{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 520205005M","title":"PLAINS PIPELINE, L.P. — Notice of Amendment","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2020-09-25","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of amendment citing 195.402(c)(3), 195.452(f)(1), 195.452(f)(3), 195.452(f)(6).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520205005m.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520205005m.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520205005m","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/520205005M","body":"Notice of Amendment involving PLAINS PIPELINE, L.P.. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.402(c)(3),  195.452(f)(1),  195.452(f)(3),  195.452(f)(6). The case was opened on 2020-09-25 and is reported as closed as of 2020-12-31. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n520205005M_Closure Letter_12312020.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520205005M/520205005M_Closure%20Letter_12312020.pdf\n\n520205005M_Closure Letter_12312020_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520205005M/520205005M_Closure%20Letter_12312020_text.pdf\n\n520205005M_Notice of Amendment_09252020.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520205005M/520205005M_Notice%20of%20Amendment_09252020.pdf\n\n520205005M_Notice of Amendment_09252020_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520205005M/520205005M_Notice%20of%20Amendment_09252020_text.pdf\n\n520205005M_Operator Response to Notice_11092020.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520205005M/520205005M_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice_11092020.pdf\n\n520205005M_Closure Letter_12312020_text.pdf\n\nVIA E-MAIL TO MR. HARRY N. PEFANIS\nDecember 31, 2020\nMr. Harry N. Pefanis\nPresident & Chief Commercial Officer & Director\nPlains All-American GP LLC\n333 Clay Street, Suite 1600\nHouston, TX 77002\nCPF 5-2020-5005M\nClosure Letter\nDear Mr. Pefanis:\nDuring the weeks of January 28 through February 1, March 11 through 15, and April 1 through 5, 2019,\nrepresentatives from the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), pursuant to\nchapter 601 of 49 United States Code, conducted an on-site pipeline safety inspection of Plains All-\nAmerican Pipeline, LP’s (PAA) procedures for the Beartooth, Bighorn, and Casper Units in Houston,\nTexas. As a result of the inspection, PAA was issued (via email) a Notice of Amendment on September\n25, 2020, which proposed amendment of your procedures.\nPAA submitted its amended procedures, dated November 9, 2020. My staff reviewed the amended\nprocedures, and it appears that the inadequacies outlined in this Notice of Amendment have been\ncorrected.\nThis letter is to inform you no further action is necessary and this case is now closed. Thank you for your\ncooperation.\nSincerely,\nDustin Hubbard\nDirector, Western Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\ncc: PHP-60 Compliance Registry\nPHP-500 D. Fehling (#163431)\nMr. Patrick Hodgins, Vice President, Health, Safety & Environmental, Plains Pipeline LP\n\n520205005M_Notice of Amendment_09252020_text.pdf\n\nNOTICE OF AMENDMENT\nVIA E-MAIL TO MR. HARRY N. PEFANIS\nSeptember 25, 2020\nMr. Harry N. Pefanis\nPresident & Chief Commercial Officer & Director\nPlains All-American GP LLC\n333 Clay Street, Suite 1600\nHouston, TX 77002\nCPF 5-2020-5005M\nDear Mr. Pefanis:\nDuring the weeks of January 28 through February 1, March 11 through 15, and April 1 through\n5, 2019, representatives of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n(PHMSA), pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code, inspected Plains All-American\nPipeline, LP’s (PAA) procedures for the Beartooth, Bighorn, and Casper Units in Houston,\nTexas.\nOn the basis of the inspection, PHMSA has identified the apparent inadequacies found within\nPAA’s plans or procedures, as described below:\n1. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) . . .\n(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by paragraph (a) of\nthis section must include procedures for the following to provide safety during\nmaintenance and normal operations:\n1\n\n\n\n(1) . . .\n(3) Operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in accordance with\neach of the requirements of this subpart and subpart H of this part.\nPAA’s written procedures for span inspections are inadequate to assure safe operation of a\npipeline facility. Specifically, PAA’s Form 515 (Plains2019P-02N_0000509, revised October\n2010), used during atmospheric corrosion inspections, is deficient for gathering adequate data for\nevaluating spans. For example, on Form 515, the total distance of spans is recorded in a specific\nfield, but the distance between supports is recorded in a general comments field. Further, Plains’\nprocedure for span inspections is not explicit regarding any process for evaluating maximum\nspan lengths, data to be documented (e.g., entire span length exposed to the atmosphere and\ndistance between supports), and identification of any immediate hazard(s) that should be\naddressed in a timely manner pursuant to §195.401(b).