{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 520200010","title":"NORTH SLOPE BOROUGH ENERGY MANAGEMENT — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2020-11-18","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 192.203(b)(9), 192.465(d), 192.467(a), 192.467(d), 192.479(a), 192.481(a), 192.481(b), 192.614(c)(1), 192.616(c), 192.616(d)(3), 192.707(c), 192.739(a), 192.743(a), 192.807(b).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520200010.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520200010.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520200010","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/520200010","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving NORTH SLOPE BOROUGH ENERGY MANAGEMENT. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 192.203(b)(9),  192.465(d),  192.467(a),  192.467(d),  192.479(a),  192.481(a),  192.481(b),  192.614(c)(1),  192.616(c),  192.616(d)(3),  192.707(c),  192.739(a),  192.743(a),  192.807(b). The case was opened on 2020-11-18 and is reported as closed as of 2023-11-16. Proposed civil penalty: $151,900. Assessed civil penalty: $151,900. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n520200010_Closure Letter_11162023_(19-166675S).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520200010/520200010_Closure%20Letter_11162023_(19-166675S).pdf\n\n520200010_Closure Letter_11162023_(19-166675S)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520200010/520200010_Closure%20Letter_11162023_(19-166675S)_text.pdf\n\n520200010_Final Order_06152021_(19-166675S).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520200010/520200010_Final%20Order_06152021_(19-166675S).pdf\n\n520200010_Final Order_06152021_(19-166675S)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520200010/520200010_Final%20Order_06152021_(19-166675S)_text.pdf\n\n520200010_NOPV PCP PCO_11182020.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520200010/520200010_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_11182020.pdf\n\n520200010_NOPV PCP PCO_11182020_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520200010/520200010_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_11182020_text.pdf\n\n520200010_Operator Response to Notice_12022020.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520200010/520200010_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice_12022020.pdf\n\n520200010_Closure Letter_11162023_(19-166675S)_text.pdf\n\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: Josiah.Patkotak@north-slope.org\nNovember 16, 2023\nThe Honorable Josiah Patkotak\nMayor of the North Slope Borough\nNorth Slope Borough Energy Management\nP.O. Box 69\nUtqiagvik, Alaska 99723\nCPF 5-2020-0010\nClosure Letter\nDear Mayor Patkotak:\nOn June 15, 2021, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) issued\nto the North Slope Borough a Final Order in the above-referenced case. This Order included\nCompliance Order and Civil Penalty assessment. Based on our review of the documentation you\nprovided and confirmation of payment of the civil penalty, it has been determined that you have\ncomplied with the terms of this Order.\nAccordingly, this case is now closed, and no further action is contemplated with respect to the\nmatters involved in this case. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nDustin Hubbard\nDirector, Western Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\ncc: PHP-60 Compliance Order\nPHP-500 J. Gano (#19-166675S)\nScott Danner, Director of NSB Department of Public Works (via email),\nScott.Danner@north-slope.org\n\n520200010_NOPV PCP PCO_11182020_text.pdf\n\nNOTICE OF PROBABLE VIOLATION\nPROPOSED CIVIL PENALTY\nand\nPROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER\nVIA E-MAIL TO THE HONORABLE HARRY K. BROWER, JR.\nNovember 18, 2020\nThe Honorable Harry K. Brower, Jr., Mayor\nMayor of the North Slope Borough\nNorth Slope Borough Energy Management\nP.O. Box 69\nUtqiagvik, Alaska 99723\nCPF 5-2020-0010\nDear Mayor Brower:\nFrom December 9 through 13, 2019, and on March 10, 2020, representatives of the Pipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), pursuant\nto Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code (U.S.C.), inspected your Barrow natural gas pipeline\nlocated in Utqiagvik and Nuiqsut natural gas pipeline in the North Slope Borough, Alaska.\nAs a result of the inspection, it is alleged that you have committed probable violations of the\nPipeline Safety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). The items inspected\nand the probable violations are:\n\n\n\n1. § 192.203 Instrument, control, and sampling pipe and components.\n(a) .…\n(b) Materials and design. All materials employed for pipe and components must be\ndesigned to meet the particular conditions of service and the following:\n(1) ….\n(9) Each control line must be protected from anticipated causes of damage and\nmust be designed and installed to prevent damage to any one control line from\nmaking both the regulator and the over-pressure protective device inoperative.