{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 520135007","title":"EXXONMOBIL PIPELINE CO — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2013-03-25","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.402(e)(2), 195.402(e)(4), 195.403(a)(3), 195.452(i)(1), 195.452(i)(2).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520135007.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520135007.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520135007","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/520135007","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving EXXONMOBIL PIPELINE CO. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.402(e)(2),  195.402(e)(4),  195.403(a)(3),  195.452(i)(1),  195.452(i)(2). The case was opened on 2013-03-25 and is reported as closed as of 2015-07-09. Proposed civil penalty: $1,700,000. Assessed civil penalty: $1,045,000. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n520135007_closure letter_07092015.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520135007/520135007_closure%20letter_07092015.pdf\n\n520135007_closure letter_07092015_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520135007/520135007_closure%20letter_07092015_text.pdf\n\n520135007_Decision on Petition for Reconsideration_06122015.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520135007/520135007_Decision%20on%20Petition%20for%20Reconsideration_06122015.pdf\n\n520135007_Decision on Petition for Reconsideration_06122015_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520135007/520135007_Decision%20on%20Petition%20for%20Reconsideration_06122015_text.pdf\n\n520135007_Final Order_01232015.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520135007/520135007_Final%20Order_01232015.pdf\n\n520135007_Final Order_01232015_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520135007/520135007_Final%20Order_01232015_text.pdf\n\n520135007_NOPV PCP PCO_03252013.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520135007/520135007_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_03252013.pdf\n\n520135007_NOPV PCP PCO_03252013_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520135007/520135007_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_03252013_text.pdf\n\n520135007_Operator Petition for Reconsideration_02122015.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520135007/520135007_Operator%20Petition%20for%20Reconsideration_02122015.pdf\n\n520135007_Operator Request for Hearing and Response to Notice_04242013.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520135007/520135007_Operator%20Request%20for%20Hearing%20and%20Response%20to%20Notice_04242013.pdf\n\n520135007_Final Order_01232015_text.pdf\n\nJANUARY 23, 2015\nMr. Gerald S. Frey\nGlobal Pipeline Manager & President\nExxonMobil Pipeline Company\n800 Bell St., Room 741-D\nHouston, TX 77002\nRe: CPF No. 5-2013-5007\nDear Mr. Frey:\nEnclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of\nviolation, withdraws one allegation, and assesses a reduced civil penalty of $1,045,000. It\nfurther finds that ExxonMobil Pipeline Company has completed the actions specified in the\nproposed compliance order to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. The penalty payment\nterms are set forth in the Final Order. This enforcement action closes automatically upon receipt\nof payment. Service of this Final Order is made pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. Chris Hoidal, Director, Western Region, PHMSA\nMr. Bob Hogfoss and Ms. Catherine Little, Hunton & Williams LLP,\nBank of America Plaza, Suite 4100, 600 Peachtree Street, N.E., Atlanta, GA 30308\nCERTIFIED MAIL – RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n___________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nExxonMobil Pipeline Company, ) CPF No. 5-2013-5007\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n___________________________________ )\nFINAL ORDER\nOn July 2, 2011, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, a representative of the Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), initiated an\ninvestigation of the records and procedures of ExxonMobil Pipeline Company (EMPCo or\nRespondent) following a failure of its Silvertip Pipeline in Laurel, Montana, that occurred on\nJuly 1, 2011. EMPCo is a subsidiary of Exxon Mobil Corporation and operates approximately\n3,800 miles of pipeline transporting crude oil, refined petroleum products, and highly volatile\nliquids in Texas, Louisiana, and Montana.1\nAs a result of the inspection, the Director, Western Region, OPS (Director) issued a Notice of\nProbable Violation, Proposed Civil Penalty, and Proposed Compliance Order (Notice) to\nRespondent on March 25, 2013. In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice alleged five\nviolations of the pipeline safety regulations, proposed a civil penalty of $1,700,000, and\nproposed certain corrective action.