# BELLE FOURCHE PIPELINE CO — Corrective Action Order

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** CPF 520165013H
- **title:** BELLE FOURCHE PIPELINE CO — Corrective Action Order
- **source type:** enforcement
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** historical
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2016-12-20
- **effective on:** Not available
- **summary:** CLOSED corrective action order.
- **machine formats:** - **json:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520165013h.json
- **markdown:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520165013h.md
- **app url:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520165013h
- **source url:** https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/520165013H
**body:**

Corrective Action Order involving BELLE FOURCHE PIPELINE CO. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2016-12-20 and is reported as closed as of 2024-02-02. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.

Official case documents:

520165013H_Closure Letter_02022024_(16-155053S).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520165013H/520165013H_Closure%20Letter_02022024_(16-155053S).pdf

520165013H_Closure Letter_02022024_(16-155053S)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520165013H/520165013H_Closure%20Letter_02022024_(16-155053S)_text.pdf

520165013H_Corrective Actioin Order_12202016_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520165013H/520165013H_Corrective%20Actioin%20Order_12202016_text.pdf

520165013H_Corrective Action Order_12202016.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520165013H/520165013H_Corrective%20Action%20Order_12202016.pdf

520165013H_HQ Post Hearing Decision Confirming CAO_03242017.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520165013H/520165013H_HQ%20Post%20Hearing%20Decision%20Confirming%20CAO_03242017.pdf

520165013H_HQ Post Hearing Decision Confirming CAO_03242017_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520165013H/520165013H_HQ%20Post%20Hearing%20Decision%20Confirming%20CAO_03242017_text.pdf

520165013H_PHC Consent Agreement and Order_07022018.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520165013H/520165013H_PHC%20Consent%20Agreement%20and%20Order_07022018.pdf

520165013H_PHC Consent Agreement and Order_07022018_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520165013H/520165013H_PHC%20Consent%20Agreement%20and%20Order_07022018_text.pdf

520165013H_Corrective Action Order_12202016.pdf

U.S. Department
of Transportation
Washington, DC 20590
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Materials Safety
Pipeline and Hazardous
Administration
VIA CERTIFIED MAIL AND FAX TO: 307-237-3164
December 20, 2016
Mr. H. A. True, III, President
Belle Fourche Pipeline Company
P.O. Box 2360
Casper, WY 82602-2360
Re: CPF No. 5-2016-5013H
Dear Mr. True:
Enclosed is a Corrective Action Order (CAO) issued in the above-referenced case. It requires
Belle Fourche Pipeline Company to take certain corrective actions with respect to the
Bicentennial Pipeline system that failed on December 5, 2016, near Belfield, North Dakota.
Service of this CAO is being made by certified mail and facsimile. Service of the CAO by
electronic transmission is deemed complete upon transmission and acknowledgement of receipt,
or as otherwise provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5. The terms and conditions of this Order are
effective upon completion of service.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
lan K. Mayberry
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety
Enclosure
CC:
Ms. Linda Daugherty, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, OPS
Mr. Chris Hoidal, Region Director, Western Region, OPS
Mr. Ken Dockweiler, Director of Land, Government & Compliance, Belle Fourche
Pipeline Company, P.O. Box 2360, Casper, Wyoming 82602
Mr. Jared Radosevich, Pipeline Compliance Coordinator, Belle Fourche Pipeline
Company, P.O. Box 2360, Casper, Wyoming 82602



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590
In the Matter of
)
)
Belle Fourche Pipeline Company,
)
CPF No. 5-2016-5013H
Respondent.
)
)
CORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER
Purpose and Background:
This Corrective Action Order (CAO or Order) is being issued, under the authority of 49 U.S.C.
§ 60112, to require Belle Fourche Pipeline Company (BFPC or Respondent), to take necessary
associated with the recent failure on BFPC's Bicentennial Pipeline system.
corrective action to protect the public, property, and environment from potential hazards
On December 5, 2016, an accident occurred on the Bicentennial Pipeline system, resulting in the
release of approximately 4,200 barrels of crude oil into the Ash Coulee Creek (the Failure).' The
Bicentennial line is a 6-inch diameter pipeline approximately 58 miles in length that transports
Bakken crude oil from Skunk Hill Pump Station in Billings County, North Dakota, to
Bicentennial Station in McKenzie County, North Dakota (Bicentennial Pipeline or Affected
Segment). See Figure 1. The cause of the Failure has not yet been determined. Pursuant to
49 U.S.C. § 60117, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA),
Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), initiated an investigation of the accident. The preliminary
findings of the ongoing investigation are as follows.
Preliminary Findings:
• BFPC gathers and transports crude oil in the Williston Basin of western North Dakota
and the Powder River Basin of Wyoming?
' On December 8, 2016, BFPC provided an initial spill estimate of 1,000 barrels. On December 12, 2016, BFPC
revised this amount to approximately 4,200 barrels based on the meter data.
" Belle Fourche Pipeline Company's website, available at http://www.bellefourchepipeline.com/ (last accessed
December 20, 2016).



