{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 520183002W","title":"FAIRBANKS NATURAL GAS — Warning Letter","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2018-12-27","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED warning letter citing 191.29(a)(1), 193.2505(a), 193.2511(a), 193.2513(a), 193.2513(b), 193.2619(c), 193.2619(c)(2), 193.2639(c)(2), 193.2707(c), 193.2711, 193.2713(b), 193.2715(b), 193.2717, 193.2717(b).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520183002w.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520183002w.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520183002w","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/520183002W","body":"Warning Letter involving FAIRBANKS NATURAL GAS. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 191.29(a)(1),  193.2505(a),  193.2511(a),  193.2513(a),  193.2513(b),  193.2619(c),  193.2619(c)(2),  193.2639(c)(2),  193.2707(c),  193.2711,  193.2713(b),  193.2715(b),  193.2717,  193.2717(b). The case was opened on 2018-12-27 and is reported as closed as of 2018-12-27. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n520183002W_Warning Letter_12272018.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520183002W/520183002W_Warning%20Letter_12272018.pdf\n\n520183002W_Warning Letter_12272018_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520183002W/520183002W_Warning%20Letter_12272018_text.pdf\n\n520183002W_Warning Letter_12272018_text.pdf\n\nWARNING LETTER\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nDecember 27, 2018\nMr. Daniel W. Britton\nPresident/CEO\nFairbanks Natural Gas, LLC\n3408 International Way\nFairbanks, Alaska 99701\nCPF 5-2018-3002W\nDear Mr. Britton:\nOn August 7 through August 11, 2017 and September 18 through September 22, 2017, a\nrepresentative of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA),\npursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code (U.S.C.), inspected your Liquified Natural\nGas facilities in Fairbanks, Alaska.\nAs a result of the inspection, it is alleged that you have committed probable violations of the\nPipeline Safety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). The items\ninspected and the probable violations are:\n1. § 193.2511 Personnel safety.\n(a) Each operator shall provide any special protective clothing and equipment\nnecessary for the safety of personnel while they are performing emergency\nresponse duties.\nThe Operator failed to have protective clothing available to protect employees from the\neffects of exposure to LNG. Operator’s procedure SOP 1110 requires “Welding\n\n\n\nleathers/Nomex gear” at each LNG storage site. NFPA 59A requires available and readily\naccessible protective clothing. Storage Site #2 was missing the required Nomex gear during\nthe site visit in August 2017.\n2. § 191.29 National Pipeline Mapping System.\n(a) Each operator of a gas transmission pipeline or liquefied natural gas facility\nmust provide the following geospatial data to PHMSA for that pipeline or\nfacility:\n(1) Geospatial data, attributes, metadata and transmittal letter appropriate for\nuse in the National Pipeline Mapping System. Acceptable formats and additional\ninformation are specified in the NPMS Operator Standards Manual available at\nwww.npms.phmsa.dot.gov or by contacting the PHMSA Geographic Information\nSystems Manager at (202) 366-4595.\nThe Operator provided no records to demonstrate that the Operator made the NPMS initial\nsubmission for 2015 (which should have been made in 2016) or a subsequent NPMS\nsubmission for 2016 (which should have been made in 2017). The operator made the 2016\nNPMS initial filing during the time of our 2017 inspection.\n3. § 193.2505 Cooldown.\n(a) The cooldown of each system of components that is subjected to cryogenic\ntemperatures must be limited to a rate and distribution pattern that keeps\nthermal stresses within design limits during the cooldown period, paying\nparticular attention to the performance of expansion and contraction devices.\nThe Operator failed to ensure that the thermal stresses are kept within design limits during\ncooldown because they have not established these limits using the required parameters.\nRecords were reviewed in conjunction with Operator’s Standard Operating Procedures 6202\n& 6203; design limits are not listed in the procedures, however, the procedure says to verify\nmaximum allowable working pressure in step 3, and this value is not contained in any records.\nNo other design limits were listed in the procedures or associated records to enable the\nOperator to keep thermal stresses within design limits.\n4. § 193.2513 Transfer procedures.\n(a) Each transfer of LNG or other hazardous fluid must be conducted in\naccordance with one or more manuals of written procedures to provide for safe\ntransfers.