{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 52022022NOA","title":"SCM PR, LLC — Notice of Amendment","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2022-06-15","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of amendment citing 195.402(a), 195.446(b)(1), 195.446(b)(2), 195.446(b)(3), 195.446(b)(4), 195.446(b)(5), 195.446(c)(2), 195.446(c)(4), 195.446(d), 195.446(d)(4), 195.446(e)(1), 195.446(e)(3), 195.446(e)(6), 195.446(h), 195.446(j)(2).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-52022022noa.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-52022022noa.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-52022022noa","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/52022022NOA","body":"Notice of Amendment involving SCM PR, LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.402(a),  195.446(b)(1),  195.446(b)(2),  195.446(b)(3),  195.446(b)(4),  195.446(b)(5),  195.446(c)(2),  195.446(c)(4),  195.446(d),  195.446(d)(4),  195.446(e)(1),  195.446(e)(3),  195.446(e)(6),  195.446(h),  195.446(j)(2). The case was opened on 2022-06-15 and is reported as closed as of 2022-07-21. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n52022022NOA_Closure Letter_07212022_(21-201441).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/52022022NOA/52022022NOA_Closure%20Letter_07212022_(21-201441).pdf\n\n52022022NOA_Closure Letter_07212022_(21-201441)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/52022022NOA/52022022NOA_Closure%20Letter_07212022_(21-201441)_text.pdf\n\n52022022NOA_Notice of Amendment_06152022_(21-201441).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/52022022NOA/52022022NOA_Notice%20of%20Amendment_06152022_(21-201441).pdf\n\n52022022NOA_Notice of Amendment_06152022_(21-201441)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/52022022NOA/52022022NOA_Notice%20of%20Amendment_06152022_(21-201441)_text.pdf\n\n52022022NOA_Closure Letter_07212022_(21-201441)_text.pdf\n\nVIA E-MAIL TO MR. J. PATRICK BARLEY\nJuly 21, 2022\nMr. J. Patrick Barley\nChief Executive Officer\nScm Pr, LLC\n909 Lake Carolyn Parkway, Suite 650\nIrving, TX 75039\nCPF 5-2022-022-NOA\nClosure Letter\nDear Mr. Barley:\nFrom March 1 through 5, 2021, representatives of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration (PHMSA), pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code (U.S.C.), inspected the\nwritten procedures and records for the Scm Pr., LLC (SCM) control room located in Irving, Texas.\nAs a result of the inspection, SCM was issued a Notice of Amendment on June 15, 2022, which\nproposed amendment of your procedures.\nSCM submitted its amended procedures on July 7, 2022. My staff reviewed the amended\nprocedures, and it appears that the inadequacies outlined in this Notice of Amendment have been\ncorrected.\nThis letter is to inform you no further action is necessary and this case is now closed. Thank you for\nyour cooperation.\nSincerely,\nDustin Hubbard\nDirector, Western Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\ncc: PHP-60 Compliance Registry\nPHP-500 J. Dunphy (#21-201441)\nMary Patton, Regulatory Manager Silver Creek Midstream, mpatton@scmidstream.com\n\n52022022NOA_Notice of Amendment_06152022_(21-201441)_text.pdf\n\nNOTICE OF AMENDMENT\nVIA E-MAIL TO MR. J. PATRICK BARLEY\nJune 15, 2022\nMr. J. Patrick Barley\nChief Executive Officer\nScm Pr, LLC\n909 Lake Carolyn Parkway, Suite 650\nIrving, TX 75039\nCPF 5-2022-022-NOA\nDear Mr. Barley:\nFrom March 1 through 5, 2021, representatives of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration (PHMSA), pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code (U.S.C.), inspected\nthe written procedures and records for the Scm Pr., LLC (SCM) control room located in Irving,\nTexas.\nOn the basis of the inspection, PHMSA has identified the following apparent inadequacies found\nwithin the SCM plans or procedures, as described below:\n1. § 195.402 - Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a\nmanual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance\nactivities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. This manual shall be\nreviewed at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year,\nand appropriate changes made as necessary to insure that the manual is effective.\nThis manual shall be prepared before initial operations of a pipeline system\ncommence, and appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and\nmaintenance activities are conducted…\n\n\n\nSCM’s written control room management procedures are inadequate to assure the safe operation\nof a pipeline facility. Under §195.402(a), operators must review their written procedures at least\nonce each calendar year to ensure they are effective, and make appropriate changes as necessary.\nThis includes control room management procedures.1 SCM’s procedure “CRM 2-17 Annual\nTraining Review” is inadequate because it does not contain guidance on how to conduct and\ndocument an annual review of the fatigue management procedures to ensure they are effective.