{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 520183001","title":"WILLIAMS PARTNERS OPERATING LLC — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2018-02-12","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 193.2017(c)(1), 193.2503(f)(4), 193.2517.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520183001.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520183001.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520183001","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/520183001","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving WILLIAMS PARTNERS OPERATING LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 193.2017(c)(1),  193.2503(f)(4),  193.2517. The case was opened on 2018-02-12 and is reported as closed as of 2019-05-23. Proposed civil penalty: $864,000. Assessed civil penalty: $200,000. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n520183001_Final Order_05162019.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520183001/520183001_Final%20Order_05162019.pdf\n\n520183001_Final Order_05162019_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520183001/520183001_Final%20Order_05162019_text.pdf\n\n520183001_NOPV PCP_02122018.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520183001/520183001_NOPV%20PCP_02122018.pdf\n\n520183001_NOPV PCP_02122018_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520183001/520183001_NOPV%20PCP_02122018_text.pdf\n\n520183001_Operator Response to Notice_04192018.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520183001/520183001_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice_04192018.pdf\n\n520183001_Final Order_05162019_text.pdf\n\nMay 16, 2019\nMr. Alan S. Armstrong\nPresident and Chief Executive Officer\nThe Williams Companies, Inc.\nOne Williams Center\nTulsa, Oklahoma 74172\nRe: CPF No. 5-2018-3001\nDear Mr. Armstrong:\nEnclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case against your subsidiary\nWilliams Partners Operating, LLC. It withdraws two of the allegations of violation, makes one\nfinding of violation, and assesses a reduced civil penalty of $200,000. The penalty payment\nterms are set forth in the Final Order. This enforcement action closes automatically upon receipt\nof payment. Service of the Final Order by certified mail is effective upon the date of mailing as\nprovided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nAlan K. Mayberry\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. Chris Hoidal, Director, Western Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA\nMr. Jason Lambert, Manager, Pipeline Safety, Williams Partners Operating, LLC, 295\nChipeta Way, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84108\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n___________________________________________\n)\nIn the Matter of )\n)\nWilliams Partners Operating, LLC, ) CPF No. 5-2018-3001\na subsidiary of The Williams Companies, Inc., )\n)\nRespondent. )\n___________________________________________)\nFINAL ORDER\nOn March 31, 2014, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, representatives of the Pipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS),\nconducted an on-site incident investigation and pipeline safety inspection of the facilities and\nrecords of Williams Partners Operating, LLC’s (Williams or Respondent), Plymouth Liquefied\nNatural Gas Peak Shaving Plant (Plymouth Plant) near the Columbia River in Plymouth,\nWashington. The Plymouth Plant is a liquefied natural gas (LNG) storage facility in the middle\nof William's Northwest Pipeline System that takes gas from the pipeline system in the spring and\nsummer months, liquefies it, stores it, and then vaporizes it during periods of high demand in the\nfall and winter months. The Plymouth Plant consists of two separate LNG plants, known\ngenerally as “LNG-1” and “LNG-2.”1\nAt approximately 8:19 a.m. PDT on March 31, 2014, the Plymouth Plant experienced a failure,\nresulting in an explosion and fire on a portion of its LNG-1 Purification and Regeneration\nSystem (Incident). The LNG-1 Purification and Regeneration System (P&R System) is a\nsubsystem of the LNG process at the Plymouth Plant that removes water vapor and carbon\ndioxide prior to the gas being liquefied.\nFollowing the Incident, PHMSA initiated a joint investigation of the Incident with the\nWashington Utilities and Transportation Commission. The investigation revealed that the\nIncident occurred during routine annual liquefaction start-up operations. In preparation for the\nstart-up, a piece of equipment known as the Regeneration Salt Bath Heater D-40 (Salt Bath\nHeater) was started on March 30, 2014, and slowly brought to its process set point of 550° F.\nThe following day, on March 31, Plymouth Plant personnel began taking steps to start up the\nP&R System. After reviewing the applicable procedure, Williams personnel took final steps for\nstart-up, which included bringing the system up to full operating pressure and starting the\n1 Pipeline Safety Violation Report (Violation Report) (Feb. 12, 2018) (on file with PHMSA), at 1.