{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 520115001S","title":"ALYESKA PIPELINE SERVICE CO — Safety Order","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2011-02-01","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED safety order.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520115001s.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520115001s.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520115001s","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/520115001S","body":"Safety Order involving ALYESKA PIPELINE SERVICE CO. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2011-02-01 and is reported as closed as of 2018-05-03. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n520115001S_Closure Letter_05032018.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520115001S/520115001S_Closure%20Letter_05032018.pdf\n\n520115001S_Closure Letter_05032018_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520115001S/520115001S_Closure%20Letter_05032018_text.pdf\n\n520115001S_Consent Agreement_08172011.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520115001S/520115001S_Consent%20Agreement_08172011.pdf\n\n520115001S_Consent Agreement_08172011_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520115001S/520115001S_Consent%20Agreement_08172011_text.pdf\n\n520115001S_Consent Order_08172011.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520115001S/520115001S_Consent%20Order_08172011.pdf\n\n520115001S_Consent Order_08172011_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520115001S/520115001S_Consent%20Order_08172011_text.pdf\n\n520115001S_operator response and request for Informal Consultation_02152011.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520115001S/520115001S_operator%20response%20and%20request%20for%20Informal%20Consultation_02152011.pdf\n\n520115001S_proposed safety order_02012011.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520115001S/520115001S_proposed%20safety%20order_02012011.pdf\n\n520115001S_proposed safety order_02012011_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520115001S/520115001S_proposed%20safety%20order_02012011_text.pdf\n\n520115001S_proposed safety order_02012011_text.pdf\n\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nFebruary 1, 2011\nMr. Thomas Barrett\nPresident\nAlyeska Pipeline Service Company\n900 E. Benson Blvd.\nP.O. Box 196660\nAnchorage, AK 99519\nCPF 5-2011-5001S\nDear Mr. Barrett:\nEnclosed is a Notice of Proposed Safety Order (Notice) issued in the above-referenced case. The\nNotice proposes that Alyeska Pipeline Service Company (Alyeska) take certain measures with\nrespect to the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System to ensure pipeline safety and protection of the\nenvironment. Your options for responding are set forth in the Notice. Your receipt of the Notice\nconstitutes service of that document under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nWe look forward to a successful resolution to ensure pipeline safety. Please direct any questions\non this matter to Dennis Hinnah at 907-271-6517 or me at 720-963-3160.\nSincerely,\nChris Hoidal\nDirector, Western Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nEnclosure: Notice of Proposed Safety Order\n49 C.F.R. § 190.239\ncc: Dennis Hinnah, Deputy Region Director, Western Region, PHMSA Office of\nPipeline Safety, 188 West Northern Lights Blvd., Suite 520, Anchorage, AK 99503\n\n\n\nDEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\n____________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nAlyeska Pipeline Service Company, ) CPF No. 5-2011-5001S\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent )\n____________________________________)\nNOTICE OF PROPOSED SAFETY ORDER\nBackground and Purpose\nPursuant to Chapter 601 of title 49, United States Code, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration (PHMSA) has initiated an investigation of the safe operation of the Trans-Alaska\nPipeline System (TAPS), including the investigation of a pipeline leak at Pump Station 1 (PS-1) that\nbegan on January 8, 2011. The TAPS is operated by Alyeska Pipeline Service Company (Alyeska)\nand transports crude oil from the production fields in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska, to their marine transfer\nfacilities in Valdez, Alaska.\nAs a result of the investigation, it appears that multiple conditions exist on your pipeline facility that\npose a pipeline integrity risk to public safety, property or the environment. Pursuant to 49 U.S.C.\n§ 60117(l), PHMSA issues this Notice of Proposed Safety Order, notifying you of the preliminary\nfindings of the investigation, and proposing that you take measures to ensure that the public,\nproperty, and the environment are protected from the potential risk.\nPreliminary Findings\n• The affected pipeline is the 800-mile long, 48-inch diameter TAPS which transports crude oil\nfrom PS-1 in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska, to the Valdez Marine Terminal in Valdez, Alaska. PS-1\nreceives crude oil from production oil fields on the North Slope of Alaska.