\n2\nDuring the inspection, PHMSA reviewed the January 2020 report by Berkana on SCM’s fatigue\nmanagement program, which did not include an effectiveness determination, and the February\n2021 review conducted by SCM, which only consisted of a document recording the date the\nreview was conducted. After reviewing both these documents, PHMSA was unable to determine\nif the program was deemed effective, and if not, what changes SCM made to improve its\nefficacy.\nSCM must amend its procedures to include language that guides the effectiveness review.\nSpecifically, the procedure should include information on how to evaluate the effectiveness of\nthe fatigue management program and a process for conducting and documenting the review.3\nThe procedure must also require that necessary changes be made, as appropriate, to ensure the\nprocedures are effective.\n2. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(a)…\n(b) Roles and responsibilities. Each operator must define the roles and\nresponsibilities of a controller during normal, abnormal, and emergency operating\nconditions. To provide for a controller’s prompt and appropriate response to\noperating conditions, an operator must define each of the following:\n(1) A controller’s authority and responsibility to make decisions and take actions\nduring normal operations\nSCM’s written control management procedures are inadequate to assure safe operation of a\npipeline facility. Specifically, SCM’s procedures fail to adequately define the roles and\nresponsibilities of a controller to provide for the prompt and appropriate response to operating\nconditions, including defining the controller’s authority and responsibility to make decisions and\ntake actions during normal operations.\nDuring the inspection, PHMSA noted that SCM has two consoles controlling its two pipeline\nsystems. SCM’s SCADA system allows for two controllers operating from separate consoles to\n1 Under §195.446(a), an operator must integrate, as appropriate, its control room management procedures,\nimplementing the requirements set forth in §195.446, with the operator’s written procedures required by §195.402.\n2 Under §195.446(d), an operator must implement certain methods to reduce the risk associated with controller fatigue\nthat could inhibit a controller’s ability to carry out the roles and responsibilities the operator has defined, including\neducating controllers and supervisors about fatigue mitigation strategies and how off-duty activities contribute to\nfatigue, and training controllers and supervisors to recognize the effects of fatigue.\n3 See §195.446(j) (requiring operators to maintain for review during inspection records demonstrating compliance\nwith the requirements of §195.446).\n\n\n\nlogin to the same pipeline system. As a result, it is possible for the controllers to issue\nconflicting commands simultaneously to SCADA. In order to mitigate this risk, SCM’s SCADA\nhas the ability to limit permissions for logins to only personnel qualified to operate a system and\nlimit the number of controllers able to login simultaneously; SCM, however, has not utilized this\nfunctionality.\nSCM must amend its procedures to adequately define a controller’s authority and responsibility\nduring normal operation by including information on simultaneous system control. SCM’s\nrevisions should limit the number of simultaneous controller logins to each pipeline system and\nassign SCADA permissions to each individual login based on the controller’s qualifications to\noperate individual pipeline systems.\n3. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(a)…\n(b) Roles and responsibilities. Each operator must define the roles and\nresponsibilities of a controller during normal, abnormal, and emergency operating\nconditions. To provide for a controller’s prompt and appropriate response to\noperating conditions, an operator must define each of the following:\n(1) A controller’s authority and responsibility to make decisions and take actions\nduring normal operations…\nSCM’s written procedure “CRM 2-7 Shift Change” is inadequate to assure safe operation of a\npipeline facility because it states that a shift change is required when a controller is away from\nthe console for 90 minutes. If the controller abandons the console for 90 minutes, he or she is no\nlonger controlling the pipeline.4 SCM must amend its procedure to shorten the length of time a\ncontroller can leave the console unattended before a shift change is required.\n4. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(a) …\n(b) Roles and responsibilities. Each operator must define the roles and\nresponsibilities of a controller during normal, abnormal, and emergency operating\nconditions. To provide for a controller’s prompt and appropriate response to\noperating conditions, an operator must define each of the following:\n(1) ...\n(2) A controller’s role when an abnormal operating condition is detected, even if the\ncontroller is not the first to detect the condition, including the controller’s\nresponsibility to take specific actions and to communicate with others\nSCM’s written procedure “CRM 2-2 Roles & Responsibilities” is inadequate to assure safe\noperation of a pipeline facility because it lacks specific instructions for controllers on how to\nrespond to abnormal operating conditions. CRM 2-2 has a subsection regarding responsibilities\nduring abnormal conditions and includes a list of actions to take, but does not provide instruction\nor guidance on how or when to implement the listed possible actions.