\nOn the Barrow natural gas pipeline, the control line between the Primary Gas Handling Facility\nand Pipeline Valve Station 1 is not protected from anticipated causes of damage as required by §\n192.203(b)(9).\nFour pressure control valves (PCV214A, PCV214B, PCV237A, and PCV237B) at the Primary\nGas Handling Facility (PGHF) reduce the pressure from the upstream gathering system\n(approximately 900 psig) to the pipeline's normal operating pressure (approximately 290\npsig). These pressure control valves share a common stainless steel sensing/control line, which\nis located on a pipe rack between the PGHF and Pipeline Valve Station 1. The sensing/control\nline is located outside and shares pipe supports with nearby piping. The sensing line may be\ndamaged by sloughing snow or ice from the adjacent pipes, particularly mid-point of the span\nbetween pipe supports. Failure of this sensing line would cause the four pressure control valves\nto all simultaneously open which could potentially overpressure the pipeline.\n2. § 192.465 External corrosion control: Monitoring.\n(a) .…\n(d) Each operator shall take prompt remedial action to correct any deficiencies\nindicated by the monitoring.\nNorth Slope Borough Energy Management (NSBEM) failed to take prompt remedial action to\ncorrect deficiencies found during their 2017, 2018, and 2019 cathodic protection (CP)\nmonitoring of the Nuiqsut natural gas pipeline. CP inspections completed in 2017, 2018, and\n2019 found locations along the buried portion of the Nuiqsut natural gas pipeline that did not\nmeet one or more applicable criteria contained in appendix D of part 192.\nIn 2017, NSBEM conducted a survey of the CP levels at each test station. Test Stations 2, 4, and\n7 did not meet CP criteria. NSBEM was cited by PHMSA in a 2013 Warning Letter (5-2013-\n0008W) for failing to maintain the required level of cathodic protection on the Nuiqsut natural\ngas pipeline. That letter states that NSBEM had reports showing, as far back as 2011, that CP\npotentials at Test Stations 2, 4, and 7 were inadequate.\nIn both 2018 and 2019, NSBEM conducted close-interval surveys and test station point surveys\nof the Nuiqsut natural gas pipeline. The close interval surveys demonstrated that the majority of\nthe pipeline did not meet applicable CP criteria in 2018, and approximately 23 percent of the\npipeline did not meet applicable CP criteria in 2019. Portions of the pipeline between Test\n2\n\n\n\nStations 1 and 2, between Test Stations 2 and 3, and between Test Stations 3 and 4, failed to\nmeet CP criteria in both the 2018 and 2019 close-interval surveys.\nDespite records showing inadequate CP potentials were found during monitoring, including\nlocations that had inadequate CP potentials for multiple consecutive years, NSBEM has not\ntaken any remedial measures to ensure the pipeline meets the CP criteria specified in appendix D\nof part 192.\n3. § 192.467 External corrosion control: Electrical isolation.\n(a) Each buried or submerged pipeline must be electrically isolated from other\nunderground metallic structures, unless the pipeline and the other structures are\nelectrically interconnected and cathodically protected as a single unit.\nThe buried segment of the Nuiqsut natural gas pipeline was not electrically isolated from other\nunderground metallic structures and was not electrically interconnected with those structures and\ncathodically protected as a single unit. Cathodic protection inspection reports completed in 2017,\n2018, and 2019 noted that a bare copper wire was bonded to the Nuiqsut transmission pipeline,\nwhich bypassed the di-electric isolation flange kit at the pressure reducing valve (PRV) at the\ndownstream end of the pipeline, shorting the pipeline to the PRV's grounding system. The PRV\nskid and the pipeline are not electrically interconnected and cathodically protected as a single\nunit. The operator removed the grounding wire during the March 10, 2020 site inspection, but\ncould not verify that the pipeline was isolated from PRV facility piping.\n4. § 192.467 External corrosion control: Electrical isolation.\n(a) .…\nadequate.\n(d) Inspection and electrical tests must be made to assure that electrical isolation is\nNSBEM failed to make inspections and electrical tests to assure that electrical isolation is\nadequate at the upstream end of the buried segment of the Nuiqsut natural gas pipeline. During\nthe March 10, 2020 inspection, PHMSA observed potential lack of isolation between the pipeline\nand the buried, bare steel vertical support members (VSMs) which support the above ground\npipeline. The VSMs were not intended to be electrically interconnected with the pipeline and\nprotected as a single unit. Specifically, PHMSA observed that the pipeline is not equipped with\nan insulating device (for example a dielectric insulating flange) to electrically isolate the buried\nsegment from the above-ground segment. The above-ground segment was braced to bare steel\nhorizontal support members (HSMs) and VSMs using steel U-bolts. In addition, the Nuiqsut\npipeline was supported between the HSMs by steel brackets that were connected via U-bolts to\nthe pipeline and three other neighboring pipelines that did not appear to be isolated from the\nVSMs. This above-ground segment has historically had coating failures and may be electrically\ncontinuous with the bare steel vertical support members.