{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 520135006H","title":"CHEVRON PIPE LINE CO — Corrective Action Order","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2013-03-22","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED corrective action order.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520135006h.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520135006h.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520135006h","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/520135006H","body":"Corrective Action Order involving CHEVRON PIPE LINE CO. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2013-03-22 and is reported as closed as of 2015-03-06. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n520135006H_Amendment to Corrective Action Order_06242013.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520135006H/520135006H_Amendment%20to%20Corrective%20Action%20Order_06242013.pdf\n\n520135006H_Amendment to Corrective Action Order_06242013_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520135006H/520135006H_Amendment%20to%20Corrective%20Action%20Order_06242013_text.pdf\n\n520135006H_closure letter_03062015.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520135006H/520135006H_closure%20letter_03062015.pdf\n\n520135006H_closure letter_03062015_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520135006H/520135006H_closure%20letter_03062015_text.pdf\n\n520135006H_Corrective Action Order_03222013.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520135006H/520135006H_Corrective%20Action%20Order_03222013.pdf\n\n520135006H_Corrective Action Order_03222013_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520135006H/520135006H_Corrective%20Action%20Order_03222013_text.pdf\n\n520135006H_Corrective Action Order_03222013_text.pdf\n\nMarch 22 2013\nVIA CERTIFIED MAIL 71791000164304521236\nFAX TO: 713-432-3737\nMr. Randall Curry\nPresident\nChevron Pipe Line Company\n4800 Fournace Place\nBellaire, Texas 77401\nRe: CPF No. 5-2013-5006H\nDear Mr. Curry:\nEnclosed is a Corrective Action Order issued in the above-referenced case. It requires Chevron\nPipe Line Company to take certain corrective actions with respect to the 8-inch pipeline that\nfailed on March 18, 2013 near Willard, Utah. Service is being made by certified mail and\nfacsimile. Your receipt of this Corrective Action Order constitutes service of that document\nunder 49 C.F.R. § 190.5. The terms and conditions of this Order are effective upon receipt.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. Gary Saenz, Team Leader, Chevron Pipe Line Company\nMr. Alan Mayberry, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, OPS\nMr. Chris Hoidal, Director, Western Region, OPS\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\n)\nIn the Matter of )\n)\nChevron Pipe Line Company,\n1 ) CPF No. 5-2013-5006H\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nCORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nPurpose and Background\nThis Corrective Action Order (Order) is being issued, under the authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60112,\nto require Chevron Pipe Line Company (Chevron or Respondent), to take the necessary\ncorrective action to protect the public, property, and the environment from potential hazards\nassociated with the recent failure on Chevron’s #1 Oil line in Willard, Utah.\nOn March 18, 2013, a reportable accident occurred on Chevron’s #1 Oil line resulting in the\nrelease of an estimated 600 barrels of petroleum product (Failure). As of March 21st\n,\napproximately 251 barrels of product had been recovered. Chevron’s #1 Oil line is a 8-inch\ndiesel fuel line, approximately 760 miles in length, which transports diesel fuel from Salt Lake\nCity, Utah, to Spokane, Washington (Pipeline). It includes delivery points to Boise and\nPocatello, Idaho. The cause of the Failure has not yet been determined. The preliminary\ninvestigation points to a longitudinal seam failure; however, the mechanism of the Failure is still\nunder investigation. Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), initiated an investigation of the\nFailure. The preliminary findings of the ongoing investigation are as follows.\nPreliminary Findings\n• The Pipeline is an 8-inch diameter pipeline, approximately 760 miles in length, which\ntransports diesel fuel from Chevron’s Salt Lake City refinery to Spokane, Washington,\nwith delivery points at Boise and Pocatello, Idaho. The Pipeline is part of Chevron’s\n1 On or around December 11, 2012, Chevron Pipe Line Company entered into an agreement with Tesoro Logistics\nLP to sell its Northwest Products system which includes the pipeline subject to this Order. The sale was scheduled\nto be consummated during the first quarter of 2013. On the date of the Failure, Chevron was operating the Pipeline\nand therefore is the Respondent in this matter.\n\n\n\n2\nNorthwest Products System, which includes four product pipelines: two 8-inch\nmainlines, one lateral, and one jet fuel line to airport. The two 8-inch lines are parallel\nand known as the #1 Oil line and #2 Products line.