\n4 Most pipeline operators limit the time a controller can leave the console unattended to 15-30 minutes.\n\n\n\nSCM must amend its procedure to define a controller’s role when an abnormal operating\ncondition is detected, even if the controller is not the first to detect the condition, including the\ncontroller’s responsibility to take specific actions–including how and when to implement certain\nactions–and to communicate with others.\n5. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(a) …\n(b) Roles and responsibilities. Each operator must define the roles and\nresponsibilities of a controller during normal, abnormal, and emergency operating\nconditions. To provide for a controller’s prompt and appropriate response to\noperating conditions, an operator must define each of the following:\n(1) …\n(3) A controller’s role during an emergency, even if the controller is not the first to\ndetect the emergency, including the controller’s responsibility to take specific\nactions and to communicate with others\nSCM’s CRM 2-5 Internal Communications Plan is inadequate to assure safe operation of a\npipeline facility because it fails to adequately define a controller’s role during an emergency.\nSpecifically, CRM 2-5 primarily addresses actions for a loss of SCADA or failure of\ncommunications. It does not address a total loss of power. Further, although CRM 2-5 mentions\nphysical evacuation, it does not have written procedures for a controller’s role and responsibility\nin transferring pipeline operations to another control room, shutting down the pipelines, or any\nother details, if controllers must evacuate the premises yet maintain safe operation of the pipeline\nsystem.\nSCM must amend its procedure to define a controller’s role during an emergency, even if the\ncontroller is not the first to detect the emergency, including the controller’s responsibility to take\nspecific actions and to communicate with others, including addressing the deficiencies noted\nabove.\n6. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(a) …\n(b) Roles and responsibilities. Each operator must define the roles and\nresponsibilities of a controller during normal, abnormal, and emergency operating\nconditions. To provide for a controller’s prompt and appropriate response to\noperating conditions, an operator must define each of the following:\n(1) …\n(4) A method of recording controller shift-changes and any hand-over of\nresponsibility between controllers\nSCM’s written procedure “CRM 2-7 Shift Change” is inadequate to assure safe operation of a\npipeline facility because it does not include a method of recording controller shift-changes and\nany hand-over of responsibility between controllers to provide for a controller’s prompt and\nappropriate response to operating conditions based on SCM’s current configuration. Currently,\n\n\n\nSCM is utilizing a primary control room and a secondary control room for 24/7 operations.5 The\nprimary control room controls the Powder River pipeline system and the back-up, secondary\ncontrol room controls the Red Butte pipeline system.6 The current method for shift change is not\nconducted face-to-face. It is conducted over the phone, with the on-duty controller in the CRM\nand the incoming controller out of the room. The procedure has a list of topics for controllers to\ncover, but no instructions on how to document the shift change. SCM keeps a spreadsheet log of\ndaily activities, but the log does not indicate whether the topics required by SCM CRM 2-7 were\ndiscussed during the shift change.\nSCM must amend its procedure to account for 24-hour a day, seven-day a week, operation of\nboth primary and secondary control rooms, as well as provide instruction for the documentation\nof each shift change and any hand-over of responsibilities between controllers.\n7. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(a) …\n(b) Roles and responsibilities. Each operator must define the roles and\nresponsibilities of a controller during normal, abnormal, and emergency operating\nconditions. To provide for a controller’s prompt and appropriate response to\noperating conditions, an operator must define each of the following:\n(1)…\n(5) The roles, responsibilities and qualifications of others who have the authority to\ndirect or supersede the specific technical actions of controllers.\nSCM’s written procedure “CRM 2-23 Console Function Criteria” is inadequate to assure safe\noperation of a pipeline facility because it does not define the roles, responsibilities, and\nqualifications of others who have the authority to direct or supersede the specific technical\nactions of controllers, in order to provide for a controller’s prompt and appropriate response to\noperating conditions. SCM must amend its procedure to explicitly address the roles,\nresponsibilities, and qualifications of others who have the authority to direct or supersede the\nspecific technical actions of controllers.