{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 52022029CAO","title":"PRODUCTS (SE) PIPE LINE CORPORATION — Corrective Action Order","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2022-02-26","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED corrective action order.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-52022029cao.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-52022029cao.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-52022029cao","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/52022029CAO","body":"Corrective Action Order involving PRODUCTS (SE) PIPE LINE CORPORATION. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2022-02-26 and is reported as closed as of 2024-11-12. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n52022029CAO_Closure Letter_11122024_(22-236522).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/52022029CAO/52022029CAO_Closure%20Letter_11122024_(22-236522).pdf\n\n52022029CAO_Closure Letter_11122024_(22-236522)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/52022029CAO/52022029CAO_Closure%20Letter_11122024_(22-236522)_text.pdf\n\n52022029CAO_Corrective Action Order_02262022_(22-236522).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/52022029CAO/52022029CAO_Corrective%20Action%20Order_02262022_(22-236522).pdf\n\n52022029CAO_Corrective Action Order_02262022_(22-236522)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/52022029CAO/52022029CAO_Corrective%20Action%20Order_02262022_(22-236522)_text.pdf\n\n52022029CAO_Corrective Action Order_02262022_(22-236522)_text.pdf\n\nFebruary 26, 2022\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: Dax Sanders@kindermorgan.com\nMr. Dax Sanders\nPresident, Products Pipeline\nKinder Morgan, Inc.\n1001 Louisiana Street, Suite 1000\nHouston, Texas 77002\nCPF No. 5-2022-029-CAO\nDear Mr. Sanders:\nEnclosed please find a Corrective Action Order (CAO) issued by the Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), in the above-\nreferenced case. It requires Products (SE) Pipe Line Corporation, a subsidiary of Kinder Morgan,\nInc. (KMI), to take certain corrective actions with respect to a leak that occurred on its 26-inch\nhazardous liquid pipeline that failed in Lawrenceville, Georgia.\nService of the CAO by electronic transmission is deemed complete upon transmission and\nacknowledgement of receipt, or as otherwise provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5. The terms and\nconditions of this Order are effective upon completion of service.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nAlan K. Mayberry\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure: CAO\ncc: Ms. Linda Daugherty, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, OPS\nMr. Dustin Hubbard, Director, Western Region, OPS\nMr. Jaime Hernandez, Director – Engineering: Codes and Standards, KMI\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nProducts (SE) Pipe Line Corporation,\n)\n)\n)\na subsidiary of Kinder Morgan, Inc.\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nCPF No. 5-2022-029-CAO\nCORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nPurpose and Background\nThis Corrective Action Order (CAO or Order) is being issued under the authority of 49 U.S.C.\n§ 60112 to require Products (SE) Pipe Line Corporation (Respondent),1 a subsidiary of Kinder\nMorgan, Inc., to take the necessary corrective actions to protect the public, property, and the\nenvironment from potential hazards associated with the February 22, 20222 leak on its 26-inch\nhazardous liquid transmission pipeline in Lawrenceville, Georgia (Accident). The Accident is\nlocated in a suburban residential neighborhood in Gwinnett County, Georgia, a suburb of Atlanta.\nAccording to the Gwinnett County Fire Department (GCFD), for several weeks, members of a\nresidential neighborhood in Lawrenceville reported the odor of natural gas to the Lawrenceville\nNatural Gas Department (LNGD). On February 22, 2022 the LNGD received a call from a resident\nreporting the discovery of an unknown oil in the neighborhood. LNGD responded to the scene\nand notified the GCFD. At approximately 9:30am Eastern Standard Time (EST), the GCFD\nresponded and confirmed the release of what appeared to be diesel in a storm drain coming from\na nearby pipeline. At 10:34am EST, the GCFD reported the leak to the National Response Center\n(NRC).3\nAccording to Respondent, at approximately 10:32am EST, the GCFD called Respondent to notify\nthem of the potential pipeline release. Respondent, who did not receive a leak alarm or other\n1 Respondent operates a products pipeline system consisting of approximately 3,180 miles, originating in Louisiana\nand terminating in Virginia, that transports a variety of product batches including motor gasoline, diesel (including\nbiodiesel), kerosene, and commercial and military jet fuels. Kinder Morgan, Inc. website, available at\nhttps://www.kindermorgan.com/Operations/Products/Index (last accessed Feb. 24, 2022).