\n• The TAPS was constructed between 1975 and 1977, and began transport of oil on June 20,\n1977. During that period, average daily oil throughput increased until it peaked at 2.033\nmillion barrels per day (bpd) in 1988. At the end of December 2010, it was averaging\n\n\n\nbetween 600,000 and 700,000 bpd, and averages a throughput decline of approximately 6%\nper year.\n• The reduced throughput has resulted in numerous integrity challenges that have not been\nfully addressed by Alyeska’s operational and maintenance activities. Significant challenges\nfor TAPS future operations include decreasing crude oil temperatures, water freezing due to\nthese decreased temperatures, increased wax precipitation and deposition on the pipe wall,\nslack line conditions at multiple locations, and changing oil composition. Two issues in\nparticular need to be addressed to ensure the long-term integrity of TAPS: water in the TAPS\nstream and deposition of crude oil solids (i.e., wax) on the pipeline wall.\no The present pipeline specification allowing crude oil containing up to 0.35% Basic\nSediment and Water (BS&W) to enter TAPS is based on an average and does not\nprevent free water and water slugs from entering the TAPS crude stream. This water\ncan create a corrosion-susceptible environment. During a TAPS shut down in\nextreme cold temperatures, there is a risk of water accumulation in low points\nfreezing and creating ice plugs which could impede restart of TAPS and damage\nvalves, instrumentation, and other pipeline components. If flowing crude temperature\ndrops below freezing, ice crystals may form in the crude stream, potentially adversely\naffecting equipment and instrumentation.\no At lower crude temperatures, increased wax precipitation from the crude stream\nadheres to the pipeline wall creating a corrosion-conducive environment. Soft wax in\nthe crude stream clogs inline inspection tool (smart pig) sensors. Increased wax\nfrom lower crude temperatures creates wax management issues during maintenance\npigging.\n• There is a history of both internal and external corrosion problems on pipelines upstream of\nPS-1. This has prompted replacement of several pipelines including the OT501 pipeline and\nthe Oil Transit line system transporting sales oil crude from Gathering Center 2 and Flow\nStation 2 by the owner of those pipelines.\n• In 2008, Alyeska identified several locations with internal corrosion, two locations with over\n80% wall loss and three locations with over 50% wall loss, in the above ground piping in the\nPS-1 Tank Farm that required mitigation. Alyeska installed full encirclement metal sleeves\nto mitigate the wall loss. The locations that required sleeves are on piping that connects the\nPS-1 tanks to the suction side of the booster pumps and the meter building.\n• Significant changes have been implemented on the TAPS during the last 15 years to address\nthis reduced throughput, including taking Pump Stations 2, 6, 8, and 10, out of service (the\nbreakout storage tanks associated with these stations were also decommissioned) and placing\nPS-7 and the tank at PS-12 on standby status.\n• The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency notified the Director, Western Region, PHMSA\n(Director), of the leak on Saturday, January 8, 2011. Shortly after this notification, Alyeska\nreported the spill and subsequent shutdown of the pipeline system to PHMSA. Alyeska\nreported the leak to the National Response Center (NRC) (incident report # 964075).\n• The area around PS-1 has been deemed a High Consequence Area per 49 CFR Part 195.\n\n\n\n• The leak appears to be located in the below-ground station piping and headers between the\nPS-1 booster pumps and the mainline pumps. The pipe was manufactured and installed in\nthe 1970s and encased in concrete in the early 1990s.\n• The leak occurred in piping connected to or in low-flow, dead leg piping. Such locations are\nsusceptible to corrosion because they cannot be cleaned with cleaning pigs and because\nsediment accumulates and prevents corrosion inhibitors and biocides from reaching the pipe\nwall. TAPS has other locations within PS-1 and other facilities where low flow and dead leg\npiping exists. Dead legs in underground piping cannot be assessed by smart pigs (ILI) or\nexternal ultrasonic transducer (UT) testing measurements.\n• The failed pipe has not yet been excavated to determine the cause of the leak; however it is\nbelieved to be the result of external or internal corrosion. Internal sampling of fluids and\ninternal pipe wall sediment and materials occurred on January 21, 2011, and testing is\nunderway by Alyeska contractors.\n• After the leak was discovered, it took approximately ten (10) days for temporary above-\nground bypass piping at PS-1 to be constructed to allow TAPS to return to full service and to\nseal off the leaking pipe. The bypass piping began service on January 17, 2011.\n• The minimum pipeline oil temperature recorded at a TAPS pump station during the\nshutdown as reported by Alyeska was 25.7 degrees Fahrenheit.