{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 520185005W","title":"TESORO LOGISTICS NORTHWEST PIPELINE LLC — Warning Letter","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2018-10-26","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED warning letter citing 195.110(a), 195.110(b), 195.208, 195.402(a), 195.412(a), 195.440(a), 195.440(e), 195.452(d), 195.452(f)(7), 195.452(g)(4), 195.452(l)(1), 195.452(l)(2), 195.452(l)(ii), 195.505(a), 195.505(b), 195.505(h), 195.505(i), 195.507(a)(1), 195.507(a)(2), 195.583(a), 195.583(c).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520185005w.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520185005w.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520185005w","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/520185005W","body":"Warning Letter involving TESORO LOGISTICS NORTHWEST PIPELINE LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.110(a),  195.110(b),  195.208,  195.402(a),  195.412(a),  195.440(a),  195.440(e),  195.452(d),  195.452(f)(7),  195.452(g)(4),  195.452(l)(1),  195.452(l)(2),  195.452(l)(ii),  195.505(a),  195.505(b),  195.505(h),  195.505(i),  195.507(a)(1),  195.507(a)(2),  195.583(a),  195.583(c). The case was opened on 2018-10-26 and is reported as closed as of 2018-10-26. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n520185005W_Warning Letter_10262018.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520185005W/520185005W_Warning%20Letter_10262018.pdf\n\n520185005W_Warning Letter_10262018_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520185005W/520185005W_Warning%20Letter_10262018_text.pdf\n\n520185005W_Warning Letter_10262018_text.pdf\n\nWARNING LETTER\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nOctober 26, 2018\nMr. Don Sorensen\nSenior Vice President\nAndeavor Logistics\n19100 Ridgewood Parkway\nSan Antonio, TX 78259\nCPF 5-2018-5005W\nDear Mr. Sorensen:\nBetween November 13, 2017 and August 6, 2018, a representative of the Pipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United\nStates Code (U.S.C.), inspected your Andeavor (Tesoro) Logistics Northwest Pipeline, LLC\nsystem located in multiple cities in the states of Utah, Idaho, Oregon and Washington.\nAs a result of the inspection, it is alleged that you have committed probable violations of the\nPipeline Safety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). The items\ninspected and the probable violations are:\n§ 195.110 External load\n(a) Anticipated external loads (e.g.), earthquakes, vibration, thermal expansion,\nand contraction must be provided for in designing a pipeline system. In providing\nfor expansion and flexibility, section 419 of ASME/ANSI B31.4 must be followed.\nThe following excerpts are from B31.4:\n404.4 Flanges\n404.4.1 General. The design of flanges manufactured in accordance with para.\n404.4 and standards listed in Table 426.1-1 shall be considered suitable for use at\nthe pressure–temperature ratings as set forth in para. 404.1.2. When steel flanged\nfittings are used, they shall comply with ASME B16.5.\n\n\n\nOperator did not design and construct flange connections for parts of its pipeline system in\naccordance with ASME B31.4, which is critical when designing a pipeline system under\n§195.110. Inspectors observed in the field where bolts at the flanged connections were short or\nnot installed correctly, resulting in the nut threads not being fully engaged with the bolts\nthreads.\n2. § 195.110 External loads\n(a)…\n(b) The pipe and other components must be supported in such a way that the\nsupport does not cause excess localized stresses. In designing attachments to pipe,\nthe added stress to the wall of the pipe must be computed and compensated for.\nThere are two areas of concern:\nTank 913 has inadequate supports on the insulated piping connected to the tank manway.\nThe following valve sites Ontario West ROV and Dixie BV were suspended in the air without\nany supports. There is a minimum design length for unsupported pipe and valves so that the\nstress put on the pipe does not exceed its minimum specified yield strength. The piping and\nvalves appeared as though the span of pipe was potentially too long without supports.\n3. § 195.208 Welding of supports and braces\nSupports and braces may not be welded directly to pipe that will be operated at a\npressure of more than 100 p.s.i. gage.\nThe inlet piping has a support welded to the pipe which is not allowed per regulations.\n4. § 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a\nmanual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance\nactivities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. This manual shall\nbe reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar\nyear, and appropriate changes made as necessary to insure that the manual is\neffective. This manual shall be prepared before initial operations of a pipeline\nsystem commence, and appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where\noperations and maintenance activities are conducted.