{"operation":"document","citation":"PHMSA FIR, Buckeye Partners, LP, 2014-08-20","title":"Buckeye Partners, LP-8/20/14","source_type":"incident","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2017-06-06","effective_on":"2014-08-20","summary":"Buckeye Partners, LP; Hazardous Liquid; NJ; failure 2014-08-20; apparent cause: Internal Corrosion.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-buckeye-partners-lp-82014.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-buckeye-partners-lp-82014.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-buckeye-partners-lp-82014","source_url":"https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/inspections-and-investigations/buckeye-partners-lp-82014","body":"<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\nDOT U.S. Department of Transportation\nPHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nOPS Office of Pipeline Safety\nEastern Region\nPrincipal Investigator Michael Yazemboski\nSenior Accident Investigator Michael Yazemboski\nRegion Director Byron E. Coy\nDate of Report 2/11/2016\nSubject Failure Investigation Report—Buckeye Linden Station, Internal\nCorrosion Leak, 8-inch Relief Line\nOperator, Location, & Consequences\nDate of Failure 8/20/2014\nCommodity Released #2 Diesel Fuel\nCity, County, & State Linden, Union County, New Jersey\nOpID & Operator Name 1845 Buckeye Partners, LP\nUnit # & Unit Name 3191 Linden Area, NJ\nSMART Activity # 147585\nMilepost/Location Latitude: 40.535833, Longitude: -74.256944\nType of Failure Leak due to internal corrosion on dead leg station piping segment\nFatalities 0\nInjuries 0\nDescription of area impacted Buckeye Property\nTotal Costs $976,244\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report—Buckeye Linden Station\nInternal Corrosion Leak, 8-inch Relief Line\n[Failure Date 8/20/2014]\nExecutive Summary\nOn August 20, 2014, at 8:30 a.m., Buckeye Partners, LP,\nreported a release of product at their Linden Station located\nin Linden, New Jersey. The product, Jet A Fuel, was\ndiscovered in the facilities storm water retention system by\nstation operations personnel. Notification was made to the\nNational Response Center by Buckeye Partners, LP, at 12:02\np.m. on August 20, 2014. An inspector from the Eastern\nRegion of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration (PHMSA) arrived on site on August 21, 2014, to begin an investigation into the cause of\nthe release. The leak occurred on an 8-inch diameter nominal pipe size (NPS) dead leg segment of\npressure relief piping connected to the 12-inch NPS Bayway Line Shipper manifold, and was caused by\ninternal corrosion of the pipe. The presence of bacteria, discovered by the metallurgical analysis,\nindicates that the corrosion was likely due to microbial-induced corrosion (MIC) in the dead leg segment\nof piping. Approximately 143 barrels of Jet A Fuel were released, with a total of 130 barrels reported\nrecovered. All released product was contained within the Linden facility, and there were no injuries,\nfatalities, or evacuations resulting from this release.\nSystem Details\nBuckeye’s Linden Station consists of 49 breakout tanks, with\n1 breakout tank located at Newark Airport (Appendix A).\nThe 8-inch NPS relief line at Linden station provides\noverpressure protection for the facility, and is connected to\nthe 12-inch NPS Bayway Line Shipper Manifold. The 8-inch\nNPS relief line consists of 0.322-inch wall thickness API 5L\nseamless pipe that was installed in 1952. The line operates\nbetween 40 and 50 pounds per square inch gauge (psig),\nwith a maximum operating pressure (MOP) of 60 psig.\nThe Linden Area NJ Unit (#3191) also includes:\n1. 20-inch NPS & 16-inch NPS pipelines that stretch from Linden, NJ, to the Pennsylvania border\n(49.1 miles);\n2. 12-inch NPS pipeline that stretches from Sewaren, NJ, to Linden Station (5.2 miles);\n3. 6-inch NPS pipeline that stretches for 1 mile from Linden, NJ, then increases to an 8-inch NPS\npipeline that runs 6.1 miles to Newark Airport, as well as two 12-inch NPS pipelines that run 2.8\nmiles from Linden, NJ, to Long Island, NY.\nEvents Leading up to the Failure\nOn the morning of August 20, 2014, prior to the discovery of the release, the 8-inch NPS relief line was\noperating under normal conditions. Station operations personnel were performing routine inspections\nof the facility when they discovered jet fuel in the facility storm water collection system.