\n(b) The transfer procedures must include provisions for personnel to:\n(1) Before transfer, verify that the transfer system is ready for use, with\nconnections and controls in proper positions, including if the system could\ncontain a combustible mixture, verifying that it has been adequately purged in\naccordance with a procedure which meets the requirements of “Purging\nPrinciples and Practices (incorporated by reference, see § 193.2013)”;\n2\n\n\n\n(2) Before transfer, verify that each receiving container or tank vehicle does not\ncontain any substance that would be incompatible with the incoming fluid and\nthat there is sufficient capacity available to receive the amount of fluid to be\ntransferred;\n(3) Before transfer, verify the maximum filling volume of each receiving\ncontainer or tank vehicle to ensure that expansion of the incoming fluid due to\nwarming will not result in overfilling or overpressure;\n(4) When making bulk transfer of LNG into a partially filled (excluding\ncooldown heel) container, determine any differences in temperature or specific\ngravity between the LNG being transferred and the LNG already in the\ncontainer and, if necessary, provide a means to prevent rollover due to\nstratification.\n(5) Verify that the transfer operations are proceeding within design conditions\nand that overpressure or overfilling does not occur by monitoring applicable flow\nrates, liquid levels, and vapor returns.\n(6) Manually terminate the flow before overfilling or overpressure occurs; and\n(7) Deactivate cargo transfer systems in a safe manner by depressurizing,\nventing, and disconnecting lines and conducting any other appropriate\noperations.\n(c) In addition to the requirements of paragraph (b) of this section, the\nprocedures for cargo transfer must be located at the transfer area and include\nprovisions for personnel to:\n(1) Be in constant attendance during all cargo transfer operations;\n(2) Prohibit the backing of tank trucks in the transfer area, except when a person\nis positioned at the rear of the truck giving instructions to the driver;\n(3) Before transfer, verify that:\n(i) Each tank car or tank truck complies with applicable regulations governing its\nuse;\n(ii) All transfer hoses have been visually inspected for damage and defects;\n(iii) Each tank truck is properly immobilized with chock wheels, and electrically\ngrounded; and\n(iv) Each tank truck engine is shut off unless it is required for transfer\noperations;\n(4) Prevent a tank truck engine that is off during transfer operations from being\nrestarted until the transfer lines have been disconnected and any released vapors\nhave dissipated;\n(5) Prevent loading LNG into a tank car or tank truck that is not in exclusive\nLNG service or that does not contain a positive pressure if it is in exclusive LNG\nservice, until after the oxygen content in the tank is tested and if it exceeds 2\npercent by volume, purged in accordance with a procedure that meets the\nrequirements of “Purging Principles and Practices (incorporated by reference,\nsee §193.2013)”.\n3\n\n\n\n(6) Verify that all transfer lines have been disconnected and equipment cleared\nbefore the tank car or tank truck is moved from the transfer position; and\n(7) Verify that transfers into a pipeline system will not exceed the pressure or\ntemperature limits of the system.\nThe Operator could not demonstrate that they followed the Standard Operating Procedures for\ntransferring LNG. Operator’s Standard Operating Procedure’s (6240 – 6244) records LNG\nTrailer Offload Data Sheets for July 2017 were reviewed during the inspection. Records and\nforms to show compliance do not follow or record all Standard Operating Procedures steps\nand requirements in § 193.2513.\n5. § 193.2639 Maintenance records.\n(a)….\n(c) Each of the following records must be retained for as long as the LNG facility\nremains in service:\n(1)....\n(2) Records of each test, survey, or inspection required by this subpart in\nsufficient detail to demonstrate the adequacy of corrosion control measures\nThe Operator failed to maintain maintenance records for infrastructure inspections. Support\nSystem and Dike Inspection forms are missing for August 2017 for Storage Site #1. Also, the\nOperator provided no annual records for 2016 and 2017 for LNG Storage Tank and\nImpoundment Inspections. Operator’s Standard Operating Procedures 7101 and 7105 cover\nthese inspections.\n6. § 193.2619 Control systems.\n(a)....\n(c) Control systems in service, but not normally in operation, such as relief valves\nand automatic shutdown devices, and control systems for internal shutoff valves\nfor bottom penetration tanks must be inspected and tested once each calendar\nyear, not exceeding 15 months, with the following exceptions:\n(1)....\n(2) Control systems that are intended for fire protection must be inspected and\ntested at regular intervals not to exceed 6 months. (Control system means a\ncomponent, or system of components functioning as a unit, including control\nvalves and sensing, warning, relief, shutdown, and other control devices, which is\nactivated either manually or automatically to establish or maintain the\nperformance of another component.)