# SCM PR, LLC — Notice of Amendment

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** CPF 52022022NOA
- **title:** SCM PR, LLC — Notice of Amendment
- **source type:** enforcement
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** historical
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2022-06-15
- **effective on:** Not available
- **summary:** CLOSED notice of amendment citing 195.402(a), 195.446(b)(1), 195.446(b)(2), 195.446(b)(3), 195.446(b)(4), 195.446(b)(5), 195.446(c)(2), 195.446(c)(4), 195.446(d), 195.446(d)(4), 195.446(e)(1), 195.446(e)(3), 195.446(e)(6), 195.446(h), 195.446(j)(2).
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**body:**

Notice of Amendment involving SCM PR, LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.402(a),  195.446(b)(1),  195.446(b)(2),  195.446(b)(3),  195.446(b)(4),  195.446(b)(5),  195.446(c)(2),  195.446(c)(4),  195.446(d),  195.446(d)(4),  195.446(e)(1),  195.446(e)(3),  195.446(e)(6),  195.446(h),  195.446(j)(2). The case was opened on 2022-06-15 and is reported as closed as of 2022-07-21. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.

Official case documents:

52022022NOA_Closure Letter_07212022_(21-201441).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/52022022NOA/52022022NOA_Closure%20Letter_07212022_(21-201441).pdf

52022022NOA_Closure Letter_07212022_(21-201441)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/52022022NOA/52022022NOA_Closure%20Letter_07212022_(21-201441)_text.pdf

52022022NOA_Notice of Amendment_06152022_(21-201441).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/52022022NOA/52022022NOA_Notice%20of%20Amendment_06152022_(21-201441).pdf

52022022NOA_Notice of Amendment_06152022_(21-201441)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/52022022NOA/52022022NOA_Notice%20of%20Amendment_06152022_(21-201441)_text.pdf

52022022NOA_Closure Letter_07212022_(21-201441)_text.pdf

VIA E-MAIL TO MR. J. PATRICK BARLEY
July 21, 2022
Mr. J. Patrick Barley
Chief Executive Officer
Scm Pr, LLC
909 Lake Carolyn Parkway, Suite 650
Irving, TX 75039
CPF 5-2022-022-NOA
Closure Letter
Dear Mr. Barley:
From March 1 through 5, 2021, representatives of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA), pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code (U.S.C.), inspected the
written procedures and records for the Scm Pr., LLC (SCM) control room located in Irving, Texas.
As a result of the inspection, SCM was issued a Notice of Amendment on June 15, 2022, which
proposed amendment of your procedures.
SCM submitted its amended procedures on July 7, 2022. My staff reviewed the amended
procedures, and it appears that the inadequacies outlined in this Notice of Amendment have been
corrected.
This letter is to inform you no further action is necessary and this case is now closed. Thank you for
your cooperation.
Sincerely,
Dustin Hubbard
Director, Western Region
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
cc: PHP-60 Compliance Registry
PHP-500 J. Dunphy (#21-201441)
Mary Patton, Regulatory Manager Silver Creek Midstream, mpatton@scmidstream.com

52022022NOA_Notice of Amendment_06152022_(21-201441)_text.pdf

NOTICE OF AMENDMENT
VIA E-MAIL TO MR. J. PATRICK BARLEY
June 15, 2022
Mr. J. Patrick Barley
Chief Executive Officer
Scm Pr, LLC
909 Lake Carolyn Parkway, Suite 650
Irving, TX 75039
CPF 5-2022-022-NOA
Dear Mr. Barley:
From March 1 through 5, 2021, representatives of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA), pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code (U.S.C.), inspected
the written procedures and records for the Scm Pr., LLC (SCM) control room located in Irving,
Texas.
On the basis of the inspection, PHMSA has identified the following apparent inadequacies found
within the SCM plans or procedures, as described below:
1. § 195.402 - Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a
manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance
activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. This manual shall be
reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year,
and appropriate changes made as necessary to insure that the manual is effective.
This manual shall be prepared before initial operations of a pipeline system
commence, and appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and
maintenance activities are conducted…