\n3\n\n\n\nNSBEM was unable to demonstrate that an inspection and electrical test had occurred at this\nlocation and that the electrical isolation was adequate. The NSBEM conducts isolation\ninspecting and testing annually at other locations on this pipeline, the results of which are\npresented in the cathodic protection monitoring reports. The reports do not include testing at the\nupstream end of the buried segment. The reports do show that test stations near this end of the\npipeline have not consistently met cathodic protection criteria, indicating isolation may be\nnecessary to facilitate the application of corrosion control.\n5. § 192.479 Atmospheric corrosion control: General.\n(a) Each operator must clean and coat each pipeline or portion of pipeline that is\nexposed to the atmosphere, except pipelines under paragraph (c) of this section.\nThe operator did not clean and coat each portion of the Nuiqsut natural gas pipeline that was\nexposed to the atmosphere as required by § 192.479(a), nor did they meet the exceptions to the\nrequirement to do so under paragraph § 192.479(c). Between 2010 and 2018, the Nuiqsut natural\ngas pipeline operated without adequate atmospheric corrosion control coating and with corrosion\npresent that was beyond that of a light surface oxide. In addition, the operator failed to\ndemonstrate that the corrosion would not affect the safe operation of the pipeline before the next\nscheduled inspection per § 192.479(c)(2).\nIn 2013, PHMSA cited the operator for failing to protect the Nuiqsut gas pipeline from\natmospheric corrosion per § 192.479. PHMSA stated in a May 23, 2013 Warning Letter (CPF 5-\n2013-0008W) to the operator that PHMSA observed that the pipeline was exposed to the\natmosphere at numerous locations where the coating was damaged; that water was present\nbeneath the damaged coating; and that pitting and corrosion beyond a light surface oxide were\npresent at these locations. The warning letter indicated that the operator had coating inspection\nrecords dating back to 2010 that showed damage to the coating and corrosion that was beyond a\nlight surface oxide.\nAtmospheric corrosion inspection records for the Nuiqsut natural gas pipeline completed in April\n2014 and April 2017 show that the damaged coating had not been repaired. In February and\nMarch 2018, NSBEM repaired the damaged coating on the pipeline. During the repairs, the\noperator noted pitting with a depth of 20 mils (0.020 inches) or deeper at 43 locations, with the\ndeepest pit depth of 47 mils (0.047 inches, or approximately 23 percent wall loss).\nNSBEM failed to demonstrate that corrosion pitting on the Nuiqsut natural gas pipeline would\nnot affect the safe operation of the pipeline before the next scheduled inspection. For example,\nthe report for the April 2017 atmospheric corrosion inspection does not show that pitting was\nobserved in the 234 inspection sites covered by that report; however, in 2018, the NSBEM\nrepaired 3,543 damaged coating sites and found pitting at 43 locations. This suggests the 2017\natmospheric corrosion inspection failed to identify the pitting and therefore cannot demonstrate it\nwould not affect the safe operation of the pipeline before the next scheduled inspection.\n4\n\n\n\n6. § 192.481 Atmospheric corrosion control: Monitoring.\n(a) Each operator must inspect each pipeline or portion of pipeline that is exposed\nto the atmosphere for evidence of atmospheric corrosion, as follows:\nIf the pipeline is\nlocated:\nThen the frequency of inspection is:\nOnshore Offshore At least once every 3 calendar years, but with intervals not\nexceeding 39 months\nAt least once each calendar year, but with intervals not\nexceeding 15 months\nConsecutive atmospheric corrosion inspections of aboveground portions of the Barrow natural\ngas pipeline occurred in July 2014 and then in September 2018, which exceeded the maximum\n39-month inspection interval for pipelines located onshore.\n7. § 192.481 Atmospheric corrosion control: Monitoring.\n(a) Each operator must inspect each pipeline or portion of pipeline that is exposed\nto the atmosphere for evidence of atmospheric corrosion, as follows:\nIf the pipeline is\nlocated:\nThen the frequency of inspection is:\nOnshore Offshore At least once every 3 calendar years, but with intervals not\nexceeding 39 months\nAt least once each calendar year, but with intervals not\nexceeding 15 months\nDuring their September 2018 atmospheric corrosion inspection, NSBEM failed to inspect every\nportion of the Barrow natural gas pipeline that was exposed to the atmosphere for evidence of\natmospheric corrosion. Specifically, the NSBEM failed to inspect the “S-Curve” separator at\nValve Station 2 and its associated aboveground piping and valves as part of the September 2018\natmospheric corrosion inspection. The report for the September 2018 atmospheric corrosion\ninspection shows the boundaries of the areas of the pipeline that NSBEM inspected (piping\ncircuit diagrams and tabulated inspection data). This report shows that NSBEM omitted the “S-\nCurve” and its associated aboveground piping from that inspection. During the December 10,\n2019 inspection, PHMSA observed wide-spread coating failures and atmospheric corrosion at\nthis location.