{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 52024025NOA","title":"NRG ENERGY SERVICES — Notice of Amendment","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2024-12-10","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of amendment citing 191.5(b), 192.615(a)(12), 192.615(a)(2), 192.615(a)(3), 192.615(a)(4), 192.615(a)(6), 192.615(a)(9), 192.631(c)(3), 192.635(a)(1).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-52024025noa.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-52024025noa.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-52024025noa","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/52024025NOA","body":"Notice of Amendment involving NRG ENERGY SERVICES. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 191.5(b),  192.615(a)(12),  192.615(a)(2),  192.615(a)(3),  192.615(a)(4),  192.615(a)(6),  192.615(a)(9),  192.631(c)(3),  192.635(a)(1). The case was opened on 2024-12-10 and is reported as closed as of 2025-03-25. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n52024025NOA_Closure Letter_03252025_(23-265653).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/52024025NOA/52024025NOA_Closure%20Letter_03252025_(23-265653).pdf\n\n52024025NOA_Closure Letter_03252025_(23-265653)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/52024025NOA/52024025NOA_Closure%20Letter_03252025_(23-265653)_text.pdf\n\n52024025NOA_Notice of Amendment_12102024_(23-265653).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/52024025NOA/52024025NOA_Notice%20of%20Amendment_12102024_(23-265653).pdf\n\n52024025NOA_Notice of Amendment_12102024_(23-265653)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/52024025NOA/52024025NOA_Notice%20of%20Amendment_12102024_(23-265653)_text.pdf\n\n52024025NOA_Operator Response to Notice_02042025_(23-265653).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/52024025NOA/52024025NOA_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice_02042025_(23-265653).pdf\n\n52024025NOA_Notice of Amendment_12102024_(23-265653)_text.pdf\n\nNOTICE OF AMENDMENT\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: mitch.samuelian@nrgenergy.com\nDecember 10, 2024\nMr. Mitchell Samuelian\nGeneral Manager\nNRG Energy Services\n100302 Yates Well Rd.\nNipton, CA 92364\nCPF 5-2024-025-NOA\nDear Mr. Samuelian:\nFrom May 8 through May 9, 2023, a representative of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials\nSafety Administration (PHMSA), pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code (U.S.C.),\ninspected NRG Energy Services procedures for the Ivanpah Fuel Gas Line’s operations and\nmaintenance in Nipton, California.\nAs a result of the inspection, PHMSA has identified the apparent inadequacies found within\nNRG Energy Service’s plans or procedures, as described below:\n1. § 191.5 Immediate notice of certain incidents.\n(a) At the earliest practicable moment following discovery, but no later than one hour\nafter confirmed discovery, each operator must give notice in accordance with\nparagraph (b) of this section of each incident as defined in § 191.3.\n(b) Each notice required by paragraph (a) of this section must be made to the\nNational Response Center either by telephone to 800-424-8802 (in Washington, DC,\n202 267-2675) or electronically at http://www.nrc.uscg.mil and must include the\nfollowing information:\n\n\n\n(1) Names of operator and person making report and their telephone numbers.\n(2) The location of the incident.\n(3) The time of the incident.\n(4) The number of fatalities and personal injuries, if any.\n(5) All other significant facts that are known by the operator that are relevant to the\ncause of the incident or extent of the damages.\nNRG’s procedures failed to direct personnel when and who to contact for reporting an incident as\ndefined in § 191.3. Specifically, the reporting criteria and contact information within in the\noperations, maintenance, and emergencies (O&M) manual and the Control Room Procedure\nwere incorrect.\nSection 5.8 of NRG’s Control Room Procedure directed the operator’s personnel to contact the\nUSDOT via 800-476-4922 when, “There is a release of gas from a pipeline AND there is a death\nor personal injury requiring hospitalization or there is estimated property damage, including the\ncost of gas lost by the Operator or others, of $50,000 or more or There is an event that is\nsignificant in the judgement of the operator, even though it was not as previously described.” The\n1-800-476-4922 phone number is for the USDOT Hazardous Materials information center, which\nis not the appropriate contact number when communicating a pipeline incident involving a death\nhas occurred. An operator must contact the National Response Center by telephone at 800- 424-\n8802 following an incident.\nAlso, the reportable criteria for monetary-loss values notated within NRG’s operations,\nmaintenance and emergencies manual (O&M Manual) and Control Room Procedures were not\nconsistent with each other or the criteria for reportable incidents per § 191.3. Within the\nDefinitions section of § 191.3, incidents are considered reportable if property damage is\nestimated to be $122,000 or more. The criteria within the Control Room Procedure’s, Section\n5.8, stated an estimated property damage of $50,000 would require notification to PHMSA. The\nO&M manual’s, Section 19.14, stated a cost estimate of $129,300 would require notification.