{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 520206001W","title":"WYOMING PIPELINE COMPANY — Warning Letter","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2020-09-25","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED warning letter citing 194.107(c)(1)(ix), 194.107(c)(1)(viii), 194.117(b)(1), 194.121(a), 194.121(b)(1), 194.121(b)(2), 195.132(b)(3), 195.204, 195.402(a), 195.402(c)(12), 195.403(a), 195.404(a)(1), 195.405(a), 195.405(b), 195.410(a)(1), 195.420(a), 195.420(b), 195.422(b), 195.428(a), 195.432(b).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520206001w.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520206001w.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-520206001w","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/520206001W","body":"Warning Letter involving WYOMING PIPELINE COMPANY. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 194.107(c)(1)(ix),  194.107(c)(1)(viii),  194.117(b)(1),  194.121(a),  194.121(b)(1),  194.121(b)(2),  195.132(b)(3),  195.204,  195.402(a),  195.402(c)(12),  195.403(a),  195.404(a)(1),  195.405(a),  195.405(b),  195.410(a)(1),  195.420(a),  195.420(b),  195.422(b),  195.428(a),  195.432(b). The case was opened on 2020-09-25 and is reported as closed as of 2020-09-25. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n520206001W_Warning Letter_09252020.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520206001W/520206001W_Warning%20Letter_09252020.pdf\n\n520206001W_Warning Letter_09252020_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/520206001W/520206001W_Warning%20Letter_09252020_text.pdf\n\n520206001W_Warning Letter_09252020_text.pdf\n\nWARNING LETTER\nVIA E-MAIL TO MR. JOSEPH ISRAEL\nSeptember 25, 2020\nMr. Joseph Israel\nPresident & CEO\nPar Pacific Holdings, Inc.\n10 Stampede St.\nNewcastle, WY 82701\nCPF 5-2020-6001W\nDear Mr. Israel:\nDuring the weeks of March 18 through 22, July 29 through August 2, September 16 through 20,\nand December 9 through 12, 2019, representatives of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials\nSafety Administration (PHMSA), pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code, inspected\nthe Wyoming Crude Pipeline, a subsidiary of Par Pacific Holdings, Inc., (Par Pacific) in\nNewcastle, Wyoming.\nAs a result of the inspection, it is alleged that you have committed probable violations of the\nPipeline Safety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). The items inspected\nand the probable violations are:\n1\n\n\n\n1. §195.422 Pipeline repairs.\n(a) . . .\n(b) No operator may use any pipe, valve, or fitting, for replacement in repairing\npipeline facilities, unless it is designed and constructed as required by this part.\nWhile replacing and repairing pipe associated with anomaly digs in 2017, Par Pacific had several\nwelds that were performed outside the parameters of the qualified welding procedure for the V\nGroove Weld, WPS-X52V pursuant to § 195.501 et seq. Those included:\n Dig #270/Weld TO-1069 performed on September 12, 2017. The external clamp was\nremoved at 30% when the procedure required removal at a minimum of 50%. Also,\ninformation for the second filler pass was not documented (electrode and size).\n Dig #257-258/Weld 1060TI performed on September 12, 2017. The external clamp was\nremoved at 30% when the procedure required removal at a minimum of 50%. Also, the\nampere range for the root, hot, and the first filler pass were outside the parameters\nspecified in the procedure; and no record of the second filler pass (electrode and size)\nwas documented.\n Dig #257-258/Weld 1060 performed on September 12, 2017. The external clamp was\nremoved at 30% when the procedure required removal at a minimum of 50%. Also, the\nampere range for the root, hot, and the first filler pass were outside the parameters\nspecified in the procedure; and no record of the second filler pass (electrode and size)\nwas documented.\n2. §195.132 Design and construction of aboveground breakout tanks.\n(a) . . .\n(b) For aboveground breakout tanks first placed into service after October 2, 2000,\ncompliance with paragraph (a) of this section requires one of the following:\n(1) …\n(3) Vertical, cylindrical, welded steel tanks with internal pressures at the tank top\napproximating atmospheric pressures (i.e., internal vapor space pressures not\ngreater than 2.5 psig (17.2 kPa), or not greater than the pressure developed by the\nweight of the tank roof) must be designed and constructed in accordance with API\nStd 650 (incorporated by reference, see §195.3).\nPursuant to API Std 650, 11th Edition (effective 2012), Section 5.8.3.5, “Shell manhole covers\nshall have two handles. Those covers weighing more than 34 kg (75 lb) shall be equipped with\neither a hinge or davit to facilitate the handling of the manhole cover plate. The davit support\narm shall not be welded directly to the shell without a reinforcing plate.”\nWhile reviewing records and verification in the field, PHMSA discovered that Tank 109 at\nThunder Creek Station (a vertical, cylindrical, welded steel tank with internal pressures at the\ntank top approximating atmospheric pressures and constructed in 2017) was found out of\ncompliance with API Std 650, Section 5.8.3.5, as the manhole covers had one handle rather than\ntwo.\n2\n\n\n\n3. §194.107 General response plan requirements.