\n• At approximately 2:26 p.m. M.D.T., on March 18, 2013, a failure occurred on\nRespondent’s #1 Oil Line near Willard, Utah, resulting in the release of an estimated 600\nbarrels of diesel fuel, which approximately 251 barrels had been recovered by noon,\nMarch 21st. The Failure occurred in a marshland area within a 100 feet of Willard Bay, a\nfreshwater lake. The Failure occurred at milepost 44.9, west of I-15 (Failure Site). The\nFailure was reported to the National Response Center (NRC Report No. 1041456) on\nMarch 18, 2013, at approximately 8:22 p.m. M.D.T.\n• In response to the spill, Chevron shut in Line #1, mobilized vacuum trucks, and deployed\nbooms.\n• The Pipeline runs through many environmentally sensitive and drinking water High\nConsequence Areas (HCA). The Failure occurred in a marshland area in North Willard\nBay State Park. Willard Bay is a freshwater reservoir on the eastern edge of the Great\nSalt Lake. The park is a well-used recreation area and is approximately 50 miles north of\nSalt Lake City. The property is owned by the U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of\nReclamation and is maintained by the State of Utah. The Failure did not cause any\nknown injuries or evacuations but did result in the closure of a portion of the park and\ncampground.\n• Various state and federal agencies responded to the scene, including the U.S.\nEnvironmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, the Utah Department\nof Natural Resources, the Utah Division of Water Quality, and the Utah Department of\nEnvironmental Quality.\n• The Pipeline was constructed between 1949 to 1952, mainly with seamless pipe and low\nfrequency electric resistance welded pipe (LFERW). Several sections of the Pipeline,\nincluding the Failure site, consisted of seamed LFERW pipe.\n• The maximum operating pressure (MOP) of the pipeline is 1870 psig, as established by\nhydrostatic test in 1987. At the time of the Failure, the actual operating pressure of the\npipeline was approximately 1550 psig.\n• The exact cause of the Failure is unknown and the investigation is ongoing. The\npreliminary investigation points to a longitudinal seam failure.\n• Chevron last performed an in-line inspection (ILI) of this line in March 2007 and\nindicated no metal loss.\n• The Northwest Products Pipeline System has experienced several failures dating back to\n2002. However, these failures were not associated with longitudinal seams, which is the\npreliminary cause of the Failure. One of these, a 22-barrel petroleum release that\noccurred on April 26, 2010 on this line, was due to external corrosion at a coating holiday\nat Milepost 198.1 in Idaho.\n\n\n\n3\n• PHMSA previously inspected this line during multiple inspection days occurring between\nApril 2011 and September 2012. As a result of this ongoing inspection, PHMSA issued a\nletter of concern on February 14, 2013, identifying potential safety concerns with the fact\nthat Chevron’s root cause analysis of that April 26, 2010 spill had not been finalized\n• Chevron Pipe Line Company is an indirect wholly-owned subsidiary of Chevron\nCorporation. The company operates approximately 10,000 miles of pipelines that\ntransport crude oil, refined petroleum products, liquefied petroleum gas, and natural gas\nacross the United States.\n2\nDetermination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing\nSection 60112 of Title 49, United States Code, provides for the issuance of a Corrective Action\nOrder, after reasonable notice and the opportunity for a hearing, requiring corrective action,\nwhich may include the suspended or restricted use of a pipeline facility, physical inspection,\ntesting, repair, replacement, or other action, as appropriate. The basis for making the\ndetermination that a pipeline facility is hazardous, requiring corrective action, is set forth both in\nthe above-referenced statute and 49 C.F.R. § 190.233, a copy of which is enclosed.\nSection 60112 and the regulations promulgated thereunder provide for the issuance of a\nCorrective Action Order without prior opportunity for notice and hearing upon a finding that\nfailure to issue the Order expeditiously will likely result in serious harm to life, property, or the\nenvironment. In such cases, an opportunity for a hearing will be provided as soon as practicable\nafter the issuance of the Order.\nAfter evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, I find that continued operation of the\npipeline without corrective measures would be hazardous to life, property, and the environment.\nAdditionally, having considered the location of the Failure, including the proximity of the\npipeline to fresh water resources, the existence of LFERW seam pipe at the Failure Site, and\nuncertainty as to the cause of the Failure, I find that a failure to issue this Order expeditiously to\nrequire immediate corrective action would result in the likelihood of serious harm to life,\nproperty, or the environment.