{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 520166006W","title":"SFPP, LP — Warning Letter","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2016-08-25","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED warning letter citing 195.260(e), 195.452(i)(1), 195.452(i)(4).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520166006w.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520166006w.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520166006w","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/520166006W","body":"Warning Letter involving SFPP, LP. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.260(e),  195.452(i)(1),  195.452(i)(4). The case was opened on 2016-08-25 and is reported as closed as of 2016-08-25. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n520166006W_Operator Response to Notice_02072017.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520166006W/520166006W_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice_02072017.pdf\n\n520166006W_Warning Letter_08252016.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520166006W/520166006W_Warning%20Letter_08252016.pdf\n\n520166006W_Warning Letter_08252016_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520166006W/520166006W_Warning%20Letter_08252016_text.pdf\n\n520166006W_Warning Letter_08252016_text.pdf\n\nWARNING LETTER\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nAugust 25, 2016\nMr. Ron McClain\nVice President of Operations and Engineering\nKinder Morgan Energy Partners, L. P., Products Pipelines\n500 Dallas Street\nHouston, TX 77002\nCPF 5-2016-6006W\nDear Mr. McClain:\nOn June 9-13, 2014, a representative of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration (PHMSA), pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code, inspected your\nrefined products pipeline, Line Section 14 (LS-14), from Portland to Eugene, Oregon. After\ncompletion of our inspection, our staff had on-going concerns regarding Kinder Morgan’s\nintegrity management program for this pipeline. Your representatives and PHMSA staff met\nin Lakewood on June 30, 2016 to gather more data about your integrity management program,\nspecifically how Kinder Morgan was complying with the Federal pipeline safety requirements\non Preventative and Mitigative measures for Integrity Management.\nAs a result of the inspection and our recent follow up compliance meeting, it appears that you\nhave committed a probable violation of the Pipeline Safety Regulations, Title 49, Code of\nFederal Regulations. The items inspected and the probable violation is:\n1. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(i) What preventive and mitigative measures must an operator take to protect the\nhigh consequence area?—(1) General requirements. An operator must take\nmeasures to prevent and mitigate the consequences of a pipeline failure that\ncould affect a high consequence area. These measures include conducting a risk\nanalysis of the pipeline segment to identify additional actions to enhance public\n\n\n\nsafety or environmental protection. Such actions may include, but are not limited\nto, implementing damage prevention best practices, better monitoring of cathodic\nprotection where corrosion is a concern, establishing shorter inspection intervals,\ninstalling EFRDs on the pipeline segment, modifying the systems that monitor\npressure and detect leaks, providing additional training to personnel on response\nprocedures, conducting drills with local emergency responders and adopting\nother management controls.\n(4) Emergency Flow Restricting Devices (EFRD). If an operator determines that\nan EFRD is needed on a pipeline segment to protect a high consequence area in\nthe event of a hazardous liquid pipeline release, an operator must install the\nEFRD. In making this determination, an operator must, at least, consider the\nfollowing factors—the swiftness of leak detection and pipeline shutdown\ncapabilities, the type of commodity carried, the rate of potential leakage, the\nvolume that can be released, topography or pipeline profile, the potential for\nignition, proximity to power sources, location of nearest response personnel,\nspecific terrain between the pipeline segment and the high consequence area, and\nbenefits expected by reducing the spill size.\nKinder Morgan (KM) did not consider all of the minimum factors required by §195.452 (i)(4)\nwhen determining the need for Emergency Flow Restriction Devices to protect high\nconsequence areas (HCAs). Line Section 14 (LS-14) which extends from Portland to Eugene\ncrosses the Willamette River or its tributaries at multiple locations. At one (1) Willamette\nRiver crossing, pipeline Milepost (MP) 23.4, the waterway is greater than 100 feet wide\nwhich if LS-14 was constructed today would require valves on both sides of the water\ncrossing per 195.260(e). Since LS-14 was constructed before the Federal pipeline safety\nregulations were issued, that code requirement is not retroactively applicable.