§ 190.207, the Notice proposed finding that Alyeska had violated § 195.402, and proposed\nassessing a civil penalty of $41,300 for the alleged violation.\nAlyeska responded to the Notice by letter dated March 10, 2010 (Response). Alyeska contested\nthe allegation of violation and requested a hearing, which was subsequently held on\nSeptember 23, 2010, in Anchorage, Alaska, with an attorney from the Office of Chief Counsel,\nPHMSA, presiding. At the hearing, Respondent was represented by counsel. After the hearing,\nRespondent provided a post-hearing statement for the record, by letter dated October 25, 2010\n(Closing).\n1 TAPS transports crude oil from production facilities at Prudhoe Bay to a marine terminal in Valdez, Alaska.\nhttp://www.alyeska-pipe.com (last accessed on December 28, 2010).\n2 BPXA was using a cleaning pig to displace crude oil from one of the transit lines. Field residue gas was used to\npush the pig. When the pig stalled, gas flow bypassed the pig, ultimately entered PS-1, and flared from the relief\nvents on TK-110 and TK-111. See Alyeska TAPS Pump Station # 1 Sadlerochit Stream Gas Excursion Incident\nInvestigation Report (February 23, 2009), at 1.\n\n\n\n2\nWITHDRAWAL OF ITEM\nItem 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402, which states in\nrelevant part:\n§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and\nemergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline\nsystem a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and\nmaintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies….\n(d) Abnormal operation. The manual required by paragraph (a) of this\nsection must include procedures for the following to provide safety when\noperating design limits have been exceeded:\n(1) Responding to, investigation, and correcting the cause of:\n(i) Unintended closure of valves or shutdowns;\n(ii) Increase or decrease in pressure or flow rate outside normal operating\nlimits;\n(iii) Loss of communications;\n(iv) Operation of any safety device\n(v) Any other malfunction of a component, deviation from normal\noperation, or personnel error which could cause a hazard to persons or\nproperty.\nIn the Notice and at the hearing, OPS alleged that Alyeska failed to follow its own manual of\nwritten procedures for abnormal operations by neglecting to verify or confirm system integrity\nprior to restarting the pipeline.3 Specifically, OPS alleged that the January 15, 2009 event\ninvolved an abnormal condition created by an influx of natural gas into TAPS from BPXA’s\npigging operations, causing the relief vents at Alyeska’s breakout tanks at Pump Station #1 to\nopen and release natural gas.4\nIn support of this contention, OPS cited Alyeska’s procedures, which listed an abnormal\noperating condition as an “[u]nintended shutdown of the pipeline for reasons other than\nmaintenance and protection of equipment” and “component malfunction, deviation from normal\noperation, or personnel error which adversely affects systems or equipment subject to DOT\njurisdiction.\n”5 Since the overpressure and vapor release event was certainly a deviation from\nnormal operations and prompted an unintended shutdown, OPS alleged that Alyeska should have\nfollowed its procedures for handling abnormal conditions, which required personnel to “verify\nsystem integrity and dispatch linewide reconnaissance as appropriate” and “restore normal\noperations once system integrity is confirmed.”6\n3 Notice, at 2.\n4 Id.\n5 Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, OM-1, Section 3, paragraph 3.1.1.\n6 Id., at 3.1.3.\n\n\n\n3\nOPS asserted that Respondent should have conducted a visual inspection of the tanks prior to\nrestarting the system. According to OPS, Alyeska restarted the pumps within 18 minutes of the\ntime when the venting ceased, but without properly verifying or confirming system integrity.\nOPS questioned whether Alyeska could have truly verified system integrity per its abnormal\noperating procedures in such a short period of time. In support of the Notice, OPS relied on the\nfollowing evidence: (1) PHMSA’s Pipeline Failure Investigation Report, dated November 12,\n2009; (2) three photographs of tank venting and pressure relief devices; (3) a copy of Alyeska’s\nProcedural Manual for Operations, Maintenance and Emergencies (OM-1); (4) the External Tank\nInspection Report, dated January 18, 2009; (5) the Event Notification, dated January 15, 2009;\nand (6) the Alyeska TAPS Pump Station # 1 Sadlerochit Stream Gas Excursion Incident\nInvestigation Report, dated February 23, 2009.