\n• Since this pipeline was encased in concrete, the exact leak site could not be easily identified\nor be repaired before TAPS would need to be restarted due to the lack of sufficient storage at\nPS-1 and the cold temperature conditions. To prevent potential freezing conditions on the\nremaining portions of TAPS, which could have caused additional pipeline damage and leaks,\nAlyeska operated the pipeline with containment and recovery from January 11, 2011, to\nJanuary 15, 2011, while repairs were ongoing.\n• Alyeska has a Cold Restart Plan that was created as early as 2001 to address the possibility of\nneeding to restart the pipeline after a prolonged shutdown of TAPS during cold temperature\nconditions. This plan was revised in December 2005 and further revised in December 2010.\nAlyeska indicated that this Cold Restart Plan had never been used in operation or tested\nunder cold weather conditions. Alyeska did indicate that the equipment and piping was\ndeployed in 2006 during a response plan exercise according to the version of the Plan that\nwas in place at the time.\n• During the leak at PS-1, Alyeska had difficultly implementing the latest version of the Cold\nRestart procedures, partially due to the inability to quickly move equipment to the necessary\nlocations along the pipeline. In addition, the Cold Restart Plan required that certain\nregulatory requirements be disregarded in order to be implemented.\n• At the current flow rate through TAPS, Alyeska has two cleaning pigs in the pipeline at any\ngiven time. A cleaning pig could cause a plug in the pipeline if the line is shut down and\nthere is a need to implement the Cold Restart Plan. Two scraper cleaning pigs were in transit\nwhen the pipeline was shutdown as a result of the leak. One was near MP 424 and the other\nwas close to the southern end of TAPS. The only permanent pig receiver that could have\n\n\n\nbeen used to remove the pigs from the pipeline was located at the Valdez Marine Terminal.\nAt the current average rate of 630,000 bpd, it takes approximately two weeks for a cleaning\npig to transverse the pipeline from PS-1 to Valdez. As throughput in TAPS changes, the\nnumber of pigs in the pipeline at any given time may need to be increased.\n• If tank storage at PS-1 reaches capacity when TAPS is shut down, production on the North\nSlope must be halted, which can cause damage to the production facilities upstream from PS-\n1. At the current approximate production rate of 630,000 bpd, tank storage at PS-1 is filled\nto capacity in about half a day. If production is prorated to 5% of the current approximate\nproduction rate of 630,000 bpd, tank storage at PS-1 is filled to capacity in about 10 days.\n• To prevent tank storage at PS-1 from reaching full capacity, the North Slope production rate\nwas adjusted throughout the incident, based upon the changing situation, from the time the\nleak was discovered on January 8, 2011, until the bypass was completed on January 17,\n2011. Production was prorated to as low as 5% for several days.\n• Based on these preliminary findings, the alleged risk conditions on TAPS that pose a pipeline\nintegrity risk are:\n1) The loss of system integrity that resulted in a hazardous liquid leak at PS-1. The\nlocation of the leak could not be assessed because it is not accessible by smart pigs\n(ILI) or external UT measurements. Other buried station piping and buried deadlegs\nexist on other portions of TAPS and they similarly cannot be assessed to ensure that\nthere are no pipe integrity threats.\n2) The inability to capture or launch cleaning or inline inspection (ILI) devices at interim\nlocations between Pump Station 4 and Valdez Marine Terminal despite the fact that this\nis where the coldest operating conditions exist and the potential for waxing and freezing\nis higher than on other portions of TAPS.\n3) The feasibility of and the time it takes to implement the Cold Restart Plan.\n4) The lack of sufficient storage facilities at key locations along the pipeline, particularly\nimmediately upstream of PS1, causes integrity challenges during TAPS shutdowns or\nlengthy production prorations and increases the risk of an additional release during cold\nweather, thus making prompt response and repair essential.\nProposed Issuance of Safety Order\nSection 60117(l) of Title 49, United States Code, provides for the issuance of a safety order, after\nreasonable notice and the opportunity for a hearing, requiring corrective measures, which may\ninclude physical inspection, testing, repair, or other action, as appropriate. The basis for making the\ndetermination that a pipeline facility has a condition or conditions that pose a pipeline integrity risk\nto public safety, property, or the environment is set forth both in the above-referenced statute and 49\nC.F.R. § 190.239, a copy of which is enclosed.