{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 52023033NOPV","title":"BLACK HILLS SHOSHONE PIPELINE, LLC — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2023-07-19","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 192.631(c)(1), 192.631(c)(4), 192.631(h), 192.631(j)(1).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-52023033nopv.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-52023033nopv.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-52023033nopv","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/52023033NOPV","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving BLACK HILLS SHOSHONE PIPELINE, LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 192.631(c)(1),  192.631(c)(4),  192.631(h),  192.631(j)(1). The case was opened on 2023-07-19 and is reported as closed as of 2024-09-05. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n52023033NOPV_Final Order_09052024_(22-239213).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/52023033NOPV/52023033NOPV_Final%20Order_09052024_(22-239213).pdf\n\n52023033NOPV_Final Order_09052024_(22-239213)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/52023033NOPV/52023033NOPV_Final%20Order_09052024_(22-239213)_text.pdf\n\n52023033NOPV_Operator Response to Notice_08172023_(22-239213).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/52023033NOPV/52023033NOPV_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice_08172023_(22-239213).pdf\n\n52023033NOPV_PCO_07192023_(22-239213).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/52023033NOPV/52023033NOPV_PCO_07192023_(22-239213).pdf\n\n52023033NOPV_PCO_07192023_(22-239213)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/52023033NOPV/52023033NOPV_PCO_07192023_(22-239213)_text.pdf\n\n52023033NOPV_Final Order_09052024_(22-239213)_text.pdf\n\nSeptember 5, 2024\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: linn.evans@blackhillscorp.com\nLinden Evans\nPresident and Chief Executive Officer\nBlack Hills Energy\n7001 Mt. Rushmore Road\nP.O. Box 1400\nRapid City, South Dakota 57709\nRe: CPF No. 5-2023-033-NOPV\nDear Mr. Evans:\nEnclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It withdraws two of\nthe allegations of violation, makes a finding of violation, and finds that Black Hills Shoshone\nPipeline, LLC, d/b/a Black Hills Energy, has completed the actions specified in the Notice of\nProbable Violation to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. Therefore, this case is now\nclosed. Service of the Final Order by e-mail is effective upon the date of transmission and\nacknowledgement of receipt as provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nAlan K. Mayberry\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. Dustin B. Hubbard, Director, Western Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA\nMr. John Hill, Vice President, Natural Gas System Safety, Black Hills Energy,\njohn.hill@blackhillscorp.com\n\n\n\nMr. Randy Seman, Director, Gas Control, Black Hills Energy,\nrandy.seman@blackhillscorp.com\nMr. Brian Kretz, Director, Pipeline Safety Compliance, Black Hills Energy,\nbrian.kretz@blackhillscorp.com\nMr. Tom Worley, Manager, Gas Control, Black Hills Energy,\ntworley@blackhillscorp.com\nMr. Christopher Ledgess, ANLY Gas Control Operations Coordinator, Black Hills\nEnergy, Christopher.ledgess@blackhillscorp.com\nCONFIRMATION OF RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\n)\nIn the Matter of )\n)\nBlack Hills Shoshone Pipeline, LLC, ) CPF No. 5-2023-033-NOPV\nd/b/a Black Hills Energy, )\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nFINAL ORDER\nFrom April 25 through 29, 2022, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, a representative of the Pipeline\nand Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS),\ninspected the facilities and records of Black Hills Shoshone Pipeline, LLC’s (Shoshone or\nRespondent) procedures for control room management in Council Bluffs, Iowa. Respondent,\nd/b/a Black Hills Energy, operates the Shoshone Pipeline that transports natural gas between\nMontana and Wyoming.1\nAs a result of the inspection, the Director, Western Region, OPS (Director), issued to\nRespondent, by letter dated July 19, 2023, a Notice of Probable Violation and Proposed\nCompliance Order (Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice proposed\nfinding that Shoshone had committed three violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 192 and proposed\nordering Respondent to take certain measures to correct the alleged violations. The Notice also\nincluded an additional warning item pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 190.205, which warned the operator\nto correct the probable violation or face possible future enforcement action.\nBlack Hills Energy responded to the Notice by letter dated August 17, 2023 (Response).\nRespondent contested several of the allegations and offered additional information in response to\nthe Notice. Respondent did not request a hearing and therefore has waived its right to one.\nFINDINGS OF VIOLATION\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. Part 192, as follows:\n1 Black Hills Energy website, available at https://www.blackhillsenergy.com/our-company/transmission/natural-\ngas-transmission (last accessed August 27, 2024).\n\n\n\nItem 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.631(c)(1), which states:\n§ 192.631 Control room management.\n(a) . . . .