\nThe Operator did not maintain required records for control systems. Records relating to\nOperator’s Standard Operating Procedure 7150 “Fire and Gas Detection Equipment\nMaintenance” and Standard Operating Procedure 7155 “Fire Control Equipment\nMaintenance” were reviewed. Standard Operating Procedure 7150 requires inspecting fire\neyes in two intervals: not to exceed 6 months and also annually. The procedure additionally\n4\n\n\n\nrequires methane detectors to be inspected and tested at intervals not to exceed 6 months and\nannually. Portable gas detectors are required to be checked monthly for battery, charge, and\ncalibration. The Operator produced no 2017 records for 6 or 12 month tests for fire eyes or\nmethane detectors. Storage Site Monthly Maintenance and Inspection Logs show monthly\ninspections of fire extinguishers, but portable gas detectors were not checked monthly (2011 -\n2016). The Operator produced annual fire eye (IR) and Methane detector inspections at\nStorage Site #1 and Storage Site #2 for 2012 to 2016 (except for Storage Site #1 2015\nMethane detector inspections).\nOperator’s Standard Operating Procedure 7155 “Fire Control Equipment Maintenance”\nrequires monthly inspection of extinguishers as well as an annual maintenance for\nextinguishers by a contractor with specialized training. An annual service of fire\nextinguishers, wheeled units, and skid units was performed on August 28, 2012. Monthly\nchecks for 2017 were available in the field. Aside from those dates, there are no consistent\nrecords for annual or monthly checks.\n7. §193.2619 Control systems.\n(a)....\n(c) Control systems in service, but not normally in operation, such as relief valves\nand automatic shutdown devices, and control systems for internal shutoff valves\nfor bottom penetration tanks must be inspected and tested once each calendar\nyear, not exceeding 15 months, ...\nThe Operator failed to inspect and test emergency control systems. Emergency Shutdown\nDevice inspection and test records provided by the Operator for Storage Site #1 and Storage\nSite #2 are only for 2016. The inspection and test records for 2015 and 2017 years were\nprovided.\n8. § 193.2711 Personnel health.\nEach operator shall follow a written plan to verify that personnel assigned\noperating, maintenance, security, or fire protection duties at the LNG plant do\nnot have any physical condition that would impair performance of their assigned\nduties. The plan must be designed to detect both readily observable disorders,\nsuch as physical handicaps or injury, and conditions requiring professional\nexamination for discovery.\nThe Operator failed to verify that the physical condition of the LNG workers would not\nimpair them from performance of their duties. The Operator produced medical exam cards\nfor personnel for Department of Transportation driving. The Operator’s Standard Operating\nProcedure 1160 says “LNG Storage site operators shall comply with the minimum of an\nInterstate Commerce Commission (ICC) physical examination Baseline Physical.” No ICC\nphysical exam records were produced.\n5\n\n\n\n9. § 193.2707 Operations and maintenance.\n(a)….\n(c) Corrosion control procedures under §193.2605(b), including those for the\ndesign, installation, operation, and maintenance of cathodic protection systems,\nmust be carried out by, or under the direction of, a person qualified by\nexperience and training in corrosion control technology.\nThe Operator did not have corrosion inspections performed by qualified individuals.\nOperator’s Standard Operating Procedure 7205 states “[a]ll corrosion inspections shall be\nperformed by a person Qualified to perform Corrosion inspections as certified by National\nAssociation of Corrosion Engineers (NACE).” Several of the Operator’s personnel performed\natmospheric, external cathodic protection for buried facilities, and intermediate corrosion\ninspections. None of the Operator’s personnel are NACE certified.\n10. §193.2713 Training: operations and maintenance.\n(a)….\n(b) A written plan of continuing instruction must be conducted at intervals of not\nmore than two years to keep all personnel current on the knowledge and skills\nthey gained in the program of initial instruction.\nThe Operator failed to give proper exams for qualification and keep appropriate records for\nsuch tests and qualifications. Operator’s Standard Operating Procedure 6001 states “5. A\nwritten plan of operator qualification training to instruct on LNG Storage and Vaporization\nFacilities and Distribution systems will be required for all staffed operators. 6. The written\nplan of continuing instruction will be conducted at intervals of not more than (2) two years, to\nensure that the staffed operators maintain the knowledge and skills they acquired in their\ninitial instruction and are kept current with updates.”