\nNRG must amend its procedures to clearly specify when and how personnel are required to\nnotify PHMSA of an incident.\n2. § 192.615 Emergency plans.\n(a) Each operator shall establish written procedures to minimize the hazard resulting\nfrom a gas pipeline emergency. At a minimum, the procedures must provide for the\nfollowing:\n(1)…\n(2) Establishing and maintaining adequate means of communication with the\nappropriate public safety answering point (i.e., 9-1-1 emergency call center), where\ndirect access to a 9-1-1 emergency call center is available from the location of the\npipeline, and fire, police, and other public officials. Operators may establish liaison\nwith the appropriate local emergency coordinating agencies, such as 9-1-1\nemergency call centers or county emergency managers, in lieu of communicating\nindividually with each fire, police, or other public entity. An operator must\n\n\n\ndetermine the responsibilities, resources, jurisdictional area(s), and emergency\ncontact telephone number(s) for both local and out-of-area calls of each Federal,\nState, and local government organization that may respond to a pipeline emergency,\nand inform such officials about the operator's ability to respond to a pipeline\nemergency and the means of communication during emergencies.\nNRG failed to establish and maintain adequate means of communication with appropriate\nemergency response entities. Specifically, the contact information was found to be inconsistent\nbetween the O&M Manual and the Control Room Procedure.\nNRG’s O&M Manual, Sections 19.7, 19.8, 19.9 each stated, “Notify Ivanpah Solar chain of\ncommand. Refer to Section 19.10” and “Notify local emergency officials if necessary. Refer to\nSection 19.10”. NRG’s O&M Manual, Section 19.10 did not contain any contact information or\ninstructions for who in the chain of command to contact in the event of an emergency, nor did it\ninclude contact information or instructions for contacting emergency officials. Rather, the\ninformation for contacting emergency officials is found in Section 19.13 of the O&M Manual.\nSection 6 of the Control Room Procedure did contain a contact list with numerous internal\npersonnel and outside agencies that should be notified in the event of an incident. However, the\ncontact information, specifically phone numbers, for the San Bernardino’s fire department,\nsheriff’s office, and emergency management, within Section 6 of the Control Room Procedure\nwere not consistent with the same emergency officials’ contact information within Section 19.13\nof the O&M Manual. Thus, NRG must amend its procedures to provide correct contact\ninformation regarding who to notify within the chain of command and emergency response\npersonnel within its manuals.\n3. § 192.615 Emergency plans.\n(a) Each operator shall establish written procedures to minimize the hazard resulting\nfrom a gas pipeline emergency. At a minimum, the procedures must provide for the\nfollowing:\n(1)…\n(3) Prompt and effective response to a notice of each type of emergency, including\nthe following:\n(i) Gas detected inside or near a building.\n(ii) Fire located near or directly involving a pipeline facility.\n(iii)Explosion occurring near or directly involving a pipeline facility.\n(iv)Natural disaster.\nNRG failed to provide adequate written guidance to minimize the hazard resulting from a gas\npipeline emergency. Specifically, during the inspection, PHMSA observed that the O&M manual\nfailed to provide direction for a prompt and effective response to a notice of each type of\nemergency. The O&M Manual also failed to provide guidance to take necessary actions to\nminimize hazards of release gas to life, property, or the environment.\nFor instance, the Ivanpah Fuel Gas Line does not have any compressors along the pipeline.\n\n\n\nHowever, the O&M Manual makes repeated reference to shutting the compressors down in an\nemergency. O&M Manual, Section 19.7, Unintended Release of Gas 192.615(a)(3)(i), page 170\nof 225, stated, \"If necessary and it can be done safely, manually shut the compressors down.\"\nO&M Manual, Section 19.8, Fire / Explosion, page 171 of 225, stated, \"If it can be done safely,\nshut the compressor(s) down.\" O&M Manual, Section 19.9, Natural Disaster, page 172 of 225,\nstated, \"If necessary and it can be done safely, manually shut the compressors down.\" Therefore,\nNRG must amend its procedures to exclude erroneous tasks for prompt and effective response to a\nnotice of emergency.\nAdditionally, during the inspection, an NRG representative provided PHMSA with an O&M\nManual as well as NRG’s Control Room Procedurea\n. The NRG representative stated both may be\nutilized during an emergency event. However, these two independent manuals do not contain any\nreference to each other, though both are required in the event of an emergency.