\n2 At the time of the issuance of this CAO, the exact failure date is unknown.\n3 NRC Incident Report #1329440.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 5-2022-029-CAO\nSCADA indication of a potential release from its control room, deployed personnel to the scene to\nbegin an investigation. On February 22, 2022 at 12:51pm EST, Respondent reported the potential\nrelease to the NRC.4\nRespondent has three hazardous liquid pipelines that travel through this neighborhood within the\nsame right-of-way: (1) a 26-inch transmission pipeline that operates in batches and carries both\ndiesel and gasoline; (2) a 14-inch transmission pipeline that operates in batches and carries both\ngasoline and jet fuel; and (3) a 10-inch abandoned pipeline. Respondent reported that the 14-inch\npipeline was not flowing on February 22, 2022 but still contained product.5 Respondent reported\nthat it shut down the 26-inch pipeline at approximately 10:36am EST.\nBetween February 22-24, 2022, Respondent performed three excavations along the right-of-way\nand found product accumulated in the ditch and surrounding soils.6 Respondent reported that it\ntested the product and determined the leak was from its 26-inch pipeline.7 On February 23, 2022\nat 8:00pm EST, Respondent confirmed the release to the NRC despite not locating the failure site.8\nOn February 25, 2022, Respondent reported that it identified the failure location on the 26-inch\npipeline at MP 500.6 at the 6 o’clock position, on the underside of the pipe, located near two dents\nin the pipeline. Specifically, the release site is located on Line Section 6C of the 26-inch pipeline,\napproximately 14.5 miles downstream of the Doraville Pump Station and approximately 1 mile\ndownstream of the Patterson Road Block Valve site.\nRespondent reports that it is still determining the extent of the product migration and the amount\nof product released. There have been no known fires or injuries as a result of this Accident. To\ndate, five residences have been evacuated.9\nFederal, state, and local agencies responded to the scene, including the Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration (PHMSA),10 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) due to\nthe general location of the Accident and its proximity to a nearby creek, the Georgia Department\nof Natural Resources – Environmental Protection Division and Wildlife Resources Division, the\nGwinnett County Department of Water Resources and the Gwinnett County Fire Department.\n4 NRC Incident Report # 1329448.\n5 According to Respondent, the 14-inch pipeline was shut down on February 21, 2022 at approximately 1:55pm EST\nfor scheduled maintenance.\n6 Benzene levels are being discovered and monitored before performing any excavation work.\n7 Respondent reported that it is testing the sulfur levels in the product to confirm the chemical composition of the\nreleased product is from the 26-inch pipeline.\n8 NRC Incident Report # 1329579.\n9 The home immediately adjacent to the failure location is currently vacant.\n10 PHMSA is also in contact with the Department of Energy regarding supply and market impacts from this Accident.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 5-2022-029-CAO\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, PHMSA, Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) initiated an investigation\nof the Accident. The preliminary findings of PHMSA’s ongoing investigation are outlined below.\nPreliminary Findings\n According to the GCFD, for several weeks, members of a residential neighborhood in\nGwinnett County, Georgia reported the odor of natural gas in their neighborhood to the\nLawrenceville Natural Gas Department.11 On February 22, 2022 the GCFD received a\ncall from a resident reporting the discovery of an unknown oil in the neighborhood. At\napproximately 9:30am EST, the GCFD responded and confirmed the release of what\nappeared to be diesel in a storm drain catch basin coming from a nearby pipeline.\n At 10:30am EST, the GCFD reported the leak to the NRC and called Respondent to\nnotify them of a potential release. Respondent did not receive a leak alarm or other\nSCADA indications of a potential release from its control room.\n Respondent deployed personnel to the approximate failure location and began an\ninvestigation. On February 22, 2022 at 10:30am EST, Respondent reported the\npotential release to the NRC.\n Respondent has three hazardous liquid pipelines that travel through this neighborhood\nwithin the same right-of-way: (1) a 26-inch transmission pipeline that operates in\nbatches and carries both diesel and gasoline; (2) a 14-inch transmission pipeline that\nwas shut down on February 21, 2022;12 and (3) a 10-inch abandoned pipeline.\nRespondent reported that it shut down the 26-inch pipeline at approximately 10:30am\nEST.