SCM’s written control room management procedures are inadequate to assure the safe operation
of a pipeline facility. Under §195.402(a), operators must review their written procedures at least
once each calendar year to ensure they are effective, and make appropriate changes as necessary.
This includes control room management procedures.1 SCM’s procedure “CRM 2-17 Annual
Training Review” is inadequate because it does not contain guidance on how to conduct and
document an annual review of the fatigue management procedures to ensure they are effective.
2
During the inspection, PHMSA reviewed the January 2020 report by Berkana on SCM’s fatigue
management program, which did not include an effectiveness determination, and the February
2021 review conducted by SCM, which only consisted of a document recording the date the
review was conducted. After reviewing both these documents, PHMSA was unable to determine
if the program was deemed effective, and if not, what changes SCM made to improve its
efficacy.
SCM must amend its procedures to include language that guides the effectiveness review.
Specifically, the procedure should include information on how to evaluate the effectiveness of
the fatigue management program and a process for conducting and documenting the review.3
The procedure must also require that necessary changes be made, as appropriate, to ensure the
procedures are effective.
2. § 195.446 - Control room management.
(a)…
(b) Roles and responsibilities. Each operator must define the roles and
responsibilities of a controller during normal, abnormal, and emergency operating
conditions. To provide for a controller’s prompt and appropriate response to
operating conditions, an operator must define each of the following:
(1) A controller’s authority and responsibility to make decisions and take actions
during normal operations
SCM’s written control management procedures are inadequate to assure safe operation of a
pipeline facility. Specifically, SCM’s procedures fail to adequately define the roles and
responsibilities of a controller to provide for the prompt and appropriate response to operating
conditions, including defining the controller’s authority and responsibility to make decisions and
take actions during normal operations.
During the inspection, PHMSA noted that SCM has two consoles controlling its two pipeline
systems. SCM’s SCADA system allows for two controllers operating from separate consoles to
1 Under §195.446(a), an operator must integrate, as appropriate, its control room management procedures,
implementing the requirements set forth in §195.446, with the operator’s written procedures required by §195.402.
2 Under §195.446(d), an operator must implement certain methods to reduce the risk associated with controller fatigue
that could inhibit a controller’s ability to carry out the roles and responsibilities the operator has defined, including
educating controllers and supervisors about fatigue mitigation strategies and how off-duty activities contribute to
fatigue, and training controllers and supervisors to recognize the effects of fatigue.
3 See §195.446(j) (requiring operators to maintain for review during inspection records demonstrating compliance
with the requirements of §195.446).



login to the same pipeline system. As a result, it is possible for the controllers to issue
conflicting commands simultaneously to SCADA. In order to mitigate this risk, SCM’s SCADA
has the ability to limit permissions for logins to only personnel qualified to operate a system and
limit the number of controllers able to login simultaneously; SCM, however, has not utilized this
functionality.
SCM must amend its procedures to adequately define a controller’s authority and responsibility
during normal operation by including information on simultaneous system control. SCM’s
revisions should limit the number of simultaneous controller logins to each pipeline system and
assign SCADA permissions to each individual login based on the controller’s qualifications to
operate individual pipeline systems.
3. § 195.446 - Control room management.
(a)…
(b) Roles and responsibilities. Each operator must define the roles and
responsibilities of a controller during normal, abnormal, and emergency operating
conditions. To provide for a controller’s prompt and appropriate response to
operating conditions, an operator must define each of the following:
(1) A controller’s authority and responsibility to make decisions and take actions
during normal operations…
SCM’s written procedure “CRM 2-7 Shift Change” is inadequate to assure safe operation of a
pipeline facility because it states that a shift change is required when a controller is away from
the console for 90 minutes. If the controller abandons the console for 90 minutes, he or she is no
longer controlling the pipeline.4 SCM must amend its procedure to shorten the length of time a
controller can leave the console unattended before a shift change is required.
4. § 195.446 - Control room management.
(a) …
(b) Roles and responsibilities. Each operator must define the roles and
responsibilities of a controller during normal, abnormal, and emergency operating
conditions. To provide for a controller’s prompt and appropriate response to
operating conditions, an operator must define each of the following:
(1) ...
(2) A controller’s role when an abnormal operating condition is detected, even if the
controller is not the first to detect the condition, including the controller’s
responsibility to take specific actions and to communicate with others
SCM’s written procedure “CRM 2-2 Roles & Responsibilities” is inadequate to assure safe
operation of a pipeline facility because it lacks specific instructions for controllers on how to
respond to abnormal operating conditions. CRM 2-2 has a subsection regarding responsibilities
during abnormal conditions and includes a list of actions to take, but does not provide instruction
or guidance on how or when to implement the listed possible actions.
4 Most pipeline operators limit the time a controller can leave the console unattended to 15-30 minutes.



