{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 520165013H","title":"BELLE FOURCHE PIPELINE CO — Corrective Action Order","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2016-12-20","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED corrective action order.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520165013h.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520165013h.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520165013h","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/520165013H","body":"Corrective Action Order involving BELLE FOURCHE PIPELINE CO. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2016-12-20 and is reported as closed as of 2024-02-02. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n520165013H_Closure Letter_02022024_(16-155053S).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520165013H/520165013H_Closure%20Letter_02022024_(16-155053S).pdf\n\n520165013H_Closure Letter_02022024_(16-155053S)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520165013H/520165013H_Closure%20Letter_02022024_(16-155053S)_text.pdf\n\n520165013H_Corrective Actioin Order_12202016_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520165013H/520165013H_Corrective%20Actioin%20Order_12202016_text.pdf\n\n520165013H_Corrective Action Order_12202016.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520165013H/520165013H_Corrective%20Action%20Order_12202016.pdf\n\n520165013H_HQ Post Hearing Decision Confirming CAO_03242017.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520165013H/520165013H_HQ%20Post%20Hearing%20Decision%20Confirming%20CAO_03242017.pdf\n\n520165013H_HQ Post Hearing Decision Confirming CAO_03242017_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520165013H/520165013H_HQ%20Post%20Hearing%20Decision%20Confirming%20CAO_03242017_text.pdf\n\n520165013H_PHC Consent Agreement and Order_07022018.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520165013H/520165013H_PHC%20Consent%20Agreement%20and%20Order_07022018.pdf\n\n520165013H_PHC Consent Agreement and Order_07022018_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520165013H/520165013H_PHC%20Consent%20Agreement%20and%20Order_07022018_text.pdf\n\n520165013H_Corrective Action Order_12202016.pdf\n\nU.S. Department\nof Transportation\nWashington, DC 20590\n1200 New Jersey Avenue SE\nMaterials Safety\nPipeline and Hazardous\nAdministration\nVIA CERTIFIED MAIL AND FAX TO: 307-237-3164\nDecember 20, 2016\nMr. H. A. True, III, President\nBelle Fourche Pipeline Company\nP.O. Box 2360\nCasper, WY 82602-2360\nRe: CPF No. 5-2016-5013H\nDear Mr. True:\nEnclosed is a Corrective Action Order (CAO) issued in the above-referenced case. It requires\nBelle Fourche Pipeline Company to take certain corrective actions with respect to the\nBicentennial Pipeline system that failed on December 5, 2016, near Belfield, North Dakota.\nService of this CAO is being made by certified mail and facsimile. Service of the CAO by\nelectronic transmission is deemed complete upon transmission and acknowledgement of receipt,\nor as otherwise provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5. The terms and conditions of this Order are\neffective upon completion of service.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nlan K. Mayberry\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\nCC:\nMs. Linda Daugherty, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, OPS\nMr. Chris Hoidal, Region Director, Western Region, OPS\nMr. Ken Dockweiler, Director of Land, Government & Compliance, Belle Fourche\nPipeline Company, P.O. Box 2360, Casper, Wyoming 82602\nMr. Jared Radosevich, Pipeline Compliance Coordinator, Belle Fourche Pipeline\nCompany, P.O. Box 2360, Casper, Wyoming 82602\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\nIn the Matter of\n)\n)\nBelle Fourche Pipeline Company,\n)\nCPF No. 5-2016-5013H\nRespondent.\n)\n)\nCORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nPurpose and Background:\nThis Corrective Action Order (CAO or Order) is being issued, under the authority of 49 U.S.C.\n§ 60112, to require Belle Fourche Pipeline Company (BFPC or Respondent), to take necessary\nassociated with the recent failure on BFPC's Bicentennial Pipeline system.\ncorrective action to protect the public, property, and environment from potential hazards\nOn December 5, 2016, an accident occurred on the Bicentennial Pipeline system, resulting in the\nrelease of approximately 4,200 barrels of crude oil into the Ash Coulee Creek (the Failure).' The\nBicentennial line is a 6-inch diameter pipeline approximately 58 miles in length that transports\nBakken crude oil from Skunk Hill Pump Station in Billings County, North Dakota, to\nBicentennial Station in McKenzie County, North Dakota (Bicentennial Pipeline or Affected\nSegment). See Figure 1. The cause of the Failure has not yet been determined. Pursuant to\n49 U.S.C. § 60117, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA),\nOffice of Pipeline Safety (OPS), initiated an investigation of the accident. The preliminary\nfindings of the ongoing investigation are as follows.