\n8. § 192.481 Atmospheric corrosion control: Monitoring.\n(a) ….\n(b) During inspections the operator must give particular attention to pipe at soil-to-\nair interfaces, under thermal insulation, under disbonded coatings, at pipe supports,\nin splash zones, at deck penetrations, and in spans over water.\n5\n\n\n\nNSBEM failed to inspect the Nuiqsut natural gas pipeline at soil-to-air interfaces and under\nthermal insulation. The Nuiqsut pipeline has thermal insulation at the soil-to-air interfaces,\nbut atmospheric corrosion records for inspection reports 2014 and 2017 showed that NSBEM\ninspected the pipeline but did not inspect soil-to-air interfaces and areas under thermal insulation,\nas required by § 192.481(b).\n9. § 192.614 Damage prevention program.\n(a) .…\n(c) The damage prevention program required by paragraph (a) of this section must,\nat a minimum:\n(1) Include the identity, on a current basis, of persons who normally engage in\nexcavation activities in the area in which the pipeline is located.\nNSBEM’s damage prevention program failed to include the identity, on a current basis, of\npersons who normally engage in excavation activities in the area in which the pipeline is located.\nDuring the inspection, NSBEM personnel stated that they did not maintain a list of any such\nexcavators.\n10. § 192.616 Public awareness.\n(a) .…\n(c) The operator must follow the general program recommendations, including\nbaseline and supplemental requirements of API RP 1162, unless the operator\nprovides justification in its program or procedural manual as to why compliance\nwith all or certain provisions of the recommended practice is not practicable and\nnot necessary for safety.\nNSBEM failed to follow the general recommendations of API RP 1162. Specifically, NSBEM\ndid not annually complete an audit or review of the Public Awareness Program's implementation,\nas required in Section 8.3 of API RP 1162. During the inspection, NSBEM provided to PHMSA\npersonnel a completed internal self-assessment worksheet for 2018; however, NSBEM personnel\nstated that an audit or review for the years prior to 2018 was never completed. NSBEM did not\nprovide justification as to why compliance with that provision was not practicable or necessary\nfor safety.\nIn addition, as of January 7, 2020, the operator had not evaluated the effectiveness of their public\nawareness program, which is required by § 192.616(c), Section 8.4 of API 1162, and their own\nprocedures. Their written Public Awareness Plan (Rev. 6, January 2019) stated:\n\"The deadline for the first Effectiveness Evaluation will be based on the\ncreation and implementation date of the original written plan, December\n2015. With this in mind, the four-year deadline for this evaluation is\ncalculated at July 2019 in order to keep in compliance with the federally\nestablished deadline as described in RP 1162.\"\n6\n\n\n\nThe operator did not complete the 4-Year Effectiveness Evaluation in 2019. The operator did\nnot provide justification as to why compliance with that provision was not practicable or\nnecessary for safety.\n11. § 192.616 Public awareness.\n(a) .…\n(d) The operator's program must specifically include provisions to educate the\npublic, appropriate government organizations, and persons engaged in excavation\nrelated activities on:\n(3) Physical indications that such a release may have occurred;\nNSBEM’s 2019 Public Awareness flyer, which was used to educate the public in Nuiqsut on the\nphysical indications of a possible release, stated that \"Natural gas smells like rotten\neggs.\" NSBEM’s Nuiqsut natural gas pipeline is un-odorized, thus the information provided to\nthe public in the flyer failed to educate the public as required by the regulation.\n12. § 192.707 Line markers for mains and transmission lines.\n(a) .…\n(c) Pipelines aboveground. Line markers must be placed and maintained along each\nsection of a main and transmission line that is located aboveground in an area\naccessible to the public.\nOn the Barrow natural gas pipeline, NSBEM failed to place and maintain line markers along\neach section of its transmission line that is located aboveground in an area accessible to the\npublic. There is an above-ground portion of the Barrow pipeline located on a causeway that is\naccessible to the public that did not have pipeline markers on either side.\n13. § 192.739 Pressure limiting and regulating stations: Inspection and testing.