# NORTH SLOPE BOROUGH ENERGY MANAGEMENT — Notice of Amendment

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** CPF 52023038NOA
- **title:** NORTH SLOPE BOROUGH ENERGY MANAGEMENT — Notice of Amendment
- **source type:** enforcement
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** historical
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2023-11-02
- **effective on:** Not available
- **summary:** CLOSED notice of amendment citing 192.383(e)(1), 192.513(c), 192.59(a)(1), 192.605(b)(1), 192.605(b)(2), 192.615(a)(2), 192.617, 192.625(f), 192.627, 192.723(b)(1), 192.756.
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- **source url:** https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/52023038NOA
**body:**

Notice of Amendment involving NORTH SLOPE BOROUGH ENERGY MANAGEMENT. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 192.383(e)(1),  192.513(c),  192.59(a)(1),  192.605(b)(1),  192.605(b)(2),  192.615(a)(2),  192.617,  192.625(f),  192.627,  192.723(b)(1),  192.756. The case was opened on 2023-11-02 and is reported as closed as of 2024-10-01. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.

Official case documents:

52023038NOA_Closure Letter_10012024_(22-254201).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/52023038NOA/52023038NOA_Closure%20Letter_10012024_(22-254201).pdf

52023038NOA_Closure Letter_10012024_(22-254201)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/52023038NOA/52023038NOA_Closure%20Letter_10012024_(22-254201)_text.pdf

52023038NOA_Notice of Amendment_11022023_(22-254201).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/52023038NOA/52023038NOA_Notice%20of%20Amendment_11022023_(22-254201).pdf

52023038NOA_Notice of Amendment_11022023_(22-254201)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/52023038NOA/52023038NOA_Notice%20of%20Amendment_11022023_(22-254201)_text.pdf

52023038NOA_Operator Response to Notice_11302023_(22-254201).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/52023038NOA/52023038NOA_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice_11302023_(22-254201).pdf

52023038NOA_Notice of Amendment_11022023_(22-254201)_text.pdf

NOTICE OF AMENDMENT
VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: Josiah.patkotak@north-slope.org
November 2, 2023
The Honorable Josiah Patkotak
Mayor of the North Slope Borough
North Slope Borough Energy Management
P.O. Box 69
Utqiagvik, AK 99723
CPF 5-2023-038-NOA
Dear Mayor Patkotak:
From October 17 through October 20, 2022, a representative of the Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), pursuant, to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code,
inspected the North Slope Borough Energy Management’s (NSB), Nuiqsut natural gas
distribution system in Nuiqsut, Alaska.
Based on the inspection, PHMSA has identified the apparent inadequacies in NSB’s plans or
procedures, as described below:
1. § 192.59 Plastic pipe.
(a) New plastic pipe is qualified for use under this part if:
(1) It is manufactured in accordance with a listed specification.
NSB’s procedures were inadequate. Specifically, NSB’s Operations and Maintenance (O&M)
manual, Section P-192.281: Joining of Plastic Pipe, page 140 of 525, included a section titled
"Caulked bell and Spigot Joints (192.753)". Caulked bell and spigot joints are cast iron metal
equipment, yet were included in a section pertaining only to plastic piping.



NSB must amend its procedures to be more clear when referring to material type requirements
regarding operations, maintenance, and repair of pipe.
2. § 192.383 Excess flow valve installation.
(a) . . . .
(e) Operator notification of customers concerning EFV installation. Operators must
notify customers of their right to request an EFV in the following manner:
(1) Except as specified in paragraphs in paragraphs (c) and (e)(5) of this section,
each operator must provide written or electronic notification to customers of their
right to request the installation of an EFV. Electronic notification can include
emails, Web site postings, and e-billing notices.
NSB’s procedures were inadequate because they did not require notification to current customers
that they had the right to request to have an excess flow valve (EFV) installed. Specifically,
during the inspection, PHMSA observed that while no new service lines had been installed
within the past 5 years, according to the annual reports, NSB’s informational mail-outs did not
inform current customers of their right to request the installation of an EFV. Upon further
inquiry, NSB could not produce records that it had notified customers of their right to request an
EFV.
NSB must amend their procedures to inform current customers of their right to request
installation of an EFV.
3. § 192.513 Test requirements for plastic pipelines.
(a) . . . .
(c) The test pressure must be at least 150% of the maximum operating pressure or
50 psi (345 kPa) gauge, whichever is greater. However, the maximum test pressure
may not be more than 2.5 times the pressure determined under § 192.121 at a
temperature not less than the pipe temperature during the test.
NSB’s procedures were inadequate pertaining to pressure test requirements for plastic pipe.
Specifically, O&M manual Page 242 of 525, Pressure Testing Plastic Pipe, contained a note
within the Procedure Steps that stated testing the pipe at 3 times the maximum allowable
operating pressure (MAOP) was acceptable1. The pipeline safety regulations limits the maximum
test pressure to 2.5 times the MAOP.
NSB must update its O&M manual to correct the maximum allowable test pressure for plastic
pipelines.
1 § 192.513(c) was amended effective date January 22, 2019. See 83 FR 58719.