\nPreliminary Findings:\n• BFPC gathers and transports crude oil in the Williston Basin of western North Dakota\nand the Powder River Basin of Wyoming?\n' On December 8, 2016, BFPC provided an initial spill estimate of 1,000 barrels. On December 12, 2016, BFPC\nrevised this amount to approximately 4,200 barrels based on the meter data.\n\" Belle Fourche Pipeline Company's website, available at http://www.bellefourchepipeline.com/ (last accessed\nDecember 20, 2016).\n\n\n\nCPF No. 5-2016-5013H\nPage 2\n• The tailed segment is a 6-inch diameter line that transports Bakken crude oll and run\nrom Skunk Hill Pump Station to the Treetop Station, a distance of approximately I.\nmiles (Isolated Segment). The Failure occurred near Milepost (MP) 17.4 near Ash Coulee\nCreek in Billings County, North Dakota (Failure Site). The oil traveled approximately\n4.5 river miles downstream from the point of release into the eastern edge of a High\nConsequence Area (HCA) (ecologically sensitive area).3 The Ash Coulee Creek\nultimately drains into the Little Missouri River. There are numerous other drainage paths\nand creeks that the pipeline traverses that lead to the Little Missouri River. It appears\nthat much of the Affected Segment may affect HAs due to the topography and drainage\nof the land.\n• The Bicentennial Pipeline system was constructed between 1980 and 1990. A portion of\nthe Isolated Segment near the release site was replaced in 2013 using a Horizontal\nDirectional Drill (HDD). The new HDD-installed pipeline consists of 6-inch, 0.250-inch\nwall thickness, Grade API 5LX-52 pipe. The new pipe was connected to the adjacent\nthicknes, and Crade in 5212 hich constance binded diam) pipe. She ph wal\nflowrate is fairly low.\n• The maximum operating pressure (MOP) of the pipeline was 1100 psig, as established by\nhydrostatic test in 2013. At the time of the Failure, the actual operating pressure of the\npipeline was 621 psig, as measured at the discharge pump at the Skunk Hill Station.\n• At approximately 10:30 am MST, on December 5, 2016, a failure occurred on the\nBicentennial Pipeline in Billings County, North Dakota, resulting in the release of\napproximately 4,200 barrels of crude oil into the Ash Coulee Creek. A rancher at the\nrelease site discovered the release, which was not detected by BFPC's leak detection\nsystem. The Failure was reported to the National Response Center (NRC Report No.\n1165618) on December 5, 2016, at approximately 12:21 pm MST by Respondent. The\nFailure was subsequently reported two more times: (1) a concerned citizen reported at\n8:09 am MST on December 7, 2016, that there was a release into the Ash Coulee Creek\n(NRC Report No. 1165786); and (2) the U.S. Forest Service Region 1 reported at 6:22\npm MST on December 9, 2016, that a pipeline in the Dakota Prairie Grasslands had an\nequipment failure (NRC Report No. 1166008).\n• It was difficult to access the failure site and investigate the accident due to weather\nconditions in the area. The roads leading to Belfield, North Dakota were snowy and\ncovered in ice. Investigators had to travel off-road approximately 2 miles, and then walk\napproximately 300 yards in 2-feet deep snow to reach the release site. Because there were\nnumerous ground fissures covered by the snowfall, investigators had to walk directly\nbehind one another to avoid falling into crevices. Temperatures ranged from minus 20-\n30° F.\n3 According to 49 C.F.R. § 195.450, a \"High Consequence Area\" is (1) a commercially navigable waterway, (2) a\nin § 195.6.\nhigh population area, (3) an \"other populated area,\" or (4) \"an unusually sensitive area,\" as more specifically defined\n\n\n\nCPF No. 5-2016-5013H\nPage 3\n• Immediately following discovery of the Failure, BFPC halted operation of the Isolated\nSegment, physically isolated the failed pipeline segment from the Skunk Hill Pump\nStation to the Treetop Station (a distance of approximately 19 miles), and closed the\nmanually-operated block valves on both sides of the release location. The Isolated\nSegment was then drained of product. Booms were installed on the Ash Coulee Creek at\nthe three- and four-mile marks on December 5, 2016, and additional booms were\ninstalled downstream two days later. The migration of crude oil has stopped and clean up\nhas begun along the creek.\n• Various state and federal agencies responded to the scene, including PHMSA, the U.S.\nEnvironmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the North Dakota Department of Health.\n• The cause of the Failure is unknown and the investigation is ongoing. It appears that there\nhas been ground movement in the area of the Failure, as indicated by numerous ground\nestimated to be in the HDD-installed segment installed in 2013. The HDD places the pipe\nfissures and slope sloughing along the pipeline right-of-way (ROW). The release site is\nat approximately 45 feet below the ground surface. BFPC plans to excavate the failed\npipe once excavation can be accomplished safely.