\n On February 22-24, 2022, Respondent excavated along the right-of-way and found\nproduct in the ditch and surrounding soils. Respondent reported that it had tested the\nproduct and determined the leak was from its 26-inch pipeline, although it was unable\nto locate the exact failure location at that time.\n On February 23, 2022 at 8:00pm EST, Respondent confirmed the release to the NRC.\n Five households in the residential neighborhood impacted by the Accident have been\nevacuated due to potential disruptions and disturbances caused by Respondent’s\nexcavation activities that are occurring around-the-clock, including the use of heavy\nequipment that can produce loud noises.\n Clean-up operations are underway. Respondent reports that it dispatched its Oil Spill\nResponse Organization (OSRO) contractors on February 22, 2022 at approximately\n1:00pm EST. Booms have been placed along the Pew Creek as a precaution. At this\n11 PHMSA was informed by a neighbor that residents were also smelling gasoline for several weeks.\n12 According to Respondent, the 14-inch pipeline was scheduled to be shut down on February 21, 2022.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 5-2022-029-CAO\npoint, no product has entered the creek. Additionally, EPA Region IV is on site and\nmonitoring clean up efforts.13 There is also a toxicologist on site to monitor air quality\nand exposure to benzene.\n The failure is located on Respondent’s 26-inch transmission Collins Gas (CNG)\npipeline. The CNG pipeline is approximately 667 miles of 30-inch and 26-inch\ndiameter pipe, reducing in diameter as it passes through the Bremen, Georgia tank farm\nand pump station. Operating control of pumping units occurs from the Alpharetta\nControl Center (ACC). The release site is approximately 14.5 miles downstream of\nDoraville Pump Station and approximately 1 mile downstream of the Patterson Road\nBlock Valve site (CNG-C-26-8).\n The failure location is located in a High Consequence Area (HCA) as defined in 49\nC.F.R. § 195.450. Specifically, the pipeline traverses a residential area with a\nconcentrated population. There is also a creek that runs through this residential area\ncalled Pew Creek and a nearby unnamed tributary.\n The pipeline was installed in 1968 and was manufactured by A.O. Smith. It has a 26-\ninch nominal diameter with 0.281-inch wall thickness. The pipeline consists of X-52\ngrade pipe, Electric Flash Weld (EFW), and the coating type is coal tar enamel. Vintage\npipe manufactured by A.O. Smith has historically been susceptible to seam failure.\n OPS issued Alert Notices on January 28, 1988, and again on March 8, 1989,\ndetermining that pre-1970 low frequency electric resistance welded (ERW) pipe was\nsusceptible to seam failure and informing pipeline operators of the problem. Numerous\ndocumented failures of the longitudinal seam of pre-1970 ERW pipe have been caused\nby the growth over time of manufacturing defects in the ERW seams. Selective\ncorrosion of the seam and cyclic fatigue can contribute to the growth of these defects.\nIn some cases, pipelines that had been successfully hydrostatically tested have later\nsuffered longitudinal seam failures involving selective corrosion or cyclic fatigue,\nsometimes many years after the test. Various regulations issued by PHMSA since pre-\n1970 ERW pipe was first determined to be susceptible to seam failure have reflected\nthe need for this threat to be addressed (see e.g., 49 C.F.R. § 195.452). EFW pipe is a\ntype of ERW pipe and has similar history with longitudinal seam concerns and issues\nwith hard spots.\n On January 4, 2011, after the San Bruno incident, PHMSA published Advisory Bulletin\n(ADB) 11-01 stressing the importance of implementing robust integrity management\n(IM) programs for aging pipelines. PHMSA expressed concern that some operators\nare not sufficiently aware of their pipeline attributes nor are they adequately or\nconsistently assessing threats and risks as a part of their IM programs. “In particular,\noperators’ programs fail to adequately address stress corrosion cracking, seam failure,\nor internal corrosion in their threat identification and risk assessments.”\n13 See also Incident Action Plan (Feb. 24, 2022)(on file with PHMSA) (containing additional information on soil\nsampling, air monitoring including vapor dispersion, and other response activities that remain ongoing).\n\n\n\nCPF No. 5-2022-029-CAO\n Respondent identified two anomalies on the pipeline (dents) near the failure location.\nRespondent initially reported these dents were not actionable. Respondent reports the\nlast in-line assessment was conducted in 2020, using an MFL tool that resulted in no\nthreats of concern or repairs.\n According to Respondent, prior to the leak, the pipeline was reported to be operating\nat approximately 218 psig. The maximum operating pressure (MOP) of the pipeline is\n809 psig.\n On February 25, 2022 Respondent reported that it temporarily repaired the failure\nlocation using a Type B Sleeve.14 Additionally, on February 25, 2022, Respondent\nreported that it is restarted the 14-inch pipeline.