\nEmergency Response\nUpon discovery of the release, Buckeye personnel activated their Emergency Response and Oil Pollution\nAct plan at the Linden facility. The local fire department responded to the release, with crews isolating\nPage 2 of 4\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report—Buckeye Linden Station\nInternal Corrosion Leak, 8-inch Relief Line\n[Failure Date 8/20/2014]\nand excavating lines near the discovery point and deploying absorbent pads and booms to keep the\nproduct from migrating throughout the storm water system. All free product was recovered from the\nfacility, and the contaminated soil removed. No product reached or breached the retention area of the\nLinden Terminal.\nSummary of Return-to-Service\nThe Linden Station was shut down to isolate a dead leg on a section of the 12-inch NPS Bayway Line\nShipper Manifold. A pressure test performed on the dead leg segment of pipe confirmed that section\nwas the source of the leak. The 8-inch NPS dead leg was permanently removed from the system and\nsent for metallurgical analysis. The station and relief line were returned to normal operations on August\n27, 2014.\nInvestigation Details\nOn August 20, 2014, station personnel conducting a routine\ninspection discovered product (Jet A Fuel) in the storm drains at\nLinden Station.\nThe Linden Station facility is located within a High Consequence\nArea (HCA). The release was contained within the storm water\nsystem on station property and no impacts to the HCA were\nnoted.\nPressure/Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)\nrecords showed the MOP of the piping was not exceeded prior to\nthe discovery of the release.\nA sample of the released product was tested and identified as Jet A Fuel.\nThe section of leaking pipe was an 8-inch NPS, 0.322-inch nominal wall thickness, API 5L steel pipe\ninstalled in 1952.\nThe leak was located on a dead leg section of piping within the station. This section of pipe experienced\nstagnant flow conditions that created a corrosive environment by allowing sludge and debris to\naccumulate in the piping.\nNormal operating pressure of the line is between 40 and 50 psig, with a MOP of 60 psig.\nTwo locations within a 6-foot section of piping were found to be leaking at the 6 o’clock orientation of\nthe pipe. This section of the pipe—approximately 6 feet in total—was removed and shipped to Det\nNorske Veritas Germanischer Lloyd (DNV-GL) for analysis.\nThe pipe was cathodically protected with an impressed current system and externally coated with coal\ntar. Cathodic protection records reviewed during the course of the investigation showed acceptable\nlevels of protection on the piping in the area of the leak.\nMetallurgical analysis of the leaking pipe section identified two leak locations with internal corrosion\npits at the 6 o’clock position on the pipe. The largest leak location (Leak #1) was approximately 0.59\ninches longitudinally and 0.51 inches circumferentially. Five additional pits (that did not penetrate the\npipe wall) were also identified in the 6 o’clock position, with the largest pit measuring 0.71 inches\nlongitudinally, 0.47 inches circumferentially, and 0.30 inches deep.\nBuckeye conducted a review of maps and diagrams of the station piping to determine if any additional\ndead leg segments existed elsewhere. None were identified.\nPage 3 of 4\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report—Buckeye Linden Station\nInternal Corrosion Leak, 8-inch Relief Line\n[Failure Date 8/20/2014]\nFindings and Contributing Factors\nBased on the metallurgical analysis performed by DNV-GL, the apparent cause of the leak was corrosion\ndue to microbial action on the internal surface of the pipe at the 6 o’clock position (Appendix D). There\nwas no evidence of significant external corrosion on the pipe section.\nThe DNV-GL analysis also states that stagnant or non-flowing conditions, such as those found in dead leg\nsegments, are known to cause internal corrosion threats due to the accumulation of water, deposits, or\nsediment. These conditions increase the risk for localized corrosion and are conductive to MIC.\nAppendices\nA 147585—Map and Photographs\nB 147585—NRC Report 1092873\nC 147585—Incident Report Form 7000.1\nD 147585—Metallurgical Analysis Report\nPage 4 of 4\n\n<<<PAGE 5>>>\n\n147585 Appendix A_Maps and Photographs\nPage 1 of 12\n\n<<<PAGE 6>>>\n\n147585 Appendix A_Maps and Photographs\nPage 2 of 12\n\n<<<PAGE 7>>>\n\n147585 Appendix A_Maps and Photographs\n(b) (7)(F)\nPage 3 of 12\n\n<<<PAGE 8>>>\n\n147585 Appendix A_Maps and Photographs\nT s ma e ca no cu en y be d s ay d\nPage 4 of 12\n\n<<<PAGE 9>>>\n\n147585 Appendix A_Maps and Photographs\n95\nContinuation of\nwalkway from the\nswale to \"(b) (7F)\nPage 5 of 12\n\n<<<PAGE 10>>>\n\n147585 Appendix A_Maps and Photographs\nPage 6 of 12\n\n<<<PAGE 11>>>\n\n147585 Appendix A_Maps and Photographs\nPage 7 of 12\n\n<<<PAGE 12>>>\n\n147585 Appendix A_Maps and Photographs\nPage 8 of 12\n\n<<<PAGE 13>>>\n\n147585 Appendix A_Maps and Photographs\n(b) (7)(F)\nPage 9 of 12\n\n<<<PAGE 14>>>\n\n147585 Appendix A_Maps and Photographs\nPage 10 of 12\n\n<<<PAGE 15>>>\n\n147585 Appendix A_Maps and Photographs\nPage 11 of 12\n\n<<<PAGE 16>>>\n\n147585 Appendix A_Maps and Photographs\nPage 12 of 12\n\n<<<PAGE 17>>>\n\n147585 Appendix B_NRC Report 1092873\nSPHIMSA\nPipeline & Hazardous\nHMIS->INCIDENTS-> TELEPHONICS\nAdministration\nMaterials Safety\n(Version 4.0.0 PROD)\nRules of Behavior\nHome\nLogout\nMenu\nNRC Number:\n[Retum to Search]\nCall Date:\n08/20/2014\n1092873\nCall Time:\n12:02:00\nCaller Information\nCompany Name:\nLast Name:\nMCMAHON\nAdoress\nBUCKEYE PIPELINE\nCity:\n2650 MARSHES DOCK RD.