\nAfter evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact and considering the undetermined cause\nof the pipeline leak, the age of the pipe involved, the method of construction, including encasement,\nthe inability of Alyeska to perform internal inspections or external UT measurements of piping, the\ninability to capture or launch cleaning or ILI devices at interim locations, the feasibility of and the\ntime it takes to implement the Cold Restart Plan, the lack of sufficient storage facilities at PS-1 and\nother key locations, the hazardous nature of the product transported, the pressure required for\n\n\n\ntransporting such product, the characteristics of the geographical areas where the pipeline facility is\nlocated, and the likelihood that the conditions could worsen or develop on other areas of the pipeline\nand potentially impact its serviceability, it appears that the continued operation of the affected\npipeline without corrective measures would pose a pipeline integrity risk to public safety, property,\nor the environment.\nAccordingly, PHMSA issues this Notice of Proposed Safety Order to notify Respondent of the\nproposed issuance of a safety order and to propose that Respondent take measures specified herein to\naddress the potential risk.\nResponse to this Notice\nIn accordance with § 190.239, you have 30 days following receipt of this Notice to submit a written\nresponse to the official who issued the Notice. If you do not respond within 30 days, this constitutes\na waiver of your right to contest this Notice and authorizes the Associate Administrator for Pipeline\nSafety to find facts as alleged in this Notice without further notice to you and to issue a Safety Order.\nIn your response, you may notify that official that you intend to comply with the terms of the Notice\nas proposed, or you may request that an informal consultation be scheduled. Informal consultation\nprovides you with the opportunity to explain the circumstances associated with the risk conditions\nalleged in the notice and, as appropriate, to present a proposal for a work plan or other remedial\nmeasures, without prejudice to your position in any subsequent hearing.\nIf you and PHMSA agree within 30 days of informal consultation on a plan and schedule for you to\naddress each identified risk condition, we may enter into a written consent agreement (PHMSA\nwould then issue an administrative consent order incorporating the terms of the agreement). If a\nconsent agreement is not reached, or if you have elected not to request informal consultation, you\nmay request an administrative hearing in writing within 30 days following receipt of the Notice or\nwithin 10 days following the conclusion of an informal consultation that did not result in a consent\nagreement, as applicable. Following a hearing, if the Associate Administrator finds the facility to\nhave a condition that poses a pipeline integrity risk to the public, property, or the environment in\naccordance with § 190.239, the Associate Administrator may issue a safety order.\nBe advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being\nmade publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document you must\nprovide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for confidential\ntreatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b).\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF 5-2011-5001S and for each document you\nsubmit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.\nProposed Corrective Measures\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117(l) and 49 C.F.R. § 190.239, PHMSA proposes to issue a safety order\nto Alyeska requiring the following:\n\n\n\n1. Submit to PHMSA by February 15, 2011, a written plan for a third-party investigation of the\nleak site at PS-1 that will include conducting appropriate tests, analyses, and evaluations to\nestablish the probable cause of the leak. The Director must approve the selection of the third\nparty contractor. The investigation plan must include collecting samples of sediments,\ndeposits, bacteria, and preserving the pipe for forensic analysis. Ship any removed samples\nand the removed pipe to a laboratory approved by PHMSA for analysis. Complete the work\nrequired by this plan, including the third party analysis regarding leak cause, and provide the\nresults to PHMSA by July 1, 2011.\n2. Replace any piping along TAPS that cannot be assessed using ILI tools or other assessment\ntechnologies as approved by the Director which upon failure would interrupt the safe\noperation of TAPS. The safe operation of TAPS requires that there be no extended shutdown\nof TAPS that would put other portions of the pipeline at risk due to reduced flow or low\ntemperatures. Submit for approval by the Director a listing of such piping being replaced and\na written plan and timeline for replacement by June 15, 2011.\n3. Submit an assessment of the need for additional permanent pig launchers and receivers,\ntaking into account the anticipated continued reduction in TAPS throughput. Submit for\napproval by the Director a recommendation from a third-party regarding the need for\nadditional permanent pig launchers and receivers and a plan for installing the additional\nrecommended equipment by May 15, 2011.