{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 52021043NOA","title":"FREEPORT-MCMORAN OIL & GAS — Notice of Amendment","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2021-08-02","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of amendment citing 195.446(a), 195.446(e)(1), 195.446(e)(2), 195.446(e)(3), 195.446(e)(4), 195.446(e)(5), 195.446(e)(6), 195.446(h)(6), 195.446(j)(2).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-52021043noa.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-52021043noa.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-52021043noa","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/52021043NOA","body":"Notice of Amendment involving FREEPORT-MCMORAN OIL & GAS. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.446(a),  195.446(e)(1),  195.446(e)(2),  195.446(e)(3),  195.446(e)(4),  195.446(e)(5),  195.446(e)(6),  195.446(h)(6),  195.446(j)(2). The case was opened on 2021-08-02 and is reported as closed as of 2025-03-18. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n52021043NOA_Closure Letter_03182025_(20-173099).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/52021043NOA/52021043NOA_Closure%20Letter_03182025_(20-173099).pdf\n\n52021043NOA_Closure Letter_03182025_(20-173099)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/52021043NOA/52021043NOA_Closure%20Letter_03182025_(20-173099)_text.pdf\n\n52021043NOA_Notice of Amendment_08022021_(20-173099).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/52021043NOA/52021043NOA_Notice%20of%20Amendment_08022021_(20-173099).pdf\n\n52021043NOA_Notice of Amendment_08022021_(20-173099)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/52021043NOA/52021043NOA_Notice%20of%20Amendment_08022021_(20-173099)_text.pdf\n\n52021043NOA_Operator Response to Notice and Request Time Extension_09302021_(20-173099).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/52021043NOA/52021043NOA_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice%20and%20Request%20Time%20Extension_09302021_(20-173099).pdf\n\n52021043NOA_Notice of Amendment_08022021_(20-173099)_text.pdf\n\nNOTICE OF AMENDMENT\nVIA E-MAIL TO MR. DAVID ROSE\nAugust 2, 2021\nMr. David Rose\nDirector, Environmental Health & Safety\nFreeport-McMoRan Oil & Gas\n201 S. Broadway Street\nOrcutt, CA 93455\nCPF 5-2021-043-NOA\nDear Mr. Rose:\nDuring the week of October 26 through 30, 2020, representatives of the Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration (PHMSA), pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code\n(U.S.C.), performed an inspection of the Freeport-McMoRan Oil & Gas (Freeport-McMoRan)\nLompoc Oil & Gas Plant (LOGP) Control Room located in Lompoc, California. This inspection\nincluded a review of company procedures and records, and personnel observations associated\nwith Freeport-McMoRan’s Control Room Management Program.\nBased on the inspection, PHMSA has identified apparent inadequacies found within Freeport\nMcMoRan’s plans or procedures, as described below:\n1. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(a) General. This section applies to each operator of a pipeline facility with a\ncontroller working in a control room who monitors and controls all or part of a\npipeline facility through a SCADA system. Each operator must have and follow\nwritten control room management procedures that implement the requirements of\nthis section…\n\n\n\nFreeport-McMoRan’s control room management procedures are inadequate to assure safe\noperation of a pipeline facility. Specifically, Freeport-McMoRan failed to have and follow\nwritten control room management procedures that defined the controller’s role when an\nabnormal operating condition is detected, even if the controller is not the first to detect the\ncondition, including the controller’s responsibility to take specific actions to communicate with\nothers, pursuant to the requirements set forth in § 195.446(b)(2).\nThe operator’s Control Room Management Operations and Maintenance Plan, Section 3001\n–\nRoles, Authorities, and Responsibilities, Subsection 303 R&Rs – Primary Controller\nResponsibilities and Level of Authority, table on page 10 (revised October 2014)2 sets forth the\ncontroller’s responsibilities during abnormal operations. The procedure states that the controller\nmust follow procedures, cannot revise procedures, and must notify a supervisor if the procedures\nneed revising. It is unclear, however, how these instructions relate the controller’s roles and\nresponsibilities during abnormal operations, which must include the controller’s responsibility to\ntake specific actions and to communicate to others.\nThe operator must amend its procedures to clearly define the controller’s responsibility and\nauthority during abnormal operations.\n2. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(a) General. This section applies to each operator of a pipeline facility with a\ncontroller working in a control room who monitors and controls all or part of a\npipeline facility through a SCADA system. Each operator must have and follow\nwritten control room management procedures that implement the requirements of\nthis section…\nFreeport-McMoRan’s control room management procedures are inadequate to assure safe\noperation of a pipeline facility. Specifically, Freeport-McMoRan failed to have and follow\nwritten control room management procedures that adequately defined a controller’s role during\nan emergency, even if the controller is not the first to detect the emergency, including the\ncontroller’s responsibility to take specific actions and to communicate with others pursuant to the\nrequirements set forth in § 195.446(b)(3).\nThe operator’s Control Room Management Operations and Maintenance Plan, Section 300 –\nRoles, Authorities, and Responsibilities, Subsection 303 R&Rs – Primary Controller\nResponsibilities and Level of Authority, table on page 11 (revised October 2014) sets forth the\ncontroller’s responsibilities during emergency operations. The table states that the controllers\nmust complete training on emergency procedures, follow emergency procedures, and notify a\nsupervisor if emergency procedures need revising. It is unclear, however, how these instructions\nrelate to the controller’s roles and responsibilities during emergency operations, which must\ninclude the controller’s responsibility to take specific actions and to communicate with others.\n1 The title of Section 300 includes a typographical error, citing to § 195.436(b) rather than § 195.446(b).\n2 The table uses the acronym PSOM, which is not defined.\n2\n\n\n\nThe operator must amend its procedures to clearly define the controller’s responsibility and\nauthority during emergency operations. This should include actions required during specific\ntypes of communication loss during emergency operations, including but not limited to loss of\nSCADA and/or loss of leak detection.\n3. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(a) General. This section applies to each operator of a pipeline facility with a\ncontroller working in a control room who monitors and controls all or part of a\npipeline facility through a SCADA system. Each operator must have and follow\nwritten control room management procedures that implement the requirements of\nthis section…\nFreeport-McMoRan’s control room management procedures are inadequate to assure safe\noperation of a pipeline facility. Specifically, Freeport-McMoRan failed to have and follow\nwritten control room management procedures that adequately defined the roles, responsibilities\nand qualifications of others who have the authority to direct or supersede the specific technical\nactions of controllers pursuant to the requirements set forth in § 195.446(b)(5).\nThe operator's procedure listed under Section 303 is not clear on who has the authority to direct\nor supersede the specific technical actions of a controller during normal, abnormal, and\nemergency operating conditions. For example, the procedures do not provide a list,\norganizational chart, or other means by which to define who has this authority. Nor do the\nprocedures specify how an individual may direct or supersede the specific technical actions of\nthe controller (e.g., under what conditions) and how this is documented if the situation occurs.3\nInstead, the procedure mentions others “directing or advising” a controller, which is not the same\nas “directing or superseding” a controller (emphasis added). Additionally, the procedure states\nthat a “non-qualified” controller can advise another controller on what tasks to accomplish, but\nnot the precise actions to take. A non-qualified controller, however, should never have the\nauthority to advise a qualified controller on what actions to take during operation, especially\nduring abnormal or emergency conditions.\nThe operator must amend its procedure to clearly identify who has the authority to direct or\nsupersede the technical actions of a controller during normal, abnormal and emergency\noperations, including how this authority would be specifically exercised, and how it will be\ndocumented.\n4. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(a) General. This section applies to each operator of a pipeline facility with a\ncontroller working in a control room who monitors and controls all or part of a\npipeline facility through a SCADA system. Each operator must have and follow\n3 See 49 C.F.R. § 195.446(j)(1) requiring operators to maintain for review during inspection records that\ndemonstrate compliance with the requirements of this section.