\nPhone 1:\nCountry:\nLINDEN\nUSA\nState:\nOrganization Type:\n9083745346\nZip:\n07036\nNJ\nConfidential:\n( )Yes (X)No ( )No Response\nPRIVATE ENTERPRISE\nPhone 2:\nIs caller the spiller?\n7325588503\n(X)Yes ( )No ( )No Response\nFirst Name:\nDischarger Information\nCompany Name:\nKEVIN\nLast Name:\nAddress:\nBUCKEYE PIPELINE\nMCMAHON\nCountry:\nCity:\nLINDEN\n2650 MARSHES DOCK RD.\nPhone 1:\nUSA\nState:\nOrganization Type:\n9083745346\nZip:\nNJ\nPRIVATE ENTERPRISE\nPhone 2:\n07036\n7325588503\nNearest City:\nState:\nSpill Information\nLocation\nLINDEN\nZip Code:\nCounty:\nUNION\n07036\n2650 MARSHES DOCK RD.\nSpill Date:\nIncident Type\nDTG Type:\nKV]\n08/20/2014 (mm/dd/yyyy)\nSpill Time:\n09:30:00 (24hh:mm:ss)\nDescription\n[Fixed Facility V]\nReported Incident Type\nFIXED FACILITY\nMaterials Involved\nHEATING OIL DISCHARGED FROM AN UNKNOWN SOURCE THAT GOT INTO THEIR STORM SYSTEM DUE TO AN UNKNOWN CAUSE AT THIS TIME.\nOIL, FUEL: NO.2\nMaterial / Chris Name\n[Chris Code\nOTW\n[Total Qty.\nO UNKNOWN AMOUNT\n(Water Qty.\nO UNKNOWN AMOUNT\nMedium Type:\nAdditional Medium Information:\nKVI\nONSITE STORM WATER SEWER SYSTEM\nInjuries:\nEvacuations:\nI Yes/Nor Unknown\nFatalites:\nDamages:\n()Yes(X)No( )Unknown\nNo. of Evacuations:\nDamage Amount:\nOther Agency Notified:\nFederal Agency Notified:\n( )Yes )No(X)Unknown\n()Yes( )No(X)Unknown\nState Agency Notified:\n()Yes( )No(X)Unknown\nA VAC TRUCK IS ONSITE AND A RESPONSE CONTRACTOR IS EN ROUTE.\nRemedial Actions\nCALLER STATES THEY HAVE SO FAR RECOVERED 6,000 GALLONS OF AN OIL WATER MIXTURE.\nAdditional Infe\nDegrees: [\nLatitude\nDegrees: [\nLongitude\nMinutes:\nSeconds:/\nQuadrant: [\nDistance from City:\nMinutes: [\nSeconds: [\nRange:\nSection:\nTownship:\nDirection:\nQuarant: [\nMilepost:\n[]Rescinded\nComments (max 250 characters)\n[<< Previous\n1.1 of 1\n[<< Save >>\nPage 1 of 1\n\n<<<PAGE 18>>>\n\n147585 Appendix C_Incident Report Form F7000.1\nNOTICE: This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195. Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to\nexceed $100,000 for each violation for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil\npenalty shall not exceed $1,000,000 as provided in 49 USC 60122.\nOMB NO: 2137-0047\nEXPIRATION DATE: 07/31/2015\nOriginal Report\nDate: 09/19/2014\nU.S Department of Transportation\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nNo. 20140333 - 20382\n--------------------------\n(DOT Use Only)\nACCIDENT REPORT - HAZARDOUS LIQUID\nPIPELINE SYSTEMS\nA federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a penalty for failure to comply\nwith a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of information displays a current valid\nOMB Control Number. The OMB Control Number for this information collection is 2137-0047. All responses to the collection of information are mandatory.\nSend comments regarding this burden or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden to: Information\nCollection Clearance Officer, PHMSA, Office of Pipeline Safety (PHP-30) 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, Washington, D.C. 20590.\nINSTRUCTIONS\nImportant: Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin. They clarify the information requested and provide specific\nexamples. If you do not have a copy of the instructions, you can obtain one from the PHMSA Pipeline Safety Community Web Page at\nhttp://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/library/forms.\nPART A - KEY REPORT INFORMATION\nReport Type: (select all that apply) Original: Supplemental: Final:\nYes Yes\nLast Revision Date: 04/24/2015\n1. Operator's OPS-issued Operator Identification Number (OPID): 1845\n2. Name of Operator BUCKEYE PARTNERS, LP\n3. Address of Operator:\n3a. Street Address FIVE TEK PARK 9999 HAMILTON BOULEVARD\n3b. City BREINIGSVILLE\n3c. State Pennsylvania\n3d. Zip Code 18031\n4. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of the Accident: 08/20/2014 08:30\n5. Location of Accident:\nLatitude: 40.609186\nLongitude: -74.239401\n6. National Response Center Report Number (if applicable): 1092873\n7. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of initial telephonic report to the\nNational Response Center (if applicable): 08/20/2014 12:14\n8. Commodity released: (select only one, based on predominant\nvolume released)\nRefined and/or Petroleum Product (non-HVL) which is a\nLiquid at Ambient Conditions\n- Specify Commodity Subtype: Diesel, Fuel Oil, Kerosene, Jet Fuel\n- If \"Other\" Subtype, Descr be:\n- If Biofuel/Alternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is\nEthanol Blend, then % Ethanol Blend:\n- If Biofuel/Alternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is\nBiodiesel, then Biodiesel Blend e.g. B2, B20, B100\n9. Estimated volume of commodity released unintentionally (Barrels): 143.00\n10. Estimated volume of intentional and/or controlled release/blowdown\n(Barrels):\n11. Estimated volume of commodity recovered (Barrels): 130.00\n12. Were there fatalities? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\n12a. Operator employees\n12b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n12c. Non-Operator emergency responders\n12d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nassociated with this Operator\n12e. General public\n12f. Total fatalities (sum of above)\n13. Were there injuries requiring inpatient hospitalization? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\n13a. Operator employees\n13b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n13c. Non-Operator emergency responders\n13d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nassociated with this Operator\n13e. General public\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1\nPage 1 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 19>>>\n\n147585 Appendix C_Incident Report Form F7000.1\n13f. Total injuries (sum of above)\n14. Was the pipeline/facility shut down due to the Accident? No\n- If No, Explain: The suspected location was a dead leg\n- If Yes, complete Questions 14a and 14b: (use local time, 24-hr clock)\n14a. Local time and date of shutdown:\n14b. Local time pipeline/facility restarted:\n- Still shut down? (* Supplemental Report Required)\n15. Did the commodity ignite? No\n16. Did the commodity explode? No\n17. Number of general public evacuated: 0\n18. Time sequence (use local time, 24-hour clock):\n18a. Local time Operator identified Accident - effective 7- 2014\nchanged to \"Local time Operator identified failure\": 08/20/2014 08:30\n18b. Local time Operator resources arrived on site: 08/20/2014 08:30\nPART B - ADDITIONAL LOCATION INFORMATION\n1. Was the origin of the Accident onshore? Yes\nIf Yes, Complete Questions (2-12)\nIf No, Complete Questions (13-15)\n- If Onshore:\n2. State: New Jersey\n3. Zip Code: 07036\n4. City Linden\n5. County or Parish Union\n6. Operator-designated location: Milepost/Valve Station\nSpecify: LN\n7. Pipeline/Facility name: Linden Station\n8. Segment name/ID: LN\n9. Was Accident on Federal land, other than the Outer Continental Shelf\n(OCS)? No\n10. Location of Accident: Totally contained on Operator-controlled property\n11. Area of Accident (as found): Underground\nSpecify: Under soil\n- If Other, Descr be:\nDepth-of-Cover (in): 60\n12. Did Accident occur in a crossing? No\n- If Yes, specify type below:\n- If Bridge crossing –\nCased/ Uncased:\n- If Railroad crossing –\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\n- If Road crossing –\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\n- If Water crossing –\nCased/ Uncased\n- Name of body of water, if commonly known:\n- Approx. water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident:\n- Select:\n- If Offshore:\n13. Approximate water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident:\n14. Origin of Accident:\n- In State waters - Specify:\n- State:\n- Area:\n- Block/Tract #:\n- Nearest County/Parish:\n- On the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) - Specify:\n- Area:\n- Block #:\n15. Area of Accident:\nPART C - ADDITIONAL FACILITY INFORMATION\n1. Is the pipeline or facility: Interstate\n2. Part of system involved in Accident: Onshore Terminal/Tank Farm Equipment and Piping\n- If Onshore Breakout Tank or Storage Vessel, Including Attached\nAppurtenances, specify:\n3. Item involved in Accident: Pipe\n- If Pipe, specify: Pipe Body\n3a. Nominal diameter of pipe (in): 8\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1\nPage 2 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 20>>>\n\n147585 Appendix C_Incident Report Form F7000.1\n3b. Wall thickness (in): .322\n3c. SMYS (Specified Minimum Yield Strength) of pipe (psi): Unknown\n3d. Pipe specification: APL 5L line pipe steel\n3e. Pipe Seam , specify: Seamless\n- If Other, Descr be:\n3f. Pipe manufacturer: Unknown\n3g. Year of manufacture: Unknown\n3h. Pipeline coating type at point of