\n(a) Each pressure limiting station, relief device (except rupture discs), and pressure\nregulating station and its equipment must be subjected at intervals not exceeding 15\nmonths, but at least once each calendar year, to inspections and tests to determine\nthat it is—\nNSBEM failed to inspect each pressure regulating station at least once each calendar year at\nintervals not to exceed 15 months. The Barrow natural gas pipeline’s pressure is regulated by six\npressure control valves (PCVs) at two facilities (specifically, PCV214A, PCV214B, PCV237A,\nand PCV237B at the Primary Gas Handling Facilities and PCV001 and PCV002 at the South\nGas Handling Facility). These PCVs are the primary pressure control on the pipeline; they\nreduce the pressure from the upstream gathering system (maximum 900 psig) to the Barrow\nnatural gas pipeline’s normal operating pressure (approximately 290 psig). NSBEM provided\nrecords showing that the pressure regulating stations on the Barrow natural gas pipeline were\ninspected on June 11, 2016 and December 7, 2017, which exceeded the maximum 15-month\ninterval.\n7\n\n\n\n14. § 192.739 Pressure limiting and regulating stations: Inspection and testing.\n(a) Each pressure limiting station, relief device (except rupture discs), and pressure\nregulating station and its equipment must be subjected at intervals not exceeding 15\nmonths, but at least once each calendar year, to inspections and tests to determine\nthat it is—\n(1) In good mechanical condition;\n(2) Adequate from the standpoint of capacity and reliability of operation for the\nservice in which it is employed;\n(3) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, set to control or relieve at\nthe correct pressure consistent with the pressure limits of §192.201(a); and\n(4) Properly installed and protected from dirt, liquids, or other conditions that\nmight prevent proper operation.\nNSBEM failed to ensure that a pressure control valve, PCV-214A, was \"in good mechanical\ncondition\" during its June 2016 inspection. PCV-214A is a Pressure Control Valve at the PGHF,\nwhich is a pressure regulating facility for the Barrow natural gas pipeline. The worksheet for the\nJune 2016 inspection indicated that there was audible leak-by at PCV-214A and that the valve\nneeded to be re-built, but the operator had not repaired the valve by the December 2017\ninspection (the leak-by was still present and noted on the December 2017 inspection\nworksheet). During PHMSA's 2019/2020 inspection the operator stated that the leak-by had still\nnot been repaired.\n15. § 192.743 Pressure limiting and regulating stations: Capacity of relief devices.\n(a) Pressure relief devices at pressure limiting stations and pressure regulating\nstations must have sufficient capacity to protect the facilities to which they are\nconnected. Except as provided in §192.739(b), the capacity must be consistent with\nthe pressure limits of § 192.201(a). This capacity must be determined at intervals\nnot exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year, by testing the devices\nin place or by review and calculations.\nNSBEM failed to test in place or review the capacity of the relief devices at the pressure\nregulating stations in the Primary Gas Handling Facility (PGHF) and South Gas\nHandling Facilities (SGHF). The PGHF and SGHF both have pressure regulating stations that\nreduce the pressure from the gathering system (maximum approximately 900 psi) to the Barrow\ntransmission pipeline's operating pressure (typically 290 psi). PSV 360 and RV005 are the relief\nvalves in the PGHF and SGHF, respectively. NSBEM stated during the inspection that they had\nnever tested the devices in place nor reviewed the capacity calculations.\n16. § 192.807 Recordkeeping.\n(a) .…\n(b) Records supporting an individual's current qualification shall be maintained\nwhile the individual is performing the covered task. Records of prior qualification\n8\n\n\n\nand records of individuals no longer performing covered tasks shall be retained for\na period of five years.\nNSBEM failed to retain Operator Qualification (OQ) records prior to 2016. Personnel operating\npipelines for the North Slope Borough work under contract; the operator stated that, in 2016, the\nprior contract company, operating on behalf of the North Slope Borough, destroyed the OQ\nrecords.\nProposed Civil Penalty\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 CFR § 190.223, you are subject to a civil penalty not to exceed\n$218,647 per violation per day the violation persists, up to a maximum of $2,186,465 for a\nrelated series of violations. For violations occurring on or after November 27, 2018 and before\nJuly 31, 2019, the maximum penalty may not exceed $213,268 per violation per day, with a\nmaximum penalty not to exceed $2,132,679. For violations occurring on or after November 2,\n2015 and before November 27, 2018, the maximum penalty may not exceed $209,002 per\nviolation per day, with a maximum penalty not to exceed $2,090,022. For violations occurring\nprior to November 2, 2015, the maximum penalty may not exceed $200,000 per violation per\nday, with a maximum penalty not to exceed $2,000,000 for a related series of violations. We\nhave reviewed the circumstances and supporting documentation involved for the above probable\nviolations and recommend that you be preliminarily assessed a civil penalty of $151,900 as\nfollows:\nItem number\nPENALTY\n6\n13\n14\n$38,000\n$55,200\n$58,700\nWarning Items\nWith respect to items 10, 11, and 16, we have reviewed the circumstances and supporting\ndocuments involved in this case and have decided not to conduct additional enforcement action\nor penalty assessment proceedings at this time. We advise you to promptly correct these items.