\n On February 26, 2022 Respondent reported that it plans to restart the 26-inch pipeline\nat a reduced pressure.15 Respondent submitted a Restart Plan to PHMSA for review\nand approval prior to restart.\n The root cause of the Accident remains unconfirmed at this time.\nDetermination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing\nSection 60112 of Title 49, United States Code, authorizes PHMSA to determine that a pipeline\nfacility is or would be hazardous to life, property, or the environment and if there is a likelihood\nof serious harm, to expeditiously order the operator of the facility to take necessary corrective\naction, including suspended or restricted use of the facility, physical inspection, testing, repair,\nreplacement, or other appropriate action. An order issued expeditiously must provide an\nopportunity for a hearing as soon as practicable after the order is issued.\nIn deciding whether to issue an order, PHMSA must consider the following, if relevant: (1) the\ncharacteristics of the pipe and other equipment used in the pipeline facility, including the age,\nmanufacture, physical properties, and method of manufacturing, constructing, or assembling the\nequipment; (2) the nature of the material the pipeline facility transports, the corrosive and\ndeteriorative qualities of the material, the sequence in which the material are transported, and the\npressure required for transporting the material; (3) the aspects of the area in which the pipeline\nfacility is located, including climatic and geologic conditions and soil characteristics; (4) the\nproximity of the area in which the hazardous liquid pipeline facility is located to environmentally\nsensitive areas; (5) the population density and population and growth patterns of the area in which\n14 See KMI “26CNG1 Grayland Hills B Sleeve Install Work Plan Rev. 1” (Rev. Feb. 25, 2022) (on file with PHMSA).\n15 See KMI “CNG Grayland Hills Post Release Restart Plan” (Rev. Feb. 24, 2022) (on file with PHMSA). According\nto Section 9.0, controller training on the restart plan will be provided through the Management of Change (MOC)\nprocess, which according to Respondent will limit the upstream Adjusted Out Bound Line Control Set-Point to 565\npsig.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 5-2022-029-CAO\nthe pipeline facility is located; (6) any recommendation of the National Transportation Safety\nBoard made under another law; and (7) other factors PHMSA may considers appropriate.\nAfter evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, and having considered the\ncharacteristics of the pipeline, including its age and manufacture, the EFW seam type, the location\nof the failure site in a suburban residential neighborhood, the hazardous nature of the materials\n(diesel and gasoline) transported, the uncertainty as to the root cause(s) of the Accident, the fact\nthat Respondent did not receive a leak alarm or other SCADA indication of a potential release, the\nsensitive environmental areas in the vicinity of the pipeline including Pew Creek, the evacuations\nof several residents and the ongoing impacts to residents in the neighborhood, the restart of this\nline at a reduced pressure due to market demands when the root cause of the Accident remains\nunknown and the investigation remains ongoing, and the risk of additional, related accidents, I find\nthat continued operation of the pipeline without corrective measures is or would be hazardous to\nlife, property, or the environment, and that failure to issue this Order expeditiously would result in\nthe likelihood of serious harm.\nAccordingly, this Corrective Action Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued\nwithout prior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Order are\neffective upon receipt.\nWithin 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may request a hearing, to be held as soon as\npracticable, by notifying the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, with a copy\nto the Director, Western Region, PHMSA (Director). If a hearing is requested, it will be held in\naccordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.211.\nAfter receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may\nidentify other corrective measures that need to be taken. Respondent will be notified of any\nadditional measures required and, if appropriate, PHMSA will consider amending this Order. To\nthe extent consistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a\nhearing prior to the imposition of any additional corrective measures.\nRequired Corrective Actions\nDefinition:\nAffected Segment – The “Affected Segment” means Respondent’s Line Section 6C of the 26-\ninch CNG pipeline from CNG-C-26-8, Patterson Road Block Valve to CNG-C-26-9, Tom\nMiller Road Block Valve, approximately 14 miles long, where the failure site is located.