\n3\n\n\n\nwritten control room management procedures that implement the requirements of\nthis section…\nFreeport-McMoRan’s control room management procedures are inadequate to assure safe\noperation of a pipeline facility. Specifically, Freeport-McMoRan failed to have and follow\nwritten control room management procedures that adequately provided its controllers with the\ninformation, tools, processes and procedures necessary for the controllers to carry out the roles\nand responsibilities the operator has defined for point-to-point (P2P) verifications pursuant to the\nrequirements set forth in § 195.446(c)(2).\nFreeport-McMoRan’s procedure in the Control Room Management (CRM) manual on P2P\nverifications is not the procedure the operator has implemented in its control room. During\nPHMSA’s inspection, Freeport-McMoRan control room staff stated to PHMSA that they use the\nform found in the P2P Test Plan, which is more comprehensive than the CRM manual\nprocedures on P2P verifications. For example, Section 403 of the CRM manual procedures on\nP2P verifications does not cover all the safety-related points that must be included in P2P\nverifications, which should include (but is not limited to) points supplying data on flow,\npressure, density, temperature, valve/pump/pig status, set points and pipeline control points.\nThe operator must amend its procedure for P2P verification to reflect the actual process used in\nthe control room. The procedures must also identify all points that can impact safety and require\nP2P verification, and how the verification will be documented.4\n5. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(a) General. This section applies to each operator of a pipeline facility with a\ncontroller working in a control room who monitors and controls all or part of a\npipeline facility through a SCADA system. Each operator must have and follow\nwritten control room management procedures that implement the requirements of\nthis section…\nFreeport-McMoRan’s control room management procedures are inadequate to assure safe\noperation of a pipeline facility. Specifically, Freeport-McMoRan failed to have and follow\nwritten control room management procedures that adequately address testing and verifying an\ninternal communication plan to provide adequate means for manual operation of the pipeline\nsafely, pursuant to the requirements set forth in § 195.446(c)(3).\nFor example, neither the company’s procedures nor its internal communication plan addresses\nthe difference between a catastrophic failure and a complete SCADA failure, despite noting each\nof these emergency scenarios separately.5\n4 See 49 C.F.R. § 195.446(j)(1) requiring operators to maintain for review during inspection records that\ndemonstrate compliance with the requirements of this section.\n5 It is also unclear to PHMSA what distinguishes a “catastrophic failure” from a “complete SCADA failure.”\n4\n\n\n\nIt is also unclear how the internal communication plan is properly tested and verified. For\nexample, the procedures require all qualified controllers to sign off on the drill (i.e. the testing of\nthe internal communication plan), even if they did not participate. This incorrectly implies that\nall qualified controllers are being trained on the company’s internal communications plan. Only\npersonnel participating in a drill, however, should be certifying that they were present during the\ndrill.\nFinally, during the PHMSA inspection, Freeport-McMoRan control room staff informed\nPHMSA that they implement a different internal communication plan than the one set forth in\nthe company’s written procedures.\nThe operator must amend its procedure to clearly and accurately describe the process for testing\nand verifying the internal communication plan and to correct the deficiencies noted above.\n6. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(a) General. This section applies to each operator of a pipeline facility with a\ncontroller working in a control room who monitors and controls all or part of a\npipeline facility through a SCADA system. Each operator must have and follow\nwritten control room management procedures that implement the requirements of\nthis section…\nFreeport-McMoRan’s control room management procedures are inadequate to assure safe\noperation of a pipeline facility. Specifically, Freeport-McMoRan failed to have and follow\nwritten control room management procedures that adequately establish a maximum limit on\ncontroller hours-of-service, which may provide for an emergency deviation from the maximum\nlimit if necessary for the safe operation of a pipeline facility pursuant to the requirements set\nforth in § 195.446(d)(4).\nDuring the inspection, PHMSA noted that the control room utilizes two schedules for controller\nshifts but only one schedule is listed in the control room procedures manual.6 The operator must\namend its procedures to accurately reflect the operating schedules and maximum limits on\ncontroller’s hours of service for both controller shift schedules.\n7. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(a) …\n(e) Alarm management. Each operator using a SCADA system must have a written\nalarm management plan to provide for effective controller response to alarms. An\noperator's plan must include provisions to:\n(1) Review SCADA safety-related alarm operations using a process that ensures\nalarms are accurate and support safe pipeline operations;\n6 Freeport-McMoRan has specific controllers who only work the night shift. They do not rotate through the schedule\nas the one schedule implies.\n5\n\n\n\nFreeport-McMoRan’s control room management procedures are inadequate to assure safe\noperation of a pipeline facility. Specifically, its written alarm management plan does not\nadequately provide for effective controller response to alarms by reviewing SCADA safety-\nrelated alarm operations using a process that ensures alarms are accurate and support safe\npipeline operations.\nSection 604 of its CRM (revised October 2014) addresses Alarm Priorities, Categories, and\nTypes. PHMSA has identified the following inadequacies:\n1. Page 41 documents the list of alarms and their priorities, categories, and types.\nHowever, the alarms listed do not add up to the total number of alarms shown. For\nexample:\na. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. The Gaviota Oil Heating Facility (GOHF) lists three priority categories (1,\n2, 3) with the number of alarms being 5, 30, and 13, respectively, which\nequals 48 but the total listed is 45.\nb. The LOGP lists three priority categories (1, 2, 3) with the number of alarms\nbeing 15, 28, and 15, respectively, which equals 58 but the total listed is\n214.\nThe table on page 39 shows a column that is titled “percentage of occurrence” but\nfails to identify any percentages.\nThe bottom of page 39 continuing onto the top of page 40 states: “The safety\nrelated alarms are audible and/or visual indications on the control console of an\nabnormal condition that require at least two actions by an operator” but the operator\nconfirmed that all alarms are both audible and visual.\nForms identified as 304 and 508 in the procedure do not exist.\nThe Alarm Management Plan fails to have an adequate procedure in place to explain\nthe administrative controls for the disabling of safety-related alarms.\nSection 608 SCADA/Control Room Point to Point Review, page 46 discusses the\nprocedure for stale alarms. However, during the PHMSA inspection, Freeport-\nMcMoRan control room staff confirmed to PHMSA that this written procedure is not\naccurate and does not reflect the process they follow for stale alarms in the control\nroom.\nThe operator must amend its procedures to correct the errors noted above. The amended\nprocedures must also accurately reflect the process it uses for reviewing SCADA safety-related\nalarm operations using a process that ensures alarms are accurate and support safe pipeline\noperations. This must include adequate procedures to identify how leak detection alarms would\nbe configured in SCADA.\n8. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(a) …\n(e) Alarm management. Each operator using a SCADA system must have a written\nalarm management plan to provide for effective controller response to alarms. An\noperator's plan must include provisions to:\n(1) …\n6\n\n\n\n(2) Identify at least once each calendar month points affecting safety that have been\ntaken off scan in the SCADA host, have had alarms inhibited, generated false\nalarms, or that have had forced or manual values for periods of time exceeding that\nrequired for associated maintenance or operating activities;\nFreeport-McMoRan’s control room management procedures are inadequate to assure safe\noperation of a pipeline facility. Specifically, its written alarm management plan does not include\nadequate provisions to identify at least once each calendar month points affecting safety that\nhave been taken off scan in the SCADA host, have had alarms inhibited, generated false alarms,\nor that have had forced or manual values for periods of time exceeding that required for\nassociated maintenance or operating activities.\nFor example, while it appears that the CRM manual, Section 608 – SCADA/ Control Room\nPoint to Point Review, indicates that monthly reviews of alarms are performed, the process is\ndisjointed and lacks specificity to be a clear procedure.7 Additionally, although Freeport-\nMcMoRan has a process for investigating problems associated with its alarms (LOGP Alarm and\nProcedures), it only addresses leak detection alarms and fails to identify the process for promptly\ncorrecting identified problem alarms that are not associated with leak detection. Further, the\nCRM manual fails to mention the LOGP Alarm and Procedures document referenced above.\nThe operator must amend its procedure to correct the deficiencies noted above.\n9. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(a) …\n(e) Alarm management. Each operator using a SCADA system must have a written\nalarm management plan to provide for effective controller response to alarms. An\noperator's plan must include provisions to:\n(1) …\n(3) Verify the correct safety-related alarm set-point values and alarm descriptions\nwhen associated field instruments are calibrated or changed and at least once each\ncalendar year, but at intervals not to exceed 15 months;\nFreeport-McMoRan’s control room management procedures are inadequate to assure safe\noperation of a pipeline facility. Specifically, its written alarm management plan does not provide\nfor effective controller response to alarms, because it fails to identify a procedure to verify the\ncorrect safety related alarm set points and alarm descriptors when field instruments are calibrated\nor changed, at least once each calendar year, but at intervals not to exceed 15 months.\nThe operator must develop a procedure to clearly identify how controllers will verify the correct\nsafety-related alarm set-point values and alarm descriptions when associated field instruments\nare calibrated or changed and at least once each calendar year, but at intervals not to exceed 15\nmonths.\n7 Given this procedural uncertainty, during the inspection, PHMSA asked Freeport-McMoRan control room\npersonnel to explain how they follow and implement the company’s procedures on conducting point-to-point\nreviews, but they were unable to do so.\n7\n\n\n\n10. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(a) …\n(e) Alarm management. Each operator using a SCADA system must have a written\nalarm management plan to provide for effective controller response to alarms. An\noperator's plan must include provisions to:\n(1) …\n(4) Review the alarm management plan required by this paragraph at least once\neach calendar year, but at intervals not exceeding 15 months, to determine the\neffectiveness of the plan;\nFreeport-McMoRan’s control room management procedures are inadequate to assure safe\noperation of a pipeline facility. Specifically, Section 609 – Alarm Management Plan Review\nstates that the alarm management review is to be documented on one form (Form 609) but then\nstates the review will be documented on another form (Form 509), which doesn’t exist.\nThe operator must amend its procedure to accurately reflect the process for performing the\nreview of the alarm management plan at least once each calendar year, but at intervals not\nexceeding 15 months, and how the review will be documented.\n11. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(a) …\n(e) Alarm management. Each operator using a SCADA system must have a written\nalarm management plan to provide for effective controller response to alarms. An\noperator's plan must include provisions to:\n(1) …\n(5) Monitor the content and volume of general activity being directed to and\nrequired of each controller at least once each calendar year, but at intervals not\nexceeding 15 months, that will assure controllers have sufficient time to analyze and\nreact to incoming alarms;\nFreeport-McMoRan’s control room management procedures are inadequate to assure safe\noperation of a pipeline facility. Specifically, its written alarm management plan fails to include a\nprovision that sufficiently addresses monitoring the content and volume of general activity being\ndirected to and required of each controller at least once each calendar year, but at intervals not\nexceeding 15 months, to assure controllers have sufficient time to analyze and react to incoming\nalarms.\nSection 610 – Controller Activity Review states: “The content and volume of activities for each\ncontroller shall be monitored, and if necessary remedied, to assure sufficient time to analyze and\nproperly act on incoming alarms, as appropriate. Circadian was brought in to perform an initial\nbaseline study to determine controller workload.”8 It further states: “Once per calendar year or\n8 Since the operator could not produce the study, it is unclear if the company is named Circadian, or if it is a\ncompany that conducts circadian studies.\n8\n\n\n\nwhenever significant changes are being made as determined by the MOC process, an activity\nreview will be conducted, with the findings documented on memorandum or other acceptable\nmethod. This review will use the Circadian study and document any changes and how they\nimpact the findings from this study. If the change shows a major impact, FM O&G will\ninvestigate the need to have Circadian or a similar company perform another full study.”\nDuring the PHMSA inspection, the initial baseline study to determine controller workload\nperformed by Circadian could not be provided. Despite this, Freeport-McMoRan’s procedures\nrequire that its yearly reviews use this study to document any proposed changes and how these\nchanges impact the findings from this study. When asked about how this can be accomplished\nwithout a copy of the initial baseline study performed by Circadian, Freeport-McMoRan’s staff\nexplained that without the initial study, they always note that nothing has changed.