\nEMPCo responded to the Notice by letter dated April 24, 2013 (Response). In its Response,\nRespondent contested four of the five alleged violations and requested a hearing. In advance of\nthe hearing, Respondent submitted additional written materials on July 8, 2013 (Pre-hearing\nSubmittal). OPS also submitted additional materials. In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.211, a\nhearing was held on July 17, 2013, in Lakewood, Colorado, before a Presiding Official from the\nOffice of Chief Counsel, PHMSA. After the hearing, Respondent submitted additional materials\non August 23, 2013 (Post-hearing Brief). Pursuant to § 190.209(b)(7), the Director submitted a\nwritten evaluation of Respondent’s response material and recommendation on September 20,\n2013.\n1 This information was reported by EMPCo for calendar year 2013 pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 195.49.\n\n\n\nCPF No: 5-2013-5007\nPage 2\nBACKGROUND\nOn July 1, 2011, the Silvertip Pipeline operated by EMPCo experienced a failure where the\npipeline crosses the Yellowstone River in Laurel, Montana.2 The failure resulted in the release\nof approximately 1500 barrels (63,000 gallons) of crude oil into the river.\nThe Silvertip Pipeline is 69.6 miles in length and runs from the Silvertip Station near production\nfields in Elk Basin, Wyoming, to the ExxonMobil refinery in Billings, Montana.3 The pipeline\nalso takes crude oil from an intermediate pump station in Edgar, Montana. The pipeline runs\nsouth to north on a 5% to 7% downward slope. The pipeline can drain by gravity into the\nrefinery in Billings. Pumps at the Edgar station are used to boost flow rate and to pull crude oil\nout of tankage.\nThe pipeline crosses four rivers. At each of the river crossings, the pipeline has a remote\ncontrolled valve (RCV) on the upstream side of the crossing and a hand operated valve on the\ndownstream side.4 The RCVs are equipped with a relief valve and bypass line to protect the\npipeline from pressure surges caused by the rapid closure of valves and other abnormal hydraulic\nevents.\nThe Silvertip Pipeline crosses beneath the Yellowstone River immediately before the pipeline\nreaches a terminal facility in Laurel, Montana, about 20 miles upstream from the end of the\npipeline. The pipeline crosses the Yellowstone approximately 800 feet east of the Highway 212\nbridge.5 Before 1991, the pipeline crossed the river at the bridge span, but EMPCo was required\nto move a portion of the pipeline so that it crossed under the river to accommodate rebuilding of\nthe bridge.6\nAt the location of the Yellowstone crossing, the Silvertip pipeline is 12.75-inch outside diameter,\n0.500-inch wall thickness, Grade B seamless pipe manufactured by U.S. Steel.7 When the\npipeline was re-routed beneath the river in 1991, it was installed using an open cut crossing\ntechnique, placing the pipeline in a rock cobble trench at least 6 feet below the river bed. The\npipe also had a 1-inch concrete weight coating.\n2 EMPCo and OPS were in general agreement on most of the background facts. The primary\ndisagreement regarded the significance of historical flooding on the Yellowstone River, as detailed below.\n3 OPS Pipeline Safety Violation Report (Violation Report) (Apr. 19, 2013), Exhibit A-1 – Accident\nInvestigation Report (Investigation Report) at 2 (Oct. 30, 2012).\n4 Terms “upstream” and “downstream” refer to relative directions on the pipeline. Upstream is in the\ndirection of the beginning of the pipeline and downstream is in the direction of the end.\n5 Violation Report at 2.\n6 Post-Hearing Brief at 2.\n7 Pre-hearing Submittal Exhibit 8 (Kiefner Report) at 2.\n\n\n\nCPF No: 5-2013-5007\nPage 3\nA. Historical Flooding of the Yellowstone River\nAccording to OPS, the Yellowstone has historically been prone to seasonal flooding, including\nincreased erosion and scouring since 1991.8 OPS asserted that at the time of the failure, these\nproblems were common knowledge in Laurel and had worsened in 1991 when the Highway 212\nbridge was rebuilt in a way that constricted water flow of the Yellowstone, increasing the\nvelocity and scouring of floodwaters. OPS pointed to information maintained by the United\nStates Geologic Survey (USGS), including data from a water gauge approximately 20 miles\ndownriver from the Silvertip crossing.9 The USGS had determined the “flood stage” at this point\nof the Yellowstone River is a water level of 13.5 feet at the gauge.\nBetween 2008 and 2010, the river typically rose during the spring runoff and summer snow melt\nand then fell a short period of time later. There were instances when the river would rise\nmultiple times during the same high water season, but water levels would usually drop within a\nweek or two. In 2011, the Yellowstone rose and stayed high for more than a month. The\nYellowstone reached the flood stage as measured by the water gauge three times in 2011: on\nMay 25, June 25, and July 1, the date of the Silvertip failure.10\nSeasonal flooding of the Yellowstone had previously affected other pipeline operators in the\narea. In June 2009, flooding and river scouring caused the failure of an 8-inch natural gas\npipeline operated by Willison Basin Interstate Pipeline (WBI).11 WBI replaced the 8-inch pipe\nwith a 16-inch line horizontally drilled at a depth of 40-50 feet below the river. Another 8-inch\npipeline that had been abandoned by ConocoPhillips became exposed and suffered a rupture\nsometime between 2009 and 2011.12 After the 2009 WBI failure, EMPCo conducted an inline\ninspection (ILI) of the Silvertip Pipeline at the Yellowstone crossing and found no anomalies.13\nThis was in addition to a prior ILI performed in 2004.