\n8. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(a) …\n(c) Provide adequate information. Each operator must provide its controllers with\nthe information, tools, processes and procedures necessary for the controllers to\ncarry out the roles and responsibilities the operator has defined by performing each\nof the following:\n(1) …\n(2) Conduct a point-to-point verification between SCADA displays and related field\nequipment when field equipment is added or moved and when other changes that\naffect pipeline safety are made to field equipment or SCADA displays\n5 Each control room is located in different areas. Under normal operations, only the primary control room is staffed.\n6 The Red Butte pipeline system can also be controlled from the primary control room.\n\n\n\nSCM’s written procedure “CRM 2-4 Point to Point Verification” is inadequate to assure safe\noperation of a pipeline facility. SCM CRM 2-4 paragraph 3 quotes the regulatory text in §\n195.446(c)(2), but lacks specificity concerning what actions trigger a required point-to-point\nverification, including specific field equipment modifications and other changes, and how point-\nto-point verification should be documented.\n7 During the inspection, PHMSA reviewed point-to-\npoint verification records demonstrating that, although testing occurred in a timely manner, the\noperator did not record adequate information to confirm the testing results. For example, the\ndischarge pressure record does not indicate what the simulated pressure was, only that the signal\nwas correctly received. SCM must amend its procedures to define when point-to-point\nverification is required and how to adequately document such verification.\n9. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(a) …\n(c) Provide adequate information. Each operator must provide its controllers with\nthe information, tools, processes and procedures necessary for the controllers to\ncarry out the roles and responsibilities the operator has defined by performing each\nof the following:\n(1) …\n(4) Test any backup SCADA systems at least once each calendar year, but at\nintervals not to exceed 15 months\nSCM’s written procedure “CRM 2-6 Backup Site” is inadequate to assure safe operation of a\npipeline facility because it does not address how SCM will test the backup SCADA system,\nincluding testing for the effective transfer of control to the backup control room or transferring\nthe secondary, backup control room to the primary control room. Further, SCM CRM 2-6 only\naddresses server failure and evacuation of the operations center (primary control room) without\nconsidering additional failure scenarios such as total power loss that should be included in\nSCM’s testing protocols.\nSCM must amend its procedures to provide for testing the backup control room, transferring\ncontrol to the back up control room, testing the full functionality of the backup control room and\nall redundant SCADA servers, and returning control back to the primary control room. It must\nalso address failure events beyond server failure and evacuation of the control room.\n10. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(a) …\n(d) Fatigue mitigation. Each operator must implement the following methods to\nreduce the risk associated with controller fatigue that could inhibit a controller’s\nability to carry out the roles and responsibilities the operator has defined…\nSCM’s written procedures on fatigue management are inadequate to assure safe operation of a\npipeline facility because they lack instructions for managing controllers who self-identified, or\n7 See §195.446(j) (requiring operators to maintain for review during inspection records demonstrating compliance\nwith the requirements of §195.446).\n\n\n\nwere identified by supervisors, as too fatigued to carry out the roles and responsibilities the\noperator has defined.\n8\nSCM must amend its procedures to provide guidance regarding the management of controllers\nwho self-identified or were identified by supervisors as being too fatigued to safely carry out the\nroles and responsibilities the operator defined, as well as a method of documenting when this\noccurs and what actions, if any, SCM takes. In amending its procedures, SCM should consider\nimplementing the recommendations identified in PHMSA Advisory Bulletin 05-06 (2005).\n11. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(a) …\n(d) Fatigue mitigation. Each operator must implement the following methods to\nreduce the risk associated with controller fatigue that could inhibit a controller’s\nability to carry out the roles and responsibilities the operator has defined:\n(1) …\n(4) Establish a maximum limit on controller hours-of-service, which may provide\nfor an emergency deviation from the maximum limit if necessary for the safe\noperation of a pipeline facility.