{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 52021004WL","title":"PANTHER OPERATING COMPANY, LLC — Warning Letter","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2021-03-24","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED warning letter citing 195.446(a), 195.446(c)(2), 195.446(c)(3), 195.446(c)(4), 195.446(d)(2), 195.446(d)(3), 195.446(g)(1), 195.446(h), 195.446(h)(5), 195.446(h)(6), 195.446(j)(2).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-52021004wl.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-52021004wl.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-52021004wl","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/52021004WL","body":"Warning Letter involving PANTHER OPERATING COMPANY, LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.446(a),  195.446(c)(2),  195.446(c)(3),  195.446(c)(4),  195.446(d)(2),  195.446(d)(3),  195.446(g)(1),  195.446(h),  195.446(h)(5),  195.446(h)(6),  195.446(j)(2). The case was opened on 2021-03-24 and is reported as closed as of 2021-03-24. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n52021004WL_Warning Letter_03242021_(20-172190).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/52021004WL/52021004WL_Warning%20Letter_03242021_(20-172190).pdf\n\n52021004WL_Warning Letter_03242021_(20-172190)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/52021004WL/52021004WL_Warning%20Letter_03242021_(20-172190)_text.pdf\n\n52021004WL_Warning Letter_03242021_(20-172190)_text.pdf\n\nWARNING LETTER\nVIA E-MAILTO MR. MATTHEW ROLAND\nMarch 24, 2021\nMr. Matthew Rowland\nCEO\nThird Coast Midstream, LLC\n1501 McKinney, Suite 800\nHouston, TX 77010\nCPF 5-2021-004-WL\nDear Mr. Rowland:\nFrom July 13, 2020 through July 17, 2020, representatives of the Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration (PHMSA), pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code\n(U.S.C.), performed a virtual inspection of the Third Coast Midstream, LLC (Third Coast),\ncontrol rooms located in Houston and Texas City, Texas. The inspection covered procedures,\nrecords, and virtual observations.\nAs a result of the inspection, it is alleged that you have committed probable violations of the\nPipeline Safety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). The items inspected\nand the probable violations are:\n1. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(a) General. This section applies to each operator of a pipeline facility with a\ncontroller working in a control room who monitors and controls all or part of a\npipeline facility through a SCADA system. Each operator must have and follow\n\n\n\nwritten control room management procedures that implement the requirements of\nthis section. The procedures required by this section must be integrated, as\nappropriate, with the operator's written procedures required by § 195.402. An\noperator must develop the procedures no later than August 1, 2011, and must\nimplement the procedures according to the following schedule. The procedures\nrequired by paragraphs (b), (c)(5), (d)(2) and (d)(3), (f) and (g) of this section must\nbe implemented no later than October 1, 2011. The procedures required by\nparagraphs (c)(1) through (4), (d)(1), (d)(4), and (e) must be implemented no later\nthan August 1, 2012. The training procedures required by paragraph (h) must be\nimplemented no later than August 1, 2012, except that any training required by\nanother paragraph of this section must be implemented no later than the deadline\nfor that paragraph.\n(h) Training. Each operator must establish a controller training program and review\nthe training program content to identify potential improvements at least once each\ncalendar year, but at intervals not to exceed 15 months. An operator's program\nmust provide for training each controller to carry out the roles and responsibilities\ndefined by the operator. In addition, the training program must include the\nfollowing elements:\n(1) …\n(6) Control room team training and exercises that include both controllers and other\nindividuals, defined by the operator, who would reasonably be expected to\noperationally collaborate with controllers (control room personnel) during normal,\nabnormal or emergency situations. Operators must comply with the team training\nrequirements under this paragraph no later than January 23, 2018.\nThird Coast did not establish team trainings and exercises until August 2018. Section 195.446(a)\nstates that the training procedures required by paragraph (h) must be implemented no later than\nAugust 1, 2012, except that any training required by another paragraph of this section must be\nimplemented no later than the deadline for that paragraph.\nSection 195.446(h)(6) states that control room team training and exercises that include both\ncontrollers and other individuals, defined by the operator, who would reasonably be expected to\noperationally collaborate with controllers (control room personnel) during normal, abnormal or\nemergency situations. This section requires that operators comply with the team training\nrequirements under this paragraph no later than January 23, 2018.\nThird Coast’s training program manual shows that team training was not identified in the manual\nuntil the revision dated August 13, 2019, approximately seven months after the regulatory\ndeadline for complying with section 195.446(h)(6).\n2. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(c) Provide adequate information. Each operator must provide its controllers with\nthe information, tools, processes and procedures necessary for the controllers to\n2\n\n\n\ncarry out the roles and responsibilities the operator has defined by performing each\nof the following:\n(1) …\n(2) Conduct a point-to-point verification between SCADA displays and related field\nequipment when field equipment is added or moved and when other changes that\naffect pipeline safety are made to field equipment or SCADA displays;\nThird Coast did not provide adequate information to its controllers necessary for the controllers\nto carry out their roles and responsibilities. Specifically, Third Coast did not conduct a point-to-\npoint verification between SCADA displays and related field equipment when field equipment is\nadded or moved and when other changes that affect pipeline safety are made to field equipment\nor SCADA displays, as required by their procedures.