\nFailure to do so may result in additional enforcement action.\nProposed Compliance Order\nWith respect to items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 12, 14, and 15, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60118, the\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration proposes to issue a Compliance Order\nto North Slope Borough Energy Management. Please refer to the Proposed Compliance Order,\nwhich is enclosed and made a part of this Notice.\nResponse to this Notice\nEnclosed as part of this Notice is a document entitled Response Options for Pipeline Operators\nin Enforcement Proceedings. Please refer to this document and note the response options. All\nmaterial you submit in response to this enforcement action may be made publicly available. If\n9\n\n\n\nyou believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for confidential treatment\nunder 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document you must provide a second\ncopy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for confidential treatment redacted\nand an explanation of why you believe the redacted information qualifies for confidential\ntreatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b).\nFollowing the receipt of this Notice, you have 30 days to submit written comments, or request a\nhearing under 49 CFR § 190.211. If you do not respond within 30 days of receipt of this Notice,\nthis constitutes a waiver of your right to contest the allegations in this Notice and authorizes the\nAssociate Administrator for Pipeline Safety to find facts as alleged in this Notice without further\nnotice to you and to issue a Final Order. If you are responding to this Notice, we propose that\nyou submit your correspondence to my office within 30 days from receipt of this Notice. This\nperiod may be extended by written request for good cause.\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF 5-2020-0010 and, for each document\nyou submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.\nSincerely,\nDustin Hubbard\nDirector, Western Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nEnclosures: Proposed Compliance Order\nResponse Options for Pipeline Operators in Enforcement Proceedings\ncc: PHP-60 Compliance Registry\nPHP-500 Jake Gano (#166675, #166676, #166677)\n10\n\n\n\nPROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER\nPursuant to 49 United States Code § 60118, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration (PHMSA) proposes to issue to North Slope Borough Energy Management a\nCompliance Order incorporating the following remedial requirements to ensure the compliance\nof North Slope Borough Energy Management with the pipeline safety regulations:\nA. B. C. In regard to Item 1 of the Notice pertaining to the control line for the pressure\ncontrol valves on the Barrow natural gas pipeline, North Slope Borough Energy\nManagement must:\nA.1 Within 90 days of receipt of the Final Order, provide to the Director of the\nWestern Region a written work plan to secure the stainless-steel sensing line. The\nwork plan must include design drawings showing a configuration that ensures that\nthe sensing line is protected from damage, and that the pipeline’s MAOP cannot\nbe exceeded as a result of the failure of the sensing line.\nA.2 Upon receiving a notice of non-objection from the Director of the Western\nRegion, North Slope Borough Energy Management must implement that work\nplan within 90 days.\nA.3 Within 30 days of completing the activities described in A.2, provide to the\nDirector of the Western Region as-built drawings and photographs demonstrating\nthat activities were completed consistent with the work plan.\nIn regard to Item 2 of the Notice pertaining to inadequate levels of cathodic\nprotection on the Nuiqsut natural gas pipeline, North Slope Borough Energy\nManagement must:\nB.1 Within 180 days of receipt of the Final Order, provide to the Director of the\nWestern Region a written assessment of the viability of meeting cathodic\nprotection criteria on the pipeline. The assessment must show the horizontal and\nvertical alignment of the pipeline; locations of current and historic inadequate\ncathodic protection levels along the alignment; and the horizontal and vertical\nlocations of known permafrost (for example from boreholes, thermistor data,\noriginal construction data) and relevant surface features (for example ponding,\nthaw bulbs, river channels).\nB.2 If the assessment described in B.1 shows areas of inadequate cathodic\nprotection levels where the pipeline is buried coinciding with locations that\ncannot be demonstrated to be permafrost, the assessment in B.1 must also include\na written work plan to address the areas of inadequate cathodic protection and/or\nthe data gaps.\nB.3 Upon receiving a notice of non-objection from the Director of the Western\nRegion, North Slope Borough Energy Management must implement the work\nplan described in B.2 within 180 days, and must provide to the Director of the\nWestern Region the records associated with that work within 90 days of\ncompletion.