\nIn its Response dated March 10, 2010, Alyeska disputed that the Incident was an abnormal\noperating condition, arguing that “all automated systems and operations and protocols at TAPS\nPump Station # 1 worked per design to shutdown the pump station and protect personnel and\nequipment.”7 However, at the hearing, Alyeska modified its response by acknowledging that the\nIncident was indeed an abnormal operating condition but maintained that the company had not\nviolated its abnormal operating procedures. On the contrary, Alyeska contended that its\nOperations Control Center followed OM-1, Section 3.1, by adequately verifying system integrity\nin coordination with personnel at PS-1 prior to restart.8\nAt the hearing, the presiding official asked Respondent what actions it specifically took\nimmediately after discovering the overpressure and vapor event. Alyeska stated that its\nOperations Control Center verified that the control systems were fully operational, while PS-1\nthat its personnel confirmed that there was no obvious damage to the tanks, that the flow meters\nwere functioning normally, that the control system was fully operational, and that it verified the\nstatus of station equipment through the station control panel. There were no injuries or\npersonnel observed the condition of the tanks prior to restarting the system.9 Respondent stated\nequipment damage. In addition, Alyeska conducted an API 653 tank inspection two days after\nthe Incident. Alyeska found these actions to be appropriate under its OM-1 procedure to verify\nsystem integrity.\nAt the hearing, OPS focused on whether there was any evidence in the case file showing that\nAlyeska had performed a visual inspection to confirm system integrity. In response, Alyeska\nmaintained that Mr. Timothy Rupp, the lead technician at PS-1 on the day of the Incident,\ncompleted the visual inspection before restarting the system. Although Mr. Rupp was listed as a\nparticipant in the investigation in the company’s investigation report,10 Alyeska did not present\nMr. Rupp as a witness at the hearing but, at the presiding official’s request, submitted an\naffidavit of his statement shortly after the hearing.11\nIn that affidavit, dated October 19, 2010,\n7 Response, at 2.\n8 Alyeska Hearing Presentation, at 7.\n9 Closing, at 2.\n10 See Alyeska TAPS Pump Station # 1 Sadlerochit Stream Gas Excursion Incident Investigation Report (February\n23, 2009), at 5.\n11 See Closing, Affidavit of Timothy Rupp, dated October 19, 2010.\n\n\n\n4\nMr. Rupp stated that upon discovery of the unplanned event, he immediately contacted BPXA\nand requested closure of the 12-inch valve to block the flow from the OTLs into the tanks.12 Mr.\nRupp also stated that he had observed the condition of the tanks and did not see any physical\ndamage from the overpressure and vapor release event.13 He admitted that he viewed the tanks\nin the twilight on the North Slope, but “despite the low ambient light, [he used] the reflection of\nthe flare on the snow [which] made it easy to see the tanks.\n”14 Finally, Mr. Rupp stated that\nwhen the venting had ceased (approximately 11 minutes after the initial event), he returned to the\noffice to discuss start-up with the company’s Operations Control Center.15\nFinally, Alyeska stated at the hearing that the allegations in the Notice were primarily based on\nAlyeska’s own, report rather than any independent investigation conducted by PHMSA. Alyeska\nargued that OPS used conclusions in the Alyeska investigation report that had been made for the\npurpose of self-improvement to support its Notice.\nPost-Hearing Request for Production of Records\nOn September 28, 2010, after the hearing, OPS submitted a Request for Production of Records\n(Request) seeking additional information from Alyeska. Specifically, OPS sought any records\nthat included Mr. Rupp’s statements, if any, or actions he took on the day of the Incident. On\nOctober 18, 2010, Alyeska submitted its objection to the Request, stating that 1) the agency did\nnot have regulatory authority for post-hearing discovery; 2) OPS had a copy of the Alyeska\ninvestigation report since its March 2009 investigation and yet had failed to seek additional\ninformation in the time that transpired between the OPS investigation and the hearing; 3)\nAlyeska had agreed to provide an affidavit of Mr. Rupp’s statement in its Closing, per the\npresiding official’s request; and 4) since Mr. Rupp was part of the investigation team, any\nstatements he may have made were incorporated into the Alyeska investigation report. The\npresiding official responded on November 9, 2010, denying the Request. Specifically, the\npresiding official stated that OPS had had ample opportunity to seek additional evidence prior to\nthe hearing and that Alyeska had submitted an affidavit from Mr. Rupp on October 25, 2010, as\npart of its Closing, and gave OPS an opportunity to file a reply to any additional information\npresented.\n16\nShortly thereafter, OPS filed a Post-Hearing Submittal, dated November 18, 2010, stating that\nfurther prosecution of the matter was inappropriate and that the Notice should be withdrawn.17\nAlthough OPS indicated that it believed deficiencies still existed in Alyeska’s procedures for\nhandling abnormal operations, it concluded that these defects should not necessarily be resolved\nin this enforcement matter.18\n12 Id. at 2.\n13 Id.\n14 Id.\n15 Id.\n16 See Post-Hearing Scheduling Letter, dated October 8, 2010.\n17 OPS Post-Hearing Submittal, at 3.\n18 Id.\n\n\n\n5\nConclusion\nI have reviewed OPS’ request to withdraw the Notice. I find it appropriate to grant this request\nand for those reasons, the allegation of violation and proposed civil penalty are withdrawn.\n___________________________________ __________________________\nJeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety","truncated":false,"body_characters":13801}