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 5-2018-3001\nPage 2\nregeneration compressor D-70. Upon confirmation of these steps, the board operator gave a\ncommand via the distributed control system to align certain automated control valves and to\npermit normal gas flow through the system. As flow began, a flammable mixture of air and\nnatural gas entered the Salt Bath Heater, where the mixture auto-ignited and resulted in a rolling\ndetonation that went against the flow of gas in the direction of the Adsorber D-20A. The\npressure wave generated by the detonation entered the Adsorber D-20A and caused the vessel to\nfail catastrophically by rapid over-pressurization, releasing natural gas into the atmosphere,\nproducing additional deflagrations.\nAt 9:27 a.m. PDT, a Williams representative called the National Response Center (Report\nNumber 1078325), and reported that an explosion had occurred at a natural gas compressor\nstation. Seven employees were stationed within 150 feet of Adsorber D-20A when it exploded\nand caught fire. Five Williams employees were injured and treated on-site. One employee was\nflown to the hospital for additional treatment for burn injuries, admitted, and released several\ndays later. The company conducted an emergency shutdown and evacuated all plant personnel.\nAfter emergency responders arrived on-site and talked with Williams’s Plymouth Plant\npersonnel, a decision was made to evacuate citizens from the village of Plymouth and the\nsurrounding area within a two-mile radius, due to concerns about gas vapors.\nThe joint investigation resulted in the publication of a failure investigation report (FIR) issued by\nPHMSA on April 28, 2016. The FIR found that the primary cause of the Incident was a\nsubstandard purge performed after leaving the LNG-1 purification loop open to the atmosphere\nfrom November 1, 2013 to March 18, 2014. A flammable gas-air mixture remained in the\nsystem, which then entered the Salt Bath Heater and auto-ignited during start-up. Specifically,\nthe FIR found that Williams failed to have detailed procedures to ensure that the plant’s LNG-1\npurification loop, which had been vented to the atmosphere during maintenance activities, was\nadequately and safely purged prior to start-up. The valve alignment prescribed by the existing\nprocedure left large volumes of gas against the closed Hot Valve 0400, which created a “dead-\nleg.” As a result, a flammable gas-air mixture remained in the system and then entered the Salt\nBath Heater and auto-ignited during start-up.\nAs a result of the investigation, the Director, Western Region, OPS (Director), issued to\nRespondent, by letter dated February 12, 2018, a Notice of Probable Violation and Proposed\nCivil Penalty (Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice proposed finding\nthat Williams had violated 49 C.F.R. §§ 193.2517, 193.2017, and 193.2503 and proposed\nassessing a civil penalty of $864,000 for the alleged violations.\nAfter requesting and receiving an extension, on April 19, 2018, Williams responded to the\nNotice (Response). In its Response, Williams did not contest Item 1 and the associated penalty,\nbut contested Items 2 and 3 and offered additional information in response to the Notice.\nRespondent did not request a hearing and therefore has waived its right to one.\nFINDING OF VIOLATION\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. Part 193, as follows:\n\n\n\nCPF No. 5-2018-3001\nPage 3\nItem 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 193.2517, which states:\n§ 193.2517 Purging.\nWhen necessary for safety, components that could accumulate\nsignificant amounts of combustible mixtures must be purged in accordance\nwith a procedure which meets the provisions of the AGA “Purging\nPrinciples and Practices” after being taken out of service and before being\nreturned to service.2\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 193.2517 by failing to purge its P&R\nSystem in accordance with a procedure that met the provisions of American Gas Association’s\n(AGA) Purging Principles and Practices (incorporated by reference, see § 193.2013), after\nbeing taken out of service and before being returned to service. Specifically, the Notice alleged\nthat Williams failed to prepare a detailed purge procedure for the purge it conducted on March\n18, 2014. Instead, Williams used a general purge procedure that failed to take into account all of\nthe various aspects of its P&R System, including vessel size, piping configuration, molecular\nsieve materials, valves, filters, and other obstructions that could cause an incomplete purge.\nImplementation of this general procedure, along with a lack of procedural specificity for a blow-\ndown pressure, created a low flow or “dead-leg” segment of pipeline on either side of the valve\nthat could not be properly purged of a combustible air/gas mixture. This incomplete purge\ncreated an explosive oxygen and natural gas mixture that was present immediately prior to the\nstart-up and resulted in the auto-ignition.\nIn its Response, Respondent did not contest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, based\nupon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 193.2517 by\nfailing to purge its P&R System in accordance with a procedure that met the provisions of\nAGA’s Purging Principles and Practices, after being taken out of service and before being\nreturned to service.\nThis finding of violation will be considered a prior offense in any subsequent enforcement action\ntaken against Respondent.