\nTherefore, NRG must amend its procedures to be consistent and exclude erroneous tasks for\nprompt and effective response to a notice of emergency while clearly directing personnel as to\nwhich manual to use during an emergency.\n4. § 192.615 Emergency plans.\n(a) Each operator shall establish written procedures to minimize the hazard resulting\nfrom a gas pipeline emergency. At a minimum, the procedures must provide for the\nfollowing:\n(1)…\n(4) The availability of personnel, equipment, tools, and materials, as needed at the\nscene of an emergency.\nNRG failed to describe, within its O&M manual, the availability of equipment, tools, and\nmaterials, as needed at the scene of an emergency.\nO&M manual, Section 19.19, Post-Incident Effectiveness Review 192.615(b)(3), page 183 of\n255, Paragraph 4 Release and Discharge, contained a question, \"Was adequate equipment\nprovided to aid in the isolation of the oil spill leak?” The Ivanpah pipeline system is a Fuel Gas\npipeline that does not transport liquid hydrocarbons. The same page also included the question,\n“Were personnel capable and properly utilize equipment?\" However, no other section within the\nO&M Manual described or listed equipment, tools, or materials needed at the scene of an\nemergency consistent with a gas transmission pipeline. NRG must therefore amend its\nprocedures to include the availability of personnel, equipment, tools, and materials needed at the\nscene of an emergency involving a gas transmission pipeline release.\n5. § 192.615 Emergency plans.\n(a) Each operator shall establish written procedures to minimize the hazard resulting\nfrom a gas pipeline emergency. At a minimum, the procedures must provide for the\nfollowing:\n(1)…\na Exhibit A-2\n\n\n\n(6) Taking necessary actions, including but not limited to, emergency shutdown,\nvalve shut-off, or pressure reduction, in any section of the operator's pipeline\nsystem, to minimize hazards of released gas to life, property, or the environment\nNRG’s procedures fail to adequately direct operator personnel on which necessary actions to\ntake during an emergency, including but not limited to, emergency shutdown, valve shut-off or\npressure reduction, in any section of the Ivanpah Fuel Gas pipeline, to minimize hazards of\nreleased gas to life, property, or the environment. Specifically, NRG’s O&M Manual, Section\n3.4, Shutdown Procedures, page 15 of 225, stated, \"NOTE: See Section 19.18 for Emergency\nShutdown procedure\" and Section 19.2, Response Guidelines, page 167 of 225, of the O&M\nManual stated, \"Refer to Section 19.18 for emergency shutdown procedures.\" However, Section\n19.18 of the O&M Manual, titled Investigation of Failure, on page 179 of 225, was not an\nemergency shut-down procedure. Section 19.18, only referred to the investigation of failures.\nIndeed no emergency shutdown procedures were observed to be contained within the O&M\nManual.\nAdditionally, NRG’s O&M Manual did not contain any procedures on which specific valves\nmust be operated during an emergency to shut down the pipeline as a whole or any section of the\npipeline system. The lack of information was noted in the emergency response, Tabletop exercise\ndocumentation on August 15, 2017. While providing feedback on the drill, employees noted a\nlack of pipeline drawings, valve location maps, and detailed descriptions of which valve(s) would\nbe required to be closed during the exercise. NRG must therefore amend its procedures in\naccordance with § 192.615(a)(6).\n6. § 192.615 Emergency plans.\n(a) Each operator shall establish written procedures to minimize the hazard resulting\nfrom a gas pipeline emergency. At a minimum, the procedures must provide for the\nfollowing:\n(1)…\n(9) Safely restoring any service outage.\nNRG's O&M manual failed to clearly direct an operator to the correct section of the O&M Manual\nto safely restore any pipeline after an outage. Specifically, NRG’s O&M manual, Section 19.16,\nPost Incident Procedures, 192.615(a)(9), page 177 of 225, stated, \"Slowly bring the pipeline into\nservice, monitoring pressures. Refer to Section 19.17 for requirements to place a pipeline system\nback into service after an emergency.\"\nHowever, O&M manual, Section 19.17, page 178 of 225, titled \"Incident Documentation\" did\nnot contain any procedures directing operator personnel on how to bring the Ivanpah pipeline\nback into service. Those procedures were found in Section 19.20 of the O&M Manual, page 185\nof 225, titled \"Placing System Back into Service 192.605(a)(5),\" Section 19.20 described all the\nprocedural steps to bring the Ivanpah pipeline back into service.\nTherefore, NRG must amend its procedures to direct personnel to the appropriate section within\nthe O&M Manual to safely restore the system back to normal operations.\n\n\n\n7. § 192.615 Emergency plans.