\n(a) . . .\n(c) Each response plan must include:\n(1) A core plan consisting of –\n(i) …\n(viii) Equipment testing.\nPar Pacific provided a list of emergency equipment resources during the PHMSA inspection.\nHowever, facility-owned equipment for emergency response found in the spill response trailer\nhave degraded over time. The “in-service” date for the majority of these emergency response\nitems was 2003. Par Pacific failed to demonstrate that the emergency response equipment is\ntested or checked for response suitability.\n4. §194.107 General response plan requirements.\n(a) …\n(c) Each response plan must include:\n(1) A core plan consisting of –\n(i) …\n(ix) Drill program – an operator will satisfy the requirement for a drill program by\nfollowing the National Preparedness for Response Exercise Program (PREP)\nguidelines. An operator choosing not to follow PREP guidelines must have a drill\nprogram that is equivalent to PREP. The operator must describe the drill program\nin the response plan and OPS will determine if the program is equivalent to PREP.\nPar Pacific could not provide records or other substantiating evidence to demonstrate that\nequipment deployment exercises occurred in the previous three calendar years (2016-2019); and\nquarterly Qualified Individual (QI) notifications could not be provided for 2018 and 2019,\npursuant to PREP guidelines.\n5. §194.117 Training.\n(a) …\n(b) Each operator shall maintain a training record for each individual that has been\ntrained as required by this section. These records must be maintained in the\nfollowing manner as long as the individual is assigned duties under the response\nplan:\n(1) Records for operator personnel must be maintained at the operator’s\nheadquarters.\nPar Pacific could not provide training records to demonstrate training of emergency response\npersonnel had occurred in the previous three years, calendar years 2016 – 2019.\n6. §194.121 Response plan review and update procedures.\n3\n\n\n\n(a) Each operator shall update its response plan to address new or different\noperating conditions or information. In addition, each operator shall review its\nresponse plan in full at least every 5 years from the date of the last submission or the\nlast approval as follows:\n(b) If a new or different operating condition or information would substantially\naffect the implementation of a response plan, the operator must immediately modify\nits response plan to address such a change and, within 30 days of making such a\nchange, submit the change to PHMSA. Examples of changes in operating conditions\nthat would cause a significant change to an operator's response plan are:\n(1) An extension of the existing pipeline or construction of a new pipeline in a\nresponse zone not covered by the previously approved plan;\n(2) Relocation or replacement of the pipeline in a way that substantially affects the\ninformation included in the response plan, such as a change to the worst case\ndischarge volume.\nPar Pacific’s last Facilities Response Plan (FRP) submittal to PHMSA was in 2018. Since then,\nthe company removed a section of pipeline without re-evaluating how the change would affect\nthe worst case discharge (WCD). Additionally, the operator constructed and placed into service\n(2015), a larger breakout tank which has almost twice the capacity of the breakout tank volume\nused for WCD in that specific response zone (Mush Creek). Par Pacific failed to modify the FRP\nto address new or different operating condition(s) and submit, within 30 days, the changes to\nPHMSA, pursuant to §194.121(b)(1) and (b)(2).\n7. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) . . .\n(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by paragraph (a) of\nthis section must include procedures for the following to provide safety during\nmaintenance and normal operations:\n(1) . . .\n(12) Establishing and maintaining liaison with fire, police, and other appropriate\npublic officials to learn the responsibility and resources of each government\norganization that may respond to a hazardous liquid or carbon dioxide pipeline\nemergency and acquaint the officials with the operator’s ability in responding to a\nhazardous liquid or carbon dioxide pipeline emergency and means of\ncommunication.\nAlthough Par Pacific was able to provide records of attending Local Emergency Planning\nCommittee (LEPC) meetings during the PHMSA inspection, it could not demonstrate who their\nliaisons are or their capabilities to assist in the event of an emergency. Further, documentation of\nliaisons with public officials to acquaint them with Par Pacific’s means of communication during\na pipeline emergency could not be provided.\n8. §195.403 Emergency response training.\n(a) Each operator shall establish and conduct a training program to instruct\nemergency response personnel to:\n4\n\n\n\n(1) Carry out the emergency procedures established under 195.402 that relate to\ntheir assignments;\n(2) Know the characteristics and hazards of the hazardous liquids or carbon dioxide\ntransported, including, in case of flammable HVL, flammability of mixtures with\nair, odorless vapors, and water reactions;\n(3) Recognize conditions that are likely to cause emergencies, predict the\nconsequences of facility malfunctions or failures and hazardous liquids or carbon\ndioxide spills, and take appropriate corrective action;\n(4) Take steps necessary to control any accidental release of hazardous liquid or\ncarbon dioxide and to minimize the potential for fire, explosion, toxicity, or\nenvironmental damage; and\n(5) Learn the potential causes, types, sizes, and consequences of fire and the\nappropriate use of portable fire extinguishers and other on-site fire control\nequipment, involving, where feasible, a simulated pipeline emergency condition.