\nIn regard to Items 3 and 4 of the Notice pertaining to inadequate electrical\nisolation on the Nuiqsut natural gas pipeline, North Slope Borough Energy\n11\n\n\n\nD. E. F. Management must, within 180 days of receipt of the Final Order, install electrical\ninsulating device(s) at the upstream end of the buried segment; conduct testing at\nboth the upstream and downstream end of the buried segment to show that the\npipeline is electrically isolated from other buried structures that are not intended\nto be cathodically protected as a single unit (including, at a minimum, the PRV\nstation at the downstream end of the buried segment and the nearest vertical\nsupport member at the upstream end of the buried segment); and, within 30 days\nof completing these activities, provide records demonstrating the electrical\nisolation of the pipeline to the Director of the Western Region.\nIn regard to Item 5 of the Notice pertaining to coating of the Nuiqsut Natural gas\npipeline, North Slope Borough Energy Management must:\nD.1 Within 90 days of receiving the Final Order, submit to the Director of the\nWestern Region a written assessment and maintenance plan for maintaining the\natmospheric corrosion control coatings on its pipelines in accordance with the\nregulations. The plan must be incorporated into North Slope Borough Energy\nManagement’s written corrosion control procedures. The plan must include, at a\nminimum, how NSBEM will determine and document whether a corroded\nsegment meets the criteria for exemption from atmospheric corrosion control per\n§ 192.479(c), and the plan must include specific time frames for repairing any\ncoating damage not meeting the criteria for exemption.\nD.2 NSBEM must provide to the Director of the Western Region a listing of all\nlocations on the pipelines that are uncoated or the coating is damaged, the results\nof any corrosion assessment performed at those locations, and a written repair\nplan for those locations. NSBEM must submit the plan within 90 days of\nreceiving the final order, and must implement the repair plan as required by the\nregulations.\nIn regard to Item 7 of the Notice pertaining to atmospheric corrosion inspections\nat Valve Station 2 of the Barrow Natural gas pipeline, North Slope Borough\nEnergy Management must:\nE.1 Within 90 days of receipt of the Final Order, complete an atmospheric\ncorrosion inspection of Valve Station 2, which must include all valves, the “S\nCurve” separator, the associated drain lines, and any other components through\nwhich natural gas may flow.\nE.2 Within 90 days of completing the inspection described in E.1, protect areas\nwhere atmospheric corrosion is found as required by § 192.481(c).\nE.3 Within 30 days of completing the activities described in E.1 and E.2, provide\nrecords of the inspection and coating repairs or replacement to the Director of the\nWestern Region.\nIn regard to Item 8 of the Notice pertaining to the insulated soil-to-air interface on\nthe Nuiqsut natural gas pipeline, North Slope Borough Energy Management must\nassess the condition of the insulation and outer coating within 180 days of receipt\nof the Final Order. If damage to the outer coating is found during the assessment,\nNorth Slope Borough Energy Management must, as soon as practicable but no\nlater than 30 days following the assessment, assess the condition of the inner pipe\nand inner pipe’s coating; assess the presence or extent of wet insulation; and\n12\n\n\n\nG. H. I. J. K. repair or replace any wet insulation and damaged inner or outer coating.\nIn regard to Item 9 of the Notice pertaining to identifying excavators for the\npurpose of damage prevention notifications, North Slope Borough Energy\nManagement must, within 90 days of receipt of the Final Order, amend its mailing\nlist for damage prevention notifications to include excavators who normally\nengage in excavation activities in the area in which the Barrow and Nuiqsut\nnatural gas pipelines are located. North Slope Borough Energy Management must\nconsider, at a minimum, excavators who frequently use the one-call system but\nare not located in Barrow or Nuiqsut and therefore are not currently part of their\nmailing list.\nIn regard to Item 12 of the Notice pertaining to line markers on the Barrow\nnatural gas pipeline, North Slope Borough Energy Management must install line\nmarkers on the Barrow natural gas pipeline at all areas where the pipeline is\nabove-ground and accessible to the public (including, at a minimum, the above-\nground pipeline segment at the causeway crossing) within 180 days of receipt of\nthe Final Order. The North Slope Borough must provide notice to the Director of\nthe Western Region with 30 days of completing the installation.\nIn regard to Item 14 of the Notice pertaining to the audible leak on Pressure\nControl Valve PVC214A at the Primary Gas Handling Facility on the Barrow\nnatural gas pipeline, North Slope Borough Energy Management must repair or\nreplace PCV-214A within 180 days of receipt of the Final Order. The North Slope\nBorough must provide notice to the Director of the Western Region within 30\ndays of completing the repair or replacement.