\nAccordingly, this Corrective Action Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued\nwithout prior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Order are\neffective upon receipt.\nWithin 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may request a hearing, to be held as soon as\npracticable, by notifying the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, with a copy\nto the Director, Western Region, PHMSA (Director). If a hearing is requested, it will be held\ntelephonically or in-person in Denver, CO, or Washington, D.C.\nAfter receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may\nidentify other corrective measures that need to be taken. In that event, Respondent will be\nnotified of any additional measures required and amendment of this Order will be considered.\n2 http://www.chevronpipeline.com/about (last accessed on March 21, 2013).\n\n\n\n4\nTo the extent consistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a\nhearing prior to the imposition of any additional corrective measures.\nRequired Corrective Actions\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60112, I hereby order Chevron to immediately take the following\ncorrective actions on that portion of the #1 Oil line running from the Salt Lake Pump Station\n(Milepost 0) to the Juniper pump station (Milepost 117.6) (Affected Segment):\n1. Chevron must not operate the Affected Segment until authorized to do so by the Director.\n2. Restart Plan. Develop and submit a written re-start plan for prior approval of the\nDirector. Submit the written plan to the Director at the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials\nSafety Administration, 12300 W. Dakota Avenue, Suite 110, Lakewood, CO 80228.\na. The restart plan must provide for adequate patrolling of the Affected Segment\nduring the restart process and must include an incremental start-up, with each increment\nto be held for at least two hours. The plan must include sufficient surveillance of each\nincrement to ensure that no leaks are present when operation of the line resumes. The\nrestart plan must specify a daylight restart and advance communications with local\nemergency response officials.\nb. The restart plan must provide for a review of the Affected Segment for LFERW\npipe conditions similar to those at the Failure site including original construction\ndocuments, integrity management records such as in-line tool inspection results, past\nhydrostatic tests, root-cause analysis of previous leaks and failures involving LFERW\npipe, corrosion and cathodic protection records affecting LFERW pipe, and any findings\nthat require remediation measures to be implemented prior to restart.\nc. The restart plan must provide a hydrostatic testing plan and schedule for the\nLFERW pipe in the vicinity of the North Willard Bay State Park (approximately milepost\n43 to milepost 46). The proposed plan for hydrostatic testing must be at a pressure\nsufficient to strength test the pipeline considering the size of flaws that would survive the\npressure test, and conform to the requirements of 49 CFR Part 195, Subpart E. The\nhydrostatic test must also include 30-minute spike test.\nd. Upon approval of the Director of the hydrostatic test plan, complete this testing\nwithin 30 days of restart. Any failures on the pipe during the testing must be removed\nand sent to an approved laboratory for metallurgical testing. Respondent must provide\ncontinuous patrolling of the pipeline segment between mileposts 43 and 46 at all times\nuntil hydrostatic testing is completed and the restart plan must provide for adequate\npatrolling of the pipeline segment between mileposts 43 and 46 during the restart process.\ne. The restart plan must also include documentation of the completion of all\nmandated actions, and a management of change plan that will ensure that all\nmodifications are safely incorporated into Chevron’s ongoing operations and\nmaintenance procedures.\n\n\n\n5\n3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. Return to Service. Obtain written approval from the Director prior to resuming operation.\nPressure Restriction. After receiving approval from the Director to restart the pipeline,\nthe pressure of the Affected Segment is not to exceed 1190 psig (80% of the pressure at\nthe time of the Failure) at the Failure site. This pressure restriction will remain in effect\nuntil written approval to increase the pressure or return the pipeline to its pre-failure\noperating pressure is obtained from the Director.\nRemoval of Pressure Restriction. The Director may allow the removal or modification of\nthe pressure restriction upon a written request from Respondent demonstrating that\nrestoring the Affected Segment to its pre-failure operating pressure is justified based on a\nreliable engineering analysis showing that the pressure increase is safe considering all\nknown defects, anomalies and operating parameters of the Affected Segment.