\n• Although the Failure investigation is ongoing, and this analysis may change, the release\nsite may be where the pipeline experienced compressive or other bending forces within\nthe slope failure. Although the cause of the Failure is not yet determined, this type of\nexcessive stress and strain imposed by land movement could occur in other areas of the\npipeline system where similar conditions exist. It appears that a majority of the Affected\nSegment traverses similar topographic features prone to slope instability.\n• The accident did not cause any known injuries. According to the EPA, the release appears\nto have entered the Little Missouri National Grassland, and may have caused some\ngrazing cattle to become ill or die.\"\n• In 2004 and 2009, PHMSA conducted Integrity Management Plan (IMP) inspections on\nBFPC. Both inspections revealed that portions of BFPC's pipeline system lacked accurate\nor timely leak-detection systems.\n• On January 23, 2015, PHMSA issued a CAO to Bridger Pipeline, LLC (Bridger), for a\nfailure that occurred on January 17, 2015, and resulted in a release of crude oil into the\nYellowstone River (CPF 5-2015-5003H). Item 10 of the CAO ordered Bridger to review\nand assess the effectiveness of its emergency response plan and facility response plan\n(FRP). BFPC's Bicentennial Pipeline and Bridger are covered by the same FRP.\nPHMSA has received and reviewed the FRP for the North Dakota, Montana, and\nWyoming Response Zones, dated July 2016. This FRP, however, does not adequately\naddress Item 10 of the 2015 CAO and has been deemed inadequate for other systems,\nincluding the Bicentennial Pipeline system.\n* According to the North Dakota Department of Health, there were at least two cows confirmed dead in the area of\nthe oil spill, but the cause of death has not been verified by a veterinarian.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 5-2016-5013H\nPage 4\n• In April 2016, a third-party vender performed an in-line inspection (ILI) of the\nBicentennial Pipeline. As part of its investigation of the Failure, PHMSA is reviewing\nthe ILI vendor results to insure BFPC had met the required remediation upon discovery\nof any anomalies on the pipeline. PHMSA has requested but has not yet received the\nreport from the 2016 ILI runs.\nDetermination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing:\nSection 60112 of Title 49, United States Code, provides for the issuance of a Corrective Action\nOrder, atter reasonable notice and the opportunity for a hearing, requiring corrective action,\nwhich may include the suspended or restricted use of a pipeline facility, physical inspection,\ntesting, repair, replacement, or other action, as appropriate. The basis for making the\ndetermination that a pipeline facility is or would be hazardous, requiring corrective action, is set\nforth both in the above-referenced statute and 49 C.F.R. § 190.233, a copy of which is enclosed.\nSection 60112 and the regulations promulgated thereunder provide for the issuance of a\nCorrective Action Order, without prior notice and opportunity for hearing, upon a finding that\nfailure to issue the Order expeditiously would result in the likelihood of serious harm to life,\nproperty, or the environment. In such cases, an opportunity for a hearing and expedited review\nwill be provided as soon as practicable after the issuance of the Order.\nAfter evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, I find that continued operation of the\npipeline without corrective measures is or would be hazardous to life, property, or the\nenvironment. Additionally, having considered the location of the Failure, the hazardous nature\nof the product being transported, the proximity of the pipeline to ecologically sensitive areas, the\nfact that the release was not detected by Respondent's leak detection system, the inaccessibility\nof the pipe, and the ongoing investigations to determine the cause of the Failure, I find that a\nfailure to issue this Order expeditiously to require immediate corrective action would result in\nthe likelihood of serious harm to life, property, or the environment.\nAccordingly, this Corrective Action Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued\nwithout prior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Order are\neffective upon receipt.\nWithin 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may contest its issuance obtain expedited\nreview either by answering in writing or requesting a hearing under 49 C.F.R. § 190.211, to be\nheld as soon as practicable under the terms of such regulation, by notifying the Associate\nAdministrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, with a copy to the Director, Western Region,\ni the tens, wit\nPHMSA (Director). If Respondent requests a hearing, it will be held telephonically or in-person\nin Lakewood, Colorado.\nAfter receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may\nidentify other corrective measures that need to be taken. In that event, PHMSA will notify\nRespondent of any additional measures that are required and an amended Order issued, if\nnecessary. To the extent consistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an\nopportunity for a hearing prior to the imposition of any additional corrective measures.