\nFurther, although PAA’s procedures identify the areas mentioned in §195.583(b) to pay\nparticular attention to while performing atmospheric corrosion inspections, Form 515 fails to\nspecify these locations to ensure they are inspected during the inspection process. PAA must\nrevise their procedure/form to address the deficiencies noted above.\n2. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) …\n(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by paragraph (a) of\nthis section must include procedures for the following to provide safety during\nmaintenance and normal operations:\n(1) . . .\n(3) Operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in accordance with\neach of the requirements of this subpart and subpart H of this part.\nPAA’s written procedure for testing Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP – Operations and\nMaintenance Manual, Revision 3, January 2019) is inadequate to assure safe operation of a\npipeline facility. Specifically, PAA’s procedures, Test Maximum Operating Pressure (January\n2019, Rev.3), and Determining Hydrostatic Test Pressure, Validation, and Evaluation Pressure\nProcedure (Document Number 32-500-SD101, Approved August 16, 2018, Rev.1), used for\ndetermining MOP, direct the reader to: “[e]stablish the MOP of all existing and new pipeline\nfacilities following ‘Determining Hydrostatic Test Pressure, Validation, and Evaluation Pressure\nProcedure.’”1 However, this procedure implies that the operator has the option to choose\nbetween the pressures listed in §195.406(a)(1)-(5) rather than explicitly stating that the lowest\noperating pressure must be selected, pursuant to §195.406. PAA should revise the procedure to\nmake clear that MOP is calculated using the lowest criteria set forth in §195.406.\nAdditionally, Section 6.1 regarding liquid MOP validation includes a provision for using 80% of\nthe factory hydrostatic test pressure, despite the fact that this is only valid for pipeline\ncomponents, not pipe pursuant to §195.406(a)(4). PAA should ensure this distinction is clear in\nSection 6.1.\n1 PAA MOP procedure, Section 2.1.\n2\n\n\n\n3. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(a) …\n(f) What are the elements of an integrity management program?\n(1) A process for identifying which pipeline segments could affect a high\nconsequence area.\nPAA’s written procedures for identifying which pipeline segments could affect a high\nconsequence area (HCA) are inadequate to assure safe operation of a pipeline facility.\nSpecifically, PAA’s Facilities Integrity Management Program (FIMP Manual, dated January\n2019, Rev.4) fails to define the frequency of and the process for identifying HCAs for facilities.\nSection 3.4 “HCA Identification” only consists of a flowchart for “Identifying Pipeline Facilities\nwith Potential HCA Impact” without any narrative or further instruction. Although the flowchart\nreferences an HCA spill plume analysis for facilities with tanks and facilities with pipelines only,\nit does not describe how to conduct this analysis. Nor does the flowchart provide details\nregarding the initial ¼ mile buffer and flow modeling process.\nFinally, during the field inspection, PAA staff discussed several steps that are performed in the\nfield that are not mentioned in PAA’s written procedures. For example, PAA staff stated to\nPHMSA that they review the HCA analysis on an annual basis (not reflected in the written\nprocedures) and use a 35-mile water transport criterion to determine “could affect” to an HCA\n(also not recorded in their written procedures). PAA should revise its procedures to address the\ndeficiencies noted above and to accurately capture undocumented field practices noted above.\n4. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(a) . . .\n(f) What are the elements of an integrity management program?\n(1) . . .\n(3) An analysis that integrates all available information about the integrity of the\nentire pipeline and the consequences of failure (see paragraph (g) of this section).\nPAA’s written procedures for an analysis that integrates all available information about the\nintegrity of the entire pipeline and consequences of a failure are inadequate to assure safe\noperation of a pipeline facility. Specifically, PAA’s FIMP, Section 4.2 “Data Integration” fails\nto provide adequate detail to sufficiently describe all available information about integrity,\nincluding necessary factors affecting the overall risk and how often risk analysis is performed.2\nPAA uses a Facility Risk Assessment Model (FRAM – internal model created by PAA) which,\nby verbal communication, seems to correctly integrate many risk factors. That process, however,\nis not clearly stated in the FIMP. For example, Section 4.2 generally states that data integrations\n“use data from various sources such as incident data, asset data, drawings, previous inspection\ndata, aerial and 3D imagery, historical imagery, and HCA data to evaluate potential areas for risk\nreduction within a facility.” It provides no specific details on, for example, what specific\n“incident data” or “asset data” is utilized or what “drawings” are considered. Further, during the\n2 PAA staff stated during the inspection that risk analysis is performed annually, but this is not included in the\nwritten procedures.