\n(a) Each operator shall establish written procedures to minimize the hazard resulting\nfrom a gas pipeline emergency. At a minimum, the procedures must provide for the\nfollowing:\n(1)…\n(12) Each operator must develop written rupture identification procedures to\nevaluate and identify whether a notification of potential rupture, as defined in\n§ 192.3, is an actual rupture event or a non-rupture event. These procedures must,\nat a minimum, specify the sources of information, operational factors, and other\ncriteria that operator personnel use to evaluate a notification of potential rupture\nand identify an actual rupture. For operators installing valves in accordance with\n§ 192.179(e), § 192.179(f), or that are subject to the requirements in § 192.634, those\nprocedures must provide for rupture identification as soon as practicable.\nNRG’s procedures do not include instructions on how to evaluate and identify whether a\nnotification of potential rupture, as defined in § 192.3, is an actual rupture or non-rupture event.\nSpecifically, a review of NRG’s O&M Manual, Section 19.11, Rupture Identification Procedure\n192.615(a)(12), page 173 of 225, revealed that while the language included § 192.615(a)(12),\n“Ivanpah Solar must develop written rupture identification procedures to evaluate and identify\nwhether a notification of potential rupture, as defined in 192.3, is an actual rupture event or a\nnon-rupture event”, the procedures did not include any instructions on how or what step the\noperator’s personnel would need to take to evaluate and identify whether a notification of\npotential rupture was an actual rupture event.\nTherefore, NRG must amend its procedures to develop written rupture identification procedures\nas described pursuant to § 192.615(a)(12).\n8. § 192.631 Control room management.\n(a)…\n(c) Provide adequate information. Each operator must provide its controllers with\nthe information, tools, processes and procedures necessary for the controllers to\ncarry out the roles and responsibilities the operator has defined by performing each\nof the following:\n(1) ...\n(3) Test and verify an internal communication plan to provide adequate means for\nmanual operation of the pipeline safely, at least once each calendar year, but at\nintervals not to exceed 15 months;\nNRG’s procedures fail to include requirements to test and verify its internal communications\nplan to provide adequate means for manual operator of the pipeline safely at least once each\ncalendar year, at intervals not to exceed 15 months, as required. Specifically, neither NRG's\n\n\n\nO&M Manual or Control Room Procedures include this requirement.\nNRG’s O&M Manual included discussion of an internal communication plan during a SCADA\nfailure, abnormal operating condition, or emergency event. Similarly, NRG's Control Room\nProcedure included discussion of an internal communication plan, in greater depth than in the\nO&M manual. However, neither of the manuals explicitly required testing and verification of an\ninternal communication plan to provide adequate means for manual operation of the pipeline, at\nleast once each calendar year, but at intervals not to exceed 15 months.\nTherefore, NRG must amend its procedures to include testing and verifying its internal\ncommunications plan to provide adequate means for safe manual operation of the pipeline at least\nonce each calendar year, at intervals not to exceed 15 months.\nThis procedural omission correlated with the lack of internal communication plan testing and\nverification activities. With the exception of NRG Ivanpah ER Drill Records, Tabletop Exercise,\ndated August 15, 2017, NRG could not provide evidence to demonstrate the testing and\nverification of any internal communication plan. Furthermore, statements from NRG Ivanpah's\nemployees, who participated in the exercise on August 15, 2017, included \"Control Room did not\nuse emergency information sheet\", \"3 way communication lacking\", \"3 way was not used by\ncontrol room\" & \"No 3 way communication\".\n9. § 192.635 Notification of potential rupture.\n(a) As used in this part, a “notification of potential rupture” refers to the\nnotification of, or observation by, an operator (e.g., by or to its controller(s) in a\ncontrol room, field personnel, nearby pipeline or utility personnel, the public, local\nresponders, or public authorities) of one or more of the below indicia of a potential\nunintentional or uncontrolled release of a large volume of gas from a pipeline:\n(1) An unanticipated or unexplained pressure loss outside of the pipeline's normal\noperating pressures, as defined in the operator's written procedures. The operator\nmust establish in its written procedures that an unanticipated or unplanned pressure\nloss is outside of the pipeline's normal operating pressures when there is a pressure\nloss greater than 10 percent occurring within a time interval of 15 minutes or less,\nunless the operator has documented in its written procedures the operational need\nfor a greater pressure-change threshold due to pipeline flow dynamics (including\nchanges in operating pressure, flow rate, or volume), that are caused by fluctuations\nin gas demand, gas receipts, or gas deliveries; or\nNRG’s O&M Manual failed to include procedures that define an unanticipated or unexplained\npressure loss outside of the Ivanpah pipeline’s normal operating pressures that would indicate a\npotential rupture. Specifically, while the O&M Manual, Section 19.10, Notification of Potential\nRupture 192.635, page 173 of 225, contained language that included § 192.635(a)(1), this\nlanguage was unclear as to what criteria was to be used in order to quantify a pressure-loss that\nindicates a potential rupture, stating in part \"unless Ivanpah Solar has documented in its written\n\n\n\nprocedures the operational need for a greater pressure-change threshold...