CPF No. 5-2016-5013H
Page 2
• The tailed segment is a 6-inch diameter line that transports Bakken crude oll and run
rom Skunk Hill Pump Station to the Treetop Station, a distance of approximately I.
miles (Isolated Segment). The Failure occurred near Milepost (MP) 17.4 near Ash Coulee
Creek in Billings County, North Dakota (Failure Site). The oil traveled approximately
4.5 river miles downstream from the point of release into the eastern edge of a High
Consequence Area (HCA) (ecologically sensitive area).3 The Ash Coulee Creek
ultimately drains into the Little Missouri River. There are numerous other drainage paths
and creeks that the pipeline traverses that lead to the Little Missouri River. It appears
that much of the Affected Segment may affect HAs due to the topography and drainage
of the land.
• The Bicentennial Pipeline system was constructed between 1980 and 1990. A portion of
the Isolated Segment near the release site was replaced in 2013 using a Horizontal
Directional Drill (HDD). The new HDD-installed pipeline consists of 6-inch, 0.250-inch
wall thickness, Grade API 5LX-52 pipe. The new pipe was connected to the adjacent
thicknes, and Crade in 5212 hich constance binded diam) pipe. She ph wal
flowrate is fairly low.
• The maximum operating pressure (MOP) of the pipeline was 1100 psig, as established by
hydrostatic test in 2013. At the time of the Failure, the actual operating pressure of the
pipeline was 621 psig, as measured at the discharge pump at the Skunk Hill Station.
• At approximately 10:30 am MST, on December 5, 2016, a failure occurred on the
Bicentennial Pipeline in Billings County, North Dakota, resulting in the release of
approximately 4,200 barrels of crude oil into the Ash Coulee Creek. A rancher at the
release site discovered the release, which was not detected by BFPC's leak detection
system. The Failure was reported to the National Response Center (NRC Report No.
1165618) on December 5, 2016, at approximately 12:21 pm MST by Respondent. The
Failure was subsequently reported two more times: (1) a concerned citizen reported at
8:09 am MST on December 7, 2016, that there was a release into the Ash Coulee Creek
(NRC Report No. 1165786); and (2) the U.S. Forest Service Region 1 reported at 6:22
pm MST on December 9, 2016, that a pipeline in the Dakota Prairie Grasslands had an
equipment failure (NRC Report No. 1166008).
• It was difficult to access the failure site and investigate the accident due to weather
conditions in the area. The roads leading to Belfield, North Dakota were snowy and
covered in ice. Investigators had to travel off-road approximately 2 miles, and then walk
approximately 300 yards in 2-feet deep snow to reach the release site. Because there were
numerous ground fissures covered by the snowfall, investigators had to walk directly
behind one another to avoid falling into crevices. Temperatures ranged from minus 20-
30° F.
3 According to 49 C.F.R. § 195.450, a "High Consequence Area" is (1) a commercially navigable waterway, (2) a
in § 195.6.
high population area, (3) an "other populated area," or (4) "an unusually sensitive area," as more specifically defined