4. § 192.605 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.
(a) . . . .
(b) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by paragraph (a) of
this section must include procedures for the following, if applicable, to provide
safety during maintenance and operations.
(1) Operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline in accordance with each of
the requirements of this subpart and subpart M of this part.
NSB’s procedures were inadequate pertaining to pressure safety valves (PSV) and ruptured
disks. Specifically, a review of NSB’s O&M manual, page 454 of 525, Relief Valves, did not
accurately reflect the practices utilized by the operator. The O&M manual directed personnel on
removal, disassembly, maintenance, testing, calibration, and reassembly of PSVs. However, a
review of NSB’s records demonstrated that all PSV maintenance, inspection, testing, and
calibration had been completed by a third party, off site.
Additionally, the O&M manual, page 455 of 525, Pressure Limiting Devices, described a process
for performing maintenance tasks that included verifying ratings of rupture disks. Rupture disks
are not installed in the Nuiqsut distribution system, nor are they considered pressure limiting
devices.
NSB must amend its procedures to accurately reflect the equipment installed in the system and
the practices utilized by the operator to conduct PSV maintenance, testing, and calibration.
5. § 192.605 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.
(a) . . . .
(b) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by paragraph (a) of
this section must include procedures for the following, if applicable, to provide
safety during maintenance and operations.
(1) . . . .
(2) Controlling corrosion in accordance with the operations and maintenance
requirements of subpart I of this part.
NSB’s procedures were inadequate pertaining to monitoring internal corrosion. Specifically, the
O&M manual, P-192.475: Internal Corrosion Control, page 214 requires the operator to,
"Periodically conduct testing to determine whether the gas transported is potentially corrosive."
It additionally states that, "The North Slope Borough shall at intervals not exceeding 7½ months,
but at least twice each calendar year, examine coupons or other types of monitoring equipment to
determine the effectiveness of the inhibitors or the extent of any corrosion."
During inspection, PHMSA found that there were no coupons or other corrosion inhibitors
installed within the system. Rather, the inspection found that in practice, NSB was monitoring
the concentration of corrosive elements in its gas by reviewing quarterly reports from Kuparuk
Labs (Alpine transmission line) and assessing the concentrations of hydrogen sulfide and water.
However, the O&M manual did not include thresholds for hydrogen sulfide, water, or other



potentially corrosive elements, nor did it include any steps to minimize internal corrosion upon
determination that the gas was corrosive.
NSB must amend its O&M manual to reflect the current practices and steps it utilizes to conduct
internal corrosion control.
6. § 192.615 Emergency plans.
(a) Each operator shall establish written procedures to minimize the hazard
resulting from a gas pipeline emergency. At a minimum, the procedures must
provide for the following:
(1) . . . .
(2) Establishing and maintaining adequate means of communication with the
appropriate public safety answering point (i.e., 9-1-1 emergency call center), where
direct access to a 9-1-1 emergency call center is available from the location of the
pipeline, and fire, police, and other public officials. Operators may establish liaison
with the appropriate local emergency coordinating agencies, such as 9-1-1
emergency call centers or county emergency managers, in lieu of communicating
individually with each fire, police, or other public entity. An operator must
determine the responsibilities, resources, jurisdictional area(s), and emergency
contact telephone number(s) for both local and out-of-area calls of each Federal,
State, and local government organization that may respond to a pipeline emergency,
and inform such officials about the operator's ability to respond to a pipeline
emergency and the means of communication during emergencies.
NSB’s procedures were inadequate pertaining to emergency action response. NSB’s O&M
manual page 281 of 525, Respond to Event, states that "Alpine/Nuiqsut Control Room will
deploy personnel, equipment, tools, and materials as appropriate to the scene." The Nuiqsut
control room was inaccurately described within NSB’s Pipeline Specific Operations and
Maintenance Manual (PSOM). Per the PSOM, Section 8.3 Abnormal Conditions, page 32 of 94,
“Abnormal operations beyond preset limits will result in a general Odorant Injection System
alarm on the Local Computer Display (LCD) in the Control Room of the PRV Station and at
the Alpine Operator’s Station. This Nuiqsut control room within the PRV Station was not an
actual manned location and only contained a controller display panel. No Nuiqsut Control Room
exists. Further NSB does not have authority over the ConocoPhillips Alpine control room and
cannot speak to how ConocoPhillips Alpine will respond to a distribution emergency event.
The O&M manual did not describe a procedure requiring coordination with the local fire
department, police, or ConocoPhillip's Alpine control room.
Further, NSB’s PSOM, Section 12.1 Communication/Emergency, page 47 of 94, stated:
“Nuiqsut operators communicate the following information by telephone. 1. Visually inspect
daily for unusual conditions, checking for dust/build-up. 2. Verify operating condition.” This
language does not adequately describe specific steps to take during an emergency. Additionally,
the procedural steps failed to describe whom the Nuiqsut operators are intended to be in
communication with, and how they are to establish contact. NSB’s O&M manual did not contain