\nMetallurgical Testing. Within 45 days of receipt of this Order, complete mechanical and\nmetallurgical testing and failure analysis of the failed pipe, including analysis of soil\nsamples and any foreign materials. Complete the testing and analysis as follows:\na. Document the chain-of-custody when handling and transporting the failed pipe\nsection and other evidence from the failure site;\nb. Within 10 days of receipt of this Order, develop and submit to the Director the\ntesting protocol, including selection of the testing laboratory, for prior approval.\nc. Prior to commencing the mechanical and metallurgical testing, provide the\nDirector with the scheduled date, time, and location of the testing to allow a\nPHMSA representative to witness the testing; and\nd. Ensure that the testing laboratory distributes all resulting reports in their entirety\n(including all media), whether draft or final, to the Director at the same time as\nthey are made available to Respondent.\nRoot Cause Failure Analysis. Within 60 days following receipt of this Order, complete a\nroot cause failure analysis that is supplemented and facilitated by an independent third-\nparty acceptable to the Director. The root cause analysis must document all contributory\nfactors and the decision making process. Submit a final report of the root cause process\nresults to the Director including any lessons learned and whether the findings are\napplicable to other locations within the Northwest Products System.\nEmergency Response. Review and assess the effectiveness of the emergency response\nplans as related to the Failure, including public awareness and training activities prior to\nthe Failure, as well on-scene response, coordination, communication and support during\nthe Failure.\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60112, I hereby order Chevron to immediately take the following\ncorrective actions on the Pipeline, as defined in the Purpose and Background Section.\n\n\n\n6\n9. Records Verification. As recommended in PHMSA Advisory Bulletin 2012-06, verify the\nrecords for the Pipeline which confirm the operating specifications for maximum\noperating pressure (MOP). Within 30 days of receipt of this Order, submit a report on\nthis record verification for the Affected Segment to the Director and make the supporting\nrecords available. Within 90 days of receipt of this Order, submit a report to the Director\non the remaining portion of the Pipeline and make the supporting records available.\n10. Inline Inspection. Within 6 months of resuming operation, perform an in-line inspection\n(ILI) of the Pipeline. Chevron must use a tool capable of identifying and assessing\nLFERW longitudinal seam issues. The Director must provide prior approval of the final\ncriteria and technology considerations taken into account in selecting the specific\ninspection tool. Technology considerations and final criteria should account for the size\n(length and depth) of seam anomalies and the possibility of selective seam corrosion in\nthe Pipeline. The ILI must also include consideration of best available technology to\nreliably detect and size seam anomalies in casings. The data analysis must be completed\nexpeditiously, but no later than 30 days of successful completion of the ILI. The ILI\nvendor must evaluate the results per a performance specification, including consideration\nof the location and size of the defects. The ILI vendor must distribute all reports in their\nentirety (including all media), whether preliminary or final, to the Director and the\nRespondent at the same time. Results of the ILI must be compared with the results of the\nprevious ILIs in a report submitted to the Director that includes such comparison, as well\nas criteria and a plan for remediation of anomalies requiring immediate action.\nOther Requirements\nReporting. Submit quarterly reports to the Director that: (1) include all available data and results\nof the testing and evaluations required by this Order; and (2) describe the progress of the repairs\nor other remedial actions being undertaken. The first quarterly report is due on June 22, 2013.\nThe Director may change the interval for the submission of these reports.\nDocumentation of the Costs. It is requested but not required that Respondent maintain\ndocumentation of the costs associated with implementation of this Corrective Action Order.\nInclude in each monthly report submitted, the to-date total costs associated with: (1) preparation\nand revision of procedures, studies and analyses; (2) physical changes to pipeline infrastructure,\nincluding repairs, replacements and other modifications; and (3) environmental remediation, if\napplicable.