\nIn regard to Item 15 of the Notice pertaining to review of capacity calculations\nfor pressure relief valves protecting the Barrow natural gas pipeline, North Slope\nBorough Energy Management must:\nJ.1 Within 90 days of receipt of the Final Order, provide to the Director of the\nWestern Region calculations of the required capacity for each relief device\nconsistent with § 192.201 and calculations of the relief capacities for each device\nunder conditions which it operates consistent with § 192.743(b).\nJ.2 If the activities described in J.1 demonstrate that any relief valves lack\nadequate capacity, the operator must provide, along with the calculations, a\nwritten work plan to address any deficiencies.\nJ.3 Upon receiving a notice of non-objection from the Director of the Western\nRegion, implement that work plan within 90 days.\nJ.4 Within 30 days of completing the activities described in J.3, provide to the\nDirector of the Western Region as-built drawings and photographs demonstrating\nthat activities were completed consistent with the work plan.\nIt is requested (not mandated) that North Slope Borough Energy Management\nmaintain documentation of the safety improvement costs associated with fulfilling\nthis Compliance Order and submit the total to Dustin Hubbard, Director, Western\nRegion, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. It is requested\nthat these costs be reported in two categories: 1) total cost associated with\npreparation/revision of plans, procedures, studies and analyses, and 2) total cost\nassociated with replacements, additions and other changes to pipeline\ninfrastructure.\n13\n\n520200010_Final Order_06152021_(19-166675S)_text.pdf\n\nJune 15, 2021\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: harry.brower@north-slope.org\nThe Honorable Harry K. Brower, Jr., Mayor\nMayor of the North Slope Borough\nNorth Slope Borough Energy Management\nP.O. Box 69\nBarrow, Alaska 99723\nRe: CPF No. 5-2020-0010\nDear Mayor Brower:\nEnclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of\nviolation, assesses a civil penalty of $151,900, and specifies actions that need to be taken by\nNorth Slope Borough Energy Management to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. The\npenalty payment terms are set forth in the Final Order. When the civil penalty has been paid and\nthe terms of the compliance order completed, as determined by the Director, Western Region,\nthis enforcement action will be closed. Service of the Final Order by electronic mail is effective\nupon the date of transmission as provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nAlan K. Mayberry\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. Dustin Hubbard, Director, Western Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA\nMr. Scott K. Danner, Director, Department of Public Works, North Slope Borough,\nscott.danner@north-slope.org\nCONFIRMATION OF RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\nIn the Matter of )\nNorth Slope Borough Energy Management, ) CPF No. 5-2020-0010\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n__________________________________________)\nFINAL ORDER\nOn December 9-13, 2019, and March 10, 2020, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, representatives of\nthe Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety\n(OPS), conducted an on-site pipeline safety inspection of the facilities and records of North\nSlope Borough Energy Management (NSB) in Utqiagvik and North Slope Borough, Alaska.\nNSB operates the Barrow and Nuiqsut natural gas pipelines with over 160 miles of plastic pipe.\nAs a result of the inspection, the Director, Western Region, OPS (Director), issued to\nRespondent, by letter dated November 18, 2020, a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil\nPenalty, and Proposed Compliance Order (Notice), which also included a warning pursuant to\n49 C.F.R. § 190.205. In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice proposed finding that\nNSB had committed thirteen (13) violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 192 and proposed assessing a civil\npenalty of $151,900 for the alleged violations. The Notice also proposed ordering Respondent to\ntake certain measures to correct the alleged violations. The warning items required no further\naction, but warned the operator to correct the probable violations or face possible future\nenforcement action.\nNSB responded to the Notice by letter dated December 2, 2020 (Response). The company\ncontested two of the allegations, offered additional information in response to the Notice,\nrequested that the proposed civil penalty be reduced, and requested that the proposed compliance\norder be modified.\nFINDINGS OF VIOLATION\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. Part 192, as follows:\nItem 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.203(b)(9), which states in\nrelevant part:\n§ 192.203 Instr","truncated":true,"body_characters":75772}