\nWITHDRAWN ITEMS\nItem 2: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 193.2017(c)(1), which states:\n§ 193.2017 Plans and procedures.\n(a) ...\n(c) Each operator must review and update the plans and procedures\nrequired by this part -\n(1) When a component is changed significantly or a new component is\ninstalled; ...\n2 This version of § 193.2517 was in effect at the time the alleged violation occurred. The regulation was updated on\nJan. 5, 2015.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 5-2018-3001\nPage 4\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 193.2017(c)(1) by failing to review and\nupdate its plans and procedures when new components were installed at the Plymouth Plant.\nSpecifically, the Notice alleged that Williams installed three new manual valves in its P&R\nSystem on March 18, 2014. During the investigation, investigators reviewed numerous written\nprocedures and records, and interviewed employees who were on-site the day of the Incident. In\ntheir review, the investigators found that the documentation provided by Williams did not\ndemonstrate the company’s compliance with 49 CFR § 193.2017(c)(1) when it installed the three\nnew manual valves in the purification-loop piping system on March 18, 2014.\nIn its Response, Williams stated that, contrary to the claim in the Notice, the three at-issue\nmanual valves were not new, but original equipment valves that had been repaired and then\nreinstalled.3 Williams argued that because no new equipment was added or modified and the\nprocess was in no way changed, a review and update of the existing operating procedures was\nnot required under § 193.2017(c)(1). Respondent also provided additional documentation\nindicating that the valves were refurbished and were not new valves.4\nAccordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find there is insufficient evidence to\ndemonstrate that Williams violated § 193.2017(c)(1). Williams did not install new components\nor significantly change existing components, and therefore it was not required under §\n193.2017(c)(1) to review and update its plans and procedures at the Plymouth Plant. Based upon\nthe foregoing, I hereby order that Item 2 be withdrawn.\nItem 3: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 193.2503(f)(4), which states, in\nrelevant part:\n§ 193.2503 Operating procedures.\nEach operator shall follow one or more manuals of written procedures\nto provide safety in normal operation and in responding to an abnormal\noperation that would affect safety. The procedures must include provisions\nfor:\n(a)…\n(f) In the case of liquefaction, maintaining temperatures, pressures,\npressure differentials and flow rates, as applicable, within their design limits\nfor: ...\n(4) Purification and regeneration equipment; …\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 193.2503(f)(4) by failing to have\nprocedures to provide safety during the normal operation start-up process. Specifically, the\nNotice alleged that Williams’s operating procedures failed to identify that its P&R equipment\nwould result in being operated beyond design limits. The Notice alleged the start-up sequence in\nWilliams’s Regeneration Compressor and Purification Adsorber - LNG I: Remote Start-up and\nShutdown procedure failed to provide safety during normal operation by instructing Williams\n3 Response at 2.\n4 Invoice for D-45 Valves (See Appendix B to Region Recommendation).\n\n\n\nCPF No. 5-2018-3001\nPage 5\npersonnel to start the Salt Bath Heater prior to pressurization. Section C.2 of its procedure\nindicated that the start-up of the heating process through completion of the Regeneration Salt\nBath Heater procedures was required prior to starting the regeneration process.\nIn its Response, Williams argued that its start-up process and procedures were adequate to\nprovide safety had the purge been completed correctly.5 It contended that had oxygen not been\npresent in the piping due to the incomplete purge, the existing start-up procedure would have\nprovided for safety of personnel and equipment. Additionally, Williams asserted that the\nexisting practice of starting and raising the Salt Bath Heater to temperature prior to introduction\nof gas is consistent with historical plant practice, manufacturer recommendations, and industry\npractice. Williams also provided additional information clarifying the design limits of the Salt\nBath Heater, demonstrating that they were not exceeded despite the occurrence of the Incident.6\nAccordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find there is insufficient evidence to\ndemonstrate that Williams violated § 193.2503(f)(4). Williams had operating procedures in\nplace to provide safety during the start-up process. It was not Respondent’s operating\nprocedures, but Respondent’s failure to properly purge its system in accordance with purging\nprocedures (addressed in Item 1) that resulted in the Incident. Based upon the foregoing, I\nhereby order that Item 3 be withdrawn.