any language mandating the establishment and maintenance of adequate means of
communication with appropriate fire, police, and other public officials. Additionally, NSB did
not have a procedure and could not provide records establishing a liaison with police, fire, or
other public officials.
NSB must amend its emergency plans in accordance with § 192.615(a)(2).
7. § 192.617 Investigation of failures and incidents.
(a) Post-failure and incident procedures. Each operator must establish and follow
procedures for investigating and analyzing failures and incidents as defined in §
191.3, including sending the failed pipe, component, or equipment for laboratory
testing or examination, where appropriate, for the purpose of determining the
causes and contributing factor(s) of the failure or incident and minimizing the
possibility of a recurrence.
NSB’s procedures were inadequate pertaining to accidents and failures. O&M manual, P-
192.617: Investigating and Analyzing Incidents and Failures, Page 297 of 525, did not include
procedures for analyzing accidents and failures, including selection of samples of the failed pipe,
components, or equipment for laboratory examination. The operator failed to include instructions
of when a laboratory analysis may be required, what samples will be obtained for laboratory
analysis, and how the information will be analyzed to minimize the possibility of recurrence.
NSB must amend its procedures regarding investigation of failures and incidence in accordance
with § 192.617.
8. § 192.625 Odorization of gas.
(a) . . . .
(f) To assure the proper concentration of odorant in accordance with this section,
each operator must conduct periodic sampling of combustible gases using an
instrument capable of determining the percentage of gas in air at which the odor
becomes readily detectable. Operators of master meter systems may comply with
this requirement by--
NSB’s PSOM procedure was inadequate pertaining to odorant testing. Specifically, NSB’s
PSOM procedure repeatedly uses the word “sniff” which implies the use of a human sense of
smell in lieu of the use of the required instrumentation. Additionally, language in the procedure
alludes to both utility operating personnel and customers performing monthly testing. PSOM,
Section 8.4 Odorant Testing, Page 33/94 stated: “… the operator shall perform monthly and
document "sniff" tests with an odor testing instrument and operator “sniff” test. Instrumented
“sniff” testing should be performed and recorded monthly….1. Monthly "sniff" tests should be
performed by both utility operating personnel and customers. 2. When utility operating personnel
do any work on the gas distribution system, they should sniff the gas for odor.”



Additionally, NSB’s procedures are inconsistent regarding the frequency for testing odorant
levels. PSOM, Section 8.4 Odorant Testing, Page 33/94, stated: “…Instrumented ‘sniff’ testing
should be performed and recorded monthly.” While the O&M manual, Section P-192.625:
Odorization of Natural Gas Pipelines, Page 331/525, stated: “Frequency…Perform ‘sniff’ test
annually.”
Therefore NSB’s procedures for odorant testing is inadequate. NSB must amend its procedures
to be consistent and concise on who, how, and at what frequency it performs odorant testing.
9. § 192.627 Tapping pipelines under pressure.
Each tap made on a pipeline under pressure must be performed by a crew qualified
to make hot taps.
NSB’s procedures were inadequate pertaining to tapping pipelines under pressure. The O&M
manual, P-192.225: Pipeline Welding, in the Hot-Tapping of Plastic Piping section on page 129
of 525, stated: “Hot tapping of plastic HDPE piping is done by following McElroys Procedure
which begins on the following page.” The following page of the O&M manual did not include
the referenced “McElroys Procedure.” The O&M manual did not include a procedure to hot tap
plastic pipelines.
The O&M manual, P-192.711: Pipeline Repair Procedures, in the Hot Tapping and Stoppling
Pressurized Pipeline section on page 416 of 525, did not specify what material the procedure
applied to.
NSB must amend its procedures to include specific procedures for hot tapping different forms of
pipe.
10. § 192.723 Distribution systems: Leakage surveys.
(a) . . . .
(b) The type and scope of the leakage control program must be determined by the
nature of the operations and the local conditions, but it must meet the following
minimum requirements:
(1) A leakage survey with leak detector equipment must be conducted in business
districts, including tests of the atmosphere in gas, electric, telephone, sewer, and
water system manholes, at cracks in pavement and sidewalks, and at other locations
providing an opportunity for finding gas leaks, at intervals not exceeding 15
months, but at least once each calendar year.
NSB’s procedures were inadequate pertaining to determining and documenting business districts.
The operator failed to document the classification of business districts in the Nuiqsut distribution
system. During the inspection, field personnel stated that the entire system was considered a
business district, but that was not documented in a record or procedure.