CPF No. 5-2016-5013H
Page 3
• Immediately following discovery of the Failure, BFPC halted operation of the Isolated
Segment, physically isolated the failed pipeline segment from the Skunk Hill Pump
Station to the Treetop Station (a distance of approximately 19 miles), and closed the
manually-operated block valves on both sides of the release location. The Isolated
Segment was then drained of product. Booms were installed on the Ash Coulee Creek at
the three- and four-mile marks on December 5, 2016, and additional booms were
installed downstream two days later. The migration of crude oil has stopped and clean up
has begun along the creek.
• Various state and federal agencies responded to the scene, including PHMSA, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the North Dakota Department of Health.
• The cause of the Failure is unknown and the investigation is ongoing. It appears that there
has been ground movement in the area of the Failure, as indicated by numerous ground
estimated to be in the HDD-installed segment installed in 2013. The HDD places the pipe
fissures and slope sloughing along the pipeline right-of-way (ROW). The release site is
at approximately 45 feet below the ground surface. BFPC plans to excavate the failed
pipe once excavation can be accomplished safely.
• Although the Failure investigation is ongoing, and this analysis may change, the release
site may be where the pipeline experienced compressive or other bending forces within
the slope failure. Although the cause of the Failure is not yet determined, this type of
excessive stress and strain imposed by land movement could occur in other areas of the
pipeline system where similar conditions exist. It appears that a majority of the Affected
Segment traverses similar topographic features prone to slope instability.
• The accident did not cause any known injuries. According to the EPA, the release appears
to have entered the Little Missouri National Grassland, and may have caused some
grazing cattle to become ill or die."
• In 2004 and 2009, PHMSA conducted Integrity Management Plan (IMP) inspections on
BFPC. Both inspections revealed that portions of BFPC's pipeline system lacked accurate
or timely leak-detection systems.
• On January 23, 2015, PHMSA issued a CAO to Bridger Pipeline, LLC (Bridger), for a
failure that occurred on January 17, 2015, and resulted in a release of crude oil into the
Yellowstone River (CPF 5-2015-5003H). Item 10 of the CAO ordered Bridger to review
and assess the effectiveness of its emergency response plan and facility response plan
(FRP). BFPC's Bicentennial Pipeline and Bridger are covered by the same FRP.
PHMSA has received and reviewed the FRP for the North Dakota, Montana, and
Wyoming Response Zones, dated July 2016. This FRP, however, does not adequately
address Item 10 of the 2015 CAO and has been deemed inadequate for other systems,
including the Bicentennial Pipeline system.
* According to the North Dakota Department of Health, there were at least two cows confirmed dead in the area of
the oil spill, but the cause of death has not been verified by a veterinarian.



CPF No. 5-2016-5013H
Page 4
• In April 2016, a third-party vender performed an in-line inspection (ILI) of the
Bicentennial Pipeline. As part of its investigation of the Failure, PHMSA is reviewing
the ILI vendor results to insure BFPC had met the required remediation upon discovery
of any anomalies on the pipeline. PHMSA has requested but has not yet received the
report from the 2016 ILI runs.
Determination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing:
Section 60112 of Title 49, United States Code, provides for the issuance of a Corrective Action
Order, atter reasonable notice and the opportunity for a hearing, requiring corrective action,
which may include the suspended or restricted use of a pipeline facility, physical inspection,
testing, repair, replacement, or other action, as appropriate. The basis for making the
determination that a pipeline facility is or would be hazardous, requiring corrective action, is set
forth both in the above-referenced statute and 49 C.F.R. § 190.233, a copy of which is enclosed.
Section 60112 and the regulations promulgated thereunder provide for the issuance of a
Corrective Action Order, without prior notice and opportunity for hearing, upon a finding that
failure to issue the Order expeditiously would result in the likelihood of serious harm to life,
property, or the environment. In such cases, an opportunity for a hearing and expedited review
will be provided as soon as practicable after the issuance of the Order.
After evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, I find that continued operation of the
pipeline without corrective measures is or would be hazardous to life, property, or the
environment. Additionally, having considered the location of the Failure, the hazardous nature
of the product being transported, the proximity of the pipeline to ecologically sensitive areas, the
fact that the release was not detected by Respondent's leak detection system, the inaccessibility
of the pipe, and the ongoing investigations to determine the cause of the Failure, I find that a
failure to issue this Order expeditiously to require immediate corrective action would result in
the likelihood of serious harm to life, property, or the environment.
Accordingly, this Corrective Action Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued
without prior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Order are
effective upon receipt.
Within 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may contest its issuance obtain expedited
review either by answering in writing or requesting a hearing under 49 C.F.R. § 190.211, to be
held as soon as practicable under the terms of such regulation, by notifying the Associate
Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, with a copy to the Director, Western Region,
i the tens, wit
PHMSA (Director). If Respondent requests a hearing, it will be held telephonically or in-person
in Lakewood, Colorado.
After receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may
identify other corrective measures that need to be taken. In that event, PHMSA will notify
Respondent of any additional measures that are required and an amended Order issued, if
necessary. To the extent consistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an
opportunity for a hearing prior to the imposition of any additional corrective measures.