\nSCM’s written procedure “CRM 2-8 Fatigue Management: Shift Lengths and Rotation” is\ninadequate to assure safe operation of a pipeline facility because it lacks specificity on how hours\nof service (HOS) must be documented.9 During the inspection, PHMSA learned that, in practice,\nthe SCM Operations Center Manager tracks and documents HOS on a spreadsheet. SCM must\namend its procedures to explain what formal method will be used for documenting each\ncontroller's HOS. The revised procedures must also provide information on when deviation in\nHOS will be approved and by whom.\n12. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(a) …\n(e) Alarm management. Each operator using a SCADA system must have a written\nalarm management plan to provide for effective controller response to alarms. An\noperator’s plan must include provisions to:\n(1) Review SCADA safety-related alarm operations using a process that ensures\nalarms are accurate and support safe pipeline operations\nSCM’s written procedure “CRM 2-19 Alarm Philosophy” is inadequate to assure safe operation\nof a pipeline facility because it lacks specificity concerning how the review of SCADA safety-\nrelated alarms will be conducted and documented, as well as how corrections should be made if\nthe review identifies that alarms are inaccurate or do not support safe pipeline operation. For\nexample, SCM CRM 2-19 discusses the priority levels of alarms, as well as nuisance alarms.\n8 See, e.g., 195.446(d)(3) (requiring operators to train controllers and supervisors to recognize the effects of fatigue).\n9 See §195.446(j) (requiring operators to maintain for review during inspection records demonstrating compliance\nwith the requirements of §195.446).\n\n\n\nHowever, nuisance alarms are just one type of potentially inaccurate or malfunctioning alarm.\nThe procedure fails to address:\n• other types of inaccurate or malfunctioning alarms;\n• a timeframe for correcting malfunctioning alarms;\n• different alarm designs and all alarm types/priorities;\n• \"calculated\" vs. discrete alarms;\n• disabling or removing alarms from SCADA;\n• correcting alarm set points; and\n• ensuring that alarm descriptions are established.\nSCM must amend its procedures to provide for the review of SCADA safety-related alarm\noperations using a process that ensures alarms are accurate and support safe pipeline operations,\naddressing the deficiencies noted above.\n13. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(a) …\n(e) Alarm management. Each operator using a SCADA system must have a written\nalarm management plan to provide for effective controller response to alarms. An\noperator’s plan must include provisions to:\n(1) …\n(3) Verify the correct safety-related alarm set-point values and alarm descriptions\nwhen associated field instruments are calibrated or changed and at least once each\ncalendar year, but at intervals not to exceed 15 months\nSCM’s written procedure “CRM 2-19 Alarm Philosophy” is inadequate to assure safe operation\nof a pipeline facility because it does not provide for effective controller response to alarms by\nfailing to require verification of the correct safety-related alarm set-point values and alarm\ndescriptions when associated field instruments are calibrated or changed, and at least once each\ncalendar year, but at intervals not to exceed 15 months. Although SCM has a written procedure\nfor point-to-point verification (see Item 8 above), this by itself is not verification of correct\nsafety-related alarm set-point values and alarm descriptions. Rather, a point-to-point verification\nis a required part of a larger process to verify correct safety-related alarm set-point values and\nalarm descriptions.\nSCM must amend its procedures to verify the correct safety-related alarm set-point values and\nalarm descriptions when associated field instruments are calibrated or changed at the requisite\nintervals.\n14. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(a) …\n(h) Training. Each operator must establish a controller training program and review\nthe training program content to identify potential improvements at least once each\ncalendar year, but at intervals not to exceed 15 months. An operator’s program\n\n\n\nmust provide for training each controller to carry out the roles and responsibilities\ndefined by the operator…\nSCM’s written procedure “CRM 1-1 Crude Oil OQ Overview Training” is inadequate to assure\nsafe operation of a pipeline facility. Although the procedure includes “on the job” training and\ncomputer-based training, and requires the evaluator to sign off at the end, it fails to provide a\nsyllab5us of the controller activities that the training program is expected to cover, such as\nresponding to abnormal operating conditions likely to occur simultaneously or in sequence\npursuant to §195.446(h)(1), or a controller’s responsibilities for communication under SCM’s\nemergency response procedures pursuant to §195.446(h)(3). Second, it does not have a means to\ndocument a new controller's training progression to become fully qualified, nor does it indicate\nthe expected time period for becoming qualified. SCM’s training procedures also fail to define a\nprocess for reviewing the training program for potential improvements or for documenting\nactions taken based on the review as noted above in Item 1.