\n4. Submit a written plan and proposed timeline for installing at least one additional permanent\npig launcher and permanent pig receiver between PS-5 and PS-10 for approval by May 15,\n2011, and complete installation according to the approved timeline. This launcher and\nreceiver must be equipped to handle both routine maintenance pigs and ILI tools.\n5. Perform a documented evaluation of the need for increased tank capacity at pump stations to\nassist during prolonged outages and the implementation of a cold restart, submit this written\ndocumented evaluation to PHMSA by September 30, 2011, and complete any identified\nincrease in tank capacity by September 30, 2012. Alyeska will use best efforts to perform\nproject actions, and obtain necessary regulatory approvals.\n6. Pre-position all Cold Restart Equipment at the facility where it would need to be utilized,\naccording to the company’s current version of the Cold Restart Plan, immediately. The cold\nrestart equipment should be assembled and protected so that the time to implement cold\nrestart is minimized.\na. Apply for the applicable regulatory permits and request expedited consideration by\nMarch 15, 2011.\nb. Demonstrate to the Director that all equipment is configured onsite and Cold Restart\ncan be implemented in less than 72 hours within 7 days of receipt of regulatory\npermits.\n7. Submit to PHMSA a revised “Cold Restart Plan” to address the possibility of a prolonged\nshutdown of the pipeline by July 15, 2011.\na. Utilize lessons learned and data collected during the January 2011 incident and any\nother research or lessons learned to date to support revisions to the Cold Restart plan.\n\n\n\nb. Ensure that all key pressure transducers at Remote Gate Valves 36, 65, 98, and 121\nremain functioning at all times, including during freezing conditions and restricted or\nreduced flow.\nc. Pre-position all cold restart equipment according to the revised Cold Restart Plan and\nprovide predesignated flange connection points for all cold restart equipment by\nOctober 31 of each year. This equipment and connection points are to remain in\nplace through May 1 of the following year.\nd. Conduct an engineering review of all restart components to ensure they meet the\nPHMSA pipeline safety regulations. Submit this engineering review to PHMSA for\nreview by August 1, 2011.\n8. Demonstrate to the Director the implementation and operational status of the revised Cold\nRestart Plan equipment, but not the engines, by August 31, 2011. Tying the engines into the\nCold Restart equipment and demonstrating their operational status will occur within 7 days\nof receipt of regulatory permits.\n9. Submit quarterly reports to the Director and Deputy Region Director that: (1) include\navailable data and results of the testing and evaluations required by the safety order; and (2)\ndescribe the progress of the repairs and other remedial actions being undertaken to comply\nwith the safety order.\n10. The Director or Deputy Region Director may grant an extension of time for compliance with\nany of the terms of the safety order upon a written request timely submitted demonstrating\ngood cause for an extension.\n11. Respondent may appeal any decision of the Director or Deputy Region Director to the\nAssociate Administrator for Pipeline Safety. Decisions of the Associate Administrator shall\nbe final.\n12. It is requested that Alyeska maintain documentation of the safety improvement costs\nassociated with fulfilling this Safety Order and report such costs in its quarterly reports as\nrequired in item 8. It is requested that these costs be reported in two categories:\na. Total cost associated with preparation/revision of plans, procedures, studies, and\nanalyses, and\nb. Total cost associated with replacements, additions, and other changes to pipeline\ninfrastructure.\n13. Submit information, reports, and notifications required by this safety order to:\na. Director, Western Region, PHMSA Office of Pipeline Safety, 12300 West Dakota\nAvenue, Suite 110, Lakewood, CO 80228, and\nb. Deputy Region Director, Western Region, PHMSA Office of Pipeline Safety, 188\nWest Northern Lights Blvd., Suite 520, Anchorage, AK 99503.\nThe actions proposed by this Notice of Proposed Safety Order are in addition to and do not waive\nany requirements that apply to Respondent’s pipeline system under 49 C.F.R. Parts 190 through 199,\nunder any other order issued to Respondent under authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60101 et seq., or under\nany other provision of Federal or state law.\n\n\n\nAfter receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this proceeding and implementation of\nthe work plan, PHMSA may identify other safety measures that need to be taken. In that event,\nRespondent will be notified of any proposed additional measures and, if necessary, amendments to\nthe work plan or safety order.