{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 520166011","title":"AIRCRAFT SERVICES INTERNATIONAL GROUP (ASIG) — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2016-11-15","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.452(f)(6), 195.452(f)(8), 195.555, 195.571.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520166011.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520166011.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520166011","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/520166011","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving AIRCRAFT SERVICES INTERNATIONAL GROUP (ASIG). PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.452(f)(6),  195.452(f)(8),  195.555,  195.571. The case was opened on 2016-11-15 and is reported as closed as of 2019-02-21. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n520166011_Closure Letter_02212019.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520166011/520166011_Closure%20Letter_02212019.pdf\n\n520166011_Closure Letter_02212019_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520166011/520166011_Closure%20Letter_02212019_text.pdf\n\n520166011_Final Order_05022017.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520166011/520166011_Final%20Order_05022017.pdf\n\n520166011_Final Order_05022017_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520166011/520166011_Final%20Order_05022017_text.pdf\n\n520166011_NOPV PCO_11152016.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520166011/520166011_NOPV%20PCO_11152016.pdf\n\n520166011_NOPV PCO_11152016_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520166011/520166011_NOPV%20PCO_11152016_text.pdf\n\n520166011_Operator Response to Notice_12022016.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520166011/520166011_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice_12022016.pdf\n\n520166011_Final Order_05022017_text.pdf\n\nMay 2, 2017\nMr. Keith Ryan\nPresident and Chief Executive Officer\nAircraft Service International Group\nJohn Menzies, plc\n201 South Orange Avenue\nOrlando, Florida 32801\nRe: CPF No. 5-2016-6011\nDear Mr. Ryan:\nEnclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of\nviolation and specifies actions that need to be taken by Aircraft Service International Group, a\nsubsidiary of John Menzies, plc, to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. When the terms\nof the compliance order have been completed, as determined by the Director, Western Region,\nthis enforcement action will be closed. Service of the Final Order by certified mail is effective as\nprovided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nAlan K. Mayberry\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. Chris Hoidal, Director, Western Region, OPS\nDr. Dermot F. Smurfit, Chairman, John Menzies, plc, 2 Lochside Ave, Edinburgh EH12\n9DJ, UK\nMr. Marc G. McCafferty, ANC ASIG, Plant Manager, 6000 Dehavilland Dr., Anchorage,\nAlaska 99502\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\n)\nIn the Matter of )\n)\nAircraft Service International Group, )\na subsidiary of John Menzies, plc, ) CPF No. 5-2016-6011\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nFINAL ORDER\nDuring the period from August 1, 2016, to August 4, 2016, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, a\nrepresentative of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office\nof Pipeline Safety (OPS), conducted an on-site pipeline safety inspection of the facilities and\nrecords of Aircraft Service International Group (ASIG or Respondent) at the Port of Anchorage\nand the Anchorage International Airport in Anchorage, Alaska. ASIG, a subsidiary of John\nMenzies, plc, is an independent provider of commercial aviation services, including into-plane\nfueling and fuel-facility maintenance.1 ASIG operates approximately seven miles of regulated\nhazardous liquid pipelines that transport jet fuel from the Port of Anchorage to and around the\nTed Stevens Anchorage International Airport.2\nAs a result of the inspection, the Director, Western Region, OPS (Director), issued to\nRespondent, by letter dated November 15, 2016, a Notice of Probable Violation and Proposed\nCompliance Order (Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice proposed\nfinding that ASIG had violated 49 C.F.R. §§ 195.452(f)(6), 195.555, 195.452(f)(8) and 195.571,\nand proposed ordering Respondent to take certain measures to correct the alleged violations.\nRespondent responded to the Notice by letter dated December 2, 2016 (Response). ASIG did not\ncontest the allegations of violation and stated that it would comply with the terms of the Notice.\nRespondent did not request a hearing and therefore has waived its right to one.\n1 Aircraft Service International Group website, available at http://www.asig.com/about/ (last accessed January 19,\n2017). ASIG was acquired by John Menzies, plc, effective February 1, 2017.