\nEMPCo acknowledged the Yellowstone is prone to seasonal flooding, but believed the facts\npresented by OPS concerning flooding were overstated. EMPCo asserted that federal databases,\nincluding the USGS, indicated that high water events on the river since the pipeline was installed\nwere less extreme than past levels. EMPCo also pointed to a report by the Yellowstone River\nConservation Council that indicated the period from 1979 to 2007 “was characterized by\nminimal floods on the tributaries and no floods on the Yellowstone River.”14\n8 Violation Report at 4.\n9 Investigation Report at 5-6.\n10 Investigation Report at 5-6.\n11 Violation Report, Exhibit B-16 at 3.\n12 Violation Report 4.\n13 Response at 2.\n14 Response at 2, referencing Pre-hearing Submittal, Exhibit 4 “Yellowstone River Historic Events\nTimeline” at 5.\n\n\n\nCPF No: 5-2013-5007\nPage 4\nAdditionally, EMPCo noted that in the past 20 years, three floods had higher levels than the\nflood level at the time of the July 1, 2011, failure. The first occurred before 1991 when the\npipeline was installed; the second occurred in 1997; and the third occurred on May 26, 2011.\nThe 1997 flood, EMPCo asserted, was the highest crest ever recorded for the Yellowstone.\nEMPCo stated that the Silvertip Pipeline “survived [these previous] high water events, and the\nCompany increased monitoring of the river crossing.”15 Additionally, EMPCo indicated that the\nOPS Investigation Report acknowledged there was an absence of historical flooding impacts to\nthis pipeline.16\nB. Events Leading up to the 2011 Flooding\nPrior to the flooding in 2011, there were numerous contacts between interested stakeholders and\nEMPCo concerning the Yellowstone crossing. In August 2010, there was a meeting of Laurel\nofficials, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, EMPCo, Cenex Pipeline Company, WBI, and\nConoco Phillips that took place at Riverside Park, located slightly east of the Highway 212\nbridge on the south side of the Yellowstone River. The meeting concerned erosion of the river\nbank in that location and the pipelines that ran beneath, including the Silvertip. Laurel officials\nhoped to obtain assistance in fortifying the south bank to help protect the park.17\nSeveral months later in October 2010, Laurel officials contacted OPS and expressed concern\nabout the pipeline crossings downstream of the Highway 212 bridge due to the seasonal\nflooding. OPS relayed this information to EMPCo. In December 2010, EMPCo conducted a\ndepth of cover survey at the Yellowstone crossing at the request of OPS, and reconfirmed the\nfindings from a prior survey that the pipeline was “buried in rock and cobble at least five to eight\nfeet below the riverbed.”18 EMPCo submitted the survey report to OPS on January 29, 2011.\nThe survey indicated that the Silvertip “met the required minimum depth of cover for new\npipelines, and that the bottom of the river had not changed significantly since the last crossing\nsurvey performed in 2002.”19 OPS staff advised EMPCo at the time to “maintain vigilance with\nrespect to the annual flooding of the Yellowstone River especially in the vicinity of their pipeline\ncrossing in Laurel, MT.”20\nOn May 25, 2011, the Yellowstone reached flood stage level. Laurel officials again contacted\nOPS with concerns over the erosion of the south bank of the Yellowstone. In turn, OPS\ncontacted EMPCo, which sent employees to Riverside Park in response. On this date, EMPCo\nshut down the Silvertip for five hours, assessed site conditions, and evaluated data. When no\n15 Response at 2.\n16 Pre-hearing Submittal at 2, citing Investigation Report at 12.\n17 Investigation Report at 3.\n18 Investigation Report at 3.\n19 Investigation Report at 3-4. The minimum depth of cover for a new pipeline under a river is four feet.\nRespondent indicated the depth of cover survey was actually performed in 2001. Response at 2.\n20 Investigation Report at 4.\n\n\n\nCPF No: 5-2013-5007\nPage 5\nanomalies were detected, the Silvertip was restarted and EMPCo began daily monitoring by\ndriving by the location to observe the general area. WBI decided to shut down its pipeline\ncrossing at the Yellowstone because of the floodwaters.21\nOne week later, on June 1, 2011, Laurel officials sent photographs of the Yellowstone to EMPCo\nwith a recommendation that EMPCo come and assess the situation.22 EMPCo responded via\nemail that the depth of cover at the south bank had been determined to be 12 feet. On June 6,\n2011, OPS inspected EMPCo’s integrity management program and most recent ILI data from\n2009, finding no actionable pipeline anomalies at the Silvertip’s Yellowstone crossing.