\n3\n\n\n\ninspection, PHMSA learned that data integration is done differently based on which integrity\nengineer performs the assessment. PAA should revise its written procedures to document a clear\nprocess to address the deficiencies noted above.\n5. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(a) . . .\n(f) What are the elements of an integrity management program?\n(1) . . .\n(6) Identification of preventative and mitigative measures to protect the high\nconsequence area (see paragraph (i) of this section);\nPAA’s written procedures for identification of preventative and mitigative (P&M) measures to\nprotect HCAs are inadequate to assure safe operation of a pipeline facility. Specifically, PAA’s\nFIMP Section 10 “Identification of Preventative and Mitigative Measures,” when compared to\nAPI 1160, Section 12.7, and §195.452(i), are minimal and broad in scope. For example, Section\n10.3 “Conducting P&M Evaluations” lists several P&M measures that should be considered, but\ndoes not specifically mention EFRDs, equipment to minimize mechanical damage from\nvehicles/machinery, equipment to minimize damage from weather and outside forces, increasing\npipe/vessel design safety factors, dikes/sumps/drains to contain or direct spills, etc. Providing a\ngeneral list and a catch-all provision for “other P&M measures… as appropriate” is insufficient\nfor PHMSA to determine which measures are being considered.\nPAA should revise their procedures to address more P&M measures, or at least provide more\ndetail under the current measures to provide more clarity on the range of P&M options PAA\nconsiders in relation to their facilities.3\n6. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) . . .\n(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by paragraph (a) of\nthis section must include procedures for the following to provide safety during\nmaintenance and normal operations:\n(1) . . .\n(3) Operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in accordance with\neach of the requirements of this subpart and subpart H of this part.\nPAA’s written procedures for monitoring external corrosion are inadequate to assure safe\noperation of a pipeline facility. Specifically, PAA’s procedure for Corrosion Control, Section 2.7\nPump Station, uses pipe-to-soil “on” criteria or 100Mv shift criteria. However, the pipe-to-soil\n“on” criteria does not adequately consider IR drop, and there is no statement consistent with\nNACE SP 0169, incorporated by reference for §§ 195.571 and 195.573(a). PAA must revise the\nprocedure to adequately address this deficiency.\n3 PAA is encouraged to incorporate the changes it has made and plans to make to its IMP regarding P&M measures\ninto its FIMP, as appropriate.\n4\n\n\n\nResponse to this Notice\nThis Notice is provided pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60108(a) and 49 C.F.R. § 190.206. Enclosed as\npart of this Notice is a document entitled Response Options for Pipeline Operators in\nCompliance Proceedings. Please refer to this document and note the response options. Be\nadvised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being\nmade publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document you\nmust provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for\nconfidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information\nqualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b).\nFollowing the receipt of this Notice, you have 30 days to submit written comments, revised\nprocedures, or a request for a hearing under §190.211. If you do not respond within 30 days of\nreceipt of this Notice, this constitutes a waiver of your right to contest the allegations in this\nNotice and authorizes the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety to find facts as alleged in\nthis Notice without further notice to you and to issue an Order Directing Amendment. If your\nplans or procedures are found inadequate as alleged in this Notice, you may be ordered to amend\nyour plans or procedures to correct the inadequacies (49 C.F.R. § 190.206). If you are not\ncontesting this Notice, we propose that you submit your amended procedures to my office within\n30 days of receipt of this Notice. This period may be extended by written request for good\ncause. Once the inadequacies identified herein have been addressed in your amended\nprocedures, this enforcement action will be closed.\nIt is requested (not mandated) that Plains All-American maintain documentation of the safety\nimprovement costs associated with fulfilling this Notice of Amendment (preparation/revision of\nplans, procedures) and submit the total to Dustin Hubbard, Director, Western Region, Pipeline\nand Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. In correspondence concerning this matter,\nplease refer to CPF 5-2020-5005M and, for each document you submit, please provide a copy in\nelectronic format whenever possible.\nSincerely,\nDustin Hubbard\nDirector, Western Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nEnclosure: Response Options for Pipeline Operators in Compliance Proceedings\ncc: PHP-60 Compliance Registry\nPHP-500 D. Fehling (#163431)\nMr. Dean Gore, Vice President, Environmental & Regulatory Compliance\nPlains All-American Pipeline, LP\n5","truncated":false,"body_characters":15354}