\nWhile Par Pacific’s training program requires annual training (plan dated October 2019 –\nTraining, Page 15 of 17) on several areas including Environmental Training, Emergency Plan\nTraining, Rescue Plan, etc., the program’s training records are vague and inadequate. Further,\npersonnel records for training could not be provided for multiple employees during calendar\nyears 2016 through 2019. Additionally, no Rescue Plan training records could be provided for\nany personnel for calendar year 2016 through October 2019.\n9. §195.404 Maps and records.\n(a) Each operator shall maintain current maps and records of its pipeline systems\nthat include at least the following information:\n(1) Location and identification of the following pipeline facilities:\n(i) Breakout tanks;\n(ii) Pump stations;\n(iii) Scraper and sphere facilities\n(iv) Pipeline valves;\n(v) Facilities to which §195.402(c)(9) applies;\n(vi) Rights-of-way; and\n(vii) Safety devices to which §195.428 applies.\nWhile Par Pacific does have maps of their facilities, the maps are not current and fail to identify\nall the required identification, pursuant to §195.404(a)(1)(i)-(vii).\n10. §195.432 Inspection of in-service breakout tanks.\n(a) . . .\n(b) Each operator must inspect the physical integrity of in-service atmospheric and\nlow-pressure steel aboveground breakout tanks according to API Std 653 (except\nsection 6.4.3, Alternative Internal Inspection Interval) (incorporated by reference, see\n§195.3). However, if structural conditions prevent access to the tank bottom, its\nintegrity may be assessed according to a plan included in the operations and\n5\n\n\n\nmaintenance manual under §195.402(c)(3). The risk-based internal inspection\nprocedures in API Std 653, section 6.4.3 cannot be used to determine the internal\ninspection interval.\nPar Pacific could not be provided in-service monthly inspection records1 for:\n Tank 102 (December 2017)\n Tank 105 (May and December 2017)\n Tank 108 (December 2017)\n11. §195.428 Overpressure safety devices and overfill protection systems.\n(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, each operator shall, at\nintervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year, or in the\ncase of pipelines used to carry highly volatile liquids, at intervals not to exceed 7 ½\nmonths, but at least twice each calendar year, inspect and test each pressure limiting\ndevice, relief valve, pressure regulator, or other item of pressure control equipment\nto determine that it is functioning properly, is in good mechanical condition, and is\nadequate from the standpoint of capacity and reliability of operation for the service\nin which it is used.\nPar Pacific did not provide complete inspection records2 for the following:\n1. Mush Creek: MC-PT-401 (Missing 2017 inspection)\nMC-PT-409 (Missing 2016 inspection)\nPRV Tank 108 Outlet (Missing 2018 inspection)\n2. Butte Junction:\nMJ-PT-201 (2016 records failed to document “as found” and “as left” settings)\nMJ-PT-401 (2016 records failed to document “as found” and “as left” settings)\n3. Thunder Creek:\nTC-PT-401 (2016 records failed to document “as found” and “as left” settings)\n12. §195.405 Protection against ignitions and safe access/egress involving floating roofs.\n(a) After October 2, 2000, protection provided against ignitions arising out of static\nelectricity, lightning, and stray currents during operation and maintenance\nactivities involving aboveground breakout tanks must be in accordance with API\nRP 2003 (incorporated by reference, see 195.3), unless the operator notes in the\nprocedural manual (195.402(c)) why compliance with all or certain provisions of\nAPI RP 2003 is not necessary for the safety of a particular breakout tank.\n(b) The hazards associated with access/egress onto floating roofs of in-service\naboveground breakout tanks to perform inspection, service, maintenance, or repair\nactivities (other than specified general considerations, specified routine tasks or\nentering tanks removed from service for cleaning) are addressed in API Pub 2026\n(incorporated by reference, see §195.3). After October 2, 2000, the operator must\n1 See § 195.404(c)(3)(requiring operators to maintain a record of each inspection and test required by subpart F for at\nleast two years or until the next inspection is performed, whichever is longer).\n2 Id.\n6\n\n\n\nreview and consider the potentially hazardous conditions, safety practices, and\nprocedures in API Pub 2026 for inclusion in the procedure manual (§195.402(c)).\nDuring the inspection, Par Pacific could not produce any records or other substantiating evidence\ndemonstrating compliance with the requirements set forth in § 195.405(a) and (b).\n13. §195.420 Valve maintenance.\n(a) Each operator shall maintain each valve that is necessary for the safe operation\nof its pipeline systems in good working order at all times.