\nThe operator must amend its procedure to provide an accurate process to monitor the content and\nvolume of general activity being directed to, and required of each controller at least once each\ncalendar year, but at intervals not exceeding 15 months, that will assure controllers have\nsufficient time to analyze and react to incoming alarms. If the company cannot locate the initial\nreport from Circadian, PHMSA recommends having Circadian or a similar company perform\nanother full study to use as its baseline assessment.\n12. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(a) …\n(e) Alarm management. Each operator using a SCADA system must have a written\nalarm management plan to provide for effective controller response to alarms. An\noperator's plan must include provisions to:\n(1) …\n(6) Address deficiencies identified through the implementation of paragraphs (e)(1)\nthrough (e)(5) of this section.\nFreeport-McMoRan’s control room management procedures are inadequate to assure safe\noperation of a pipeline facility. Specifically, its written alarm management plan, Section 612 –\nAlarm Management Plan Deficiencies of the Control Room Management Manual, does not\ninclude procedures for addressing deficiencies identified through implementation of\n§195.446(e)(1)-(5). Instead, the section paraphrases agency guidance material (Control Room\nManagement FAQ E.16), and also references Section 607, which simply restates the regulatory\nrequirements in subsection (e). For example, the procedure does not include any clear instruction\non how the company will discover, evaluate, and remediate identified deficiencies, or identify\nroot cause(s), trends, etc. that may be indicative of systemic deficiencies that need to be\ncorrected.\nThe operator must develop a procedure for how it will address deficiencies identified through the\nimplementation of §195.446(e)(1)-(5).\n9\n\n\n\n13. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(a) General. This section applies to each operator of a pipeline facility with a\ncontroller working in a control room who monitors and controls all or part of a\npipeline facility through a SCADA system. Each operator must have and follow\nwritten control room management procedures that implement the requirements of\nthis section…\nFreeport-McMoRan’s control room management procedures are inadequate to assure safe\noperation of a pipeline facility. Specifically, Freeport-McMoRan failed to have and follow\nwritten control room management procedures that adequately assure that changes that could\naffect control room operations are coordinated with control room personnel by requiring its field\npersonnel to contact the control room when emergency conditions exist and when making field\nchanges that affect control room operations pursuant to the requirements set forth in\n§ 195.446(f)(2).\nSpecifically, Freeport-McMoRan’s Standard Operating and Maintenance Procedures Manual for\nHazardous Liquid Pipelines (Revision 2018), Procedure 7.01 (Fed/Cal) for inspecting and\nmaintaining emergency valves fails to explicitly require that field personnel contact the control\nroom when emergency conditions exist, or when making field changes that affect control room\noperations. Additionally, the required form mentioned in the procedure (Form 7.01A) does not\nprovide an area to indicate that the control room was notified prior to and after the valve is\noperated.\nThe operator’s procedure and form documentation must be revised to require field personnel to\ncontact the control room when emergency conditions exist and when making field changes that\naffect control room operations.\n14. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(a) General. This section applies to each operator of a pipeline facility with a\ncontroller working in a control room who monitors and controls all or part of a\npipeline facility through a SCADA system. Each operator must have and follow\nwritten control room management procedures that implement the requirements of\nthis section…\nFreeport-McMoRan’s control room management procedures are inadequate to assure safe\noperation of a pipeline facility. Specifically, Freeport-McMoRan failed to have and follow\nwritten control room management procedures that adequately explain in sufficient detail how the\noperator includes lessons learned from the operator’s experience in its control room management\ntraining program pursuant to the requirements set forth in § 195.446(g)(2).\nSpecifically, Section 802 – Lessons Learned, of the Control Room Management manual merely\nparaphrases the § 195.446(g)(2) regulatory text and does not include an established method for\n10\n\n\n\nidentifying lessons learned from experience and incorporating them into its training program.9\nThe operator must develop a detailed procedure that explains how the company will include\nlessons learned from the operator’s experience into the training program required by this section.