\"\nTherefore, NRG must amend its procedures to clearly state which quantifiable pressure-loss\ncriteria, within Section 19.10, was intended to be utilized to demonstrate a potential rupture had\noccurred.\nResponse to this Notice\nThis Notice is provided pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60108(a) and 49 C.F.R. § 190.206. Enclosed as\npart of this Notice is a document entitled Response Options for Pipeline Operators in\nCompliance Proceedings.\nPlease refer to this document and note the response options. Be advised that all material you\nsubmit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being made publicly available. If you\nbelieve that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for confidential treatment under 5\nU.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document you must provide a second copy of the\ndocument with the portions you believe qualify for confidential treatment redacted and an\nexplanation of why you believe the redacted information qualifies for confidential treatment\nunder 5 U.S.C. 552(b).\nFollowing the receipt of this Notice, you have 30 days to submit written comments, revised\nprocedures, or a request for a hearing under §190.211. If you do not respond within 30 days of\nreceipt of this Notice, this constitutes a waiver of your right to contest the allegations in this\nNotice and authorizes the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety to find facts as alleged in\nthis Notice without further notice to you and to issue an Order Directing Amendment. If your\nplans or procedures are found inadequate as alleged in this Notice, you may be ordered to amend\nyour plans or procedures to correct the inadequacies (49 C.F.R. § 190.206). If you are not\ncontesting this Notice, we propose that you submit your amended procedures to my office within\n180 days of receipt of this Notice. This period may be extended by written request for good\ncause. Once the inadequacies identified herein have been addressed in your amended procedures,\nthis enforcement action will be closed.\nIt is requested (not mandated) that NRG Energy Services maintain documentation of the safety\nimprovement costs associated with fulfilling this Notice of Amendment (preparation/revision of\nplans, procedures) and submit the total to Dustin Hubbard, Director, Western Region, Pipeline\nand Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. In correspondence concerning this matter, please\nrefer to CPF 5-2024-025-NOA and, for each document you submit, please provide a copy in\nelectronic format whenever possible.\nSincerely,\nDustin Hubbard\nDirector, Western Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nEnclosure: Response Options for Pipeline Operators in Enforcement Proceedings\n\n\n\ncc: PHP-60 Compliance Registry\nPHP-500 M. Yeager, B. Brown (#23-265653)\nPHP-500 Marion Garcia, Operations Supervisor, Western Region\nChristina (Chrissy) Villarreal, Everline Manager, christina.villarreal@everlineus.com\n\n52024025NOA_Closure Letter_03252025_(23-265653)_text.pdf\n\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: Nicholas.Volturno@nrg.com\nMarch 25, 2025\nMr. Nicholas Volturno\nGeneral Manager\nNRG Energy Services.\n100302 Yates Well Rd.\nNipton, CA 92364\nCPF 5-2024-025-NOA\nClosure Letter\nDear Mr. Volturno:\nFrom May 8 through May 9, 2023, a representative of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials\nSafety Administration (PHMSA), pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code (U.S.C.),\nconducted an on-site pipeline safety inspection of NRG Energy Services (NRG) procedures in\nNipton, California. As a result of the inspection, NRG was issued a Notice of Amendment on\nDecember 10, 2024, which proposed amendment of your procedures. On January 7, 2025,\nPHMSA received a request from Everline, representing NRG, for a 30-day time extension to\nrespond to the NOA. The extension request was granted on January 8, 2025.\nNRG submitted its amended procedures on February 4, 2025. My staff reviewed the amended\nprocedures, and it appears that the inadequacies outlined in this Notice of Amendment have been\ncorrected.\nThis letter is to inform you no further action is necessary and this case is now closed. Thank you\nfor your cooperation.\nSincerely,\nFor Dustin Hubbard\nDirector, Western Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n\n\n\ncc: PHP-60 Compliance Registry\nPHP-500 M. Yeager, B. Brown (#23-265653)\nChristina (Chrissy) Villarreal, Everline Manager, christina.villarreal@everlineus.com","truncated":false,"body_characters":24518}