\n(b) Each operator shall, at intervals not exceeding 7 ½ months, but at least twice\neach calendar year, inspect each mainline valve to determine that it is functioning\nproperly.\nPar Pacific failed to complete valve inspections for the following locations:\nClareton Line:\n1. 2. All mainline valve inspections were missed in the second part of 2016.\nMainline valve inspections exceeded the 7 ½ month interval from June 8, 2017, to\nJanuary 24, 2018.\nThunder Creek Line:\n1. 2. All mainline valve inspections were missed in the second part of 2016.\nMainline valve inspections exceeded the 7 ½ month interval from June 8, 2017, to\nJanuary 24, 2018.\n14. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a\nmanual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance\nactivities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies . . .\nPar Pacific failed to follow their written procedures regarding patrolling. The procedure requires\nfollow-up documentation when reportable observances are identified during a patrol. Multiple\nrecords were reviewed during the inspection that clearly indicated reportable observances, yet no\nfollow-up documentation could be provided.\nFurther, Par Pacific failed to follow their written procedures regarding abnormal events. The\nrecords state either: “Long Term Actions Needed” or “Follow Up Actions Needed” associated\nwith recordable abnormal events. However, no details or records were provided to demonstrate\nwhat these actions entailed pursuant to Par Pacific’s procedures. The records also failed to\ndocument what the abnormal event was (i.e., loss of communications, equipment/component\nfailure, etc.).\n15. §195.410 Line markers.\n(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, each operator shall place\n7\n\n\n\nand maintain line markers over each buried pipeline in accordance with the\nfollowing:\n(1) Markers must be located at each public road crossing, at each railroad crossing,\nand in sufficient number along the remainder of each buried line so that its location\nis accurately known.\nLine markers were missing for most the pipeline. The only line markers that were observed\nduring the field inspection were ones at the entrance and exit of pumping stations, road and\nrailroad crossings, and valve stations, despite the requirement that they must also be “in\nsufficient number along the remainder of each buried line so that its location is accurately\nknown.”\n16. §195.204 Inspection-general.\nInspection must be provided to ensure that the installation of pipe or pipeline\nsystems is in accordance with the requirements of this subpart. Any operator\npersonnel used to perform the inspection must be trained and qualified in the phase\nof construction to be inspected. An operator must not use operator personnel to\nperform a required inspection if the operator personnel performed the construction\ntask requiring inspection. Nothing in this section prohibits the operator from\ninspecting construction tasks with operator personnel who are involved in other\nconstruction tasks.\nPar Pacific could not provide any documentation or substantiating evidence to demonstrate that\nwelding inspectors were qualified and/or trained to perform welding inspections on repairs\nperformed in 2017 and 2018.\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 CFR § 190.223, you are subject to a civil penalty not to exceed\n$218,647 per violation per day the violation persists, up to a maximum of $2,186,465 for a\nrelated series of violations. For violation occurring on or after November 27, 2018 and before\nJuly 31, 2019, the maximum penalty may not exceed $213,268 per violation per day, with a\nmaximum penalty not to exceed $2,132,679. For violation occurring on or after November 2,\n2015 and before November 27, 2018, the maximum penalty may not exceed $209,002 per\nviolation per day, with a maximum penalty not to exceed $2,090,022. For violations occurring\nprior to November 2, 2015, the maximum penalty may not exceed $200,000 per violation per\nday, with a maximum penalty not to exceed $2,000,000 for a related series of violations.\nWe have reviewed the circumstances and supporting documents involved in this case, and have\ndecided not to conduct additional enforcement action or penalty assessment proceedings at this\ntime. We advise you to correct the item(s) identified in this letter. Failure to do so will result in\nPar Pacific/Wyoming Pipeline Company being subject to additional enforcement action.\nNo reply to this letter is required. If you choose to reply, in your correspondence please refer to\nCPF 5-2020-6001W. Be advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement\naction is subject to being made publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your\nresponsive material qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the\n8\n\n\n\ncomplete original document you must provide a second copy of the document with the portions\nyou believe qualify for confidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe\nthe redacted information qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b).\nSincerely,\nDustin Hubbard\nDirector, Western Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\ncc: PHP-60 Compliance Registry\nPHP-500 D. Fehling (#163167)\n9","truncated":false,"body_characters":20537}