\nApprovals. With respect to each submission that under this Order requires the approval of the\nDirector, the Director may: (a) approve, in whole or part, the submission; (b) approve the\nsubmission on specified conditions; (c) modify the submission to cure any deficiencies; (d)\ndisapprove in whole or in part, the submission, directing that Respondent modify the submission,\nor (e) any combination of the above. In the event of approval, approval upon conditions, or\nmodification by the Director, Respondent shall proceed to take all action required by the\nsubmission as approved or modified by the Director. If the Director disapproves all or any\n\n\n\n7\nportion of the submission, Respondent must correct all deficiencies within the time specified by\nthe Director, and resubmit it for approval.\nExtensions of Time. The Director may grant an extension of time for compliance with any of the\nterms of this Order upon a written request timely submitted demonstrating good cause for an\nextension.\nThe actions required by this Corrective Action Order are in addition to and do not waive any\nrequirements that apply to Respondent’s pipeline system under 49 C.F.R. Part 195, under any\nother order issued to Respondent under authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60101 et seq., or under any other\nprovision of Federal or State law.\nRespondent may appeal any decision of the Director to the Associate Administrator for Pipeline\nSafety. Decisions of the Associate Administrator shall be final.\nBe advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being\nmade publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document you\nmust provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for\nconfidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information\nqualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b).\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties and in referral to\nthe Attorney General for appropriate relief in United States District Court pursuant to 49 U.S.C.\n§ 60120.\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF No. 5-2013-5006H and for each\ndocument you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.\nThe terms and conditions of this Corrective Action Order are effective upon receipt.\n__________________________________ __________________\nJeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\n\n520135006H_Amendment to Corrective Action Order_06242013_text.pdf\n\nVIA UPS 2nd DAY DELIVERY [1Z WR2 578 02 9286 6886]\nJune 24, 2013\nMr. Rick D. Weyen\nVP, Logistics\nTesoro Logistics\n19100 Ridgewood Parkway\nSan Antonio, TX 78259\nRe: CPF 5-2013-5006H\nDear Mr. Weyen:\nAs you are aware, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration issued the\nenclosed Corrective Action Order (Order) to Chevron Pipe Line Company on March 22, 2013 in\nthe above-referenced case. It required Chevron Pipe Line Company to take certain corrective\nactions with respect to the 8-inch pipeline that failed on March 18, 2013 near Willard, Utah.\nIt has come to my attention that Tesoro Logistics is now the owner and operator of this pipeline.\nAs the owner and operator of this pipeline, Tesoro Logistics is ultimately responsible to ensure\nthat the pipeline is operated in compliance with the pipeline safety regulations and that all of the\ncorrective measures listed in the Order are completed. Tesoro must either conduct the work\nitself or make arrangements with Chevron to ensure that the terms of the Order are satisfied.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nChris Hoidal\nDirector, Western Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. Randall Curry, President, Chevron Pipe Line Company\nMr. Gary Saenz, Team Leader, Chevron Pipe Line Company\n\n\n\n2\nVIA CERTIFIED MAIL 71791000164304521236\nFAX TO: 713-432-3737\nMr. Randall Curry\nPresident\nChevron Pipe Line Company\n4800 Fournace Place\nBellaire, Texas 77401\nRe: CPF No. 5-2013-5006H\nDear Mr. Curry:\nEnclosed is a Corrective Action Order issued in the above-referenced case. It requires Chevron\nPipe Line Company to take certain corrective actions with respect to the 8-inch pipeline that\nfailed on March 18, 2013 near Willard, Utah. Service is being made by certified mail and\nfacsimile. Your receipt of this Corrective Action Order constitutes service of that document\nunder 49 C.F.R. § 190.5. The terms and conditions of this Order are effective upon receipt.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. Gary Saenz, Team Leader, Chevron Pipe Line Company\nMr. Alan Mayberry, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, OPS\nMr. Chris Hoidal, Director, Western Region, OPS\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________ )\nIn the Matter of )\nChevron Pipe Line Company,1 ) CPF No. 5-2013-5006H\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nCORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nPurpose and Background\nThis Corrective Action Order (Order) is being issued, under the authority of 49 U.S.C. §\n60112, to require Chevron Pipe Line Company (Chevron or Respondent), to take the\nnecessary corrective action to protect the public, property, and the environment from potential\nhazards associated with the recent failure on Chevron’s #1 Oil line in Willard, Utah.