\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60112, I hereby order Respondent to immediately take the following\ncorrective actions:\n1. Operating Pressure Restriction. In accordance with the terms of this Order, upon restart\nRespondent must maintain no less than a twenty percent (20%) pressure reduction in the\nactual operating pressure along the entire length of the Affected Segment such that the\noperating pressure along the Affected Segment will not exceed eighty percent (80%) of the\n\n\n\nCPF No. 5-2022-029-CAO\n2. 3. 4. actual operating pressure in effect at the failure location immediately prior to the\nAccident.16\na. This pressure restriction is to remain in effect until written approval to increase the\npressure or return the pipeline to its pre-failure operating pressure is obtained from\nthe Director in accordance with the terms of this Order.\nb. Respondent must review the pressure restriction monthly by analyzing the operating\npressure data, taking into account any ILI features or anomalies present in the\nAffected Segment. Respondent must immediately reduce the operating pressure\nfurther to maintain the safe operations of the Affected Segment, if warranted by the\nmonthly review. Further, Respondent must submit the results of the monthly review\nto the Director including, at a minimum, the current discharge set-points (including\nany additional pressure reductions), and any pressure exceedance at discharge set-\npoints. Submittals may be made quarterly, in accordance with the terms of this Order.\nRecords Verification. Respondent must verify the records for the Affected Segment that\nwere used to establish the MOP. Respondent must submit documentation of this record\nverification to the Director within 45 days of receipt of this Order.\nReview of Prior Inline Inspection (ILI) Results. Within 180 days of receipt of this\nOrder, Respondent must conduct a review of any previous ILI results of the Affected\nSegment, including a review of the ILI vendors’ raw data and analysis. Respondent must\ndetermine whether any features were present near the failure site. In addition, Respondent\nmust determine if any features with similar characteristics are present elsewhere on the\nAffected Segment. Respondent must submit documentation of this ILI review to the\nDirector within 180 days of receipt of this Order as follows:\na. List all ILI tool runs, tool types, and the calendar years of the tool runs.\nb. List, describe (type, size, wall loss, etc.), and identify the specific location of all ILI\nfeatures present in the vicinity of the failure location.\nc. List, describe (type, size, wall loss, etc.), and identify the specific location of all ILI\nfeatures with similar characteristics present elsewhere on the Affected Pipeline.\nd. Explain the process used to review the ILI results and the results of the reevaluation.\nMechanical and Metallurgical Testing. Within 45 days of receipt of this Order,\ncomplete mechanical and metallurgical testing and failure analysis of the failed pipe,\nincluding an analysis of soil samples and any foreign materials. Complete the testing and\nanalysis as follows:\n16 Respondent reports that if it uses the 208 psig that was the value at the upstream pump station when Respondent\nstarted to investigate the leak on February 22, 2022, it will not be able to operate the pipeline to all downstream\ndelivery locations. According to Respondent, at the time of the 208 psig occurrence, downstream flow was\nterminating at a shorter haul location. Therefore, Respondent assessed its 60-day high peak and noted it to be 707\npsig. PHMSA is agreeable to the 707 psig value for purposes of this paragraph.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 5-2022-029-CAO\na. Document the chain-of-custody when handling and transporting the failed pipe\nsection and other evidence from the failure site.\nb. Within 10 days of receipt of this Order, develop and submit the testing protocol and\nthe proposed testing laboratory to the Director for prior approval.\nc. Prior to beginning the mechanical and metallurgical testing, provide the Director\nwith the scheduled date, time, and location of the testing to allow for an OPS\nrepresentative to witness the testing.\nd. Ensure the testing laboratory distributes all reports whether draft or final in their\nentirety to the Director at the same time they are made available to Respondent.\n5. Root Cause Failure Analysis (RCFA). Within 90 days following receipt of this Order,\ncomplete a root cause failure analysis (RCFA) and submit a final report of this RCFA to\nthe Director. The RCFA must be supplemented/facilitated by an independent third-party\nacceptable to the Director and must document the decision-making process and all factors\ncontributing to the failure. The final report must include findings and any lessons learned\nand whether the findings and any lessons learned are applicable to other locations within\nRespondent’s pipeline system.\n6. Remedial Work Plan (RWP).\na. Within 90 days following receipt of this Order, Respondent must submit a remedial\nwork plan (RWP) to the Director for approval.