CPF No. 5-2016-5013H
Page 5
Required Corrective Actions:
Definitions:
Affected Segment - The Affected Segment is Respondent's crude-oil Bicentennial
Pipeline system that runs approximately 58 miles in length, from the Skunk Hill Pump
Station in Billings County, North Dakota, to the Bicentennial Station in McKenzie
County, North Dakota, as illustrated in Figure 1.
Director - The Director means the Director, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety, Western Region.
Isolated Segment - The Isolated Segment is that portion of the Affected Segment running
approximately 19 miles from the Skunk Hill Pump Station to the Treetop Pump Station,
as illustrated in Figure 1.
Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60112, I hereby order BFPC to immediately take the following
corrective actions for the Affected Segment (including the Isolated Segment):
1. Shutdown of Isolated Segment. BFPC must not operate the Isolated Segment until
authorized to do so by the Director.
2. Aerial Patrols of Affected Segment. BFPC must provide daily aerial patrols of the
Affected Segment for the next 14 calendar days from the date of this Order. One of the
aerial patrols during this time must utilize Forward Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR) or
equivalent technology to locate any areas of potential crude oil leakage. After the next 14
calendar days, provide weekly aerial patrols for one year not to exceed 8 days, weather
and safety conditions permitting.
3. Return to Service. BFPC must obtain written approval from the Director prior to
resuming operation of the Isolated Segment of the pipeline.
4. Excavation of Failure. BFPC must provide PHMSA with advance notice of at least
three business days prior to the failed section of pipe being excavated. BFPC must not
conduct on-site testing or pipeline removal without a PHMSA Representative on site.
5. Metallurgical Testing. Within 90 days of receipt of this Order, BFPC must complete
mechanical and metallurgical testing and failure analysis of the failed pipe section,
including analysis of the forces need to fail the pipe should it have occurred due to
external loads. BFPC will complete the testing and analysis as follows.
a. Document the chain-of-custody when handling and transporting the failed pipe
section and other evidence from the Failure site;
b. Within 10 days of receipt of this Order, develop and submit to the Director the
testing protocol, including selection of the testing laboratory, for prior approval;



CPF No. 5-2016-5013H
Page 6
c. Prior to commencing the mechanical and metallurgical testing, provide the
Director with the scheduled date, time, and location of the testing to allow a
PHMSA representative to witness the testing; and
d. Ensure that the testing laboratory distributes all resulting reports in their entirety
(including all media), whether draft or final, to the Director at the same time as
they are made available to Respondent.
6. Root Cause Failure Analysis. Within 120 days following receipt of this Order, BFPC
must complete a root cause failure analysis that is supplemented and facilitated by an
independent third-party vendor acceptable to the Director. The root cause analysis must
document all contributory factors and the decision-making process. BFPC must submit a
tinal report of the root cause analysis to the Director, including any lessons learned and
whether the findings are applicable to other locations within the Affected Segment.
7. Emergency Response. BFPC must review and assess the effectiveness of the emergency
response, including implementation of the company's FRP, as related to the Failure,
including response equipment, deployment actions, and training activities prior to the
Failure, as well as on-scene response, coordination, communication, and support during
the Failure. BFPC must submit any revisions to PHMSA for review and approval prior to
starting up the Isolated Segment, but no later than 90 days.
8. Geotechnical Evaluation of Existing HDD-installed Pipe Segments. Within 180 days
of receipt of this Order, BFPC must complete a geohazard evaluation and analysis of the
existing HDD-installed pipe segments, the surrounding subsoil conditions, and any
waterways crossed within the Affected Segment, to ensure that the HDD-installed pipe
segments have been installed to minimize damage. The analysis shall be facilitated by an
independent third-party geotechnical specialist acceptable to the Director. The
geotechnical analysis must document soil parameters, topography, river flow, and other
design factors when assessing the existing HDD-installed segments and evaluate whether
a significant risk of pipeline damage exists. Respondent must submit a final report of the
geohazard analysis of the existing HDD-installed segments to the Director, including any
lessons learned and whether the findings are applicable to other locations within the
Affected Segment.
9. Future Geotechnical Evaluation and Remediation. Within 12 months of resuming
operation, BFPC must perform a risk assessment of all slopes steeper than 3H:1V in
proximity to the Affected Segment to determine whether slope movement could damage
the pipeline. BFPC must submit to the Director for approval an analysis and remediation
plan of whether HDD crossings should be installed at these locations or whether the
pipeline should be rerouted or reinstalled deeper to avoid unstable areas.
10. Records Verification. As recommended in PHMSA Advisory Bulletin 2012-06, BFPC
must verify the records
for the Affected Segment that confirm the operating
specifications for MOP. Within 30 days of receipt of this Order, BFPC must submit
reports) on this record verification for the Affected Segment to the Director and make
the supporting records available. Within 90 days of receipt of this Order, BFPC must