Accident, specify: Coal Tar\n- If Other, Descr be:\n- If Weld, including heat-affected zone, specify. If Pipe Girth Weld,\n3a through 3h above are required:\n- If Other, Descr be:\n- If Valve, specify:\n- If Mainline, specify:\n- If Other, Descr be:\n3i. Manufactured by:\n3j. Year of manufacture:\n- If Tank/Vessel, specify:\n- If Other - Descr be:\n- If Other, descr be:\n4. Year item involved in Accident was installed: 1952\n5. Material involved in Accident: Carbon Steel\n- If Material other than Carbon Steel, specify:\n6. Type of Accident Involved: Leak\n- If Mechanical Puncture – Specify Approx. size:\nin. (axial) by\nin. (circumferential)\n- If Leak - Select Type: Other\n- If Other, Descr be: internal corrosion\n- If Rupture - Select Orientation:\n- If Other, Describe:\nApprox. size: in. (widest opening) by\nin. (length circumferentially or axially)\n- If Other – Describe:\nPART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION\n1. Wildlife impact: No\n1a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Fish/aquatic\n- Birds\n- Terrestrial\n2. Soil contamination: Yes\n3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: No\n4. Anticipated remediation: No\n4a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Surface water\n- Groundwater\n- Soil\n- Vegetation\n- Wildlife\n5. Water contamination: No\n5a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Ocean/Seawater\n- Surface\n- Groundwater\n- Drinking water: (Select one or both)\n- Private Well\n- Public Water Intake\n5b. Estimated amount released in or reaching water (Barrels):\n5c. Name of body of water, if commonly known:\n6. At the location of this Accident, had the pipeline segment or facility\nbeen identified as one that \"could affect\" a High Consequence Area\n(HCA) as determined in the Operator's Integrity Management Program?\nYes\n7. Did the released commodity reach or occur in one or more High\nConsequence Area (HCA)? Yes\n7a. If Yes, specify HCA type(s): (Select all that apply)\n- Commercially Navigable Waterway:\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1\nPage 3 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 21>>>\n\n147585 Appendix C_Incident Report Form F7000.1\nIntegrity Management Program?\n- High Population Area: Yes\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nIntegrity Management Program?\nYes\n- Other Populated Area\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\" determination\nfor this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity\nManagement Program?\n- Unusually Sensitive Area (USA) - Drinking Water\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\" determination\nfor this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity\nManagement Program?\n- Unusually Sensitive Area (USA) - Ecological\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\" determination\nfor this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity\nManagement Program?\n8. Estimated cost to Operator – effective 12-2012, changed to \"Estimated Property Damage\":\n8a. Estimated cost of public and non-Operator private property\ndamage paid/reimbursed by the Operator – effective 12-2012,\n\"paid/reimbursed by the Operator\" removed\n$ 0\n8b. Estimated cost of commodity lost $ 0\n8c. Estimated cost of Operator's property damage & repairs $ 155,059\n8d. Estimated cost of Operator's emergency response $ 818,521\n8e. Estimated cost of Operator's environmental remediation $ 475\n8f. Estimated other costs $ 2,189\nDescr be: Estimated commodity lost calculation will be determined at\na later date\n8g. Estimated total costs (sum of above) – effective 12-2012,\nchanged to \"Total estimated property damage (sum of above)\" $ 976,244\nPART E - ADDITIONAL OPERATING INFORMATION\n1. Estimated pressure at the point and time of the Accident (psig): .00\n2. Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) at the point and time of the\nAccident (psig): .00\n3. Describe the pressure on the system or facility relating to the\nAccident (psig): Pressure did not exceed MOP\n4. Not including pressure reductions required by PHMSA regulations\n(such as for repairs and pipe movement), was the system or facility\nrelating to the Accident operating under an established pressure\nrestriction with pressure limits below those normally allowed by the\nMOP?\nNo\n- If Yes, Complete 4.a and 4.b below:\n4a. Did the pressure exceed this established pressure\nrestriction?\n4b. Was this pressure restriction mandated by PHMSA or the\nState?\n5. Was \"Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites\" OR \"Offshore\nPipeline, Including Riser and Riser Bend\" selected in PART C, Question\n2?