\n(c) Provide adequate information. Each operator must provide its\ncontrollers with the information, tools, processes and procedures necessary\nfor the controllers to carry out the roles and responsibilities the operator has\ndefined by performing each of the following:\n(1) Implement sections 1, 4, 8, 9, 11.1, and 11.3 of API RP 1165\n(incorporated by reference, see § 192.7) whenever a SCADA system is\nadded, expanded or replaced, unless the operator demonstrates that certain\nprovisions of sections 1, 4, 8, 9, 11.1, and 11.3 of API RP 1165 are not\npractical for the SCADA system used;\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.631(c)(1) by failing to implement\nthe prescribed sections of API RP 1165 or demonstrate that certain provisions of those sections\nare not practical for the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system used.\nSpecifically, the Notice alleged that Shoshone was unable to provide records demonstrating that\nits SCADA systems were compliant with API RP 1165. The Notice stated that Shoshone has\noperated two SCADA systems from its Council Bluffs, Iowa, control room (the Legacy Source\nGas system commissioned in 2016, and the Legacy Black Hills system commissioned prior to\n2009) since 2020, prior to which Shoshone operated two control rooms in Omaha, Nebraska.\nThe Notice alleged that the relocation and consolidation of multiple control rooms to a new\nfacility required Shoshone to conduct an analysis of the new facility to determine if it was an\naddition, expansion, or replacement of a SCADA system under 49 C.F.R. § 192.631(c)(1).\nIn its Response, Shoshone contested the alleged violation in Item 1, arguing that the\nconsolidation and relocation of its control rooms did not result in an addition, expansion, or\nreplacement of either the Legacy Source Gas or Legacy Black Hills SCADA systems. Shoshone\nprovided a narrative analysis of the consolidation and relocation of its Denver and Papillion\nControl Centers, respectively, stating that the virtual workstations used for operating the SCADA\nsystem at the Denver Control Center were hosted on off-premises servers such that when the\nDenver Control Center operations were moved to the Fayetteville and Papillion Control Centers,\nthe operators at those facilities remotely accessed the same virtual workstations. Additionally,\nShoshone maintained that while the relocation of the Papillion Control Center to the Council\nBluffs Control Center in 2020 required the relocation of operations, servers, and workstations,\nthe existing Legacy Source Gas system servers and workstations were replicated on SCADA\nserver infrastructure at the Council Bluffs Control Center. Shoshone also stated that both\nSCADA systems retained the same SCADA software and configuration, and no changes were\nmade to the SCADA system that met the definition of addition, expansion, or replacement in\naccordance with its procedure, Operations & Maintenance 135.6.2. Pipeline SCADA Displays\nand API RP-1165.\nAfter consideration of the record and Shoshone’s Response to Item 1, I find that the narrative\nprovided by Respondent is sufficient to demonstrate compliance with the control room\nmanagement requirements under 49 C.F.R. § 192.631(c)(1). Respondent is responsible for\n\n\n\nensuring compliance with the pipeline safety regulations, “which includes sound record keeping.\nWithout this history, an operator will have difficulty determining areas where there are problems\nthat need to be addressed.”2 Additionally, 49 C.F.R. § 192.631(j)(1) requires an operator to\nmaintain records that demonstrate compliance with the control room management requirements\nfor review during an inspection. While Respondent could not produce records demonstrating\nthat it was in compliance with the regulations at the time of the inspection, the information\nprovided in the Response demonstrates that Shoshone was in compliance with the pipeline safety\nregulations at that time because it had not added, expanded, or replaced a SCADA system, and\ntherefore was not required to implement the prescribed sections of API RP 1165.3\nBased upon the foregoing, I hereby order that Item 1 be withdrawn. Respondent is warned that\nfailure to maintain records demonstrating compliance may result in potential future enforcement.\nItem 2: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.631(c)(4), which states:\n§ 192.631 Control room management.\n(a) . . . .\n(c) Provide adequate information. Each operator must provide its\ncontrollers with the information, tools, processes and procedures necessary\nfor the controllers to carry out the roles and responsibilities the operator has\ndefined by performing each of the following:\n(1) . . . .\n(4) Test any backup SCADA systems at least once each calendar year,\nbut at intervals not to exceed 15 months; and\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.631(c)(4) by failing to test any\nbackup SCADA systems at least once each calendar year, but at intervals not to exceed 15\nmonths in accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 192.631(c)(4). Specifically, the Notice alleged that\nShoshone was unable to provide records of testing its backup SCADA systems for the years\n2020 and 2021.\nIn its Response, Shoshone contested the alleged violation in Item 2, arguing that the testing\nrequired by 49 C.F.R. § 192.631(c)(4) was completed for the years 2020 and 2021. Shoshone\nprovided records in its Response showing that backup SCADA system testing was completed in\n2020 and 2021.\nAfter a thorough review of the record, I find that the documentation and records submitted by\nRespondent are sufficient to demonstrate compliance with the backup SCADA system testing\nrequirements under 49 C.F.R. § 192.631(c)(1). As stated above, Respondent is responsible for\nensuring compliance with the pipeline safety regulations, including sound record keeping and\nmaintaining records that demonstrate compliance with the control room management\nrequirements. While Respondent could not produce records demonstrating that it was in\n2 In the Matter of Ozark Gas Transmission, Final Order 2-2002-1004, 2003 WL 26473449 at *2 (April 29, 2003).\n3 See e.g., In the Matter of Enable Mississippi River Transmission, LLC, Decision on Petition for Reconsideration 4-\n2022-047-NOPV, 2023 WL 3122253 (April 21, 2023).