SCM must amend its procedure to define a controller’s role when an abnormal operating
condition is detected, even if the controller is not the first to detect the condition, including the
controller’s responsibility to take specific actions–including how and when to implement certain
actions–and to communicate with others.
5. § 195.446 - Control room management.
(a) …
(b) Roles and responsibilities. Each operator must define the roles and
responsibilities of a controller during normal, abnormal, and emergency operating
conditions. To provide for a controller’s prompt and appropriate response to
operating conditions, an operator must define each of the following:
(1) …
(3) A controller’s role during an emergency, even if the controller is not the first to
detect the emergency, including the controller’s responsibility to take specific
actions and to communicate with others
SCM’s CRM 2-5 Internal Communications Plan is inadequate to assure safe operation of a
pipeline facility because it fails to adequately define a controller’s role during an emergency.
Specifically, CRM 2-5 primarily addresses actions for a loss of SCADA or failure of
communications. It does not address a total loss of power. Further, although CRM 2-5 mentions
physical evacuation, it does not have written procedures for a controller’s role and responsibility
in transferring pipeline operations to another control room, shutting down the pipelines, or any
other details, if controllers must evacuate the premises yet maintain safe operation of the pipeline
system.
SCM must amend its procedure to define a controller’s role during an emergency, even if the
controller is not the first to detect the emergency, including the controller’s responsibility to take
specific actions and to communicate with others, including addressing the deficiencies noted
above.
6. § 195.446 - Control room management.
(a) …
(b) Roles and responsibilities. Each operator must define the roles and
responsibilities of a controller during normal, abnormal, and emergency operating
conditions. To provide for a controller’s prompt and appropriate response to
operating conditions, an operator must define each of the following:
(1) …
(4) A method of recording controller shift-changes and any hand-over of
responsibility between controllers
SCM’s written procedure “CRM 2-7 Shift Change” is inadequate to assure safe operation of a
pipeline facility because it does not include a method of recording controller shift-changes and
any hand-over of responsibility between controllers to provide for a controller’s prompt and
appropriate response to operating conditions based on SCM’s current configuration. Currently,



SCM is utilizing a primary control room and a secondary control room for 24/7 operations.5 The
primary control room controls the Powder River pipeline system and the back-up, secondary
control room controls the Red Butte pipeline system.6 The current method for shift change is not
conducted face-to-face. It is conducted over the phone, with the on-duty controller in the CRM
and the incoming controller out of the room. The procedure has a list of topics for controllers to
cover, but no instructions on how to document the shift change. SCM keeps a spreadsheet log of
daily activities, but the log does not indicate whether the topics required by SCM CRM 2-7 were
discussed during the shift change.
SCM must amend its procedure to account for 24-hour a day, seven-day a week, operation of
both primary and secondary control rooms, as well as provide instruction for the documentation
of each shift change and any hand-over of responsibilities between controllers.
7. § 195.446 - Control room management.
(a) …
(b) Roles and responsibilities. Each operator must define the roles and
responsibilities of a controller during normal, abnormal, and emergency operating
conditions. To provide for a controller’s prompt and appropriate response to
operating conditions, an operator must define each of the following:
(1)…
(5) The roles, responsibilities and qualifications of others who have the authority to
direct or supersede the specific technical actions of controllers.
SCM’s written procedure “CRM 2-23 Console Function Criteria” is inadequate to assure safe
operation of a pipeline facility because it does not define the roles, responsibilities, and
qualifications of others who have the authority to direct or supersede the specific technical
actions of controllers, in order to provide for a controller’s prompt and appropriate response to
operating conditions. SCM must amend its procedure to explicitly address the roles,
responsibilities, and qualifications of others who have the authority to direct or supersede the
specific technical actions of controllers.
8. § 195.446 - Control room management.
(a) …
(c) Provide adequate information. Each operator must provide its controllers with
the information, tools, processes and procedures necessary for the controllers to
carry out the roles and responsibilities the operator has defined by performing each
of the following:
(1) …
(2) Conduct a point-to-point verification between SCADA displays and related field
equipment when field equipment is added or moved and when other changes that
affect pipeline safety are made to field equipment or SCADA displays
5 Each control room is located in different areas. Under normal operations, only the primary control room is staffed.
6 The Red Butte pipeline system can also be controlled from the primary control room.