\nThe 2017 depolarization was not performed per procedure, which calls for a 12-day\ndepolarization (depol). The depol was performed over September 5 through 7, 2017.\nRespondent’s procedures, specifically page 15 of 52 of the Corrosion Control Program dated\nDecember 20, 2016, require a minimum of 12 days for piping or facility piping to depolarize.\nTesoro failed to follow this procedure as the depolarization was performed between September\n5 and 7, 2017.\n2\n\n\n\n5. § 195.412 Inspection of rights-of-way and crossings under navigable waters.\n(a) Each operator shall, at intervals not exceeding 3 weeks, but at least 26 times\neach calendar year, inspect the surface conditions on or adjacent to each pipeline\nright-of-way. Methods of inspection include walking, driving, flying or other\nappropriate means of traversing the right-of-way.\nThe pipeline right-of-way cannot be observed via aerial patrol. The pipeline in the area where\nthe pipeline was previously exposed to the atmosphere, near MP 516 is in a valley with heavy\ntree cover. Andeavor (Tesoro) representatives stated that aerial patrols were the only method\nused by Tesoro for this area.\nThe second area of concern, is where Tesoro failed to take into consideration the effect that\ntrees growing over the pipeline could have on the pipeline system. The Northwest Product\nSystem has experienced leaks on or about April 2018, in areas where trees were growing over\nthe pipeline. The school grounds in Declo, Idaho and adjacent property had areas where large\ntrees were either directly over or very nearly over the pipeline as determined by pipeline\nlocating by the technician during the inspection. One tree is located between the football field\nand elementary school, with three additional trees on the east side of the high school grounds.\nThe pipeline crosses a canal from this area where another tree is growing over the pipe.\n6. § 195.440 Public awareness.\n(a) Each pipeline operator must develop and implement a written continuing\npublic education program that follows the guidance provided in the American\nPetroleum Institute's (API) Recommended Practice (RP) 1162 (incorporated by\nreference, see §195.3).\n(e) The program must include activities to advise affected municipalities, school\ndistricts, businesses, and residents of pipeline facility locations.\nAndeavor (Tesoro) did not contact an appropriate official at Northwest Middle School in Salt\nLake City regarding the pipeline on the edge of the school property. The Principal had not\nbeen contacted by Tesoro about the pipeline in 2014 and a new principal who has been at the\nschool the past two years has never been contacted. The Tesoro Public Awareness person had\ncontact with the school janitor during his meeting with the school, but not the Principal which\nis responsible for developing emergency response plans at the school.\n7. § 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(a)…\n(d) When must operators complete baseline assessments?\n(1)…\n(3) Newly-identified areas.\n(i) When information is available from the information analysis (see paragraph\n(g) of this section), or from Census Bureau maps, that the population density\naround a pipeline segment has changed so as to fall within the definition in\n§195.450 of a high population area or other populated area, the operator must\n3\n\n\n\nincorporate the area into its baseline assessment plan as a high consequence area\nwithin one year from the date the area is identified. An operator must complete\nthe baseline assessment of any line pipe that could affect the newly-identified high\nconsequence area within five years from the date the area is identified.\n(ii) An operator must incorporate a new unusually sensitive area into its baseline\nassessment plan within one year from the date the area is identified. An operator\nmust complete the baseline assessment of any line pipe that could affect the newly-\nidentified high consequence area within five years from the date the area is\nidentified.\nTesoro was aware of an increase in the population density around the pipeline in the Boise,\nIdaho and Salt Lake, Utah areas. The operator has not updated this information in four years\nand does not appear that documentation existed that any review or revisions were undertaken\nin that time-frame.\n8. § 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas\n(a)…\n(f) What are the elements of an integrity management program?\nAn integrity management program begins with the initial framework. An\noperator must continually change the program to reflect operating experience,\nconclusions drawn from results of the integrity assessments, and other\nmaintenance and surveillance data, and evaluation of consequences of a failure on\nthe high consequence area. An operator must include, at minimum, each of the\nfollowing elements in its written integrity management program:\n(1)…\n(7) Methods to measure the program's effectiveness (see paragraph (k) of this\nsection);\nNo meaningful metrics exist within their program. Tesoro only conducted one review out of\nfive years of ownership even though this is an annual requirement. Only one document for the\nIMP Effectiveness Review Report for 2016 was provided to review the performance metrics.