\n2 Pipeline Safety Violation Report (Violation Report), (November 10, 2016) (on file with PHMSA), at 1.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 5-2016-6011\nPage 2\nFINDINGS OF VIOLATION\nIn its Response, ASIG did not contest the allegations in the Notice that it violated 49 C.F.R.\nPart 195, as follows:\nItem 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(f)(6), which states:\n§ 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(a) ….\n(f) What are the elements of an integrity management program? An integrity\nmanagement program begins with the initial framework. An operator must\ncontinually change the program to reflect operating experience, conclusions drawn\nfrom results of the integrity assessments, and other maintenance and surveillance\ndata, and evaluation of consequences of a failure on the high consequence area. An\noperator must include, at minimum, each of the following elements in its written\nintegrity management program:\n(1) ….\n(6) Identification of preventive and mitigative measures to protect the high\nconsequence area (see paragraph (i) of this section); ….\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(f)(6) by failing to continually\nchange its Integrity Management Plan (IMP) with regard to the identification of preventive and\nmitigative measures. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Respondent’s IMP stated: “The\n[Integrity Management Plan Assessment Team] shall evaluate the preventative and mitigative\n(P&M) measures annually not to exceed 15 months and make recommendations for\nimprovement.” However, by the Respondent’s own admission, the annual evaluation of P&M\nmeasures had not been implemented.3\nRespondent did not contest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, based upon a review of all\nof the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(f)(6) by failing to\ncontinually change its IMP with respect to the identification of preventive and mitigative\nmeasures.\nItem 2: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.555, which states:\n§ 195.555 What are the qualifications for supervisors?\nYou must require and verify that supervisors maintain a thorough knowledge\nof that portion of the corrosion control procedures established under\n§ 195.402(c)(3) for which they are responsible for insuring compliance.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.555 by failing to require and verify\nthat supervisors maintain a thorough knowledge of that portion of the corrosion control\nprocedures established under § 195.402(c)(3) for which they are responsible for insuring\n3 Mr. McCafferty, the Plant Manager, allegedly stated to PHMSA that a formalized process for reevaluation of\npreventive and mitigative measures is not used. Id. at 6.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 5-2016-6011\nPage 3\ncompliance. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Respondent used contractors for most of its\ncorrosion-related work but that ASIG supervisors failed to implement a thorough review process\nof the contract deliverables. For example, Respondent’s IMP stated that a qualified third-party\nengineer would evaluate inline-inspection and cathodic-protection data, but ASIG was unable to\nprovide any verification that this had been done.\nRespondent did not contest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, based upon a review of all\nof the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.555 by failing to require and\nverify that its supervisors maintain a thorough knowledge of that portion of the corrosion control\nprocedures established under § 195.402(c)(3) for which they are responsible for insuring\ncompliance.\nItem 3: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(f)(8), which states:\n§ 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(a) ….\n(f) What are the elements of an integrity management program? An integrity\nmanagement program begins with the initial framework. An operator must\ncontinually change the program to reflect operating experience, conclusions drawn\nfrom results of the integrity assessments, and other maintenance and surveillance\ndata, and evaluation of consequences of a failure on the high consequence area. An\noperator must include, at minimum, each of the following elements in its written\nintegrity management program:\n(1) ….\n(8) A process for review of integrity assessment results and information analysis\nby a person qualified to evaluate the results and information (see paragraph (h)(2)\nof this section).\nThe Notice alleged that ASIG violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(f)(8) by failing to implement a\nprocess for review of integrity-assessment results and information analysis by a person qualified\nto evaluate the results and information. Specifically, the Notice alleged that, in 2007, the\nlocations of select anomalies detected in the prior year’s inline-inspection (ILI) run were dug up\nfor field ultrasonic thickness-testing measurements. However, the locations of the ultrasonic\nthickness measurements allegedly were not recorded and correlated with ILI data. Further, the\nNotice alleged that no evaluation of the 2011 or 2016 ILI data quality had been conducted.