SCM’s written procedure “CRM 2-4 Point to Point Verification” is inadequate to assure safe
operation of a pipeline facility. SCM CRM 2-4 paragraph 3 quotes the regulatory text in §
195.446(c)(2), but lacks specificity concerning what actions trigger a required point-to-point
verification, including specific field equipment modifications and other changes, and how point-
to-point verification should be documented.
7 During the inspection, PHMSA reviewed point-to-
point verification records demonstrating that, although testing occurred in a timely manner, the
operator did not record adequate information to confirm the testing results. For example, the
discharge pressure record does not indicate what the simulated pressure was, only that the signal
was correctly received. SCM must amend its procedures to define when point-to-point
verification is required and how to adequately document such verification.
9. § 195.446 - Control room management.
(a) …
(c) Provide adequate information. Each operator must provide its controllers with
the information, tools, processes and procedures necessary for the controllers to
carry out the roles and responsibilities the operator has defined by performing each
of the following:
(1) …
(4) Test any backup SCADA systems at least once each calendar year, but at
intervals not to exceed 15 months
SCM’s written procedure “CRM 2-6 Backup Site” is inadequate to assure safe operation of a
pipeline facility because it does not address how SCM will test the backup SCADA system,
including testing for the effective transfer of control to the backup control room or transferring
the secondary, backup control room to the primary control room. Further, SCM CRM 2-6 only
addresses server failure and evacuation of the operations center (primary control room) without
considering additional failure scenarios such as total power loss that should be included in
SCM’s testing protocols.
SCM must amend its procedures to provide for testing the backup control room, transferring
control to the back up control room, testing the full functionality of the backup control room and
all redundant SCADA servers, and returning control back to the primary control room. It must
also address failure events beyond server failure and evacuation of the control room.
10. § 195.446 - Control room management.
(a) …
(d) Fatigue mitigation. Each operator must implement the following methods to
reduce the risk associated with controller fatigue that could inhibit a controller’s
ability to carry out the roles and responsibilities the operator has defined…
SCM’s written procedures on fatigue management are inadequate to assure safe operation of a
pipeline facility because they lack instructions for managing controllers who self-identified, or
7 See §195.446(j) (requiring operators to maintain for review during inspection records demonstrating compliance
with the requirements of §195.446).