CPF No. 5-2016-5013H
Page 7
submit a report to the Director on the remaining portion of the Affected Segment and
make the supporting records available.
11. In-line Inspection. Within two months of resuming operation of the Isolated Segment,
BFPC must perform an ILI of the entire Affected Segment. The Director must provide
prior approval of the final criteria and technology considerations taken into account in
selecting the specific inspection tool. At a minimum, the ILI tool must be able to detect
deformation that may be resulting from externally-imposed stress, e.g. ground movement.
The data analysis must be completed within 60 days of successful completion of the ILI.
The ILI vendor must evaluate the results per a performance specification, including
consideration of the location and size of the defects and/or deformation. The ILI vendor
must distribute all reports in their entirety (including all media), whether preliminary or
final, to the Director and the Respondent at the same time. Respondent must submit a
final report to the Director with a comparison of the results of the ILI with the results of
previous ILIs, including criteria and a plan for remediation of anomalies.
12. Reporting. BFPC must submit quarterly reports to the Director that: (1) include all
available data and results of the testing and evaluations required by this Order; and (2)
describe the progress of the repairs or other remedial actions being undertaken. The first
quarterly report is due on March 1, 2017. The Director may change the interval for the
submission of these reports.
13. Leak Detection. BFPC must install and implement leak-detection equipment that is
compliant with 49 C.F.R. 88 195.134, 195.444, and 195.452(i), according to API RP
1130 requirements for the Affected Segment. Installation of devices should be completed
within six months of receipt of this Order in accordance with a risk-based schedule
provided to PHMSA that meets the following requirements:
a. A high priority shall be placed on areas associated with the Little Missouri River
and other water crossings over 100 feet wide.
b. BFPC must implement instrumentation maintenance and a repair tracking system
that keeps all control room instruments functional and properly prioritized within
30 days of being installed.
c. Within nine months of receipt of this Order, BFPC must provide documentation
of the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system for the
Affected Segment. This shall include, but not be limited to, display reviews for
consistency with API RP 1165 application and added instrumentation, point-to-
point completed checkouts for leak detection, and associated instrumentation
such as flow and pressure monitoring, low-low alarm pressure limits for those
points that do not operate in slack line condition, verification of the accuracy of
all points, pressure cycle monitoring, implementation of pressure and flow rate
monitoring application where possible, and training operators on the system. A
change to the pipeline monitoring or operation locations may not result in
decreased operations monitoring or leak detection performance. If third parties
are utilized for operations and monitoring control room activities, contracts shall
be kept current and performance of the third-party vendor periodically audited.