\nRecords fail to document all the guidelines required by the Point to Point Verification Procedure,\nCRM-APP-309, rev. 2, dated 8/13/2019, section 309.3.1 - General Instrument Point to Point\nGuidelines. Bullet three of that procedure states, “In general, a point to point check of all\nindicating and control instruments shall be made at the minimum of three points 0%, 50%, and\n100% of range.” Third Coast did not provide documentation showing the operator conducted\npoint to point verification in accordance with its procedure.\n3. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(c) Provide adequate information. Each operator must provide its controllers with\nthe information, tools, processes and procedures necessary for the controllers to\ncarry out the roles and responsibilities the operator has defined by performing each\nof the following:\n(1) …\n(3) Test and verify an internal communication plan to provide adequate means for\nmanual operation of the pipeline safely, at least once each calendar year, but at\nintervals not to exceed 15 months.\nThird Coast did not provide its controllers with the information, tools, processes and procedures\nnecessary for the controllers to carry out their roles and responsibilities. Specifically, Third\nCoast did not test and verify an internal communication plan to provide adequate means for\nmanual operation of the pipeline safely, at least once each calendar year, but at intervals not to\nexceed 15 months.\nRecords provided for testing of the internal communication plan indicate that the operator\nexceeded the interval for testing by approximately two months, from May 23, 2017 to November\n1, 2018.\nAdditionally, the documentation in the test records is sparse and fails to demonstrate that test and\nverification processes confirmed that the operator has adequate personnel, procedures, processes,\ncommunications infrastructure, and manual command-and-control capabilities to assure safe,\nreliable operations and pipeline integrity when operating manually.\n3\n\n\n\nRecords also illustrated that issues were identified during the testing, but no follow up actions\nwere taken and/or documented.\n4. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(c) Provide adequate information. Each operator must provide its controllers with\nthe information, tools, processes and procedures necessary for the controllers to\ncarry out the roles and responsibilities the operator has defined by performing each\nof the following:\n(1) …\n(4) Test any backup SCADA systems at least once each calendar year, but at\nintervals not to exceed 15 months;\nThird Coast did not provide its controllers with the information, tools, processes and procedures\nnecessary for the controllers to carry out their roles and responsibilities. Specifically, Third\nCoast did not test any backup SCADA systems at least once each calendar year, but at intervals\nnot to exceed 15 months.\nRecords for the SCADA test with a date of “April 6” did not include a year on document and\nsignature approvals were missing. Third Coast stated the forms were not signed due to the\nCOVID pandemic, however, it remains unclear why the full date was not documented. Third\nCoast reported that they assume that the SCADA test occurred in 2020, but the test could not be\nverified.\nFurther, records for the SCADA test from November, 2019 failed to include approval signatures,\nwhich are required by the control room procedures.\nRecords for the SCADA test from October 18, 2018 also failed to include approval signatures.\nOnly typed comments were noted in the approval boxes.\nFinally, records for the SCADA test from November 9, 2017 failed to include approval\nsignatures.\n5. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(d) Fatigue mitigation. Each operator must implement the following methods to\nreduce the risk associated with controller fatigue that could inhibit a controller's\nability to carry out the roles and responsibilities the operator has defined:\n(1) …\n(2) Educate controllers and supervisors in fatigue mitigation strategies and how off-\nduty activities contribute to fatigue;\nThird Coast failed to implement all methods to reduce the risk associated with controller fatigue.\nSpecifically, Third Coast failed to educate controllers and supervisors in fatigue mitigation\n4\n\n\n\nstrategies and how off-duty activities contribute to fatigue. High Island Pipeline System (HIPS)1\ntraining records (circadian online training) for 2017 and 2020 were reviewed, however, Third\nCoast could not provide training records regarding fatigue mitigation strategies for 2018 and\n2019. HIPS personnel confirmed operator personnel did not provide training or education for\ncontrollers and supervisors in fatigue mitigation strategies and how off-duty activities contribute\nto fatigue in 2018 and 2019.\n6. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(d) Fatigue mitigation. Each operator must implement the following methods to\nreduce the risk associated with controller fatigue that could inhibit a controller's\nability to carry out the roles and responsibilities the operator has defined:\n(1) …\n(3) Train controllers and supervisors to recognize the effects of fatigue;\nThird Coast failed to implement all methods to reduce the risk associated with controller fatigue.\nSpecifically, Third Coast failed to train controllers and supervisors to recognize the effects of\nfatigue.