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 5-2016-5013H\nPage 5\nRequired Corrective Actions:\nDefinitions:\nAffected Segment - The Affected Segment is Respondent's crude-oil Bicentennial\nPipeline system that runs approximately 58 miles in length, from the Skunk Hill Pump\nStation in Billings County, North Dakota, to the Bicentennial Station in McKenzie\nCounty, North Dakota, as illustrated in Figure 1.\nDirector - The Director means the Director, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety, Western Region.\nIsolated Segment - The Isolated Segment is that portion of the Affected Segment running\napproximately 19 miles from the Skunk Hill Pump Station to the Treetop Pump Station,\nas illustrated in Figure 1.\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60112, I hereby order BFPC to immediately take the following\ncorrective actions for the Affected Segment (including the Isolated Segment):\n1. Shutdown of Isolated Segment. BFPC must not operate the Isolated Segment until\nauthorized to do so by the Director.\n2. Aerial Patrols of Affected Segment. BFPC must provide daily aerial patrols of the\nAffected Segment for the next 14 calendar days from the date of this Order. One of the\naerial patrols during this time must utilize Forward Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR) or\nequivalent technology to locate any areas of potential crude oil leakage. After the next 14\ncalendar days, provide weekly aerial patrols for one year not to exceed 8 days, weather\nand safety conditions permitting.\n3. Return to Service. BFPC must obtain written approval from the Director prior to\nresuming operation of the Isolated Segment of the pipeline.\n4. Excavation of Failure. BFPC must provide PHMSA with advance notice of at least\nthree business days prior to the failed section of pipe being excavated. BFPC must not\nconduct on-site testing or pipeline removal without a PHMSA Representative on site.\n5. Metallurgical Testing. Within 90 days of receipt of this Order, BFPC must complete\nmechanical and metallurgical testing and failure analysis of the failed pipe section,\nincluding analysis of the forces need to fail the pipe should it have occurred due to\nexternal loads. BFPC will complete the testing and analysis as follows.\na. Document the chain-of-custody when handling and transporting the failed pipe\nsection and other evidence from the Failure site;\nb. Within 10 days of receipt of this Order, develop and submit to the Director the\ntesting protocol, including selection of the testing laboratory, for prior approval;\n\n\n\nCPF No. 5-2016-5013H\nPage 6\nc. Prior to commencing the mechanical and metallurgical testing, provide the\nDirector with the scheduled date, time, and location of the testing to allow a\nPHMSA representative to witness the testing; and\nd. Ensure that the testing laboratory distributes all resulting reports in their entirety\n(including all media), whether draft or final, to the Director at the same time as\nthey are made available to Respondent.\n6. Root Cause Failure Analysis. Within 120 days following receipt of this Order, BFPC\nmust complete a root cause failure analysis that is supplemented and facilitated by an\nindependent third-party vendor acceptable to the Director. The root cause analysis must\ndocument all contributory factors and the decision-making process. BFPC must submit a\ntinal report of the root cause analysis to the Director, including any lessons learned and\nwhether the findings are applicable to other locations within the Affected Segment.\n7. Emergency Response. BFPC must review and assess the effectiveness of the emergency\nresponse, including implementation of the company's FRP, as related to the Failure,\nincluding response equipment, deployment actions, and training activities prior to the\nFailure, as well as on-scene response, coordination, communication, and support during\nthe Failure. BFPC must submit any revisions to PHMSA for review and approval prior to\nstarting up the Isolated Segment, but no later than 90 days.\n8. Geotechnical Evaluation of Existing HDD-installed Pipe Segments. Within 180 days\nof receipt of this Order, BFPC must complete a geohazard evaluation and analysis of the\nexisting HDD-installed pipe segments, the surrounding subsoil conditions, and any\nwaterways crossed within the Affected Segment, to ensure that the HDD-installed pipe\nsegments have been installed to minimize damage. The analysis shall be facilitated by an\nindependent third-party geotechnical specialist acceptable to the Director. The\ngeotechnical analysis must document soil parameters, topography, river flow, and other\ndesign factors when assessing the existing HDD-installed segments and evaluate whether\na significant risk of pipeline damage exists. Respondent must submit a final report of the\ngeohazard analysis of the existing HDD-installed segments to the Director, including any\nlessons learned and whether the findings are applicable to other locations within the\nAffected Segment.