\n\n\n\ncompliance with the regulations at the time of the inspection, the documentation and records\nprovided in its Response demonstrates that Shoshone was in compliance with the pipeline safety\nregulations at that time because it had records demonstrating that it tested its backup SCADA\nsystems for 2020 and 2021.4\nBased upon the foregoing, I hereby order that Item 2 be withdrawn. Respondent is warned that\nfailure to maintain records demonstrating compliance may result in potential future enforcement.\nItem 4: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.631(j)(1), which states:\n§ 192.631 Control room management.\n(a) . . . .\n(j) Compliance and deviations. An operator must maintain for review\nduring inspection:\n(1) Records that demonstrate compliance with the requirements of this\nsection; and\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.631(j)(1) by failing to provide\nrecords demonstrating point-to-point verification after annual maintenance activities, like-for-\nlike replacements and calibration of field instrumentation, valve operations and other field-\ninitiated activities that affect control room operations in accordance with 49 C.F.R.\n§ 192.631(c)(2). The Notice also alleged that Respondent failed to maintain records\ndocumenting on-the-job training provided to controllers by Shoshone employees, but that in\npractice, Shoshone had developed and implemented a new controller training program that is\nmore in depth with computer-based training, reading of individual system description manuals,\none-to-one training on consoles, and exams.\nIn its Response, Shoshone did not contest the alleged violation in Item 4 but clarified that point-\nto-point verifications are completed when changes are made within the SCADA configuration\nbased on the work done in the field. Respondent provided further information explaining that\nwhen activities are completed in the field that do not require changes to the SCADA\nconfiguration, check-outs are done with Gas Control without documenting the validation of\nspecific points in the Gas Control logs. Respondent indicated that a new log has been\nimplemented to capture field-initiated point-to-point activities with Gas Control. Respondent\nalso stated in its Response that on-the-job training activities have been implemented with\ndocumentation requirements.\nAccordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.\n§ 192.631(j)(1) by failing to maintain records documenting compliance with the point-to-point\nverification requirements under 49 C.F.R. § 192.631(c)(2).\nThis finding of violation will be considered a prior offense in any subsequent enforcement action\ntaken against Respondent.\nCOMPLIANCE ORDER\n4 Id.\n\n\n\nThe Notice proposed a compliance order with respect to Items 1, 2, and 4 in the Notice for\nviolations of 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.631(c)(1), 192.631(c)(4), and 192.631(j)(1), respectively. Under\n49 U.S.C. § 60118(a), each person who engages in the transportation of gas or who owns or\noperates a pipeline facility is required to comply with the applicable safety standards established\nunder chapter 601. As discussed above, Items 1 and 2 have been withdrawn. Therefore, the\ncompliance terms proposed in the Notice for those Item are not included in this Order. The\nDirector indicates that Respondent has taken the following actions specified in the proposed\ncompliance order:\n1. With respect to the violation of § 192.631(j)(1) (Item 4), Respondent has revised\nits procedures to document field-initiated point-to-point verification with Gas\nControl, trained its field personnel managers to ensure that field-initiated activities are\npoint-to-point verified, and submitted to the Direct a forensic analysis of point-to-\npoint verifications for the years 2018 through 2022.\nAccordingly, I find that compliance has been achieved with respect to this violation. Therefore,\nthe compliance terms proposed in the Notice are not included in this Order.\nWARNING ITEM\nWith respect to Item 3, the Notice alleged a probable violation of Part 192, but identified it as a\nwarning item pursuant to § 190.205. The warning was for:\n49 C.F.R. § 192.631(h) (Item 3) ─ Respondent’s alleged failure to complete the\nrequired training program content review to identify potential improvements at\nleast once each calendar year, but at intervals not to exceed 15 months, for the\nyear 2021.\nShoshone presented information in its Response showing that it rewrote its training program in\n2021 as part of its annual review and considered the new training program the record of its 2021\nreview. If OPS finds a violation of this provision in a subsequent inspection, Respondent may be\nsubject to future enforcement action.\nUnder 49 C.F.R. § 190.243, Respondent may submit a Petition for Reconsideration of this Final\nOrder to the Associate Administrator, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA, 1200 New Jersey\nAvenue, SE, East Building, 2nd Floor, Washington, DC 20590, with a copy sent to the Office of\nChief Counsel, PHMSA, at the same address. The written petition must be received no later than\n20 days after receipt of the Final Order by Respondent. Any petition submitted must contain a\nstatement of the issue(s) and meet all other requirements of 49 C.F.R. § 190.243. The terms of\nthe order, including corrective action, remain in effect unless the Associate Administrator, upon\nrequest, grants a stay.\n\n\n\nThe terms and conditions of this Final Order are effective upon service in accordance with 49\nC.F.R. § 190.5.\nSeptember 5, 2024\n___________________________________ __________________________\nAlan K. Mayberry Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety","truncated":false,"body_characters":16946}