\nThe Yellowstone reached the flood stage again on June 25 due to snow melt.23 Laurel personnel\nbegan reinforcing the Yellowstone banks on both the north and south sides. They again\ncontacted OPS with concerns over the Silvertip crossing. OPS contacted EMPCo, which shut\ndown the Silvertip for a second time, visited the site, and assessed the situation. EMPCo\nperformed a depth of cover survey in Riverside Park from the south bank of the Yellowstone to\nRCV 4462, which is the closest upstream valve south of the river crossing. The depth of cover at\nthis point was between 6.7 feet and 8.5 feet. Additionally, on June 25, 2011, EMPCo placed\nsandbags around RCV 4462 in case the park flooded.24\nC. Silvertip Pipeline Failure\nOn July 1, 2011, the Yellowstone River reached the flood stage for the third time in six weeks.\nAt 10:40:43 p.m., Mountain Daylight Time, EMPCo’s Operation Control Center (OCC) in\nHouston, Texas, received an alarm indicating a pressure drop at RCV 4462, the remote valve\nimmediately upstream of the Yellowstone River crossing.\n25 Controller A, who was in charge of\nthe console at the time, did not see the alarm. At 10:41:14, approximately 30 seconds after the\nfirst alarm, the controller noticed a second alarm which indicated a booster pump at Edgar\nStation had automatically shut down because of low suction pressure. The Edgar Station is\napproximately fourteen miles upstream of Laurel. Believing there might be a leak, Controller A\nshut down the pumps and RCV 1066 at the beginning of the Silvertip Pipeline at 10:50:39 p.m.\nHe then closed RCV 1067, located approximately one-half mile downstream of the Yellowstone\nRiver at the Laurel facility.\nThree minutes later, Controller A notified a supervisor, who reviewed the trends and alarm logs.\nAt 11:07:32 p.m., the supervisor ordered Controller A to re-open RCV 1067 to allow oil to drain\ninto the Billings refinery. The supervisor then called the First Line Supervisor in the field, who\nrequested a senior technician be added to the call. A discussion ensued as to what caused the\nEdgar Station pumps to have low suction. After the discussion and review of the relevant data,\n21 Violation Report at 5.\n22 Investigation Report at 4-5.\n23 Investigation Report at 5.\n24 Investigation Report at 5.\n25 Notice at 1-2.\n\n\n\nCPF No: 5-2013-5007\nPage 6\nthe supervisor noticed the low suction pressure alarm had been preceded by a pressure drop at\nRCV 4462. At 11:36:51 p.m., the Supervisor ordered RCV 4462 closed, which stopped the\ngravity flow of oil into the river. Approximately 56 minutes had passed since the first alarm was\nreceived until RCV 4462 was closed, resulting in a total of about 1500 barrels of crude oil\nreleased into the river.\nOPS sent investigators to the scene of the failure. On July 5, 2011, a Corrective Action Order\n(CAO) was issued by PHMSA.\n26 The CAO required EMPCo to take specific actions before\nrestarting the Silvertip Pipeline. It also required EMPCo to complete additional safety measures\nbefore the next flood season, including replacement of the pipeline crossing at the Yellowstone\nRiver with a horizontally drilled line.\nThe OPS Investigation Report indicated the pipeline failed as a result of a submerged\n“guillotine” break in the pipeline near the south shore of the Yellowstone River caused by debris\ncaught on the exposed pipe during flooding, which gradually increased external stress on the\npipe until it failed.27 EMPCo’s failure report, prepared by Kiefner & Associates, Inc., similarly\nconcluded that the Silvertip “failed at a girth weld as a result of the effects of external loading\nthat occurred due to exposure to flood conditions.”28 The report concluded further that “the\nfailure mechanism was fatigue crack growth adjacent to a girth weld, followed by ductile\nfracture of the remaining section due to tensile overload.”29 Ultimately, the cracks were caused\nby “vortex-induced vibration of the exposed pipe in the river current.”30\nThe Notice issued on March 25, 2013, alleged that Respondent committed five violations of the\npipeline safety regulations in 49 C.F.R. Part 195, as follows:\nItem 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(i)(2), which states:\n§ 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(a) Which pipelines are covered by this section? This section applies to\neach hazardous liquid pipeline and carbon dioxide pipeline that could\naffect a high consequence area . . . .\n(i) What preventive and mitigative measures must an operator take to\nprotect the high consequence area?—(1) General requirements. An\nFINDINGS OF VIOLATION\n26 ExxonMobil Pipeline Co., CPF No. 5-2011-5017H , 2011 WL 10796851 (Jul. 5, 2011). Prior\nenforcement decisions can also be viewed on PHMSA’s website at http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/\npipeline/enforcement (follow link for enforcement since 2002 and then for Actions issued by year).\n27 Violation Report at 3-4.\n28 Pre-hearing Submittal Exhibit 8 (Kiefner Report) at 1.\n29 Kiefner Report at 1.\n30 Kiefner Report at 1.