\n9. Future Geotechnical Evaluation and Remediation. Within 12 months of resuming\noperation, BFPC must perform a risk assessment of all slopes steeper than 3H:1V in\nproximity to the Affected Segment to determine whether slope movement could damage\nthe pipeline. BFPC must submit to the Director for approval an analysis and remediation\nplan of whether HDD crossings should be installed at these locations or whether the\npipeline should be rerouted or reinstalled deeper to avoid unstable areas.\n10. Records Verification. As recommended in PHMSA Advisory Bulletin 2012-06, BFPC\nmust verify the records\nfor the Affected Segment that confirm the operating\nspecifications for MOP. Within 30 days of receipt of this Order, BFPC must submit\nreports) on this record verification for the Affected Segment to the Director and make\nthe supporting records available. Within 90 days of receipt of this Order, BFPC must\n\n\n\nCPF No. 5-2016-5013H\nPage 7\nsubmit a report to the Director on the remaining portion of the Affected Segment and\nmake the supporting records available.\n11. In-line Inspection. Within two months of resuming operation of the Isolated Segment,\nBFPC must perform an ILI of the entire Affected Segment. The Director must provide\nprior approval of the final criteria and technology considerations taken into account in\nselecting the specific inspection tool. At a minimum, the ILI tool must be able to detect\ndeformation that may be resulting from externally-imposed stress, e.g. ground movement.\nThe data analysis must be completed within 60 days of successful completion of the ILI.\nThe ILI vendor must evaluate the results per a performance specification, including\nconsideration of the location and size of the defects and/or deformation. The ILI vendor\nmust distribute all reports in their entirety (including all media), whether preliminary or\nfinal, to the Director and the Respondent at the same time. Respondent must submit a\nfinal report to the Director with a comparison of the results of the ILI with the results of\nprevious ILIs, including criteria and a plan for remediation of anomalies.\n12. Reporting. BFPC must submit quarterly reports to the Director that: (1) include all\navailable data and results of the testing and evaluations required by this Order; and (2)\ndescribe the progress of the repairs or other remedial actions being undertaken. The first\nquarterly report is due on March 1, 2017. The Director may change the interval for the\nsubmission of these reports.\n13. Leak Detection. BFPC must install and implement leak-detection equipment that is\ncompliant with 49 C.F.R. 88 195.134, 195.444, and 195.452(i), according to API RP\n1130 requirements for the Affected Segment. Installation of devices should be completed\nwithin six months of receipt of this Order in accordance with a risk-based schedule\nprovided to PHMSA that meets the following requirements:\na. A high priority shall be placed on areas associated with the Little Missouri River\nand other water crossings over 100 feet wide.\nb. BFPC must implement instrumentation maintenance and a repair tracking system\nthat keeps all control room instruments functional and properly prioritized within\n30 days of being installed.\nc. Within nine months of receipt of this Order, BFPC must provide documentation\nof the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system for the\nAffected Segment. This shall include, but not be limited to, display reviews for\nconsistency with API RP 1165 application and added instrumentation, point-to-\npoint completed checkouts for leak detection, and associated instrumentation\nsuch as flow and pressure monitoring, low-low alarm pressure limits for those\npoints that do not operate in slack line condition, verification of the accuracy of\nall points, pressure cycle monitoring, implementation of pressure and flow rate\nmonitoring application where possible, and training operators on the system. A\nchange to the pipeline monitoring or operation locations may not result in\ndecreased operations monitoring or leak detection performance. If third parties\nare utilized for operations and monitoring control room activities, contracts shall\nbe kept current and performance of the third-party vendor periodically audited.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 5-2016-5013H\nPage 8\nIn addition to the above Corrective Action Items, PHMSA strongly encourages, but does not\norder, that Respondent implement a Safety Management System (SMS). API RP 1173 provides\nOther Requirements:\n1. Reporting. BFPC must submit monthly reports to the Director that: (1) include all\navailable data and results of the testing and evaluations required by this Order; and (2)\ndescribe the progress of the repairs or other remedial actions being undertaken. The first\nmonthly report is due on January 31, 2017. The Director may change the interval for the\nsubmission of these reports.