CPF No. 5-2016-5013H
Page 8
In addition to the above Corrective Action Items, PHMSA strongly encourages, but does not
order, that Respondent implement a Safety Management System (SMS). API RP 1173 provides
Other Requirements:
1. Reporting. BFPC must submit monthly reports to the Director that: (1) include all
available data and results of the testing and evaluations required by this Order; and (2)
describe the progress of the repairs or other remedial actions being undertaken. The first
monthly report is due on January 31, 2017. The Director may change the interval for the
submission of these reports.
2. Documentation of Costs. It is requested, but not required, that Respondent maintain
documentation of the costs associated with implementation of this Order. BFPC should
include in each monthly report the to-date total costs associated with: (1) preparation and
revision of procedures, studies and analyses; (2) physical changes to pipeline
infrastructure,
including repairs, replacements and other modifications; and (3)
environmental remediation, if applicable.
3. Approvals. With respect to each submission requiring the approval of the Director, the
Director may: (a) approve the submission in whole or in part; (b) approve the submission
on specified conditions; (c) modify the submission to cure any deficiencies; (d)
disapprove the submission in whole or in part and direct Respondent to modify the
submission; or (e) any combination of the above. In the event of approval, approval upon
conditions, or modification by the Director, Respondent shall proceed to take all action
required by the submission, as approved or modified by the Director. If the Director
disapproves all or any portion of a submission, Respondent must correct all deficiencies
within the time specified by the Director and resubmit it for approval.
4. Extensions of Time. The Director may grant an extension of time for compliance with
any of the terms of this Order upon a written request timely submitted and demonstrating
good cause for an extension.
The actions required by this Corrective Action Order are in addition to and do not waive any
requirements that apply to Respondent's pipeline system under 49 C.F.R. Part 195, under any
other order issued to Respondent under authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60101, et seq., or under any
other provision of Federal or State law.
Respondent may appeal any decision of the Director to the Associate Administrator for Pipeline
Safety. Decisions of the Associate Administrator shall be final.
Be advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being
made publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for
confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document you
must provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for



CPF No. 5-2016-5013H
Page 9
confidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information
qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b).
Failure to comply with this Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties and in referral to
the Attorney General for appropriate relief in U.S. District Court pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60120.
In your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF No. 5-2016-5013H and for each
document you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.
The terms and conditions of this Corrective Action Order are effective upon receipt.
DEC 2 0 2016
Mauklans
Alan K. Mayberry
Date Issued
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety



CPF No. 5-2016-5013H
Page 10
Affected Pipeline Segment
Bicentennial
)58.4ml
Skunk Hill
Little Missoun River
Liltle Mo.
Redto
East BV
Approx. Recose
0.0 m
- 29.6 mi
17.4 mi
Cerkoney BV
Trestop
21.6 Mi
Fat Rock Butte 55.3 ml
Lte Missouri River
Lact 2405
21.0 mi
(< Isolated Pipeline Segment. →)
Figure 1. Affected Segment and Isolated Segment
Skunk Hill to Bicentennial 6'
Provided by Belle Fourche

520165013H_Closure Letter_02022024_(16-155053S)_text.pdf

VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: MR. H.A. TRUE, III
February 2, 2024
Mr. H. A. True, III
President
Belle Fourche Pipeline Company
P.O. Box 2360
Casper, WY 82602-2360
CPF 5-2016-5013H
Closure Letter
Dear Mr. True:
On December 20, 2016, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)
issued to Belle Fourche Pipeline Company a Corrective Action Order in the above-referenced
case. This Order included a requirement to take corrective actions on your pipeline. Based on
our review of the documentation you provided, it has been determined that you have complied
with the terms of this Order.
Accordingly, this case is now closed, and no further action is contemplated with respect to the
matters involved in this case. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Dustin Hubbard
Director, Western Region
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
cc: PHP-60 Compliance Registry
PHP-500 Jeff Gilliam (#16-155053S)