\nPursuant to ASIG’s IMP, a qualified third-party engineer was supposed to evaluate the ILI and\ncathodic-protection data and supervise the field verification, but ASIG was unable to provide any\ndocumentation to show that this had been done.\nRespondent did not contest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, based upon a review of all\nthe evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(f)(8) by failing to implement\na process to review and evaluate information and results from integrity assessments.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 5-2016-6011\nPage 4\nItem 4: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.571, which states:\n§ 195.571 What criteria must I use to determine the adequacy of cathodic\nprotection?\nCathodic protection required by this subpart must comply with one or more of\nthe applicable criteria and other considerations for cathodic protection contained\n[in] paragraphs 6.2.2, 6.2.3, 6.2.4, 6.2.5 and 6.3 in NACE SP 1069 (incorporated\nby reference, see § 195.3).\nThe Notice alleged that ASIG violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.571 by failing to demonstrate that\ncathodic-protection criteria applicable to steel pipelines (listed in paragraph 6.2.2 of the NACE\nSP 0169) had been met. Specifically, the Notice alleged that during the 2015 Close Internal\nSurvey (CIS), portions of the pipeline from the off-airport tank to approximately 1,800 feet from\nthe tank farm exceeded the -850mV polarized criteria. According to the Notice, ASIG did not\ninterrupt all current sources or otherwise account for the voltage drops per paragraph 6.3.1 of\nNACE SP 1069 and therefore could not demonstrate that one or more of the criteria in paragraph\n6.2.2 had been satisfied. More particularly, the Notice alleged the following:\n Magnesium anodes located at several locations were shown in the 2014 CP\nmonitoring report, but the 2015 cathodic protection (CP) monitoring and 2015\nCIS reports did not indicate that these current sources were interrupted or that\nthe voltage drop from these anodes was otherwise accounted for. The pipeline\nfailed to meet CP criteria at Test Station 1A and Test Station 15 when the\nmagnesium anodes were disconnected in 2014. Additionally, the 2015 CP\nmonitoring report and 2015 CIS report do not state that these anodes were\ninterrupted when collecting CP measurements.\n Magnesium galvanic anodes located at Test Stations 15, 15A, and 17 were not\ninterrupted during the 2015 CIS and many test points between Test Station 14\nand Test Station 18 were only slightly more negative than the -850 mV\ncriteria. ASIG failed to demonstrate that those locations would meet CP\ncriteria, should all voltage drops be properly accounted for. NACE SP 0169\nSection 6.3.2 states that in cases where “it is impractical or considered\nunnecessary to disconnect all current sources to correct for voltage drop(s) in\nthe structure-to-electrolyte potential measurements, sound engineering\npractices should be used to ensure that adequate CP has been achieved.”\nHowever, the 2015 CIS does not explain if or how such practices were\nemployed.\nRespondent did not contest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, based upon a review of all\nthe evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.571 by failing to demonstrate that\ncathodic-protection criteria applicable to steel pipelines (listed in paragraph 6.2.2 of NACE SP\n0169) had been met.\nThese findings of violation will be considered prior offenses in any subsequent enforcement\naction taken against Respondent.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 5-2016-6011\nPage 5\nCOMPLIANCE ORDER\nThe Notice proposed a compliance order with respect to Items 1, 2, 3, and 4 in the Notice for\nviolations of 49 C.F.R. §§ 195.452(f)(6), 195.555, 195.452(f)(8), and 195.571, respectively.\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60118(a), each person who engages in the transportation of hazardous liquids\nor who owns or operates a pipeline facility is required to comply with the applicable safety\nstandards established under chapter 601. Pursuant to the authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60118(b) and\n49 C.F.R. § 190.217, Respondent is ordered to take the following actions to ensure compliance\nwith the pipeline safety regulations applicable to its operations:\n1. 2. 3. 4. With respect to the violation of § 195.452(f)(6) (Item 1), Respondent must implement\nand document a process of periodic reevaluation of preventive and mitigative\nmeasures for pipeline integrity, and must provide PHMSA with documentation\nshowing that the process has been implemented.