\nThe need for additional Emergency Flow Restricting Devices (EFRD) are, however, required\nunder the Integrity Management regulations and apply to all hazardous liquid pipelines that\ncould affect High Consequence Areas (HCA) regardless of when the pipelines were\nconstructed. In person discussions on June 30, 2016 and records provided on July 8, 2016\nindicate that EFRD studies to determine the need for addition valves were conducted and\nconcluded on June 5, 2009 and February 20, 2012. While two EFRD enhancements were\nconsidered at Stations 190,321 (MP 36) and 519,642 (MP 98.3), KM decided in their EFRD\nProject Closure Report, dated February 20, 2012, to not install either valve enhancement.\nDetailed rationale for dropping of the EFRD projects was not given other than quoting that the\nBusiness Unit Engineering and Operations teams considered the factors in the Federal\nregulations.\n2\n\n\n\nFurthermore, it does not appear that evaluation of all Willamette River crossings were\nformally evaluated in the EFRD studies conducted in 2009 and 2012. Our inspector noted\nthat at the MP 23.4 river crossing, there are two (2) motor operated valves (MOVs) on either\nside of the river, but they are over 11 miles apart, one at MP 15.35 and one at MP 27.05.\nThere is a nearer block valve north of the river at MP 22.94 but it is manually operated. There\nis no valve near the south side of the river. During our June 30th meeting, KM representatives\nstated the expected reduction of a guillotine spill event into the Willamette River at this\nlocation would be 673.07 barrels should they place valves adjacent to the river.\nThe Willamette River is one of 14 waterways in the American Heritage Rivers Protection\nProgram. It contributes 12 to 15 percent of the total flow of the Columbia River and traverses\nmany ecologically sensitive and populated areas. The Willamette's flow varies considerably\nseason to season, averaging about 8,200 cubic feet per second in August to more than 79,000\ncubic feet per second in December. Not to include a detailed EFRD evaluation at the\nWillamette crossings does not address all of the mandatory factors for evaluating EFRDs,\nespecially considering that your current valve placement would not meet today’s minimum\nstandards. Specifically, past evaluations did not address the volume that can be released, the\nunique nature of the high consequence area, and benefits expected by reducing the spill size.\nKM must conduct and document detailed EFRD studies for the LS-14 crossings of the\nWillamette River in Oregon. KM must also specify why they did not pursue completion of the\nother EFRDs proposed in 2009 and 2012.\nUnder 49 United States Code, § 60122, you are subject to a civil penalty not to exceed\n$200,000 per violation per day the violation persists up to a maximum of $2,000,000 for a\nrelated series of violations. For violations occurring prior to January 4, 2012, the maximum\npenalty may not exceed $100,000 per violation per day, with a maximum penalty not to\nexceed $1,000,000 for a related series of violations. We have reviewed the circumstances and\nsupporting documents involved in this case, and have decided not to conduct additional\nenforcement action or penalty assessment proceedings at this time. We advise you to correct\nthe item(s) identified in this letter.\nNo reply to this letter is required. If you choose to reply, in your correspondence please refer\nto CPF 5-2016-6006W. Be advised that all material you submit in response to this\nenforcement action is subject to being made publicly available. If you believe that any\nportion of your responsive material qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b),\nalong with the complete original document you must provide a second copy of the document\nwith the portions you believe qualify for confidential treatment redacted and an explanation of\nwhy you believe the redacted information qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C.\n552(b).\n3\n\n\n\nPHMSA does apologize for any inconvenience or confusion that this delayed enforcement\nletter might cause. If there are any questions concerning this letter, please do not hesitate to\ncontact me at (720) 963-3160. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nChris Hoidal\nDirector, Western Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\ncc: PHP-60 Compliance Registry\nPHP-500 H. Monfared (#145281)\n4","truncated":false,"body_characters":8854}