520165013H_HQ Post Hearing Decision Confirming CAO_03242017_text.pdf

March 24, 2017
VIA CERTIFIED MAIL AND FAX TO: 307-237-3164
Mr. H.A. True, III
President
Belle Fourche Pipeline Company
455 N. Poplar Street
P.O. Drawer 2360
Casper, WY 82602
Re: CPF No. 5-2016-5013H
Dear Mr. True:
Please find enclosed the Post-Hearing Decision regarding the Corrective Action Order issued to
Belle Fourche Pipeline Company on December 20, 2016. The Decision confirms the Corrective
Action Order with respect to the Bicentennial Pipeline system, with certain modifications. This
Decision is being served by facsimile and certified mail in accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.
The terms of the decision are effective upon receipt.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Alan K. Mayberry
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety
Enclosure
cc: Ms. Linda Daugherty, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, OPS
Mr. Chris Hoidal, Director, Western Region, OPS
Mr. Colin G. Harris, Faegre Baker Daniels LLP (via email to
colin.harris@Faegrebd.com)
Ms. Ann Prouty, Faegre Baker Daniels LLP (via email to ann.prouty@Faegrebd.com)
CERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590
____________________________________
In the Matter of )
Belle Fourche Pipeline Company, ) CPF No. 5-2016-5013H
)
)
)
Respondent. )
____________________________________)
POST-HEARING DECISION CONFIRMING
CORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER
On December 20, 2016, the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety, Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), issued a Corrective
Action Order (CAO) under authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60112 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.233, finding that
continued operation by Belle Fourche Pipeline Company (Belle Fourche or Respondent) of its
Bicentennial Pipeline would be hazardous to life, property, or the environment. The CAO made
preliminary findings that the hazards were associated with a failure of the pipeline discovered on
December 5, 2016, and the hazards would continue unless certain corrective measures were
taken. The CAO also found that failure to issue the order expeditiously without prior notice
would result in a likelihood of serious harm to life, property, or the environment.
The Respondent requested review of the CAO to determine whether the order should remain in
effect. In accordance with 49 C.F.R. §§ 190.211 and 190.233(c), a hearing was held on February
21, 2017, in Denver, Colorado, before a Presiding Official from the Office of Chief Counsel,
PHMSA.
At the hearing, the Respondent provided an overview of its pipeline system, discussed the factual
circumstances of the failure, and argued that the CAO should be terminated because OPS
exceeded its statutory authority and relied on erroneous facts in issuing the CAO. In the
alternative, Respondent requested that the terms of the corrective action be amended.
I. Background
On December 5, 2016 (estimated time 10:30 a.m.), a landowner reported a spill to Belle
Fourche’s DOT Compliance Coordinator, who later confirmed the discharge from the Skunk Hill
to Bicentennial pipeline system. It remains unknown exactly when the release started.
Respondent initially estimated that 1200 barrels of crude oil were released, but later increased



CPF No. 5-2016-5013H
Page 2
that estimate to 12,6151 barrels on March 22, 2017. The crude oil was released into the Ash
Coulee Creek due to a girth weld failure.2
Belle Fourche Pipeline Company is a liquids pipeline operator that gathers and transports crude
oil. The company was founded in 1957 and is based in Casper, Wyoming. Belle Fourche Pipeline
Company operates as a subsidiary of True Companies, Inc.3The Skunk Hill to Bicentennial
pipeline system is approximately 58 miles long and transports Bakken crude oil westwards from
the Skunk Hill Pump Station in Billings County, North Dakota to the Bicentennial Station in
McKenzie County, North Dakota. The failure occurred in Billings County, North Dakota,
approximately 16 miles south of Belfield. The maximum operating pressure (MOP) of the
pipeline is 1100 psig, established by hydrostatic test in 2013. The pressure at the point of the
failure was approximately 621 psig when the failure occurred.
II. Standard for Reviewing Issuance of a Corrective Action Order
The authority for issuing a CAO is specified in 49 U.S.C. § 60112 and 49 C.F.R.
§ 190.233. Under those provisions, the Associate Administrator may issue a CAO if a pipeline
facility is or would be hazardous to life, property, or the environment. Prior notice to the
operator of the facility must be given before issuance of a CAO, but prior notice may be waived
if the Associate Administrator finds that failure to do so would result in the likelihood of serious
harm to life, property, or the environment. The CAO may include corrective measures including
suspended or restricted use of the facility, physical inspection, testing, repair, replacement, or
other appropriate action.
The primary purpose of a hearing following issuance of a CAO without prior notice is to
determine whether the CAO should remain in effect or be terminated or amended.4 If the
Associate Administrator finds that the facility is or would be hazardous to life, property, or the
environment, the Associate administrator confirms the CAO. If the Associate Administrator
does not find the facility is or would be hazardous, the Associate Administrator terminates the
order.
In making such a determination, the Associate Administrator must consider, if relevant: (1) the
characteristics of the pipe and other equipment used in the pipeline facility, including its age,
manufacturer, physical properties (including its resistance to corrosion and deterioration), and
the method of its manufacture, construction or assembly; (2) the nature of the materials
transported (including their corrosive and deteriorative qualities), the sequence in which the
materials are transported, and the pressure required for such transportation; (3) the characteristics
of the geographical areas in which the pipeline facility is located, in particular the climatic and
1 Respondent provided a new (and higher) spill volume estimate in a supplemental accident report dated March 22,
2017.
2 The Ash Coulee Creek drains into the Little River Missouri River. The oil reached 4.5 miles downstream from the
failure site to the eastern edge of a High Consequence Area (HCA).
3 http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=4440556.
4 § 190.233(b).