\nWith respect to the violation of § 195.555 (Item 2), Respondent must ensure that its\npersonnel in charge of implementing corrosion control are qualified to review work\ndone by corrosion contractors for regulatory compliance. Respondent must:\na. Designate supervisor(s) whose corrosion-control responsibilities include\nensuring that deliverables from corrosion contractors are sufficient to meet\nregulatory requirements in 49 C.F.R. 195 Subpart H; and\nb. Provide PHMSA with the name(s) and qualifications of the designated\nsupervisor(s).\nWith respect to violation of § 195.452(f)(8) (Item 3), Respondent must implement a\nprogram of data-quality verification and validation. ASIG must:\na. “Follow recognized industry practices,” per 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(b)(6), in\nconducting the data-quality review;\nb. Provide PHMSA with records “to support the decisions and analyses,\nincluding any modifications, justifications, deviations and determinations\nmade, variances, and actions taken” that ASIG has used in the validation\nprocess, per 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(l)(1)(ii); and\nc. Provide PHMSA with the results of data-quality review for the 2016 in-line\ninspection, including records of any field verification.\nWith respect to violation of § 195.571 (Item 4), Respondent must demonstrate that\nthe pipeline is meeting CP criteria. Respondent must:\na. Correct areas of low CP potential found during the 2015 CIS;\nb. Assess the effects of the voltage drop due to current output of the magnesium\n\n\n\nCPF No. 5-2016-6011\nPage 6\nanode, either through measurement or “sound engineering judgment” (NACE\nSP 0169 par. 6.3.2, incorporated by reference), to demonstrate the pipeline is\nmeeting CP criteria; and\nc. Provide PHMSA with the results of the assessment in item 4(b) above,\nincluding a plan to correct any deficiencies should they be found during the\nassessment.\n5. Complete Items 1 through 4 within one year after receipt of the Final Order.\nThe Director may grant an extension of time to comply with any of the required items upon a\nwritten request timely submitted by the Respondent and demonstrating good cause for an\nextension.\nIn addition, pursuant to the authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60118(b) and 49 C.F.R. § 190.217, ASIG is\nrequested (not mandated) to take the following action:\nASIG should maintain documentation of the safety improvement costs associated with\nfulfilling this Compliance Order and submit the total to Mr. Chris Hoidal, Director,\nWestern Region, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. It is requested\nthat these costs be reported in two categories: 1) total cost associated with\npreparation/revision of plans, procedures, studies and analyses; and 2) total cost\nassociated with replacements, additions and other changes to pipeline infrastructure.\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in the administrative assessment of civil penalties\nnot to exceed $200,000 for each violation for each day the violation continues or in referral to the\nAttorney General for appropriate relief in a district court of the United States.\nThe terms and conditions of this Final Order are effective upon receipt of service in accordance\nwith 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nMay 2, 2017\n___________________________________ __________________________\nAlan K. Mayberry Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\n\n520166011_Closure Letter_02212019_text.pdf\n\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nFebruary 21, 2019\nMr. Trent Carbaugh\nGeneral Manager\nMenzies Aviation\n6000 De Havilland Drive\nAnchorage, Alaska 99502\nCPF 5-2016-6011\nClosure Letter\nDear Mr. Carbaugh:\nOn May 2, 2017, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) issued to\nAircraft Service International Group (ASIG) a Final Order in the above-referenced case. This Order\nincluded a Compliance Order. Menzies Aviation, the current owner of ASIG, responded with a letter\ndated May 4, 2018, which included several attachments. PHMSA reviewed the May 4th submission\nand found that Menzies completed several of the items associated with the Final Order but, as PHMSA\ndescribed in our October 3, 2018 letter, Menzies failed to adequately complete Item 4 of the Final\nOrder.\nMenzies responded to the remaining deficiency on November 5, 2018. Based on our review of the\ndocumentation you provided, it has been determined that you have complied with the terms of this\nOrder. Accordingly, this case is now closed and no further action is contemplated with respect to the\nmatters involved in this case. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nChris Hoidal\nActing Director, Western Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\ncc: PHP-60 Compliance Registry\nPHP-500 J. Gano (#153333)\nMr. Marc G. McCafferty, Plant Manager, ASIG, 6000 De Havilland Dr., Anchorage, Alaska\n99502","truncated":false,"body_characters":19007}