\n\n\n\nCPF No: 5-2013-5007\nPage 7\noperator must take measures to prevent and mitigate the consequences of a\npipeline failure that could affect a high consequence area. These measures\ninclude conducting a risk analysis of the pipeline segment to identify\nadditional actions to enhance public safety or environmental protection . . .\n(2) Risk analysis criteria. In identifying the need for additional\npreventive and mitigative measures, an operator must evaluate the\nlikelihood of a pipeline release occurring and how a release could affect\nthe high consequence area. This determination must consider all relevant\nrisk factors, including, but not limited to:\n(i) Terrain surrounding the pipeline segment, including drainage\nsystems such as small streams and other smaller waterways that could\nact as a conduit to the high consequence area;\n(ii) Elevation profile; . . .\n(iv) Amount of product that could be released; [and] . . .\n(vii) Physical support of the pipeline segment such as by a cable\nsuspension bridge; . . . .\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated § 195.452(i)(2) by failing to conduct a risk analysis\nof its pipeline considering all the relevant risk factors. Specifically, the Notice alleged that\nRespondent prepared a risk analysis of the Silvertip Pipeline in July 2010 to evaluate the\nlikelihood of a pipeline release and possible consequences, but failed to consider the risk of\nflooding and river bottom scour, as well as certain risk factors relevant to the Yellowstone River\ncrossing. The risk factors that Respondent allegedly failed to consider included the terrain\nsurrounding the pipeline segment; the elevation profile of the pipeline; the amount of product\nthat could be released in a spill; and the physical support of the pipeline segment in the river.\nThe Notice also alleged that Respondent should have considered additional factors listed in\nAppendix C to 49 C.F.R. Part 195, such as potential natural forces inherent in flood zones and\nsubsidence areas. The Notice alleged the risk of flooding, channel migration, and river bottom\nscour on the Yellowstone River was a known threat given its history, including at least one prior\npipeline failure in the area caused by flooding and impact to other pipelines.\nEMPCo responded that it had complied with all requirements in the regulation concerning\npreventative and mitigative risk analysis.31 Specifically, it asserted that its 2010 written integrity\nmanagement program addressed natural forces such as flooding. Respondent also asserted that\nan integrity threat assessment conducted in 2009 considered the threat of weather-related and\noutside forces such as flooding. Based on the threats identified by that integrity assessment,\nRespondent maintained that its risk analysis considered all of the relevant risk factors, including\nthose specified under § 195.452(i)(2).32\nIn addition, Respondent argued that the effects of the July 1, 2011, flood were unforeseeable.\nEMPCo noted that seasonal flooding on the Yellowstone River had never before impacted the\n31 Pre-hearing Submittal at 7.\n32 Pre-hearing Submittal at 6-7, referencing Exhibits 9 and 10 and Violation Report Exhibit B-7.\n\n\n\nCPF No: 5-2013-5007\nPage 8\nSilvertip Pipeline despite several floods with higher levels than the one that caused the failure.\nRespondent noted that it had assessed the pipeline before the failure and found it had adequate\ndepth of cover with no known anomalies. EMPCo also referenced the OPS Investigation Report\nwhich acknowledged “Based on the lack of historical flooding impacts to this pipeline since [it\nwas installed in] 1991, EMPCo may not have known that the river bottom could change\nsufficiently to undermine their pipeline.”33\nA. Applicable Standards for Identifying P&M Measures\nUnder the pipeline safety regulations in 49 C.F.R. Part 195, pipeline operators must develop,\nimplement, and follow a written integrity management program (IMP) for each hazardous liquid\npipeline that could affect a high consequence area (HCA). 34 An operator’s IMP must include,\namong other things, identification of additional actions that can be taken to protect the HCA.35\nThese are known as preventative and mitigative (P&M) measures.\nTo identify appropriate P&M measures for each pipeline, an operator must conduct a risk\nanalysis that evaluates “the likelihood of a pipeline release occurring” on the segment and the\npotential consequences to the HCA.36 The risk analysis must include consideration of all risk\nfactors relevant to the likelihood of a release and potential consequences. The regulation lists a\nnumber of risk factors that must be considered, including, but not limited to: the terrain\nsurrounding the pipeline segment, including drainage that could act as a conduit for the product\nto reach the HCA; the elevation profile; amount of product that could be released; and the\nphysical support of the pipeline segment.