\n___________________________________ __________________\nChris Hoidal Date issued\nDirector, Western Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n\n520115001S_Closure Letter_05032018_text.pdf\n\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nMay 3, 2018\nMr. Rod Hanson\nSenior Vice President, Operations and Maintenance\nAlyeska Pipeline Service Company\n3700 Centerpoint Drive\nAnchorage, Alaska 99503\nCPF 5-2011-5001S\nClosure Letter\nDear Mr. Hanson:\nOn August 17, 2011, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)\nissued to Alyeska Pipeline Service Company (Alyeska) a Consent Order (Order) in the above-\nreferenced case. The Order approved and incorporated by reference a Consent Agreement\n(Agreement), signed on August 12, 2011, and dated August 17, 2011. Based on our review of\ndocumentation you provided and confirmation of work you have accomplished under the\nAgreement, it has been determined that you have complied with the terms of the Order.\nOn January 8, 2011, a hazardous liquid leak was discovered at Alyeska’s Pump Station 1\nfacility, a part of the Trans Alaska Pipeline System. As a result of the hazardous liquid leak,\nPHMSA issued a Notice of Proposed Safety Order (Notice) to the operator on February 1,\n2011. The Notice alleged multiple conditions existing on TAPS that would, without\ncorrective measures, pose a pipeline integrity risk to public safety, property, or the\nenvironment. In response to the Notice, pursuant to 49 CFR 190.239(b)(2), Alyeska\nrequested informal consultation. PHMSA and Alyeska engaged in good faith discussions\nregarding the Notice and agreed to enter into the above-mentioned August 17, 2011 Consent\nAgreement to resolve the Notice without further administrative proceedings or litigation.\nSince January 2011, work progressed across TAPS to address pipeline integrity risks by\nperforming actions identified in Section II of the Agreement (Work to be performed). Plans\nrequired by Section II were revised as new information was received in accordance with\nParagraph 11 of the Agreement. Work performed and revisions in plans and schedules have\nbeen found to be acceptable by PHMSA and appear to be complete.\n\n\n\nThis case is now closed and no further action is contemplated with respect to the matters\ninvolved in this case.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nKim West\nDirector, Western Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\ncc: PHP-Compliance Registry\nPHP-500 Adelheid Marlowe / Robert Guisinger (#138252)\n\n520115001S_Consent Order_08172011_text.pdf\n\nAUG 17 2011\nMr. Michael W. Joynor\nSenior Vice President of Operations\nAlyeska Pipeline Service Company\n900 E. Benson Blvd.\nP.O. Box 196660\nAnchorage, AK 99519\nRe: CPF No. 5-2011-5001S\nDear Mr. Joynor:\nEnclosed please find a Consent Order incorporating the terms of the Consent Agreement that you\nsigned on August 12, 2011. Service of the Consent Order and Consent Agreement by certified\nmail is deemed effective upon the date of mailing, or as otherwise provided under 49 C.F.R.\n§ 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. Alan Mayberry, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, Pipeline Safety\nMr. Chris Hoidal, Director, Western Region, PHMSA\nMr. Dennis Hinnah, Deputy Director, Western Region, PHMSA\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED [7005 1160 0001 0070 4183]\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\n)\nIn the Matter of )\n)\nAlyeska Pipeline Service Company, ) CPF No. 5-2011-5001S\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nCONSENT ORDER\nBy letter dated February 1, 2011, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n(PHMSA) Office of Pipeline Safety issued a Notice of Proposed Safety Order (Notice) to\nAlyeska Pipeline Service Company (Respondent) in this case.\nIn accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.239, the Notice alleged that multiple conditions exist on the\nTrans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) that, without corrective measures, would pose a pipeline\nintegrity risk to public safety, property, or the environment. Specifically, the Notice alleged that\nsuch conditions caused a loss of system integrity and a hazardous liquid leak that began on\nJanuary 8, 2011, at the company’s Pump Station 1 facility, demonstrating the presence of\nintegrity risks on TAPS.\nIn response to the Notice, Respondent requested an informal consultation. Respondent and\nPHMSA engaged in good-faith settlement discussions resulting in the Consent Agreement,\nattached to this Order, that settles all of the allegations in the Notice.\nAccordingly, the foregoing Consent Agreement is hereby approved and incorporated by\nreference into this Order. The Respondent is hereby ordered to comply with the terms of the\nConsent Agreement, effective immediately.\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. 