\nOn March 18, 2013, a reportable accident occurred on Chevron’s #1 Oil line resulting in the\nrelease of an estimated 600 barrels of petroleum product (Failure). As of March 21st\n,\napproximately 251 barrels of product had been recovered. Chevron’s #1 Oil line is a 8-inch\ndiesel fuel line, approximately 760 miles in length, which transports diesel fuel from Salt\nLake City, Utah, to Spokane, Washington (Pipeline). It includes delivery points to Boise and\nPocatello, Idaho. The cause of the Failure has not yet been determined. The preliminary\ninvestigation points to a longitudinal seam failure; however, the mechanism of the Failure is\nstill under investigation. Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, the Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), initiated an\ninvestigation of the Failure. The preliminary findings of the ongoing investigation are as\nfollows.\nPreliminary Findings\n• The Pipeline is an 8-inch diameter pipeline, approximately 760 miles in length, which\ntransports diesel fuel from Chevron’s Salt Lake City refinery to Spokane, Washington,\nwith delivery points at Boise and Pocatello, Idaho. The Pipeline is part of Chevron’s\nNorthwest Products System, which includes four product pipelines: two 8-inch\n1 On or around December 11, 2012, Chevron Pipe Line Company entered into an agreement with Tesoro\nLogistics LP to sell its Northwest Products system which includes the pipeline subject to this Order. The sale\nwas scheduled to be consummated during the first quarter of 2013. On the date of the Failure, Chevron was\noperating the Pipeline and therefore is the Respondent in this matter.\n\n\n\nmainlines, one lateral, and one jet fuel line to airport. The two 8-inch lines are parallel\nand known as the #1 Oil line and #2 Products line.\n• At approximately 2:26 p.m. M.D.T., on March 18, 2013, a failure occurred on\nRespondent’s #1 Oil Line near Willard, Utah, resulting in the release of an estimated\n600 barrels of diesel fuel, which approximately 251 barrels had been recovered by\nnoon, March 21st. The Failure occurred in a marshland area within a 100 feet of\nWillard Bay, a freshwater lake. The Failure occurred at milepost 44.9, west of I-15\n(Failure Site). The Failure was reported to the National Response Center (NRC\nReport No. 1041456) on March 18, 2013, at approximately 8:22 p.m. M.D.T.\n• In response to the spill, Chevron shut in Line #1, mobilized vacuum trucks, and\ndeployed booms.\n• The Pipeline runs through many environmentally sensitive and drinking water High\nConsequence Areas (HCA). The Failure occurred in a marshland area in North\nWillard Bay State Park. Willard Bay is a freshwater reservoir on the eastern edge of\nthe Great Salt Lake. The park is a well-used recreation area and is approximately 50\nmiles north of Salt Lake City. The property is owned by the U.S. Department of\nInterior, Bureau of Reclamation and is maintained by the State of Utah. The Failure\ndid not cause any known injuries or evacuations but did result in the closure of a\nportion of the park and campground.\n• Various state and federal agencies responded to the scene, including the U.S.\nEnvironmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, the Utah\nDepartment of Natural Resources, the Utah Division of Water Quality, and the Utah\nDepartment of Environmental Quality.\n• The Pipeline was constructed between 1949 to 1952, mainly with seamless pipe and\nlow frequency electric resistance welded pipe (LFERW). Several sections of the\nPipeline, including the Failure site, consisted of seamed LFERW pipe.\n• The maximum operating pressure (MOP) of the pipeline is 1870 psig, as established\nby hydrostatic test in 1987. At the time of the Failure, the actual operating pressure of\nthe pipeline was approximately 1550 psig.\n• The exact cause of the Failure is unknown and the investigation is ongoing. The\npreliminary investigation points to a longitudinal seam failure.\n• Chevron last performed an in-line inspection (ILI) of this line in March 2007 and\nindicated no metal loss.\n• The Northwest Products Pipeline System has experienced several failures dating back\nto 2002. However, these failures were not associated with longitudinal seams, which\nis the preliminary cause of the Failure. One of these, a 22-barrel petroleum release\nthat occurred on April 26, 2010 on this line, was due to external corrosion at a coating\nholiday at Milepost 198.1 in Idaho.\n\n\n\n• PHMSA previously inspected this line during multiple inspection days occurring\nbetween April 2011 and September 2012. As a result of this ongoing inspection,\nPHMSA issued a letter of concern on February 14, 2013, identifying potential safety\nconcerns with the fact that Chevron’s root cause analysis of that April 26, 2010 spill\nhad not been finalized\n• Chevron Pipe Line Company is an indirect wholly-owned subsidiary of Chevron\nCorporation. The company operates approximately 10,000 miles of pipelines that\ntransport crude oil, refined petroleum products, liquefied petroleum gas, and natural\ngas across the United States.