\nASSESSMENT OF PENALTY\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60122, Respondent is subject to an administrative civil penalty not to exceed\n$200,000 per violation for each day of the violation, up to a maximum of $2,000,000 for any\nrelated series of violations.7\nIn determining the amount of a civil penalty under 49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.225, I\nmust consider the following criteria: the nature, circumstances, and gravity of the violation,\nincluding adverse impact on the environment; the degree of Respondent’s culpability; the history\nof Respondent’s prior offenses; any effect that the penalty may have on its ability to continue\ndoing business; and the good faith of Respondent in attempting to comply with the pipeline\nsafety regulations. In addition, I may consider the economic benefit gained from the violation\nwithout any reduction because of subsequent damages, and such other matters as justice may\nrequire. The Notice proposed a total civil penalty of $864,000 for the violations cited above.\nItem 1: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $288,000 for Respondent’s violation of 49\nC.F.R. § 193.2517, for failing to purge its P&R System in accordance with a procedure that met\nthe provisions of AGA’s Purging Principles and Practices, after being taken out of service and\nbefore being returned to service. Williams did not contest the violation or the penalty. Although\n5 Response at 3.\n6 Response at 3.\n7 These amounts are adjusted annually for inflation. See, e.g., Pipeline Safety: Inflation Adjustment of Maximum\nCivil Penalties, 82 Fed. Reg. 19325 (April 27, 2017).\n\n\n\nCPF No. 5-2018-3001\nPage 6\nthe Violation Report stated that the violation began on October 31, 2013, the date Williams’s\npurging procedures were implemented,8 and continued until the date of the Incident, I find that\nRespondent’s failure to purge its P&R System was a one-day activity occurring on March 18,\n2014.9 Reducing the duration of the violation from multiple days to one day serves to reduce the\namount of the proposed penalty. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the\nassessment criteria, I assess Respondent a reduced civil penalty of $200,000 for violation of 49\nC.F.R. § 193.2517.\nItem 2: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $288,000 for Respondent’s alleged violation of\n49 C.F.R. § 193.2017(c)(1), for failing to review and update its plans and procedures when new\ncomponents were installed at the Plymouth Plant. I have withdrawn Item 2, therefore there is no\nassociated penalty for this item.\nItem 3: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $288,000 for Respondent’s alleged violation of\n49 C.F.R. § 193.2503(f)(4), for failing to have procedures in place to provide safety during the\nstart-up process. I have withdrawn Item 3, therefore there is no associated penalty for this item.\nIn summary, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria for each of the\nItems cited above, I assess Respondent a total civil penalty of $200,000.\nPayment of the civil penalty must be made within 20 days of service. Federal regulations (49\nC.F.R. § 89.21(b)(3)) require such payment to be made by wire transfer through the Federal\nReserve Communications System (Fedwire), to the account of the U.S. Treasury. Detailed\ninstructions are contained in the enclosure. Questions concerning wire transfers should be\ndirected to: Financial Operations Division (AMK-325), Federal Aviation Administration, Mike\nMonroney Aeronautical Center, 6500 S MacArthur Blvd, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 79169.\nThe Financial Operations Division telephone number is (405) 954-8845.\nFailure to pay the $200,000 civil penalty will result in accrual of interest at the current annual\nrate in accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 3717, 31 C.F.R. § 901.9 and 49 C.F.R. § 89.23. Pursuant to\nthose same authorities, a late penalty charge of six percent (6%) per annum will be charged if\npayment is not made within 110 days of service. Furthermore, failure to pay the civil penalty\nmay result in referral of the matter to the Attorney General for appropriate action in a district\ncourt of the United States.\nUnder 49 C.F.R. § 190.243, Respondent may submit a Petition for Reconsideration of this Final\nOrder to the Associate Administrator, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA, 1200 New Jersey\nAvenue, SE, East Building, 2nd Floor, Washington, DC 20590, with a copy sent to the Office of\nChief Counsel, PHMSA, at the same address, no later than 20 days after receipt of service of the\nFinal Order by Respondent. Any petition submitted must contain a brief statement of the issue(s)\nand meet all other requirements of 49 C.F.R. § 190.243. The filing of a petition automatically\nstays the payment of any civil penalty assessed. The other terms of the order, including any\ncorrective action, remain in effect unless the Associate Administrator, upon request, grants a\n8 Violation Report at 9, Ex. A.\n9 Violation Report at 10.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 5-2018-3001\nPage 7\nstay. If Respondent submits payment of the civil penalty, the Final Order becomes the final\nadministrative decision and the right to petition for reconsideration is waived.\nThe terms and conditions of this Final Order are effective upon service in accordance with 49\nC.F.R. § 190.5.\nMay 16, 2019\n___________________________________ __________________________\nAlan K. Mayberry Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety","truncated":false,"body_characters":20518}