60101 et seq. and 49 C.F.R § 190.221, failure to comply with this Consent\nOrder may result in the assessment of civil penalties of up to $100,000 per violation per day, or\nin the referral of the case for judicial enforcement. The terms and conditions of this Consent\nOrder are effective upon service in accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\n___________________________________ __________________________\nJeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\n\n520115001S_Consent Agreement_08172011_text.pdf\n\nAUG 17 2011\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, DC 20590\n____________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nAlyeska Pipeline Service Company, ) CPF No. 5-2011-5001S\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nCONSENT AGREEMENT\nOn February 1, 2011, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA),\nOffice of Pipeline Safety (OPS), issued a Notice of Proposed Safety Order (Notice) to Alyeska\nPipeline Service Company (Alyeska or Respondent). Alyeska operates a transmission pipeline\nknown as the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) that transports crude oil from production\nfields in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska, to the company’s marine transfer facilities in Valdez, Alaska.\nThe Notice alleged that multiple conditions exist on TAPS that, without corrective measures,\nwould pose a pipeline integrity risk to public safety, property, or the environment. Specifically,\nthe Notice alleged that such conditions caused a loss of system integrity and a hazardous liquid\nleak that began on January 8, 2011, at the company’s Pump Station 1 facility, demonstrating the\npresence of integrity risks on TAPS.\nOn February 15, 2011, pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 190.239(b)(2), Alyeska submitted a request for\ninformal consultation in response to the Notice. On February 17, 2011, a meeting was held in\nLakewood, Colorado, to begin the process, which has continued to date. Alyeska and PHMSA\n(Parties) have engaged in good-faith discussions regarding the Notice and have agreed that\nsettlement of this proceeding will avoid further administrative proceedings or litigation and that\nentry of this Consent Agreement (Agreement) is the most appropriate means of resolving the\nNotice without adjudication of any issue of fact or law. While Alyeska disputes some of the\nPreliminary Findings in the Notice, the Parties agree that the Preliminary Findings in the Notice\nwill be used to construe the terms of this Consent Agreement. The Parties agree as follows:\nI. General Provisions\n1. Alyeska acknowledges, as operator of TAPS, that Alyeska and its pipeline system are\nsubject to the jurisdiction of the Federal pipeline safety laws, 49 U.S.C. §§ 60101, et seq., and\nthe regulations and administrative orders issued thereunder. For purposes of this Agreement,\nAlyeska acknowledges that it received proper notice of PHMSA’s action in this proceeding and\nthat the Notice states claims upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 49 U.S.C. §§ 60101,\net seq., and the regulations and orders issued thereunder.\n\n\n\n2. Alyeska agrees, for purposes of this Agreement, to address the integrity risks identified in\nthe Notice by completing the actions specified in Section II of this Agreement (Work to be\nPerformed). These actions, including any work plans and schedules, shall automatically be\nincorporated into this Agreement upon approval by PHMSA. This Agreement does not\nconstitute a finding of violation of any Federal law or regulation and may not be used in any civil\nproceeding of any kind as evidence or proof of any fact, fault or liability, or as evidence of the\nviolation of any law, rule, regulation or requirement, except in a proceeding to enforce the\nprovisions of this Agreement.\n3. After Alyeska returns a signed original of this Agreement, PHMSA’s representative will\npresent it to the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety (Associate Administrator),\nrecommending that he adopt the terms of this Agreement by issuing an administrative order\n(Consent Order) incorporating the terms of this Agreement. The terms of this Agreement\nconstitute an offer of settlement until accepted by Alyeska and the Associate Administrator.\nUpon the date on which this Consent Order is issued, any request for a hearing submitted by\nAlyeska shall be automatically withdrawn.\n4. Alyeska consents to the issuance of the Consent Order, and hereby waives any further\nprocedural requirements with respect to its issuance. Alyeska waives all rights to contest the\nadequacy of notice, or the validity of the Consent Order or this Agreement, including all rights to\nadministrative or judicial hearings or appeals.\n5. This Agreement shall apply to and be binding upon PHMSA and its successors and upon\nAlyeska, its officers, directors, and employees, and its successors, assigns, owners, or other\nentities or persons otherwise bound by law. Alyeska agrees to provide a copy of this Agreement\nand any incorporated work plans and schedules to all of Alyeska’s officers, employees, owners\nand agents whose duties might reasonably include compliance with this Agreement.