\n2. Documentation of Costs. It is requested, but not required, that Respondent maintain\ndocumentation of the costs associated with implementation of this Order. BFPC should\ninclude in each monthly report the to-date total costs associated with: (1) preparation and\nrevision of procedures, studies and analyses; (2) physical changes to pipeline\ninfrastructure,\nincluding repairs, replacements and other modifications; and (3)\nenvironmental remediation, if applicable.\n3. Approvals. With respect to each submission requiring the approval of the Director, the\nDirector may: (a) approve the submission in whole or in part; (b) approve the submission\non specified conditions; (c) modify the submission to cure any deficiencies; (d)\ndisapprove the submission in whole or in part and direct Respondent to modify the\nsubmission; or (e) any combination of the above. In the event of approval, approval upon\nconditions, or modification by the Director, Respondent shall proceed to take all action\nrequired by the submission, as approved or modified by the Director. If the Director\ndisapproves all or any portion of a submission, Respondent must correct all deficiencies\nwithin the time specified by the Director and resubmit it for approval.\n4. Extensions of Time. The Director may grant an extension of time for compliance with\nany of the terms of this Order upon a written request timely submitted and demonstrating\ngood cause for an extension.\nThe actions required by this Corrective Action Order are in addition to and do not waive any\nrequirements that apply to Respondent's pipeline system under 49 C.F.R. Part 195, under any\nother order issued to Respondent under authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60101, et seq., or under any\nother provision of Federal or State law.\nRespondent may appeal any decision of the Director to the Associate Administrator for Pipeline\nSafety. Decisions of the Associate Administrator shall be final.\nBe advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being\nmade publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document you\nmust provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for\n\n\n\nCPF No. 5-2016-5013H\nPage 9\nconfidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information\nqualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b).\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties and in referral to\nthe Attorney General for appropriate relief in U.S. District Court pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60120.\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF No. 5-2016-5013H and for each\ndocument you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.\nThe terms and conditions of this Corrective Action Order are effective upon receipt.\nDEC 2 0 2016\nMauklans\nAlan K. Mayberry\nDate Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\n\n\n\nCPF No. 5-2016-5013H\nPage 10\nAffected Pipeline Segment\nBicentennial\n)58.4ml\nSkunk Hill\nLittle Missoun River\nLiltle Mo.\nRedto\nEast BV\nApprox. Recose\n0.0 m\n- 29.6 mi\n17.4 mi\nCerkoney BV\nTrestop\n21.6 Mi\nFat Rock Butte 55.3 ml\nLte Missouri River\nLact 2405\n21.0 mi\n(< Isolated Pipeline Segment. →)\nFigure 1. Affected Segment and Isolated Segment\nSkunk Hill to Bicentennial 6'\nProvided by Belle Fourche\n\n520165013H_Closure Letter_02022024_(16-155053S)_text.pdf\n\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: MR. H.A. TRUE, III\nFebruary 2, 2024\nMr. H. A. True, III\nPresident\nBelle Fourche Pipeline Company\nP.O. Box 2360\nCasper, WY 82602-2360\nCPF 5-2016-5013H\nClosure Letter\nDear Mr. True:\nOn December 20, 2016, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)\nissued to Belle Fourche Pipeline Company a Corrective Action Order in the above-referenced\ncase. This Order included a requirement to take corrective actions on your pipeline. Based on\nour review of the documentation you provided, it has been determined that you have complied\nwith the terms of this Order.\nAccordingly, this case is now closed, and no further action is contemplated with respect to the\nmatters involved in this case. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nDustin Hubbard\nDirector, Western Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\ncc: PHP-60 Compliance Registry\nPHP-500 Jeff Gilliam (#16-155053S)\n\n520165013H_HQ Post Hearing Decision Confirming CAO_03242017_text.pdf\n\nMarch 24, 2017\nVIA CERTIFIED MAIL AND FAX TO: 307-237-3164\nMr. H.A. True, III\nPresident\nBelle Fourche Pipeline Company\n455 N. Poplar Street\nP.O. Drawer 2360\nCasper, WY 82602\nRe: CPF No. 5-2016-5013H\nDear Mr. True:\nPlease find enclosed the Post-Hearing Decision regarding the Corrective Action Order issued to\nBelle Fourche Pipeline Company on December 20, 2016. The Decision confirms the Corrective\nAction Order with respect to the Bicentennial Pipeline system, with certain modifications. This\nDecision is being served by facsimile and certified mail in accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThe terms of the decision are effective upon receipt.