\n15. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(a) …\n(h) Training. Each operator must establish a controller training program and review\nthe training program content to identify potential improvements at least once each\ncalendar year, but at intervals not to exceed 15 months. An operator's program\nmust provide for training each controller to carry out the roles and responsibilities\ndefined by the operator. In addition, the training program must include the\nfollowing elements:\n(1) Responding to abnormal operating conditions likely to occur simultaneously or\nin sequence;\n(2) Use of a computerized simulator or non-computerized (tabletop) method for\ntraining controllers to recognize abnormal operating conditions;\n(3) Training controllers on their responsibilities for communication under the\noperator's emergency response procedures;\n(4) Training that will provide a controller a working knowledge of the pipeline\nsystem, especially during the development of abnormal operating conditions;\n(5) For pipeline operating setups that are periodically, but infrequently used,\nproviding an opportunity for controllers to review relevant procedures in advance\nof their application; and\n(6) Control room team training and exercises that include both controllers and other\nindividuals, defined by the operator, who would reasonably be expected to\noperationally collaborate with controllers (control room personnel) during normal,\nabnormal or emergency situations. Operators must comply with the team training\nrequirements under this paragraph no later than January 23, 2018.\nFreeport-McMoRan’s control room management procedures are inadequate to assure safe\noperation of a pipeline facility. Specifically, Freeport-McMoRan failed to establish a controller\ntraining program that sufficiently incorporates the requirements set forth in § 195.446(h). While\nthe training program generally states the training elements that will be covered, the program fails\nto explain in sufficient detail how controllers will be trained on these elements.\nFor example, the training program fails to identify how controllers will be trained (e.g., types of\nexercises), or how they will be evaluated (e.g., assigning pass/fail criteria for training elements),\nincluding specifying how many times a controller can retake any failed training element before\nadditional training is required. Additionally, the training program includes a controller’s ability\n9 Section 802 also incorrectly cites to reporting requirements under Part 191, which only applies to the transportation\nof natural and other gas by pipeline. Freeport-McMoRan operates hazardous liquid assets and therefore is subject to\nthe reporting requirements under Part 195, subpart B.\n11\n\n\n\nto see colors as a component of training, when this really is a matter of SCADA display\nstandards.10\nAdditionally, the required annual review of the training program to identify potential\nimprovements is a statement rather than a procedure. The metrics listed for use in determining\nthe effectiveness of the training program are unclear and difficult to discern, and include items\nthat do not measure effectiveness, such as participation in drills.\nThe operator must develop an adequate training program that provides the details necessary to\nunderstand how controllers will be trained on the elements set forth in § 195.446(h)(1)-(6) and\naddresses the deficiencies noted above. The training content must require each controller to\ndemonstrate proficiency in each of the roles and responsibilities identified by the operator as well\nas the applicable operator qualification (OQ) covered tasks.\n16. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(a) …\n(j) Compliance and deviations. An operator must maintain for review during\ninspection:\n(1) …\n(2) Documentation to demonstrate that any deviation from the procedures required\nby this section was necessary for the safe operation of the pipeline facility.\nFreeport-McMoRan’s control room management procedures are inadequate to assure safe\noperation of a pipeline facility.\nSpecifically, Section 1000 – Compliance Validation and Deviations, is disjointed and unclear.\nFor example, several parts of this section simply paraphrase the regulatory text and/or agency\nguidance documents, and does not set forth an actual process that explains how the company will\ndocument instances of deviation from its procedures when it is deemed necessary for the safe\noperation of the pipeline facility.\nFurther, Subsection 1003 – Deviation and Exception Process fails to include acceptable criteria\nfor determining whether a deviation was necessary for safe operation. For example, the\nprocedure states that the Facility Supervisor may approve hours of service (HOS) deviation on\nForm #503. However, the form could not be found and it could not be determined if the form\never existed. It is unclear under which circumstances a Facility Supervisor could approve HOS\ndeviation, or when they should be denied. The procedures do not offer any decision-trees,\nguidelines, or other explanation for when and how deviation may occur.