\nb. The Director may approve the RWP incrementally without approving the entire\nRWP.\nc. Once approved by the Director, the RWP will be incorporated by reference into this\nOrder.\nd. e. i. ii. The RWP must specify the tests, inspections, assessments, evaluations, and\nremedial measures Respondent will use to verify the integrity of the Affected\nSegment. It must address all known or suspected factors and causes of the Accident.\nRespondent must consider the risks and consequences of another failure to develop\na prioritized schedule for RWP-related work along the Affected Segment.\nThe RWP must include a procedure or process to:\nIdentify pipe in the Affected Segment with characteristics similar to the\ncontributing factors identified for the Accident, including the age and\nmanufacture of the entire length of the Affected Segment.\nGather all data necessary to review the failure history (in service and pressure test\nfailures) of the Affected Segment and to prepare a written report containing all the\navailable information such as the locations, dates, and causes of leaks and\nfailures.\niii. Integrate the results of the mechanical and metallurgical tests, root cause failure\nanalysis, and other corrective actions required by this Order with all relevant pre-\nexisting operational and assessment data for the Affected Segment. Pre-existing\noperational data includes, but is not limited to, design, construction, operations,\n\n\n\nCPF No. 5-2022-029-CAO\nmaintenance, testing, repairs, prior metallurgical analyses, and any third-party\nconsultation information. Pre-existing assessment data includes, but is not limited\nto, ILI tool runs, hydrostatic pressure testing, direct assessments, close interval\nsurveys, and direct current voltage gradient (DCVG)/alternating current voltage\ngradient (ACVG) surveys.\niv. Determine if conditions similar to those contributing to the Accident are likely to\nexist elsewhere on the Affected Segment.\nv. Conduct additional field tests, inspections, assessments, and evaluations to\ndetermine whether, and to what extent, the conditions associated with the\nAccident, and other failures from the failure history (see (e)(ii) above) or any\nother integrity threats are present elsewhere on the Affected Segment. At a\nminimum, this process must consider all failure causes and specify the use of one\nor more of the following:\n1) Hydrostatic pressure testing;\n2) Close-interval surveys;\n3) Cathodic protection survey;\n4) Coating surveys;\n5) Stress corrosion cracking surveys;\n6) Selective seam corrosion surveys; and\n7) Other tests, inspections, assessments, and evaluations appropriate for the\nfailure cause(s).\nNote: Respondent may use the results of previous tests, inspections, assessments, and\nevaluations if approved by the Director, provided the results of the tests, inspections,\nassessments, and evaluations are analyzed with regard to the factors known or\nsuspected to have caused the Accident.\nvi. Describe the inspection and repair criteria Respondent will use to prioritize,\nexcavate, evaluate, and repair anomalies, imperfections, and other identified\nintegrity threats. Include a description of how any defects will be graded and a\nschedule for repairs or replacement.\nvii. Based on the known history and condition of the Affected Segment, describe the\nmethods Respondent will use to repair, replace, or take other corrective measures\nto remediate the conditions associated with the Accident and to address other\nknown integrity threats along the Affected Segment. The repair, replacement, or\nother corrective measures must meet the criteria specified in (e)(vi) above.\nviii. Implement continuing long-term periodic testing and integrity verification\nmeasures to ensure the ongoing safe operation of the Affected Segment\nconsidering the results of the analyses, inspections, evaluations, and corrective\nmeasures undertaken pursuant to the Order.\nf. g. The RWP must include a proposed schedule for completion of the RWP.\nRespondent must revise the RWP as necessary to incorporate new information\nobtained during the failure investigation and remedial activities, to incorporate the\n\n\n\nCPF No. 5-2022-029-CAO\nresults of actions undertaken pursuant to this Order, and to incorporate\nmodifications required by the Director.\ni. ii. iii. Respondent must submit any plan revisions to the Director for prior approval.\nThe Director may approve plan revisions incrementally.\nAll revisions to the RWP after it has been approved and incorporated by\nreference into this Order will be fully described and documented in the CAO\nDocumentation Report.\nh. Respondent must implement the RWP as it is approved by the Director, including\nany revisions to the plan, prior to restart.