# TALLGRASS INTERSTATE GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC — Corrective Action Order

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** CPF 520131007H
- **title:** TALLGRASS INTERSTATE GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC — Corrective Action Order
- **source type:** enforcement
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** historical
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2013-06-19
- **effective on:** Not available
- **summary:** CLOSED corrective action order.
- **machine formats:** - **json:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520131007h.json
- **markdown:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520131007h.md
- **app url:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520131007h
- **source url:** https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/520131007H
**body:**

Corrective Action Order involving TALLGRASS INTERSTATE GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2013-06-19 and is reported as closed as of 2015-08-14. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.

Official case documents:

520131007H_Corrective Action Order_06192013.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520131007H/520131007H_Corrective%20Action%20Order_06192013.pdf

520131007H_Corrective Action Order_06192013_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520131007H/520131007H_Corrective%20Action%20Order_06192013_text.pdf

520131007H_Region Response to CAO Status Report and Closure Letter_08142015.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520131007H/520131007H_Region%20Response%20to%20CAO%20Status%20Report%20and%20Closure%20Letter_08142015.pdf

520131007H_Region Response to CAO Status Report and Closure Letter_08142015_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520131007H/520131007H_Region%20Response%20to%20CAO%20Status%20Report%20and%20Closure%20Letter_08142015_text.pdf

520131007H_Corrective Action Order_06192013_text.pdf

JUNE 19, 2013
VIA CERTIFIED MAIL AND FAX TO: (913) 928-6006
David G. Dehaemers, Jr., CEO
Tallgrass Interstate Gas Transmission, LLC
6640 W. 143. St., Ste. 200
Overland Park, Kansas 66223
Re: CPF No. 5-2013-1007H
Dear Mr. Dehaemers:
Enclosed is a Corrective Action Order issued by the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration in the above-referenced case. It requires Tallgrass Interstate Gas Transmission,
LLC, to take certain corrective actions with respect to the 12-inch Glenrock Natural Bridge
Pipeline that failed on June 13, 2013, near Henry, Nebraska. Service is being made by certified
mail and facsimile. Service of this Corrective Action Order by facsimile or other electronic
means is complete upon transmission or acknowledgement of receipt, as provided under
49 C.F.R. § 190.5. The terms and conditions of this Order are effective immediately upon
service.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Jeffrey D. Wiese
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety
Enclosure
cc: Mr. Alan Mayberry, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, OPS
Mr. Chris Hoidal, Director, Western Region, OPS
Mr. Mick Rafter, Vice President of Operations, Tallgrass Interstate Gas Transmission, LLC



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590
__________________________________________
In the Matter of )
Tallgrass Interstate Gas Transmission, LLC, ) CPF No. 5-2013-1007H
)
)
)
Respondent. )
__________________________________________)
CORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER
Purpose and Background
This Corrective Action Order (Order) is being issued, under the authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60112
and 49 C.F.R. § 190.233, to require Tallgrass Interstate Gas Transmission, LLC (Tallgrass or
Respondent), to take the necessary corrective action to protect the public, property, and the
environment from potential hazards associated with a recent failure involving Tallgrass’s 12-inch
Glenrock Natural Bridge Lateral Pipeline.
On June 13, 2013, a failure occurred on Respondent’s 12-inch line, approximately seven miles to
the east of Torrington, Wyoming, and one mile west of Henry, Nebraska, resulting in the release
of approximately 2.5 million cubic feet of natural gas into the atmosphere (Failure). The cause
of the Failure has not yet been determined.
Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), initiated an investigation of the Failure. The
preliminary findings of the ongoing investigation are set forth below.
Preliminary Findings
• Tallgrass Interstate Gas Transmission, LLC, a subsidiary of Tallgrass Energy Partners,
LP, owns and operates approximately 5,100 miles of natural gas transportation pipelines
in Colorado, Kansas, Nebraska, Missouri and Wyoming.1
• The affected pipeline is a 12-inch diameter line that runs from Lingle, Wyoming, and
through Torrington, Wyoming, to Henry and Mitchel, Nebraska, a distance of
1 See http://www.tallgrassenergylp.com/Pipelines/TIGT/ (last accessed June 17, 2013).