\nThe operator must amend its procedure to accurately reflect the deviation process and\ndocumentation for deviations, addressing the deficiencies noted above.\n10 The training manual lists this under operator qualifications. The ability to see SCADA display symbols, colors,\netc. is not, however, an operator qualified (OQ) covered task. Section 903 – Training and Qualification Program\nElements fails to identify appropriate covered tasks for operator qualifications.\n12\n\n\n\nResponse to this Notice\nThis Notice is provided pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60108(a) and 49 C.F.R. § 190.206. Enclosed as\npart of this Notice is a document entitled Response Options for Pipeline Operators in\nCompliance Proceedings.\nPlease refer to this document and note the response options. Be advised that all material you\nsubmit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being made publicly available. If you\nbelieve that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for confidential treatment under 5\nU.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document you must provide a second copy of\nthe document with the portions you believe qualify for confidential treatment redacted and an\nexplanation of why you believe the redacted information qualifies for confidential treatment\nunder 5 U.S.C. 552(b).\nFollowing the receipt of this Notice, you have 30 days to submit written comments, revised\nprocedures, or a request for a hearing under §190.211. If you do not respond within 30 days of\nreceipt of this Notice, this constitutes a waiver of your right to contest the allegations in this\nNotice and authorizes the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety to find facts as alleged in\nthis Notice without further notice to you and to issue an Order Directing Amendment. If your\nplans or procedures are found inadequate as alleged in this Notice, you may be ordered to amend\nyour plans or procedures to correct the inadequacies (49 C.F.R. § 190.206). If you are not\ncontesting this Notice, we propose that you submit your amended procedures to my office within\n30 days of receipt of this Notice. This period may be extended by written request for good\ncause. Once the inadequacies identified herein have been addressed in your amended\nprocedures, this enforcement action will be closed.\nIt is requested (not mandated) that Freeport McMoRan maintain documentation of the safety\nimprovement costs associated with fulfilling this Notice of Amendment (preparation/revision of\nplans, procedures) and submit the total to Dustin Hubbard, Director, Western Region, Pipeline\nand Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. In correspondence concerning this matter,\nplease refer to CPF 5-2021-043-NOA and, for each document you submit, please provide a copy\nin electronic format whenever possible.\nSincerely,\nDustin Hubbard\nDirector, Western Region, Office of Pipeline Safety\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nEnclosure: Response Options for Pipeline Operators in Enforcement Proceedings\ncc: PHP-60 Compliance Registry\nPHP-500 D. Fehling (#20-173099)\n13\n\n52021043NOA_Closure Letter_03182025_(20-173099)_text.pdf\n\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO:\nMarch 18, 2025\nMr. David Rose\nDirector, Environmental Health & Safety\nFreeport-McMoRan Oil & Gas\n201 S. Broadway Street\nOrcutt, CA 93455\nCPF 5-2021-043-NOA\nDear Mr. Rose:\nDuring the week of October 26 through 30, 2020, a representative from the Pipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), pursuant to chapter 601 of 49 United\nStates Code, conducted an on-site pipeline safety inspection of Freeport-McMoRan Oil & Gas\n(Freeport-McMoRan) Lompoc Oil & Gas Plant (LOGP) Control Room and written control room\nmanagement procedures, located in Lompoc, California. As a result of the inspection, Freeport-\nMcMoRan was issued a Notice of Amendment (NOA) on August 2, 2021, which proposed\namendment of your procedures. Freeport-McMoRan submitted a response on December 9,\n2021.\nRegrettably, PHMSA never responded to your submission. Given the passage of time, this letter\nis to notify you that PHMSA will review your current written procedures, including any changes\nsince your 2021 submission, at the upcoming 2025 inspection rather than continue the current\nproceeding. PHMSA will address any remaining items with Freeport-McMoran at that time.\nAccordingly, this case is now withdrawn.\nThank you for your cooperation.\nSincerely,\nDustin Hubbard\nDirector, Western Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n\n\n\ncc: PHP-60 Compliance Registry\nPHP-500 D. Fehling (20-173099)","truncated":false,"body_characters":38102}