\nHIPS Training records (circadian online training) for 2017 and 2020 were reviewed, however,\nThird Coast could not provide training records regarding fatigue mitigation strategies for 2018\nand 2019. HIPS personnel confirmed that operator personnel did not provide training for\ncontrollers and supervisors to recognize the effects of fatigue in 2018 and 2019.\n7. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(g) Operating experience. Each operator must assure that lessons learned from its\noperating experience are incorporated, as appropriate, into its control room\nmanagement procedures by performing each of the following:\n(1) Review accidents that must be reported pursuant to § 195.50 and 195.52 to\ndetermine if control room actions contributed to the event and, if so, correct, where\nnecessary, deficiencies related to:\n(i) Controller fatigue;\n(ii) Field equipment;\n(iii) The operation of any relief device;\n(iv) Procedures;\n(v) SCADA system configuration; and\n(vi) SCADA system performance.\nThird Coast failed to assure that lessons learned from its operating experience are incorporated,\nas appropriate, into its control room management procedures. Specifically, Third Coast did not\nreview accidents that must be reported pursuant to § 195.50 and 195.52 to determine if control\n1 Third Coast has a control room located in Texas City that controls only the HIPS system. Third Coast was in the\nprocess of moving the HIPS assets to the control room in Houston, but had not completed the transfer at the time of\nthe inspection. The HIPS records were separate from the Houston control room records. This alleged violation is\nspecific to the controllers on the HIPS system not receiving training in 2018 and 2019.\n5\n\n\n\nroom actions contributed to the event(s) and, if so, correct, where necessary, deficiencies related\nto SCADA system configuration and SCADA system performance as required per the\nregulations.\nThe operator presented its Comprehensive List of Causes Checklist as the record Third Coast\nuses to determine contribution factors and/or root causes after an accident. While this checklist\nshows Third Coast has a process for reviewing accidents, the review does not include whether\nthere were deficiencies related to SCADA system configuration and SCADA system\nperformance.\n8. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(h) Training. Each operator must establish a controller training program and review\nthe training program content to identify potential improvements at least once each\ncalendar year, but at intervals not to exceed 15 months. An operator's program\nmust provide for training each controller to carry out the roles and responsibilities\ndefined by the operator. In addition, the training program must include the\nfollowing elements:\n(1) Responding to abnormal operating conditions likely to occur simultaneously or\nin sequence;\n(2) Use of a computerized simulator or non-computerized (tabletop) method for\ntraining controllers to recognize abnormal operating conditions;\n(3) Training controllers on their responsibilities for communication under the\noperator's emergency response procedures;\n(4) Training that will provide a controller a working knowledge of the pipeline\nsystem, especially during the development of abnormal operating conditions;\n(5) For pipeline operating setups that are periodically, but infrequently used,\nproviding an opportunity for controllers to review relevant procedures in advance\nof their application; and\n(6) Control room team training and exercises that include both controllers and other\nindividuals, defined by the operator, who would reasonably be expected to\noperationally collaborate with controllers (control room personnel) during normal,\nabnormal or emergency situations. Operators must comply with the team training\nrequirements under this paragraph no later than January 23, 2018.\nThird Coast failed to provide for training each controller to carry out the roles and\nresponsibilities defined by the operator, including all the elements required by §195.446(h).\nThird Coast training final evaluation records for an employee, dated September 5, 2018, failed to\ninclude what tasks he was trained and tested on. These records did not document which elements\nof §195.446(h)(1) through (h)(6) to show the controller received training on all the required\nelements.\nFurther, training records provided for an employee, dated September 11, 2018, stated that more\ntraining was needed for this controller, but the training checklist indicated he passed the training\nwithout indication that additional training was conducted.\n6\n\n\n\n9. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(h) Training. Each operator must establish a controller training program and review\nthe training program content to identify potential improvements at least once each\ncalendar year, but at intervals not to exceed 15 months.\nThird Coast failed to review the controller training program content to identify potential\nimprovements at least once each calendar year, but at intervals not to exceed 15 months.\nThird Coast could not provide records demonstrating that a review of the controller training\nprogram occurred in 2017.\nFurther, the review records from 2018 and 2019 indicate a review occurred, however, the records\nfor 2018 and 2019 fail to provide a description of the program content and effectiveness review.\nAdditionally, the review dated December 18, 2018 failed to provide any information or\ndocumentation that the operator reviewed any of their third-party vendor information to ensure\ntraining content was effective or to determine whether the training required updating or\nimprovements based on the third-party vendor information.\n10. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(h) Training. Each operator must establish a controller training program and review\nthe training program content to identify potential improvements at least once each\ncalendar year, but at intervals not to exceed 15 months. An operator's program\nmust provide for training each controller to carry out the roles and responsibilities\ndefined by the operator. In addition, the training program must include the\nfollowing elements:\n(1) …\n(5) For pipeline operating setups that are periodically, but infrequently used,\nproviding an opportunity for controllers to review relevant procedures in advance\nof their application;\nThird Coast failed to establish a controller training program that including providing an\nopportunity for controllers to review relevant procedures in advance of their application for\npipeline operating setups that are periodically, but infrequently used.\nThird Coast reported that they do have flow reversals, which is an infrequently used setup. The\noperator verbally stated there was no list developed for periodic, but infrequently used operating\nsetups, that would provide the controller an opportunity to review prior to application. Third\nCoast’s controller training program, therefore, does not include an opportunity for controllers to\nreview relevant procedures for pipeline operating setups that are periodically, but infrequently\nused, like follow reversals, in advance of their application.\n11. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(h) Training. Each operator must establish a controller training program and review\nthe training program content to identify potential improvements at least once each\n7\n\n\n\ncalendar year, but at intervals not to exceed 15 months. An operator's program\nmust provide for training each controller to carry out the roles and responsibilities\ndefined by the operator. In addition, the training program must include the\nfollowing elements:\n(1) …\n(6) Control room team training and exercises that include both controllers and other\nindividuals, defined by the operator, who would reasonably be expected to\noperationally collaborate with controllers (control room personnel) during normal,\nabnormal or emergency situations. Operators must comply with the team training\nrequirements under this paragraph no later than January 23, 2018.\nThird Coast could not show that its controller training program included team training and\nexercises in 2019. The records provided for team training that occurred on January 17, 2019,\nwere vague and failed to identify positions and/or titles showing that team training included\npersonnel who would reasonably be expected to operationally collaborate with controllers. Third\nCoast’s control room training documentation from 2019 did not show compliance with the team\ntraining requirement.\n12. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(j) Compliance and deviations. An operator must maintain for review during\ninspection:\n(2) Documentation to demonstrate that any deviation from the procedures required\nby this section was necessary for the safe operation of the pipeline facility.\nnull\nThird Coast failed to maintain documentation to demonstrate that any deviation from the\nprocedures required by §195.446 was necessary for the safe operation of the pipeline facility.\nThird Coast’s records indicated deviations from the normal schedule occurred during the month\nof June 2017, including the days of June 3rd and June 17th for several controllers. Additionally,\na lead controller deviated from the normal schedule during the weeks of June 10 through 14, and\nJune 17 through 21. No records of deviations during this time frame could be provided by Third\nCoast.\nThe operator reported that they believed they did not have to document a deviation from their\nprocedure for \"normal schedule\" if they met the Hours of Service requirements, however, this\npractice is not consistent with the regulations.\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 CFR § 190.223, you are subject to a civil penalty not to exceed\n$222,504 per violation per day the violation persists, up to a maximum of $2,225,034 for a\nrelated series of violations. For violation occurring on or after July 31, 2019 and before January\n11, 2021, the maximum penalty may not exceed $218,647 per violation per day the violation\npersists, up to a maximum of $2,186,465 for a related series of violations. For violation\noccurring on or after November 27, 2018 and before July 31, 2019, the maximum penalty may\nnot exceed $213,268 per violation per day, with a maximum penalty not to exceed $2,132,679.\n8\n\n\n\nFor violation occurring on or after November 2, 2015 and before November 27, 2018, the\nmaximum penalty may not exceed $209,002 per violation per day, with a maximum penalty not\nto exceed $2,090,022.\nWe have reviewed the circumstances and supporting documents involved in this case, and have\ndecided not to conduct additional enforcement action or penalty assessment proceedings at this\ntime. We advise you to correct the items identified in this letter. Failure to do so will result in\nThird Coast Midstream, LLC being subject to additional enforcement action.\nNo reply to this letter is required. If you choose to reply, in your correspondence please refer to\nCPF 5-2021-004-WL. Be advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement\naction is subject to being made publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your\nresponsive material qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the\ncomplete original document you must provide a second copy of the document with the portions\nyou believe qualify for confidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe\nthe redacted information qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b).\nSincerely,\nDustin Hubbard\nDirector, Western Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\ncc: PHP-60 Compliance Registry\nPHP-500 D. Fehling (#20-172190)\n9","truncated":false,"body_characters":22612}