\nSCM must amend its procedures to provide adequate guidance and documentation for the\ntraining of controllers. Specifically, it must provide a syllabus for the controller training\nprogram, provide a means of documenting a controller’s training progression, define an expected\ntime frame for a controller to be fully qualified, and provide instruction on how to review the\ntraining program and document the review findings.\n15. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(a) …\n(j) Compliance and deviations. An operator must maintain for review during\ninspection:\n(1) . . .\n(2) Documentation to demonstrate that any deviation from the procedures required\nby this section was necessary for the safe operation of the pipeline facility.\nSCM’s written procedure “CRM 2-1 (FD) Silver Creek CRM Framework Document” is\ninadequate to assure safe operation of a pipeline facility because it fails to provide instruction on\nhow to document a deviation.10 The procedure only states that the manager of the Operations\nCenter may approve deviation without further instruction on how and why deviation may occur.\nSCM must amend its procedures to provide instruction on how to document a deviation to\ndemonstrate that doing so was necessary for the safe operation of the pipeline facility.\n16. § 195.446 - Control room management.\n(a)…\n(e) Alarm management. Each operator using a SCADA system must have a written\nalarm management plan to provide for effective controller response to alarms. An\noperator’s plan must include provisions to:\n(1) …\n10 During the inspection, SCM provided this procedure to PHMSA in response to a request to review its procedures\nfor managing deviations pursuant to § 195.446(j).\n\n\n\n(6) Address deficiencies identified through the implementation of paragraphs (e)(1)\nthrough (e)(5) of this section.\nSCM’s written control room alarm management procedures are inadequate to assure safe\noperation of a pipeline facility because they do not contain a procedure to address deficiencies\nfound in SCM’s alarm management plan. Although SCM’s written procedure “CRM 2-19\nAlarm Philosophy” contains metrics and guidance, it lacks specific instructions for documenting\nand correcting deficiencies. SCM must amend its procedures to provide detailed instructions to\naddress deficiencies identified through implementation of its alarm management plan.\nResponse to this Notice\nThis Notice is provided pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60108(a) and 49 C.F.R. § 190.206. Enclosed as\npart of this Notice is a document entitled Response Options for Pipeline Operators in\nCompliance Proceedings.\nPlease refer to this document and note the response options. Be advised that all material you\nsubmit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being made publicly available. If you\nbelieve that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for confidential treatment under 5\nU.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document you must provide a second copy of\nthe document with the portions you believe qualify for confidential treatment redacted and an\nexplanation of why you believe the redacted information qualifies for confidential treatment\nunder 5 U.S.C. 552(b).\nFollowing the receipt of this Notice, you have 30 days to submit written comments, revised\nprocedures, or a request for a hearing under §190.211. If you do not respond within 30 days of\nreceipt of this Notice, this constitutes a waiver of your right to contest the allegations in this\nNotice and authorizes the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety to find facts as alleged in\nthis Notice without further notice to you and to issue an Order Directing Amendment. If your\nplans or procedures are found inadequate as alleged in this Notice, you may be ordered to amend\nyour plans or procedures to correct the inadequacies (49 C.F.R. § 190.206). If you are not\ncontesting this Notice, we propose that you submit your amended procedures to my office within\n30 days of receipt of this Notice. This period may be extended by written request for good\ncause. Once the inadequacies identified herein have been addressed in your amended\nprocedures, this enforcement action will be closed.\nIt is requested (not mandated) that SCM maintain documentation of the safety improvement\ncosts associated with fulfilling this Notice of Amendment (preparation/revision of plans,\nprocedures) and submit the total to Dustin Hubbard, Director, Western Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration. In correspondence concerning this matter, please refer to CPF\n5-2022-022-NOA and, for each document you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format\n\n\n\nwhenever possible.\nSincerely,\nDustin Hubbard\nDirector, Western Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nEnclosure: Response Options for Pipeline Operators in Enforcement Proceedings\ncc: PHP-60 Compliance Registry\nPHP-500 J. Dunphy (#21-201441)\nMary Patton, Regulatory Manager Silver Creek Midstream, mpatton@scmidstream.com","truncated":false,"body_characters":29750}