\n7. Emergency Response Plan and Training Review. Within 90 days following receipt of\nthis Order, Respondent must review and assess the effectiveness of its emergency\nresponse plan with regard to the Accident. Respondent must include in the review and\nassessment the on-scene response and support, coordination, notification, and\ncommunication with emergency responders and public officials. Also, Respondent must\ninclude a review and assessment of the effectiveness of its emergency training program.\nRespondent must amend its emergency response plan and emergency training, if\nnecessary, to reflect the results of this review, within 30 days of completion of the\nreview. The documentation of this Emergency Response Plan and Training Review must\nbe available for inspection by OPS or provided to the Director, if requested.\n8. Public Awareness Program Review. Within 90 days following receipt of this Order,\nRespondent must review and assess the effectiveness of its Public Awareness Program\nwith regard to the failure. Respondent must amend its Public Awareness Program, if\nnecessary, to reflect the results of this review within 30 days of completion of the review.\nThe documentation of this Public Awareness Program Review must be available for\ninspection by OPS or provided to the Director, if requested.\n9. Leak Detection Plan. Within 90 days of receipt of this Order, perform a review and\nsubmit to the Director for approval a written plan to improve the leak detection capability\non the Affected Segment. The review must include a comprehensive analysis of any\nSCADA, leak detection, surveillance, and other monitoring systems on the Affected\nPipeline. The written plan must include a schedule for improving the leak detection\ncapability on the Affected Segment through additional instrumentation, updated hardware\nor software, installation of a computational pipeline monitoring system and associated\nsoftware programming, additional surveillance, pipeline control staffing, ongoing leak\nsurveys, and any other appropriate measures.\n10. CAO Documentation Report (CDR). Respondent must create and revise, as necessary, a\nCAO Documentation Report (CDR). When Respondent has concluded all the items in\nthis Order, it will submit the final CDR in its entirety to the Director. This will allow the\nDirector to complete a thorough review of all actions taken by Respondent with regard to\nthis Order prior to approving the closure of this Order. The intent is for the CDR to\nsummarize all activities and documentation associated with this Order in one document.\na. The Director may approve the CDR incrementally without approving the entire\nCDR.\nb. Once approved by the Director, the CDR will be incorporated by reference into\n\n\n\nCPF No. 5-2022-029-CAO\nthis Order.\nc. The CDR must include, but is not necessarily limited to, the following:\ni. Table of Contents;\nii. iii. Summary of the Accident and the response activities;\nSummary of pipe data, material properties and all prior assessments of the\nAffected Segment;\niv. Summary of all tests, inspections, assessments, evaluations, and analysis\nrequired by the Order;\nv. vi. vii. Summary of the metallurgical testing as required by the Order;\nSummary of the RCFA with all root causes as required by the Order;\nDocumentation of all actions taken by Respondent to implement the RWP, the\nresults of those actions, and the inspection and repair criteria used;\nviii. Documentation of any revisions to the RWP including those necessary to\nincorporate the results of actions undertaken pursuant to this Order and\nwhenever necessary to incorporate new information obtained during the\nfailure investigation and remedial activities;\nix. x. Lessons learned while completing this Order;\nA path forward describing specific actions Respondent will take on its entire\npipeline system as a result of the lessons learned from work on this Order; and\nxi. Appendices (if required).\n11. Removal of Pressure Restriction.\na. The Director may allow the removal or modification of the pressure restriction upon a\nwritten request from Respondent demonstrating that restoring the pipeline to its pre-\nfailure operating pressure is justified based on a reliable engineering analysis showing\nthat the pressure increase is safe considering all known defects, anomalies, and\noperating parameters of the pipeline.\nb. The Director may allow the temporary removal or modification of the pressure\nrestrictions upon a written request from Respondent demonstrating that temporary\nmitigative and preventive measures are implemented prior to and during the\ntemporary removal or modification of the pressure restriction. The Director’s\ndetermination will be based on available information, including the failure cause and\nprovision of evidence that preventative and mitigative actions taken by the operator\nprovide for the safe operation of the Affected Segment during the temporary removal\nor modification of the pressure restriction. Appeals to determinations of the Director\nin this regard will be decided by the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.