\n9. § 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas\n(a)…\n(g) What is an information analysis?\nIn periodically evaluating the integrity of each pipeline segment (paragraph (j) of\nthis section), an operator must analyze all available information about the\nintegrity of the entire pipeline and the consequences of a failure. This information\nincludes:\n(1)…\n(4) Information about how a failure would affect the high consequence area, such\nas location of the water intake.\n4\n\n\n\nTesoro was unable to provide evidence of compliance with this section. During the inspection\nrepresentatives of Tesoro stated that no documentation existed for periodic evaluations for\npipeline integrity for the years of 2014 and 2015, and did not know if the required evaluations\nwere performed.\n10. § 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas\n(a)…\n(l) What records must an operator keep to demonstrate compliance?\n(1) An operator must maintain, for the useful life of the pipeline, records that\ndemonstrate compliance with the requirements of this subpart. At a minimum, an\noperator must maintain the following records for review during an inspection:\n(ii) Documents to support the decisions and analyses, including any modifications,\njustifications, deviations and determinations made, variances, and actions taken,\nto implement and evaluate each element of the integrity management program\nlisted in paragraph (f) of this section.\nNo records existed that annual evaluations of their program were completed as required by the\nregulations. Tesoro only performed the IMP Effectiveness Review Report for the 2016\nevaluation out of five years of operation.\n11. § 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(a)…\n(l) What records must an operator keep to demonstrate compliance?\n(1) An operator must maintain, for the useful life of the pipeline, records that\ndemonstrate compliance with the requirements of this subpart. At a minimum, an\noperator must maintain the following records for review during an inspection:\n(i) A written integrity management program in accordance with paragraph (b) on\nthis section.\n(ii)…\n(2) See Appendix C of this part for examples of records an operator would be\nrequired to keep.\nAppendix C to Part 195—Guidance for Implementation of an Integrity\nManagement Program\nThis Appendix gives guidance to help an operator implement the requirements of\nthe integrity management program rule in §§195.450 and 195.452. Guidance is\nprovided on:\n(1)…\n(7) Types of conditions that an integrity assessment may identify that an operator\nshould include in its required schedule for evaluation and remediation.\nVII. Conditions that may impair a pipeline's integrity.\nSection 195.452(h) requires an operator to evaluate and remediate all pipeline\nintegrity issues raised by the integrity assessment or information analysis. An\noperator must develop a schedule that prioritizes conditions discovered on the\n5\n\n\n\npipeline for evaluation and remediation. The following are some examples of\nconditions that an operator should schedule for evaluation and remediation.\nA. Any change since the previous assessment.\nB. Mechanical damage that is located on the top side of the pipe.\nC. An anomaly abrupt in nature.\nD. An anomaly longitudinal in orientation.\nE. An anomaly over a large area.\nF. An anomaly located in or near a casing, a crossing of another pipeline, or an\narea with suspect cathodic protection.\nAs part of the inspection, a PHMSA representative asked for ILI results and anomaly repairs\nmade as a result of 2013 ILI runs. In response to this request, Tesoro stated that it did not have\nto maintain or provide records for IMP related activities prior to their purchase of the\nNorthwest Pipeline Assets. Tesoro is required to understand the integrity issues associated\nwith its pipeline, including the integrity issues associated with pipelines it purchases from\nanother operator. If documentation of such integrity issues exists, including documents\nrelating to ILI runs and anomaly repairs that were performed prior to Tesoro’s purchasing the\npipeline, are required to be kept for the useful life of the pipeline to demonstrate compliance\nwith the regulations.\n12. § 195.505 Qualification program.\nEach operator shall have and follow a written qualification program. The\nprogram shall include provisions to:\n(a) …\n(b) Ensure through evaluation that individuals performing covered tasks are\nqualified;\nThe operator failed to document who is performing covered tasks on their anomaly digs or\npipeline repairs, and is therefore unable to verify if the personnel who performed coating\nrepairs, pipe-to-soil potential readings, excavation, etc., were qualified at the time of the\nrepairs in 2016.