\n2\nDetermination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing\nSection 60112 of Title 49, United States Code, provides for the issuance of a Corrective\nAction Order, after reasonable notice and the opportunity for a hearing, requiring corrective\naction, which may include the suspended or restricted use of a pipeline facility, physical\ninspection, testing, repair, replacement, or other action, as appropriate. The basis for making\nthe determination that a pipeline facility is hazardous, requiring corrective action, is set forth\nboth in the above-referenced statute and 49 C.F.R. § 190.233, a copy of which is enclosed.\nSection 60112 and the regulations promulgated thereunder provide for the issuance of a\nCorrective Action Order without prior opportunity for notice and hearing upon a finding that\nfailure to issue the Order expeditiously will likely result in serious harm to life, property, or\nthe environment. In such cases, an opportunity for a hearing will be provided as soon as\npracticable after the issuance of the Order.\nAfter evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, I find that continued operation of\nthe pipeline without corrective measures would be hazardous to life, property, and the\nenvironment. Additionally, having considered the location of the Failure, including the\nproximity of the pipeline to fresh water resources, the existence of LFERW seam pipe at the\nFailure Site, and uncertainty as to the cause of the Failure, I find that a failure to issue this\nOrder expeditiously to require immediate corrective action would result in the likelihood of\nserious harm to life, property, or the environment.\nAccordingly, this Corrective Action Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued\nwithout prior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Order are\neffective upon receipt.\nWithin 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may request a hearing, to be held as soon\nas practicable, by notifying the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, with a\ncopy to the Director, Western Region, PHMSA (Director). If a hearing is requested, it will be\nheld telephonically or in-person in Denver, CO, or Washington, D.C.\nAfter receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may\nidentify other corrective measures that need to be taken. In that event, Respondent will be\n2 http://www.chevronpipeline.com/about (last accessed on March 21, 2013).\n\n\n\nnotified of any additional measures required and amendment of this Order will be considered.\nTo the extent consistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity\nfor a hearing prior to the imposition of any additional corrective measures.\nRequired Corrective Actions\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60112, I hereby order Chevron to immediately take the following\ncorrective actions on that portion of the #1 Oil line running from the Salt Lake Pump Station\n(Milepost 0) to the Juniper pump station (Milepost 117.6) (Affected Segment):\n1. Chevron must not operate the Affected Segment until authorized to do so by the\nDirector.\n2. Restart Plan. Develop and submit a written re-start plan for prior approval of the\nDirector. Submit the written plan to the Director at the Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration, 12300 W. Dakota Avenue, Suite 110, Lakewood, CO\n80228.\na. The restart plan must provide for adequate patrolling of the Affected Segment\nduring the restart process and must include an incremental start-up, with each\nincrement to be held for at least two hours. The plan must include sufficient\nsurveillance of each increment to ensure that no leaks are present when operation of\nthe line resumes. The restart plan must specify a daylight restart and advance\ncommunications with local emergency response officials.\nb. The restart plan must provide for a review of the Affected Segment for\nLFERW pipe conditions similar to those at the Failure site including original\nconstruction documents, integrity management records such as in-line tool inspection\nresults, past hydrostatic tests, root-cause analysis of previous leaks and failures\ninvolving LFERW pipe, corrosion and cathodic protection records affecting LFERW\npipe, and any findings that require remediation measures to be implemented prior to\nrestart.\nc. The restart plan must provide a hydrostatic testing plan and schedule for the\nLFERW pipe in the vicinity of the North Willard Bay State Park (approximately\nmilepost 43 to milepost 46). The proposed plan for hydrostatic testing must be at a\npressure sufficient to strength test the pipeline considering the size of flaws that would\nsurvive the pressure test, and conform to the requirements of 49 CFR Part 195,\nSubpart E. The hydrostatic test must also include 30-minute spike test.