\nAppendix C to Part 195 provides additional guidance for implementing an IMP, including\nguidance on risk factors. The guidance lists both mandatory and additional factors for operators\nto consider when identifying measures to prevent and mitigate the consequences of a pipeline\nfailure. The factors listed include, among other things, potential natural forces in the area, such\nas natural forces in a flood zone.37\nBoth parties acknowledged that seasonal floods were known to occur on the Yellowstone River\nat the location of the Silvertip Pipeline crossing. Evidence also demonstrates that during 2008\nthrough 2011, water level of the river rose each year during June and July. During those years,\nwater level would rise from a typical non-flood height of approximately 2 feet to a seasonal flood\nheight of 11 to 12 feet.38 During the 2011 season, the height exceeded 14 feet. Flooding is\n33 Pre-Hearing Submittal at 2.\n34 § 195.452(a)-(b). “High consequence areas” include commercially navigable waterways, as defined in\n§ 195.450, and areas that are unusually sensitive to environmental damage, as defined under § 195.2.\n35 § 195.452(f)(6).\n36 § 195.452(i)(2).\n37 49 C.F.R. Part 195, Appendix C (I)(B)(12).\n38 Violation Report, Exhibit B-21. Respondent submitted a report titled “Yellowstone River Historic\nEvents Timeline” from 2008, which stated that 1998-2007 was “characterized by minimal flooding on\n\n\n\nCPF No: 5-2013-5007\nPage 9\nknown to PHMSA as a potential threat to buried pipelines, and PHMSA has communicated to\noperators precautions that should be taken when flooding occurs.39 At this particular location,\nflooding had previously caused at least one other pipeline to fail, the WBI gas pipeline failure in\nJune 2009.40 Taken together, all of this information was sufficient to notify Respondent that\nflooding should be analyzed as a potential threat to its pipeline.\nRespondent contended that certain information caused it to believe flooding could not impact its\npipeline. For example, EMPCo’s pipeline had survived prior flooding events without damage,\nincluding two floods with a higher water level than the flood that ultimately caused the failure.\nEMPCo had also performed a depth of cover survey in 2010, which detected cover over its\npipeline had not changed significantly since the last crossing survey. In its written submissions,\nEMPCo also noted that the OPS Investigation Report stated that “based on the lack of historical\nflooding impacts to this pipeline since 1991, EMPCo may not have known that the river bottom\ncould change sufficiently to undermine their pipeline.”41\nPHMSA disagrees that this information alleviated Respondent from having to analyze the\npossibility that flooding could cause a failure. The fact that flooding had not previously caused\nan integrity issue for Respondent’s pipeline does not mean future flooding could never cause a\nfailure. One of the purposes of the integrity management regulations is to anticipate the possible\nthreats to the pipeline in the future. Given that flooding is a threat in general and that flooding\nhad caused integrity issues for other pipelines at the same location, it was not reasonable for\nEMPCo to assume seasonal flooding would never impact its own pipeline. At a minimum, the\nOperator had a duty to evaluate the likelihood of a pipeline release occurring from flooding.\nB. Whether Respondent’s Risk Analysis Complied with Applicable Standards\nPHMSA reviewed the evidence in the record to determine whether Respondent had prepared a\nrisk analysis that considered the threat of flooding and relevant risk factors. This review\nincluded Respondent’s Silvertip to Billings 12” Crude Preventive & Mitigative Measures\nAnalysis Summary (2010 P&M Analysis).42\n2010 P&M Analysis. The 2010 P&M Analysis described Respondent’s 69.6-mile Silvertip\nIt noted the location of block valves, elevation at each station, type of product\nPipeline. tributaries, and no floods on the Yellowstone River.” For the purpose of the report, however, only floods\nwith a 10% or less probability of occurring were identified. The report did not analyze seasonal flooding.\n39 OPS has published Advisory Bulletins related to the impacts of flooding on pipeline systems. See\nAdvisory Bulletin ADB-93-03, 58 Fed. Reg. 41321 (Aug. 3, 1993); Advisory Bulletin ADB-94-05, 59\nFed. Reg. 55152 (Nov. 3, 1994). See also Potential for Damage to Pipeline Facilities Caused by Flooding\n(ADB-11-04), 76 FR 44985 (Jul. 27, 2011); and Potential for Damage to Pipeline Facilities Caused by\nFlooding (ADB-2013-02), 78 Fed. Reg. 41991 (Jul. 12, 2013).\n40 Violation Report, Exhibit B-16 at 3.\n41 Post-hearing Brief at 2-3, quoting Investigation Report at 12.\n42 Violation Report Exhibit B-7. The P&M Analysis is dated July 7, 2010.\n\n\n\nCPF No: 5-2013-5007\nPage 10\ntransported, line fill capacity, flow rate, and maximum operating pressure. The entire length of\nthe pipeline was identified as potentially affecting an HCA. Three potential integrity threats to\nthe Silvertip Pipeline were identified: third-party damage, manufacturing, and external corrosion.\nThe document then identified and evaluated different P&M measures to address those three\nintegrity threats.