\n12. Leakage Survey. Within 24 hours of returning the pipeline to service, Respondent must\nperform a ground leakage survey of the Affected Segment Right-of-Way. If Respondent\nidentifies any leak indications, it must immediately shut down the Affected Segment and\ninvestigate all leak indications and remedy all leaks discovered prior to restart.\nRespondent must submit documentation of this survey to the Director within 48 hours of\n\n\n\nCPF No. 5-2022-029-CAO\na return to service.\nOther Requirements:\n13. Approvals. With respect to each submission that under this Order requires the approval\nof the Director, the Director may: (a) approve, in whole or part, the submission; (b)\napprove the submission on specified conditions; (c) modify the submission to cure any\ndeficiencies; (d) disapprove in whole or in part, the submission, directing that Respondent\nmodify the submission, or (e) any combination of the above. In the event of approval,\napproval upon conditions, or modification by the Director, Respondent shall proceed to\ntake all action required by the submission as approved or modified by the Director. If the\nDirector disapproves all or any portion of the submission, Respondent must correct all\ndeficiencies within the time specified by the Director and resubmit it for approval.\n14. Extensions of Time. The Director may grant an extension of time for compliance with\nany of the terms of this Order upon a written request timely submitted demonstrating\ngood cause for an extension.\n15. Reporting. Submit quarterly reports to the Director that: (1) include all available data\nand results of the testing and evaluations required by this Order; and (2) describe the\nprogress of the repairs or other remedial actions being undertaken. The first quarterly\nreport is due on December 31, 2021. The Director may change the interval for the\nsubmission of these reports.\n16. Documentation of the Costs. It is requested that Respondent maintain documentation of\nthe costs associated with implementation of this Corrective Action Order. Include in each\nmonthly report submitted, the to-date total costs associated with: (1) preparation and\nrevision of procedures, studies and analyses; (2) physical changes to pipeline\ninfrastructure, including repairs, replacements and other modifications; and (3)\nenvironmental remediation, if applicable.\nBe advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being\nmade publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), along with the complete original document you\nmust provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for confidential\ntreatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to “CPF No. 5-2022-029-CAO” and for each\ndocument you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible. The actions\nrequired by this Order are in addition to and do not waive any requirements that apply to\nRespondent’s pipeline system under 49 C.F.R. Parts 190 through 199, under any other order issued\nto Respondent under authority of 49 U.S.C. Chapter 601, or under any other provision of Federal\nor State law. This Order does not preclude additional enforcement by PHMSA.\nRespondent may appeal any decision of the Director to the Associate Administrator for Pipeline\nSafety. Decisions of the Associate Administrator shall be final.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 5-2022-029-CAO\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties and in referral to\nthe Attorney General for appropriate relief in United States District Court pursuant to\n49 U.S.C. § 60120.\nThe terms and conditions of this Order are effective upon service in accordance with 49 C.F.R.\n§ 190.5.\n_________________________________ ________________________\nAlan K. Mayberry Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\n\n52022029CAO_Closure Letter_11122024_(22-236522)_text.pdf\n\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: Dax Sanders@kindermorgan.com\nNovember 12, 2024\nMr. Dax Sanders\nPresident, Products Pipeline\nKinder Morgan, Inc.\n1001 Louisiana Street, Suite 1000\nHouston, Texas 77002\nCPF 5-2022-029-CAO\nClosure Letter\nDear Mr. Sanders:\nOn February 26, 2022, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)\nissued to Products (SE) Pipe Line Corporation, a subsidiary of Kinder Morgan, Inc. (KMI), a\nCorrective Action Order in the above-referenced case. This Order included a requirement to take\ncorrective actions on your pipeline. Based on our review of the documentation you provided, it\nhas been determined that you have complied with the terms of this Order.\nAccordingly, this case is now closed and no further action is contemplated with respect to the\nmatters involved in this case. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nDustin Hubbard\nDirector, Western Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\ncc: PHP-60 Compliance Registry\nPHP-500 D. Fehling (#22-236522)\nZach Ragain, Director – Engineering, Codes & Standards","truncated":false,"body_characters":39162}