\nd. Upon approval of the Director of the hydrostatic test plan, complete this testing\nwithin 30 days of restart. Any failures on the pipe during the testing must be removed\nand sent to an approved laboratory for metallurgical testing. Respondent must provide\ncontinuous patrolling of the pipeline segment between mileposts 43 and 46 at all times\nuntil hydrostatic testing is completed and the restart plan must provide for adequate\npatrolling of the pipeline segment between mileposts 43 and 46 during the restart\nprocess.\n\n\n\ne. The restart plan must also include documentation of the completion of all\nmandated actions, and a management of change plan that will ensure that all\nmodifications are safely incorporated into Chevron’s ongoing operations and\nmaintenance procedures.\n3. Return to Service. Obtain written approval from the Director prior to resuming\noperation.\n4. Pressure Restriction. After receiving approval from the Director to restart the\npipeline, the pressure of the Affected Segment is not to exceed 1190 psig (80% of the\npressure at the time of the Failure) at the Failure site. This pressure restriction will\nremain in effect until written approval to increase the pressure or return the pipeline to\nits pre-failure operating pressure is obtained from the Director.\n5. Removal of Pressure Restriction. The Director may allow the removal or modification\nof the pressure restriction upon a written request from Respondent demonstrating that\nrestoring the Affected Segment to its pre-failure operating pressure is justified based\non a reliable engineering analysis showing that the pressure increase is safe\nconsidering all known defects, anomalies and operating parameters of the Affected\nSegment.\n6. Metallurgical Testing. Within 45 days of receipt of this Order, complete mechanical\nand metallurgical testing and failure analysis of the failed pipe, including analysis of\nsoil samples and any foreign materials. Complete the testing and analysis as follows:\na. Document the chain-of-custody when handling and transporting the failed pipe\nsection and other evidence from the failure site;\nb. Within 10 days of receipt of this Order, develop and submit to the Director the\ntesting protocol, including selection of the testing laboratory, for prior\napproval.\nc. Prior to commencing the mechanical and metallurgical testing, provide the\nDirector with the scheduled date, time, and location of the testing to allow a\nPHMSA representative to witness the testing; and\nd. Ensure that the testing laboratory distributes all resulting reports in their\nentirety (including all media), whether draft or final, to the Director at the same\ntime as they are made available to Respondent.\n7. Root Cause Failure Analysis. Within 60 days following receipt of this Order,\ncomplete a root cause failure analysis that is supplemented and facilitated by an\nindependent third-party acceptable to the Director. The root cause analysis must\ndocument all contributory factors and the decision making process. Submit a final\nreport of the root cause process results to the Director including any lessons learned\nand whether the findings are applicable to other locations within the Northwest\nProducts System.\n\n\n\n8. Emergency Response. Review and assess the effectiveness of the emergency response\nplans as related to the Failure, including public awareness and training activities prior\nto the Failure, as well on-scene response, coordination, communication and support\nduring the Failure.\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60112, I hereby order Chevron to immediately take the following\ncorrective actions on the Pipeline, as defined in the Purpose and Background Section.\n9. Records Verification. As recommended in PHMSA Advisory Bulletin 2012-06, verify\nthe records for the Pipeline which confirm the operating specifications for maximum\noperating pressure (MOP). Within 30 days of receipt of this Order, submit a report on\nthis record verification for the Affected Segment to the Director and make the\nsupporting records available. Within 90 days of receipt of this Order, submit a report\nto the Director on the remaining portion of the Pipeline and make the supporting\nrecords available.\n10. Inline Inspection. Within 6 months of resuming operation, perform an in-line\ninspection (ILI) of the Pipeline. Chevron must use a tool capable of identifying and\nassessing LFERW longitudinal seam issues. The Director must provide prior approval\nof the final criteria and technology considerations taken into account in selecting the\nspecific inspection tool. Technology considerations and final criteria should account\nfor the size (length and depth) of seam anomalies and the possibility of selective seam\ncorrosion in the Pipeline. The ILI must also include consideration of best available\ntechnology to reliably detect and size seam anomalies in casings. The data analysis\nmust be completed expeditiously, but no later than 30 days of successful completion\nof the ILI. The ILI vendor must evaluate the results per a performance specification,\nincluding consideration of the location and size of the defects. The ILI vendor must\ndistribute all reports in their","truncated":true,"body_characters":44802}