\nBesides third-party damage, manufacturing, and external corrosion, the 2010 P&M Analysis did\nnot identify other threats that could affect the likelihood of a pipeline release. In particular, the\nAnalysis did not consider the threat of flooding in evaluating the likelihood of a release.\nPHMSA also finds several other deficiencies in the 2010 P&M Analysis. The risk analysis\nmentioned the types of “nearby HCAs, which include HPOP, OPOP, Drinking Water and USA-\nECO” but did not define them or identify specific HCAs like the Yellowstone River.43 There\nwas no mention of the terrain surrounding the pipeline near the Yellowstone River or the\npossible consequences of a failure at the crossing. In addition, while the elevation of the entire\npipeline is noted, the elevation profile is not evaluated as a risk factor that could impact the\nconsequences of a failure, such as whether the elevation profile from south to north allows more\nproduct to drain into the Yellowstone than if the pipeline had a flat profile.\nThere is some discussion of spill size in the section evaluating emergency flow restriction\ndevices, but only with regard to the threats previously identified. Since flooding is not identified\nas a possible failure mode, there is no consideration of the potential amount of product that could\nbe released as a result of damage at the crossing caused by flooding, such as if there is a\nguillotine break in the pipeline. There is also no mention of the physical support of the pipeline\ncrossing at the Yellowstone River.\nFor these reasons, PHMSA finds Respondent’s 2010 P&M Analysis did not consider all of the\nrelevant risk factors in evaluating the likelihood of a release and potential consequences affecting\nthe HCA. While PHMSA recognizes that Respondent employed certain P&M measures in the\nfield, including depth of cover surveys and increased patrolling, these measures are not relevant\nto this alleged violation, which concerns whether the risk analysis prepared by Respondent\nappropriately considered relevant risk factors. Respondent’s other P&M measures are\nconsidered below under Item 2.\nIn its written submissions and at the hearing, Respondent indicated that additional details of its\nrisk analysis were contained in other documents, including its 2010 Integrity Management\nProgram (IMP), 2010 IMP Forms 6.1, 2005 EFRD analysis, 2010 Data Integration and Risk\nAssessment Summary, and 2009 integrity threat assessment. Those documents are considered\nbelow.\n43 The acronyms presumably refer to the types of HCAs, such as high population areas, other populated\nareas, and unusually sensitive drinking water and ecological resource areas.\n\n\n\nCPF No: 5-2013-5007\nPage 11\n2010 IMP Plan. Respondent argued that sections 3 and 6 of its 2010 IMP Plan demonstrated that\nit considered time dependent threats such as heavy rains and floods.44\nSection 3 of the 2010 IMP Plan discussed the process for data analysis generally, and stated that\nsegments are to be evaluated with regard to nine pipeline integrity threats listed in ASME\nB31.8S.45 Section 6 of the IMP Plan discussed the procedures for evaluating P&M actions. It\ndescribed the evaluation process and noted that Form 6.1 should be used to document the\nevaluation.\nAccording to Section 6 of the 2010 IMP Plan, the evaluation process required identification of\nHCAs and significant threats, including possible causes of failure. Examples of threats given\nwere third-party damage and corrosion. After identifying HCAs that may be affected and threats\nthat could cause a failure, Section 6 stated that appropriate risk factors must be considered,\nwhich either increase or reduce risk. The procedure listed a number of risk factors that, at a\nminimum, should be evaluated, including: terrain to HCAs and proximity, elevation profile,\nwaterways, potential volume released, and physical support.\nWhile the procedures in the 2010 IMP Plan indicate the process Respondent should have\nfollowed in performing a risk analysis, the procedures do not, by themselves, show whether this\nprocess was indeed followed for the Silvertip Pipeline at the Yellowstone River crossing. In\nparticular, the procedures do not demonstrate that Respondent considered the threat of floods.\n2010 IMP Form 6.1. The 2010 IMP Form 6.1 was used by EMPCo to document the evaluation\nof P&M actions in support of the 2010 P&M Analysis.\n46 Respondent submitted two such\nforms.47 One was for the identified threat of external corrosion and the other was for the threat\nof manufacturing defects. There were no forms identifying other threats that could cause a\npipeline failure, such as the threat of natural forces or flooding.\nBoth of the forms submitted include evaluation of the risk factors relevant to the identified threat.\nRisk factors such as terrain to the HCA, pipeline profile, potential product spillage, and physical\nsupports were all considered, but since their consideration was limited to the two identified\nfailure threats, these factors were not considered in regard to the threat of natural forces or\nflooding.