were identified by supervisors, as too fatigued to carry out the roles and responsibilities the
operator has defined.
8
SCM must amend its procedures to provide guidance regarding the management of controllers
who self-identified or were identified by supervisors as being too fatigued to safely carry out the
roles and responsibilities the operator defined, as well as a method of documenting when this
occurs and what actions, if any, SCM takes. In amending its procedures, SCM should consider
implementing the recommendations identified in PHMSA Advisory Bulletin 05-06 (2005).
11. § 195.446 - Control room management.
(a) …
(d) Fatigue mitigation. Each operator must implement the following methods to
reduce the risk associated with controller fatigue that could inhibit a controller’s
ability to carry out the roles and responsibilities the operator has defined:
(1) …
(4) Establish a maximum limit on controller hours-of-service, which may provide
for an emergency deviation from the maximum limit if necessary for the safe
operation of a pipeline facility.
SCM’s written procedure “CRM 2-8 Fatigue Management: Shift Lengths and Rotation” is
inadequate to assure safe operation of a pipeline facility because it lacks specificity on how hours
of service (HOS) must be documented.9 During the inspection, PHMSA learned that, in practice,
the SCM Operations Center Manager tracks and documents HOS on a spreadsheet. SCM must
amend its procedures to explain what formal method will be used for documenting each
controller's HOS. The revised procedures must also provide information on when deviation in
HOS will be approved and by whom.
12. § 195.446 - Control room management.
(a) …
(e) Alarm management. Each operator using a SCADA system must have a written
alarm management plan to provide for effective controller response to alarms. An
operator’s plan must include provisions to:
(1) Review SCADA safety-related alarm operations using a process that ensures
alarms are accurate and support safe pipeline operations
SCM’s written procedure “CRM 2-19 Alarm Philosophy” is inadequate to assure safe operation
of a pipeline facility because it lacks specificity concerning how the review of SCADA safety-
related alarms will be conducted and documented, as well as how corrections should be made if
the review identifies that alarms are inaccurate or do not support safe pipeline operation. For
example, SCM CRM 2-19 discusses the priority levels of alarms, as well as nuisance alarms.
8 See, e.g., 195.446(d)(3) (requiring operators to train controllers and supervisors to recognize the effects of fatigue).
9 See §195.446(j) (requiring operators to maintain for review during inspection records demonstrating compliance
with the requirements of §195.446).



However, nuisance alarms are just one type of potentially inaccurate or malfunctioning alarm.
The procedure fails to address:
• other types of inaccurate or malfunctioning alarms;
• a timeframe for correcting malfunctioning alarms;
• different alarm designs and all alarm types/priorities;
• "calculated" vs. discrete alarms;
• disabling or removing alarms from SCADA;
• correcting alarm set points; and
• ensuring that alarm descriptions are established.
SCM must amend its procedures to provide for the review of SCADA safety-related alarm
operations using a process that ensures alarms are accurate and support safe pipeline operations,
addressing the deficiencies noted above.
13. § 195.446 - Control room management.
(a) …
(e) Alarm management. Each operator using a SCADA system must have a written
alarm management plan to provide for effective controller response to alarms. An
operator’s plan must include provisions to:
(1) …
(3) Verify the correct safety-related alarm set-point values and alarm descriptions
when associated field instruments are calibrated or changed and at least once each
calendar year, but at intervals not to exceed 15 months
SCM’s written procedure “CRM 2-19 Alarm Philosophy” is inadequate to assure safe operation
of a pipeline facility because it does not provide for effective controller response to alarms by
failing to require verification of the correct safety-related alarm set-point values and alarm
descriptions when associated field instruments are calibrated or changed, and at least once each
calendar year, but at intervals not to exceed 15 months. Although SCM has a written procedure
for point-to-point verification (see Item 8 above), this by itself is not verification of correct
safety-related alarm set-point values and alarm descriptions. Rather, a point-to-point verification
is a required part of a larger process to verify correct safety-related alarm set-point values and
alarm descriptions.
SCM must amend its procedures to verify the correct safety-related alarm set-point values and
alarm descriptions when associated field instruments are calibrated or changed at the requisite
intervals.
14. § 195.446 - Control room management.
(a) …
(h) Training. Each operator must establish a controller training program and review
the training program content to identify potential improvements at least once each
calendar year, but at intervals not to exceed 15 months. An operator’s program