NSB must amend its procedures to include a process for determining and documenting business
districts.
11. § 192.756 Joining plastic pipe by heat fusion; equipment maintenance and
calibration.
Each operator must maintain equipment used in joining plastic pipe in accordance
with the manufacturer's recommended practices or with written procedures that
have been proven by test and experience to produce acceptable joints.
NSB’s procedures were inadequate pertaining to heat fusion equipment maintenance.
Specifically, the operator failed to include a procedures in the O&M manual regarding the
maintenance of equipment for the joining of plastic pipe using heat fusion. Furthermore, the
operator could not produce records that demonstrated continued maintenance on heat fusion
equipment.
Therefore NSB’s procedures were inadequate. NSB must amend its procedures to include
maintenance for plastic heat fusion equipment.
Response to this Notice
This Notice is provided pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60108(a) and 49 C.F.R. § 190.206. Enclosed as
part of this Notice is a document entitled Response Options for Pipeline Operators in
Enforcement Proceedings.
Please refer to this document and note the response options. Be advised that all material you
submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being made publicly available. If you
believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for confidential treatment under 5
U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document, you must provide a second copy of
the document with the portions you believe qualify for confidential treatment redacted and an
explanation of why you believe the redacted information qualifies for confidential treatment
under 5 U.S.C. 552(b).
Following the receipt of this Notice, you have 30 days to submit written comments, revised
procedures, or a request for a hearing under §190.211. If you do not respond within 30 days of
receipt of this Notice, this constitutes a waiver of your right to contest the allegations in this
Notice and authorizes the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety to find facts as alleged in
this Notice without further notice to you and to issue an Order Directing Amendment. If your
plans or procedures are found inadequate, as alleged in this Notice, you may be ordered to amend
your plans or procedures to correct the inadequacies (49 C.F.R. § 190.206). If you are not
contesting this Notice, we propose that you submit your amended procedures to my office within
180 days of receipt of this Notice. This period may be extended by written request for good
cause. Once the inadequacies identified herein have been addressed in your amended
procedures, this enforcement action will be closed.



It is requested (not mandated) that North Slope Borough Energy Management maintains
documentation of the safety improvement costs associated with fulfilling this Notice of
Amendment (preparation/revision of plans, procedures) and submit the total to Dustin Hubbard,
Director, Western Region, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. In
correspondence concerning this matter, please refer to CPF 5-2023-038-NOA, and for each
document you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.
Sincerely,
Dustin Hubbard,
Director, Western Region, Office of Pipeline Safety
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
Enclosure: Response Options for Pipeline Operators in Enforcement Proceedings
cc: PHP-60 Compliance Registry
PHP-500 M. Yeager (#22-254201)
Roy Martinez, Nuiqsut Gas Distribution Manager, NSBmanager@nucmail.com
Joanne Simmonds, Assistant to the Mayor Joanne.simmonds@north-slope.org
Charlie Risley, NSB Gas Field Manager Charlie.risley@north-slope.org

52023038NOA_Closure Letter_10012024_(22-254201)_text.pdf

VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: Josiah.Patkotak@north-slope.org
October 1, 2024
The Honorable Josiah Patkotak
Mayor of the North Slope Borough
North Slope Borough Energy Management
P.O. Box 69
Utqiagvik, AK 99723
CPF 5-2023-038-NOA
Closure Letter
Dear Mayor Patkotak:
From October 17 through October 20, 2022, a representative from the Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), pursuant to chapter 601 of 49 United States Code,
conducted an on-site pipeline safety inspection of North Slope Borough Energy Management’s
(NSB) procedures in Nuiqsut, Alaska. As a result of the inspection, NSB was issued a Notice of
Amendment on November 2, 2023, which proposed amendment of your procedures.
NSB submitted its amended procedures on June 7, 2024. My staff reviewed the amended
procedures, and it appears that the inadequacies outlined in this Notice of Amendment have been
corrected.
This letter is to inform you no further action is necessary and this case is now closed. Thank you
for your cooperation.
Sincerely,
Dustin Hubbard,
Director, Western Region, Office of Pipeline Safety
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
cc: PHP-60 Compliance Registry
PHP-500 M. Yeager (#22-254201)
Roy Martinez, Nuiqsut Gas Distribution Manager - NSBmanager@nucmail.com



Joanne Simmonds, Assistant to the Mayor- Joanne.Simmonds@north-slope.org
Charlie Risley, NSB Gas Field Manager- Charlie.Risley@north-slope.org
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