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nAlan K. Mayberry\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Ms. Linda Daugherty, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, OPS\nMr. Chris Hoidal, Director, Western Region, OPS\nMr. Colin G. Harris, Faegre Baker Daniels LLP (via email to\ncolin.harris@Faegrebd.com)\nMs. Ann Prouty, Faegre Baker Daniels LLP (via email to ann.prouty@Faegrebd.com)\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nBelle Fourche Pipeline Company, ) CPF No. 5-2016-5013H\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nPOST-HEARING DECISION CONFIRMING\nCORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nOn December 20, 2016, the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety, Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), issued a Corrective\nAction Order (CAO) under authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60112 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.233, finding that\ncontinued operation by Belle Fourche Pipeline Company (Belle Fourche or Respondent) of its\nBicentennial Pipeline would be hazardous to life, property, or the environment. The CAO made\npreliminary findings that the hazards were associated with a failure of the pipeline discovered on\nDecember 5, 2016, and the hazards would continue unless certain corrective measures were\ntaken. The CAO also found that failure to issue the order expeditiously without prior notice\nwould result in a likelihood of serious harm to life, property, or the environment.\nThe Respondent requested review of the CAO to determine whether the order should remain in\neffect. In accordance with 49 C.F.R. §§ 190.211 and 190.233(c), a hearing was held on February\n21, 2017, in Denver, Colorado, before a Presiding Official from the Office of Chief Counsel,\nPHMSA.\nAt the hearing, the Respondent provided an overview of its pipeline system, discussed the factual\ncircumstances of the failure, and argued that the CAO should be terminated because OPS\nexceeded its statutory authority and relied on erroneous facts in issuing the CAO. In the\nalternative, Respondent requested that the terms of the corrective action be amended.\nI. Background\nOn December 5, 2016 (estimated time 10:30 a.m.), a landowner reported a spill to Belle\nFourche’s DOT Compliance Coordinator, who later confirmed the discharge from the Skunk Hill\nto Bicentennial pipeline system. It remains unknown exactly when the release started.\nRespondent initially estimated that 1200 barrels of crude oil were released, but later increased\n\n\n\nCPF No. 5-2016-5013H\nPage 2\nthat estimate to 12,6151 barrels on March 22, 2017. The crude oil was released into the Ash\nCoulee Creek due to a girth weld failure.2\nBelle Fourche Pipeline Company is a liquids pipeline operator that gathers and transports crude\noil. The company was founded in 1957 and is based in Casper, Wyoming. Belle Fourche Pipeline\nCompany operates as a subsidiary of True Companies, Inc.3The Skunk Hill to Bicentennial\npipeline system is approximately 58 miles long and transports Bakken crude oil westwards from\nthe Skunk Hill Pump Station in Billings County, North Dakota to the Bicentennial Station in\nMcKenzie County, North Dakota. The failure occurred in Billings County, North Dakota,\napproximately 16 miles south of Belfield. The maximum operating pressure (MOP) of the\npipeline is 1100 psig, established by hydrostatic test in 2013. The pressure at the point of the\nfailure was approximately 621 psig when the failure occurred.\nII. Standard for Reviewing Issuance of a Corrective Action Order\nThe authority for issuing a CAO is specified in 49 U.S.C. § 60112 and 49 C.F.R.\n§ 190.233. Under those provisions, the Associate Administrator may issue a CAO if a pipeline\nfacility is or would be hazardous to life, property, or the environment. Prior notice to the\noperator of the facility must be given before issuance of a CAO, but prior notice may be waived\nif the Associate Administrator finds that failure to do so would result in the likelihood of serious\nharm to life, property, or the environment. The CAO may include corrective measures including\nsuspended or restricted use of the facility, physical inspection, testing, repair, replacement, or\nother appropriate action.\nThe primary purpose of a hearing following issuance of a CAO without prior notice is to\ndetermine whether the CAO should remain in effect or be terminated or amended.4 If the\nAssociate Administrator finds that the facility is or would be hazardous to life, property, or the\nenvironment, the Associate administrator confirms the CAO. If the Associate Administrator\ndoes not find the facility is or would be hazardous, the Associate Administrator terminates the\norder.