must provide for training each controller to carry out the roles and responsibilities
defined by the operator…
SCM’s written procedure “CRM 1-1 Crude Oil OQ Overview Training” is inadequate to assure
safe operation of a pipeline facility. Although the procedure includes “on the job” training and
computer-based training, and requires the evaluator to sign off at the end, it fails to provide a
syllab5us of the controller activities that the training program is expected to cover, such as
responding to abnormal operating conditions likely to occur simultaneously or in sequence
pursuant to §195.446(h)(1), or a controller’s responsibilities for communication under SCM’s
emergency response procedures pursuant to §195.446(h)(3). Second, it does not have a means to
document a new controller's training progression to become fully qualified, nor does it indicate
the expected time period for becoming qualified. SCM’s training procedures also fail to define a
process for reviewing the training program for potential improvements or for documenting
actions taken based on the review as noted above in Item 1.
SCM must amend its procedures to provide adequate guidance and documentation for the
training of controllers. Specifically, it must provide a syllabus for the controller training
program, provide a means of documenting a controller’s training progression, define an expected
time frame for a controller to be fully qualified, and provide instruction on how to review the
training program and document the review findings.
15. § 195.446 - Control room management.
(a) …
(j) Compliance and deviations. An operator must maintain for review during
inspection:
(1) . . .
(2) Documentation to demonstrate that any deviation from the procedures required
by this section was necessary for the safe operation of the pipeline facility.
SCM’s written procedure “CRM 2-1 (FD) Silver Creek CRM Framework Document” is
inadequate to assure safe operation of a pipeline facility because it fails to provide instruction on
how to document a deviation.10 The procedure only states that the manager of the Operations
Center may approve deviation without further instruction on how and why deviation may occur.
SCM must amend its procedures to provide instruction on how to document a deviation to
demonstrate that doing so was necessary for the safe operation of the pipeline facility.
16. § 195.446 - Control room management.
(a)…
(e) Alarm management. Each operator using a SCADA system must have a written
alarm management plan to provide for effective controller response to alarms. An
operator’s plan must include provisions to:
(1) …
10 During the inspection, SCM provided this procedure to PHMSA in response to a request to review its procedures
for managing deviations pursuant to § 195.446(j).



(6) Address deficiencies identified through the implementation of paragraphs (e)(1)
through (e)(5) of this section.
SCM’s written control room alarm management procedures are inadequate to assure safe
operation of a pipeline facility because they do not contain a procedure to address deficiencies
found in SCM’s alarm management plan. Although SCM’s written procedure “CRM 2-19
Alarm Philosophy” contains metrics and guidance, it lacks specific instructions for documenting
and correcting deficiencies. SCM must amend its procedures to provide detailed instructions to
address deficiencies identified through implementation of its alarm management plan.
Response to this Notice
This Notice is provided pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60108(a) and 49 C.F.R. § 190.206. Enclosed as
part of this Notice is a document entitled Response Options for Pipeline Operators in
Compliance Proceedings.
Please refer to this document and note the response options. Be advised that all material you
submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being made publicly available. If you
believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for confidential treatment under 5
U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document you must provide a second copy of
the document with the portions you believe qualify for confidential treatment redacted and an
explanation of why you believe the redacted information qualifies for confidential treatment
under 5 U.S.C. 552(b).
Following the receipt of this Notice, you have 30 days to submit written comments, revised
procedures, or a request for a hearing under §190.211. If you do not respond within 30 days of
receipt of this Notice, this constitutes a waiver of your right to contest the allegations in this
Notice and authorizes the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety to find facts as alleged in
this Notice without further notice to you and to issue an Order Directing Amendment. If your
plans or procedures are found inadequate as alleged in this Notice, you may be ordered to amend
your plans or procedures to correct the inadequacies (49 C.F.R. § 190.206). If you are not
contesting this Notice, we propose that you submit your amended procedures to my office within
30 days of receipt of this Notice. This period may be extended by written request for good
cause. Once the inadequacies identified herein have been addressed in your amended
procedures, this enforcement action will be closed.
It is requested (not mandated) that SCM maintain documentation of the safety improvement
costs associated with fulfilling this Notice of Amendment (preparation/revision of plans,
procedures) and submit the total to Dustin Hubbard, Director, Western Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration. In correspondence concerning this matter, please refer to CPF
5-2022-022-NOA and, for each document you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format



whenever possible.
Sincerely,
Dustin Hubbard
Director, Western Region
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
Enclosure: Response Options for Pipeline Operators in Enforcement Proceedings
cc: PHP-60 Compliance Registry
PHP-500 J. Dunphy (#21-201441)
Mary Patton, Regulatory Manager Silver Creek Midstream, mpatton@scmidstream.com
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