\n13. § 195.583 What must I do to monitor atmospheric corrosion control?\n(a) You must inspect each pipeline or portion of pipeline that is exposed to the\natmosphere for evidence of atmospheric corrosion, as follows:\n(c) If you find atmospheric corrosion during an inspection, you must provide\nprotection against the corrosion as required by §195.581.\nTank 913 in the Pocatello terminal was said to be out of service and non-jurisdictional to\nPHMSA. At the time of the inspection, the tank was piped into the header to receive hazardous\nliquids from a PHMSA regulated pipeline. The piping had no coating between the header tie-in\nand the tank. The construction records showed that the new piping was constructed three and\nhalf years prior to the inspection which is enough time to have an atmospheric coating applied.\n6\n\n\n\n14. § 195.505 Qualification program.\nEach operator shall have and follow a written qualification program. The\nprogram shall include provisions to:\n(a) Identify covered tasks;\n(h) After December 16, 2004, provide training, as appropriate, to ensure that\nindividuals performing covered tasks have the necessary knowledge and skills to\nperform the tasks in a manner that ensures the safe operation of pipeline\nfacilities;\nThe operator has not identified task specific Abnormal Operation Conditions (AOCs) for each\ncovered task in its written qualification program. This was noted when reviewing the\noperator’s Operator Qualification Program: Section 6 Abnormal Operating Conditions dated\n06/30/2016.\n15. § 195.505 Qualification program.\n(a)…\nEach operator shall have and follow a written qualification program. The\nprogram shall include provisions to:\n(i) After December 16, 2004, notify the Administrator or a state agency\nparticipating under 49 U.S.C. Chapter 601 if the operator significantly modifies\nthe program after the administrator or state agency has verified that it complies\nwith this section. Notifications to PHMSA may be submitted by electronic mail\nto InformationResourcesManager@dot.gov, or by mail to ATTN: Information\nResources Manager DOT/PHMSA/OPS, East Building, 2nd Floor, E22-321, New\nJersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.\nTesoro failed to notify PHMSA of their acquisition of Chevron assets in 2013 or after the\nacquisition. Tesoro claims that their acquisition did not qualify as a \"significant change\" even\nthough an Advisory Bulletin was issued on this subject.\n16. § 195.507 Record Keeping.\nEach operator shall maintain records that demonstrate compliance with this\nsubpart.\n(a) Qualification records shall include:\n(1) Identification of qualified individual(s);\n(2) Identification of the covered tasks the individual is qualified to perform;\nTesoro’s OQ records only showed Michael Randall to be qualified in fall of 2015. The records\ndo not demonstrate he was qualified to perform mainline valve inspections in February and\nMarch of 2015, when he did the valve inspections. Valve records do not demonstrate that\na qualified supervisor directed and observed Mr. Randall during performance of this covered\ntask. Respondent stated during the inspection close out interview that Tesoro could not locate\nthe OQ records for Mr. Randall.\n7\n\n\n\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 CFR § 190.223, you are subject to a civil penalty not to\nexceed $209,002 per violation per day the violation persists, up to a maximum of $2,090,022\nfor a related series of violations. For violations occurring prior to November 2, 2015, the\nmaximum penalty may not exceed $200,000 per violation per day, with a maximum penalty\nnot to exceed $2,000,000 for a related series of violations. We have reviewed the\ncircumstances and supporting documents involved in this case, and have decided not to\nconduct additional enforcement action or penalty assessment proceedings at this time. We\nadvise you to correct the items identified in this letter. Failure to do so will result in Andeavor\nLogistics being subject to additional enforcement action.\nNo reply to this letter is required. If you choose to reply, in your correspondence please refer\nto CPF 5-2018-5005W. Be advised that all material you submit in response to this\nenforcement action is subject to being made publicly available. If you believe that any portion\nof your responsive material qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along\nwith the complete original document you must provide a second copy of the document with\nthe portions you believe qualify for confidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why\nyou believe the redacted information qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C.\n552(b).\nSincerely,\nKim West\nDirector, Western Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\ncc: PHP-60 Compliance Registry\nPHP-500 J. Gilliam (#156730)\n8","truncated":false,"body_characters":19156}