\nAn employee’s original training documents from 2012 are inapplicable because all the\nanswers in the multiple choice tests are italicized while the wrong answers were in a plain\nfont. There are no dates on many documents for the review of Standard Operating\nProcedures. Certain Operator personnel records for Red Cross first aid credentials do not\nexist for 2016. There are first aid certificates for most employees in 2012, 2014, and 2017,\nbut none for 2016.\n11. § 193.2715 Training: security.\n(a)....\n(b) A written plan of continuing instruction must be conducted at intervals of not\nmore than two years to keep all personnel having security duties current on the\nknowledge and skills they gained in the program of initial instruction.\nThe Operator’s security training was not sufficient to qualify employees. For example,\nrecords show that one of the Operator’s personnel completed a security review of Standard\nOperating Procedures 1220, 1215, 1211, 1205 on March 3, 2017. Generic undated memos in\n6\n\n\n\nprevious years (2016 – 2012) regarding review of Standard Operating Procedures as training\ndon't appear to meet code because they are undated and lack specificity of the security\ntraining topics covered.\n12. § 193.2717 Training: fire protection.\n(a) All personnel involved in maintenance and operations of an LNG plant,\nincluding their immediate supervisors, must be trained according to a written\nplan of initial instruction, including plant fire drills, to:\n(1) Know the potential causes and areas of fire;\n(2) Know the types, sizes, and predictable consequences of fire; and\n(3) Know and be able to perform their assigned fire control duties according to\nthe procedures established under § 193.2509 and by proper use of equipment\nprovided under § 193.2801.\n(b) A written plan of continuing instruction, including plant fire drills, must be\nconducted at intervals of not more than two years to keep personnel current on\nthe knowledge and skills they gained in the instruction under paragraph (a) of\nthe section.\n(c) Plant fire drills must provide personnel hands-on experience in carrying out\ntheir duties under the fire emergency procedures required by § 193.2509.\nThe Operator's April 6, 2016 “Live LNG Situational walk through training for an emergency\nsituation” appears to meet the standards in § 193.2717, however, there is no evidence that the\ntraining was offered to the two initial hires who started work for the Operator in\napproximately February 2017, as per Standard Operating Procedure 1112.\n13. § 193.2717 Training: fire protection.\n(a)....\n(b) A written plan of continuing instruction, including plant fire drills, must be\nconducted at intervals of not more than two years to keep personnel current on\nthe knowledge and skills they gained in the instruction under paragraph (a) of\nthe section.\nPersonnel records for one of the Operator’s employees for “LNG fire training,” dated March\n6, 2016, does not meet the requirements of the regulation. Specifically, the employee’s\nemergency training folder shows Fire Drill Training at LNG Storage site without a date. The\nmemos from May 20, 2015 and June 10, 2013 for “Emergency recognition and response” do\nnot show that 193.2717 standards to include plant fire drills have been met.\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 CFR § 190.223, you are subject to a civil penalty not to\nexceed $209,002 per violation per day the violation persists, up to a maximum of $2,090,022\nfor a related series of violations. For violations occurring prior to November 2, 2015, the\nmaximum penalty may not exceed $200,000 per violation per day, with a maximum penalty\nnot to exceed $2,000,000 for a related series of violations. We have reviewed the\ncircumstances and supporting documents involved in this case, and have decided not to\n7\n\n\n\nconduct additional enforcement action or penalty assessment proceedings at this time. We\nadvise you to correct the items identified in this letter. Failure to do so will result in\nFairbanks Natural Gas being subject to additional enforcement action.\nNo reply to this letter is required. If you choose to reply, in your correspondence please refer\nto CPF 5-2018-3002W. Be advised that all material you submit in response to this\nenforcement action is subject to being made publicly available. If you believe that any\nportion of your responsive material qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b),\nalong with the complete original document you must provide a second copy of the document\nwith the portions you believe qualify for confidential treatment redacted and an explanation of\nwhy you believe the redacted information qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C.\n552(b).\nSincerely,\nChris Hoidal\nActing Director, Western Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\ncc: PHP-60 Compliance Registry\nPHP-500 J. Owens (# 155562)\n8","truncated":false,"body_characters":18945}