\n6. All references to “Director” in this Consent Agreement shall refer to the persons named\nbelow. Approval from either of the persons named below will satisfy any requirement for\napproval by the Director. Information, reports, and notifications required by this Agreement\nshall be submitted to the following persons:\na. Director, Western Region, PHMSA Office of Pipeline Safety, 12300 West Dakota\nAvenue, Suite 110, Lakewood, CO 80228; and\nb. Deputy Director, Western Region, PHMSA Office of Pipeline Safety, 188 West\nNorthern Lights Blvd., Suite 520, Anchorage, AK 99503.\n7. For all transfers of ownership interests or operating responsibility of TAPS, Alyeska shall\nprovide a copy of this Agreement to the prospective transferee at least 30 days prior to such\ntransfer and simultaneously provide written notice of the prospective transfer to the Director.\n8. Nothing in this Agreement affects or relieves Alyeska of its responsibility to comply with\nall applicable requirements of the Federal pipeline safety laws, 49 U.S.C. §§ 60101, et seq., and\n2\n\n\n\nthe regulations and orders issued thereunder. Nothing in this Agreement alters PHMSA’s right\nof access, entry, inspection, and information gathering or its authority to bring enforcement\nactions against Alyeska pursuant to the Federal pipeline safety laws, the regulations and orders\nissued thereunder, or any other provision of Federal or State law.\n9. This Agreement does not waive or modify any Federal, State, or local laws or regulations\nthat are applicable to Alyeska’s pipeline systems. This Agreement is not a permit, or a\nmodification of any permit, under any Federal, State, or local laws or regulations. Alyeska\nremains responsible for achieving and maintaining compliance with all applicable Federal, State,\nand local laws, regulations and permits.\n10. This Agreement does not create rights in, or grant any cause of action to, any third\nperson not a party to this Agreement. The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) is not\nliable for any injuries or damages to persons or property arising from acts or omissions of\nAlyeska or its officers, employees, or agents carrying out the work required by this Agreement.\nAlyeska agrees to indemnify and hold harmless DOT, its agencies, officers, employees, agents,\nand representatives from any and all causes of action arising from any acts or omissions of\nAlyeska or its contractors in carrying out the work required by this Agreement.\nII. Work to be Performed\n11. Alyeska agrees to perform all actions set forth below in paragraphs 12-21. The plans\nrequired below shall be revised as necessary to incorporate new information obtained during the\nevaluations and remedial activities performed under the plans. Alyeska will submit any such\nplan revisions to the Director for prior approval, who may approve plan elements incrementally.\n12. On February 15, 2011, Alyeska submitted to PHMSA a written plan for a third-party\ninvestigation of the leak site at PS-1 that included conducting appropriate tests, analyses, and\nevaluations to establish the probable cause of the leak. The Director approved the selection of\nthe third-party contractor by letter dated February 22, 2011. The investigation plan called for\ncollection of samples of sediments, deposits, bacteria, and preservation of the pipe for forensic\nanalysis, the shipment of any removed samples and pipe to a laboratory approved by PHMSA for\nanalysis, and a third-party analysis regarding leak cause. Alyeska agreed to complete the work\nrequired by this investigation plan and to provide the results to PHMSA by July 15, 2011.\nAlyeska submitted Government Letter #23939 on July 15, 2011, and the submission is currently\nbeing reviewed by the Director.\n13. Alyeska will replace or remove any hazardous liquid piping along TAPS which cannot\nbe assessed using in-line inspection tools (or other suitable assessment methods approved by the\nDirector) and which would compromise the safe operation of TAPS upon failure. The Director\nwill approve assessment methods that provide an assessment of 100% of the length and\ncircumference of the pipeline and that are capable of detecting internal and external corrosion\nfeatures and other damage and determining the percentage metal loss, areal extent, and geometry\nof any damage. Alyeska performed a documented evaluation to determine the piping to be\nreplaced. Alyeska agreed to submit a listing of such piping being replaced or removed and a\nwritten plan and timeline for replacement by July 15, 2011, to the Director for approval.3\n\n\n\nAlyeska submitted Government Letter #23939 on July 15, 2011, and the submission is currently\nbeing reviewed by the Director.\n14. The Low Flow Study Team is an independent team composed of external consultants\nand Alyeska engineers that recently produced a report on the impacts of reduced throughput on\nTAPS. On June 15, 2011, Alyeska submitted to the Director the Low Flow Study Team’s\nassessment of the need for additional permanent pig launchers and receivers. This report takes\ninto account the anticipated continued reduction in TAPS throughput and includes a\nrecommendati","truncated":true,"body_characters":50871}