CPF No. 5-2016-5013H
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geologic conditions (including soil characteristics) associated with such areas; (4) the proximity
of the area in which the hazardous liquid pipeline facility is located to environmentally sensitive
areas; (5) the population density and population and growth patterns of such areas; (6) any
recommendation of the National Transportation Safety Board made under another law; and (7)
any other factors the Associate Administrator consider appropriate. The relevant factors are
considered below.
1. Characteristics of the Pipe
The Bicentennial Pipeline system was constructed between 1979 and 1990. The failure occurred
in a 19-mile segment of the 58-mile Skunk Hill to Bicentennial Pipeline system, and is located
between the Skunk Hill Pump Station and the Treetop Station. This particular segment was built
in 1985 using 6-inch nominal diameter, API 5LX-42, 0.1880-inch wall thickness Electric
Resistance Welded (“ERW”) pipe.
In some respects, this system has classic components of a gathering system.5 However, in March
2015, the system began to receive crude from an upstream liquid line, and became a regulated
line. Yet, the system has “hydraulic characteristics of a gathering line” that constrain the
Respondent’s ability to interpret the data that it receives from its leak detection system (or
“LDS”). In other words, if the Bicentennial system were a classic regulated liquid line, (1) the
system would operate at a steady pressure, and every barrel injected into its system could be
accounted for; and (2) there would be no injection or withdrawal points along the length of the
pipeline. However, the Bicentennial system routinely operates in a low-pressure environment
due to shutdowns and input variations. Belle Fourche does not pump out of the Skunk Hill
Station every day, and on average, the pipeline is shut down 3-6 times a month. In addition, the
system has eleven lease automated custody transfer units (“LACTs”) that inject oil along the
pipeline.6 Imbalances in the line are not uncommon, and do not necessarily portend a leak or
failure.7
The Respondent’s LDS8 relies on volume balancing, or line balance. Skunk Hill is a metered
station at which discharge pressure and other data is collected, and then transmitted via satellite
to the Casper control center. As mentioned above, there are 11 LACTs, along with other manual
injection points, that run the length of the system. The end of the system is also metered. Belle
Fourche monitors pressure flow trend displays and pressure flow alarm thresholds at Skunk Hill,
and if pressure variations exceed thresholds, there are hi-lo alarms. Each pump along the
pipeline also has hi-lo alarms.
5 “It has a history as a gathering system for most of the years. Since the older segments go back to 1979, it’s most
simply operated as a gathering system to Bicentennial.” Mr. Stamp, Belle Fourche Engineer, Transcript, Page 90:
14-17.
6 “The LACTs account for approximately 200 barrels per day of input, or less than 1% of the approximately 24,000
barrel daily flow of the Pipeline.”
7 115:3-9.
8 Exhibit 4, 13.



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Nevertheless, PHMSA correctly notes that the system is correctly classified as a regulated liquid
line, and that the Respondent could eliminate its slack line conditions via backpressure controls.9
2. Nature of the materials transported
The Bicentennial Pipeline system transports Bakken crude oil. In the CAO, OPS pointed to the
hazardous nature of the product being transported as one basis for its finding that continued
operation of the Bicentennial pipeline would pose a hazard.10 There is no contrary evidence in
the record. When released into the environment, crude oil poses a serious risk of harm to
persons, property, and the environment. This fact, coupled with the system’s proximity to high
consequence areas and waterways are significant considerations in assessing this pipeline
system.
3. Characteristics of the geographical area
During the hearing, both sides vigorously disputed the extent to which the geography and
topography of the area affected the risk of a similar event across the pipeline system. In OPS’
view, the majority of the system is in a landslide-prone area, and therefore susceptible to the
k
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