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• approximately 32.98 miles (“Affected Segment”).2 The Failure occurred near milepost
17.65 in the state of Wyoming outside of Torrington, Wyoming, and Henry, Nebraska.
• The Affected Segment parallels and then loops with the Respondent’s 16-inch line
starting in Lingle, Wyoming. The 12-inch line takes a more southeasterly route and the
Respondent’s 16-inch diameter pipeline takes a more northeasterly route. The lines
recombine in Mitchel, Nebraska. As originally configured, the overpressure protection
for both lines was provided by a relief valve installed on the 12-inch pipeline at the
Lingle takeoff. Since the release, the 12-inch pipeline has been isolated from the 16-inch
pipeline. Therefore, the 16-inch pipeline currently has no overpressure protection
downstream of the Guernsey Compressor Station. The Guernsey Compressor Station is
approximately 19.33 miles upstream from Lingle, Wyoming.
• The Affected Segment was originally constructed in 1963. The failed pipe is 12 inches in
diameter, has a wall thickness of 0.219,” and has a low frequency electric resistance weld
(LF-ERW) pipe seam.
• At approximately 8:58 pm CDT on June 13, 2013, Tallgrass’ Operations Control Center
in Lakewood, Colorado, detected a pressure drop on the pipeline and suspected that a
failure had occurred on Respondent’s Glen Rock Natural Bridge Lateral Pipeline in
Goshen County.
• Upon learning of the pressure drop, Tallgrass began to close the valves downstream and
upstream to isolate the Failure site. The valves were closed within 35 minutes of the
pressure drop. The distance between the valves is approximately eight miles.
• The maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP) of the pipeline at the Failure Site is
865 psig. At the time of the Failure, the actual operating pressure of the pipeline was 812
psig.
• Various federal, state and local agencies, including PHMSA and first responders,
responded to the scene of the Failure. Due to their proximity to the Failure Site,
emergency responders closed Highway 26 and State Road 63 during the release. The
cause of the Failure is still undetermined and the investigation is ongoing. It appears that
the cause of the Failure may have been due to an LF-ERW pipe seam failure.
• The Failure did not cause any known injuries, fatalities, fires or evacuations.
• Portions of the Affected Segment and Respondent’s 16-inch pipeline run through
populated areas, along Highway 26 and State Road 63, and along a railroad right-of-way.
• The line was brought back into service late in the day on Friday, June 14, 2013. The
operator took a voluntary 20% reduction in pressure not to exceed 650 psig in the 12-inch
segment. Permanent repairs were scheduled for June 17, 2013 and have been completed.
2 The Affected Segment runs from the pig launcher at MP 0.00 at Lingle, Wyoming, to the pig receiver at MP 32.98
at Mitchel, Nebraska.



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Determination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing
Section 60112 of Title 49, United States Code, provides for the issuance of a Corrective Action
Order, after reasonable notice and the opportunity for a hearing, requiring corrective action,
which may include the suspended or restricted use of a pipeline facility, physical inspection,
testing, repair, replacement, or other action, as appropriate. The basis for making the
determination that a pipeline facility is hazardous, requiring corrective action, is set forth both in
the above-referenced statute and 49 C.F.R. § 190.233, a copy of which is enclosed.
Section 60112 and the regulations promulgated thereunder provide for the issuance of a
Corrective Action Order without prior opportunity for notice and hearing, upon a finding that
failure to issue the Order expeditiously will likely result in serious harm to life, property, or the
environment. In such cases, an opportunity for a hearing will be provided as soon as practicable
after the issuance of the Order.
After evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, I find that continued operation of the
pipeline without corrective measures would be hazardous to life, property, and the environment.
Additionally, having considered the unknown cause of the Failure,; the location of the Failure;
the proximity of the Affected Segment and Respondent’s 16-inch pipeline to populated areas,
highways and a railroad; the current lack of adequate overpressure protection on Respondent’s
system; and the nature of the product being transported, I find that a failure to issue this Order
expeditiously to require immediate corrective action would result in the likelihood of serious
harm to life, property, or the environment.
Accordingly, this Corrective Action Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued
without prior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Order are
effective upon receipt.
Within 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may request a hearing, to be held as soon as
practicable, by notifying the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, with a copy
to the Director, Western Region, PHMSA (Director). If a hearing is requested, it will be held
telephonically or in-person in Lakewood, CO or Washington, D.C.
After receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may
identify other corrective measures that need to be taken. In that event, Respondent will be
notified of any additional measures required and amendment of this Order will be considered.
To the extent consistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a
hearing prior to the imposition of any additional corrective measures.
Required Corrective Actions
Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60112, I hereby order Tallgrass to immediately take the following
corrective actions regarding the Affected Segment:
1. Metallurgical Testing. Respondent has contracted with EN Engineering, Inc., located at
28100 Torch Parkway, Warrenville, Illinois 60555 to perform its metallurgical testing.
Complete the testing and analysis as follows:



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2. 3. 4. A. Document the chain-of-custody when handling and transporting the failed pipe
section and other evidence from the Failure site;
B. Prior to commencing the mechanical and metallurgical testing utilizing the
PHMSA metallurgical protocol, provide the Director with the scheduled date,
time, and location of the testing to allow a PHMSA representative to witness the
testing; and
C. Ensure that the testing laboratory distributes all resulting reports in their entirety
(including all media), whether draft or final, to the Director at the same time as
they are made available to Respondent.
Hydrotest. Within 30 days after the metallurgical report is completed, submit a hydrotest
plan, including a spike test to 110% SMYS held for a minimum of 30 minutes, to be
approved by the Director. The Director will approve a pressure test level and duration
based upon the metallurgical report. Once the plan is approved, Respondent must
perform a hydrotest, including a spike test, and submit the report to the Director within
30 days.
Inline Inspection. Within 180 days after the metallurgical report is completed, perform
an in-line inspection (ILI) of the Affected Segment. The Director must provide prior
approval of the final criteria and specific technology considerations taken into account in
selecting the specific inspection tool. Technology considerations and final criteria should
account for the size of the anomalies discovered. The data analysis must be completed
expeditiously, but no later than 60 days of successful completion of the ILI. The ILI
vendor must evaluate the results per a performance specification, including consideration
of the location and size of the defects. The ILI vendor must distribute all reports in their
entirety (including all media), whether preliminary or final, to the Director and the
Respondent at the same time. Results of the ILI must be compared with the results of the
previous ILIs in 2003 and 2010 in a report submitted to the Director that includes such
comparison, as well as criteria and a plan for remediation of anomalies requiring
immediate action.
Leak Survey. Within 30 days of receipt of this Order, perform a leak survey and submit
the report to the Director.
5. Root Cause Failure. Within 60 days of the receipt of the Final Metallurgical Report,
complete a root cause failure analysis that is supplemented and facilitated by an
independent third-party acceptable to the Director. The root cause analysis must
document all contributory factors and the decision making process. Submit a final report
of the root cause process results to the Director including any lessons learned and
whether the findings are applicable to other locations within the Respondent’s system.
6. Pressure Restriction. Lower the pressure on the overpressure protection valve on the
Affected Segment not to exceed 650 psig. This pressure restriction will remain in effect
until written approval is obtained from the Director.



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7. Removal of Pressure Restriction. The Director may allow the removal or modification of
the pressure restriction upon a written request from Respondent demonstrating that
restoring the over-pressure protection valve to its pre-failure operating pressure is
justified, based on a reliable engineering analysis showing that the pressure increase is
safe considering all known defects, anomalies and operating parameters of the pipeline.
8. Monitoring. Controllers must closely monitor the pressures downstream of the Guernsey
compressor station (CS) on the 16-inch line that has been isolated from all overpressure
protection. Maintain a log of pressures and flow rates on the Affected Segment and 16-
inch line downstream of the Guernsey CS until the lines are returned back to their
original configuration. Respondent must immediately notify the Western Region office if
the MAOP of the lines are exceeded.
9. Reporting. Submit quarterly reports to the Director that: (1) include all available data and
results of the testing and evaluations required by this Order; and (2) describe the progress
of the repairs or other remedial actions being undertaken. The first quarterly report is due
on October 15, 2013. The Director may change the interval for the submission of these
reports.
10. Documentation of the Costs. It is requested but not required that Respondent maintain
documentation of the costs associated with implementation of this Corrective Action
Order. Include in each monthly report submitted, the to-date total costs associated with:
(1) preparation and revision of procedures, studies and analyses; (2) physical changes to
pipeline infrastructure, including repairs, replacements and other modifications; and (3)
environmental remediation, if applicable.
11. Approvals. With respect to each submission that under this Order requires the approval
of the Director, the Director may: (a) approve, in whole or part, the submission; (b)
approve the submission on specified conditions; (c) modify the submission to cure any
deficiencies; (d) disapprove in whole or in part, the submission, directing that Respondent
modify the submission, or (e) any combination of the above. In the event of approval,
approval upon conditions, or modification by the Director, Respondent shall proceed to
take all action required by the submission as approved or modified by the Director. If the
Director disapproves all or any portion of the submission, Respondent must correct all
deficiencies within the time specified by the Director, and resubmit it for approval.
12. Extensions of Time. The Director may grant an extension of time for compliance with
any of the terms of this Order upon a written request timely submitted demonstrating
good cause for an extension.
The actions required by this Corrective Action Order are in addition to and do not waive any
requirements that apply to Respondent’s pipeline system under 49 C.F.R. Part 192, under any
other order issued to Respondent under authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60101 et seq., or under any other
provision of Federal or State law.
Respondent may appeal any decision of the Director to the Associate Administrator for Pipeline
Safety. Decisions of the Associate Administrator shall be final.



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Be advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being
made publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for
confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document you
must provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for
confidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information
qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b).
Failure to comply with this Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties and in referral to
the Attorney General for appropriate relief in United States District Court pursuant to
49 U.S.C. § 60120.
In your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF No. 5-2013-1007H and for each
document you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.
The terms and conditions of this Corrective Action Order are effective upon receipt.
__________________________________ __________________
Jeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety
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