\nIn making such a determination, the Associate Administrator must consider, if relevant: (1) the\ncharacteristics of the pipe and other equipment used in the pipeline facility, including its age,\nmanufacturer, physical properties (including its resistance to corrosion and deterioration), and\nthe method of its manufacture, construction or assembly; (2) the nature of the materials\ntransported (including their corrosive and deteriorative qualities), the sequence in which the\nmaterials are transported, and the pressure required for such transportation; (3) the characteristics\nof the geographical areas in which the pipeline facility is located, in particular the climatic and\n1 Respondent provided a new (and higher) spill volume estimate in a supplemental accident report dated March 22,\n2017.\n2 The Ash Coulee Creek drains into the Little River Missouri River. The oil reached 4.5 miles downstream from the\nfailure site to the eastern edge of a High Consequence Area (HCA).\n3 http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=4440556.\n4 § 190.233(b).\n\n\n\nCPF No. 5-2016-5013H\nPage 3\ngeologic conditions (including soil characteristics) associated with such areas; (4) the proximity\nof the area in which the hazardous liquid pipeline facility is located to environmentally sensitive\nareas; (5) the population density and population and growth patterns of such areas; (6) any\nrecommendation of the National Transportation Safety Board made under another law; and (7)\nany other factors the Associate Administrator consider appropriate. The relevant factors are\nconsidered below.\n1. Characteristics of the Pipe\nThe Bicentennial Pipeline system was constructed between 1979 and 1990. The failure occurred\nin a 19-mile segment of the 58-mile Skunk Hill to Bicentennial Pipeline system, and is located\nbetween the Skunk Hill Pump Station and the Treetop Station. This particular segment was built\nin 1985 using 6-inch nominal diameter, API 5LX-42, 0.1880-inch wall thickness Electric\nResistance Welded (“ERW”) pipe.\nIn some respects, this system has classic components of a gathering system.5 However, in March\n2015, the system began to receive crude from an upstream liquid line, and became a regulated\nline. Yet, the system has “hydraulic characteristics of a gathering line” that constrain the\nRespondent’s ability to interpret the data that it receives from its leak detection system (or\n“LDS”). In other words, if the Bicentennial system were a classic regulated liquid line, (1) the\nsystem would operate at a steady pressure, and every barrel injected into its system could be\naccounted for; and (2) there would be no injection or withdrawal points along the length of the\npipeline. However, the Bicentennial system routinely operates in a low-pressure environment\ndue to shutdowns and input variations. Belle Fourche does not pump out of the Skunk Hill\nStation every day, and on average, the pipeline is shut down 3-6 times a month. In addition, the\nsystem has eleven lease automated custody transfer units (“LACTs”) that inject oil along the\npipeline.6 Imbalances in the line are not uncommon, and do not necessarily portend a leak or\nfailure.7\nThe Respondent’s LDS8 relies on volume balancing, or line balance. Skunk Hill is a metered\nstation at which discharge pressure and other data is collected, and then transmitted via satellite\nto the Casper control center. As mentioned above, there are 11 LACTs, along with other manual\ninjection points, that run the length of the system. The end of the system is also metered. Belle\nFourche monitors pressure flow trend displays and pressure flow alarm thresholds at Skunk Hill,\nand if pressure variations exceed thresholds, there are hi-lo alarms. Each pump along the\npipeline also has hi-lo alarms.\n5 “It has a history as a gathering system for most of the years. Since the older segments go back to 1979, it’s most\nsimply operated as a gathering system to Bicentennial.” Mr. Stamp, Belle Fourche Engineer, Transcript, Page 90:\n14-17.\n6 “The LACTs account for approximately 200 barrels per day of input, or less than 1% of the approximately 24,000\nbarrel daily flow of the Pipeline.”\n7 115:3-9.\n8 Exhibit 4, 13.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 5-2016-5013H\nPage 4\nNevertheless, PHMSA correctly notes that the system is correctly classified as a regulated liquid\nline, and that the Respondent could eliminate its slack line conditions via backpressure controls.9\n2. Nature of the materials transported\nThe Bicentennial Pipeline system transports Bakken crude oil. In the CAO, OPS pointed to the\nhazardous nature of the product being transported as one basis for its finding that continued\noperation of the Bicentennial pipeline would pose a hazard.10 There is no contrary evidence in\nthe record. When released into the environment, crude oil poses a serious risk of harm to\npersons, property, and the environment. This fact, coupled with the system’s proximity to high\nconsequence areas and waterways are significant considerations in assessing this pipeline\nsystem.\n3. Characteristics of the geographical area\nDuring the hearing, both sides vigorously disputed the extent to which the geography and\ntopography of the area affected the risk of a similar event across the pipeline system. In OPS’\nview, the majority of the system is in a landslide-prone area, and therefore susceptible to the\nk","truncated":true,"body_characters":100791}