\nAccordingly, the forms submitted do not support Respondent’s assertion that its risk analysis\nconsidered the threat of floods and associated risk factors.\n44 Pre-hearing Submittal at 6-7.\n45 Pre-hearing Submittal Exhibit 9. ASME B31.8S is not incorporated by reference in § 195.452.\n46 Violation Report, Exhibit B-7 at 3.\n47 Pre-hearing Submittal Exhibit 10 – Preventative & Mitigative Actions Evaluation, dated July 7, 2010.\n\n\n\nCPF No: 5-2013-5007\nPage 12\nOther Documentation. Respondent asserted that its 2010 P&M Analysis relied upon a\nconsideration of elevation profile performed in 2005.48 Respondent also referenced its 2010\nData Integration and Risk Assessment Summary, which noted the approximate 1150-foot\nelevation change between the two ends of the pipeline and the static pressure at the downstream\nend.49\nHaving reviewed the 2005 Emergency Flow Restricting Device (EFRD) Evaluation and related\nmaterials, PHMSA finds Respondent considered the elevation profile of the pipeline, but there is\ninadequate consideration of how the elevation profile impacts the consequences of a pipeline\nfailure at the Yellowstone River. In particular, there is no consideration of how the elevation\nprofile could result in crude oil draining into the river in the event of a failure at the crossing.\nRespondent also contended that its 2009 integrity assessment “considered the threat of weather-\nrelated and outside forces.”50 In connection with this assertion, Respondent cited to its 2010\nIMP Plan, which is already discussed above.\nC. Conclusion\nGiven the history of flooding and impact to other pipelines at this location, the threat of flooding\nwas relevant to the likelihood of a release occurring on Respondent’s pipeline. Respondent did\nnot evaluate the likelihood of a release caused by flooding of the Yellowstone River and failed to\nconsider risk factors relevant to flooding. Accordingly, PHMSA finds Respondent violated\n§ 195.452(i)(2) by failing to conduct a risk analysis of the Silvertip Pipeline that considered all\nrisk factors relevant to the likelihood of a release on the Silvertip Pipeline and potential\nconsequences affecting the Yellowstone River.\nItem 2: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(i)(1), which states:\n§ 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(a) . . . .\n(i) What preventive and mitigative measures must an operator take to\nprotect the high consequence area?—(1) General requirements. An\noperator must take measures to prevent and mitigate the consequences of a\npipeline failure that could affect a high consequence area. These measures\ninclude conducting a risk analysis of the pipeline segment to identify\nadditional actions to enhance public safety or environmental protection.\nSuch actions may include, but are not limited to, implementing damage\nprevention best practices, better monitoring of cathodic protection where\ncorrosion is a concern, establishing shorter inspection intervals, installing\nEFRDs on the pipeline segment, modifying the systems that monitor\n48 Post-hearing Brief at 5, citing Violation Report Exhibit B-3.\n49 Post-hearing Brief at 5, citing Violation Report Exhibit A-15.\n50 Pre-hearing Submittal at 7.\n\n\n\nCPF No: 5-2013-5007\nPage 13\npressure and detect leaks, providing additional training to personnel on\nresponse procedures, conducting drills with local emergency responders\nand adopting other management controls.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated § 195.452(i)(1) by failing to take appropriate\nmeasures to prevent or mitigate the consequences of a failure on the Silvertip Pipeline at the\nYellowstone River crossing. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Respondent failed to operate\nremote control valves (RCVs) installed on the Silvertip Pipeline to prevent or mitigate the\nconsequences of a failure. In addition, the Notice alleged that Respondent failed to take “any\nother” P&M measures to address the threat of failure from flooding, such as implementation of\ndamage prevention best practices, strengthening leak detection systems, undertaking additional\ntraining for response personnel, or addressing the risk of a guillotine failure.51\nIn its written submissions and at the hearing, Respondent contested the allegation that it failed to\nidentify and implement appropriate P&M measures. Respondent contended that its written IMP\nPlan addressed P&M measures and that EMPCo had adopted those measures at the Yellowstone\nRiver crossing.52 Respondent contended that it “had employed all of the P&M measures\nsuggested by PHMSA” under the regulation prior to the incident.53\nRespondent explained that the P&M measures it employed included conducting a depth of cover\nsurvey several months before the accident, which determined the pipeline had adequate\nprotection.54 The measures also included actively monitoring river conditions prior to the\naccident, having thicker walled pipe and concrete coating, placing the pipe in a rock trench\ndeeper than otherwise required,","truncated":true,"body_characters":137682}