\nNo\n- If Yes - (Complete 5a. – 5f below) effective 12-2012, changed to \"(Complete 5.a – 5.e below)\"\n5a. Type of upstream valve used to initially isolate release\nsource:\n5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release\nsource:\n5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft):\n5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal\ninspection tools?\n- If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? (select all that apply)\n- Changes in line pipe diameter\n- Presence of unsuitable mainline valves\n- Tight or mitered pipe bends\n- Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's,\nprojecting instrumentation, etc.)\n- Extra thick pipe wall (applicable only for magnetic\nflux leakage internal inspection tools)\n- Other -\n- If Other, Descr be:\n5e. For this pipeline, are there operational factors which\nsignificantly complicate the execution of an internal inspection tool\nrun?\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1\nPage 4 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 22>>>\n\n147585 Appendix C_Incident Report Form F7000.1\n- If Yes, Which operational factors complicate execution? (select all that apply)\n- Excessive debris or scale, wax, or other wall buildup\n- Low operating pressure(s)\n- Low flow or absence of flow\n- Incompatible commodity\n- Other -\n- If Other, Descr be:\n5f. Function of pipeline system: > 20% SMYS Regulated Trunkline/Transmission\n6. Was a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)-based\nsystem in place on the pipeline or facility involved in the Accident? No\nIf Yes -\n6a. Was it operating at the time of the Accident?\n6b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident?\n6c. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s),\nalert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with\nthe detection of the Accident?\n6d. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s),\nalert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with\nthe confirmation of the Accident?\n7. Was a CPM leak detection system in place on the pipeline or facility\ninvolved in the Accident? No\n- If Yes:\n7a. Was it operating at the time of the Accident?\n7b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident?\n7c. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as\nalarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist\nwith the detection of the Accident?\n7d. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as\nalarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist\nwith the confirmation of the Accident?\n8. How was the Accident initially identified for the Operator? Local Operating Personnel, including contractors\n- If Other, Specify:\n8a. If \"Controller\", \"Local Operating Personnel\", including\ncontractors\", \"Air Patrol\", or \"Ground Patrol by Operator or its\ncontractor\" is selected in Question 8, specify:\nOperator employee\n9. Was an investigation initiated into whether or not the controller(s) or\ncontrol room issues were the cause of or a contributing factor to the\nAccident?\n- If No, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the\ncontroller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to:\n(provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)\nNo, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the\ncontroller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary\ndue to: (provide an explanation for why the Operator did not\ninvestigate)\nThis section of the station is not monitored by SCADA\n- If Yes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that apply)\n- Investigation reviewed work schedule rotations,\ncontinuous hours of service (while working for the\nOperator), and other factors associated with fatigue\n- Investigation did NOT review work schedule rotations,\ncontinuous hours of service (while working for the\nOperator), and other factors associated with fatigue\nProvide an explanation for why not:\n- Investigation identified no control room issues\n- Investigation identified no controller issues\n- Investigation identified incorrect controller action or\ncontroller error\n- Investigation identified that fatigue may have affected the\ncontroller(s) involved or impacted the involved controller(s)\nresponse\n- Investigation identified incorrect procedures\n- Investigation identified incorrect control room equipment\noperation\n- Investigation identified maintenance activities that affected\ncontrol room operations, procedures, and/or controller\nresponse\n- Investigation identified areas other than those above:\nDescr be:\nPART F - DRUG & ALCOHOL TESTING INFORMATION\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1\nPage 5 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 23>>>\n\n147585 Appendix C_Incident Report Form F7000.1\n1. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator employees tested\nunder the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of DOT's\nDrug & Alcohol Testing regulations?\nNo\n- If Yes:\n1a. Specify how many were tested:\n1b. Specify how many failed:\n2. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator contractor employees\ntested under the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of\nDOT's Drug & Alcohol Testing regulations?\nNo\n- If Yes:\n2a. Specify how many were tested:\n2b. Specify how many failed:\nPART G – APPARENT CAUSE\nSelect only one box from PART G in shaded column on left representing the APPARENT Cause of the Accident, and answer\nthe questions on the right. Describe secondary, contributing or root causes of the Accident in the narrative (PART H).\nApparent Cause: G1 - Corrosion Failure\nG1 - Corrosion Failure - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nCorrosion Failure – Sub-Cause: Internal Corrosion\n- If External Corrosion:\n1. Results of visual examination:\n- If Other, Descr be:\n2. Type of corrosion: (select all that apply)\n- Galvanic\n- Atmospheric\n- Stray Current\n- Microbiological\n- Selective Seam\n- Other:\n- If Other, Descr be:\n3. The type(s) of corrosion selected in Question 2 is based on the following: (select all that apply)\n- Field examination\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis\n- Other:\n- If Other, Descr be:\n4. Was the failed item buried under the ground?\n- If Yes :\n4a. Was failed item considered to be under cathodic\nprotection at the time of the Accident?\nIf Yes - Year protection started:\n4b. Was shielding, tenting, or disbonding of coating evident at\nthe point of the Accident?\n4c. Has one or more Cathodic Protection Survey been\nconducted at the point of the Accident?\nIf \"Yes, CP Annual Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\nIf \"Yes, Close Interval Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\nIf \"Yes, Other CP Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\n- If No:\n4d. Was the failed item externally coated or painted?\n5. Was there observable damage to the coating or paint in the vicinity of\nthe corrosion?\n- If Internal Corrosion:\n6. Results of visual examination: Localized Pitting\n- Other:\n7. Type of corrosion (select all that apply): -\n- Corrosive Commodity\n- Water drop-out/Acid\n- Microbiological Yes\n- Erosion\n- Other:\n- If Other, Descr be:\n8. The cause(s) of corrosion selected in Question 7 is based on the following (select all that apply): -\n- Field examination\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis Yes\n- Other:\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1\nPage 6 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 24>>>\n\n147585 Appendix C_Incident Report Form F7000.1\n- If Other, Descr be:\n9. Location of corrosion (select all that apply): -\n- Low point in pipe Yes\n- Elbow\n- Other:\n- If Other, Descr be:\n10. Was the commodity treated with corrosion inhibitors or biocides? Yes\n11. Was the interior coated or lined with protective coating? No\n12. Were cleaning/dewatering pigs (or other operations) routinely\nutilized? Not applicable - Not mainline pipe\n13. Were corrosion coupons routinely utilized? Not applicable - Not mainline pipe\nComplete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C,\nQuestion 3) is Tank/Vessel.\n14. List the year of the most recent inspections:\n14a. API Std 653 Out-of-Service Inspection\n- No Out-of-Service Inspection completed\n14b. API Std 653 In-Service Inspection\n- No In-Service Inspection completed\nComplete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C,\nQuestion 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n15. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the\nAccident? No\n15a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: -\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool\nMost recent year:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year:\n- Crack\nMost recent year:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year:\n- Other\nMost recent year:\nDescr be:\n16. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted since\noriginal construction at the point of the Accident? No\nIf Yes -\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure:\n17. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on this segment? No\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident::\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\n18. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\npoint of the Accident since January 1, 2002? No\n18a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radiography\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescr be:\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1\nPage 7 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 25>>>\n\n147585 Appendix C_Incident Report Form F7000.1\nG2 - Natural Force Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-handed column\nNatural Force Damage – Sub-Cause:\n- If Earth Movement, NOT due to Heavy Rains/Floods:\n1. Specify:\n- If Other, Descr be:\n- If Heavy Rains/Floods:\n2. Specify:\n- If Other, Descr be:\n- If Lightning:\n3. Specify:\n- If Temperature:\n4. Specify:\n- If Other, Descr be:\n- If Other Natural Force Damage:\n5. Describe:\nComplete the following if any Natural Force Damage sub-cause is selected.\n6. Were the natural forces causing the Accident generated in\nconjunction with an extreme weather event?\n6a. If Yes, specify: (select all that apply)\n- Hurricane\n- Tropical Storm\n- Tornado\n- Other\n- If Other, Descr be:\nG3 - Excavation Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nExcavation Damage – Sub-Cause:\n- If Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity: Complete Questions 1-5 ONLY IF the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART\nC, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n1. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of\nthe Accident?\n1a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: -\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Crack\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescr be:\n2. Do you have reason to believe that the internal inspection was\ncompleted BEFORE the damage was sustained?\n3. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted since\noriginal construction at the point of the Accident?\n- If Yes:\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure (psig):\n4. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on the pipeline\nsegment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident:\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\n5. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\npoint of the Accident since January 1, 2002?\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1\nPage 8 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 26>>>\n\n147585 Appendix C_Incident Report Form F7000.1\n5a. If Yes, for each examination, conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radiography\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescr be:\nComplete the following if Excavation Damage by Third Party is selected as the sub-cause.\n6. Did the operator get prior notification of the excavation activity?\n6a. If Yes, Notification received from: (select all that apply) -\n- One-Call System\n- Excavator\n- Contractor\n- Landowner\nComplete the following mandatory CGA-DIRT Program questions if any Excavation Damage sub-cause is selected.\n7. Do you want PHMSA to upload the following information to CGA-\nDIRT (www.cga-dirt.com)?\n8. Right-of-Way where event occurred: (select all that apply) -\n- Public\n- If \"Public\", Specify:\n- Private\n- If \"Private\", Specify:\n- Pipeline Property/Easement\n- Power/Transmission Line\n- Railroad\n- Dedicated Public Utility Easement\n- Federal Land\n- Data not collected\n- Unknown/Other\n9. Type of excavator:\n10. Type of excavation equipment:\n11. Type of work performed:\n12. Was the One-Call Center notified?\n12a. If Yes, specify ticket number:\n12b. If this is a State where more than a single One-Call Center\nexists, list the name of the One-Call Center notified:\n13. Type of Locator:\n14. Were facility locate marks vis ble in the area of excavation?\n15. Were facilities marked correctly?\n16. Did the damage cause an interruption in service?\n16a. If Yes, specify duration of the interruption (hours)\n17. Description of the CGA-DIRT Root Cause (select only the one predominant first level CGA-DIRT Root Cause and then, where\navailable as a choice, the one predominant second level CGA-DIRT Root Cause as well):\nRoot Cause:\n- If One-Call Notification Practices Not Sufficient, specify:\n- If Locating Practices Not Sufficient, specify:\n- If Excavation Practices Not Sufficient, specify:\n- If Other/None of the Above, explain:\nG4 - Other Outside Force Damage - only one sub-cause can be selected from the shaded left-hand column\nOther Outside Force Damage – Sub-Cause:\n- If Damage by Car, Truck, or Other Motorized Vehicle/Equipment NOT Engaged in Excavation:\n1. Vehicle/Equipment operated by:\n- If Damage by Boats, Barges, Drilling Rigs, or Other Maritime Equipment or Vessels Set Adrift or Which Have Otherwise Lost\nTheir Mooring:\n2. Select one or more of the following IF an extreme weather event was a factor:\n- Hurricane\n- Tropical Storm\n- Tornado\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1\nPage 9 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 27>>>\n\n147585 Appendix C_Incident Report Form F7000.1\n- Heavy Rains/Flood\n- Other\n- If Other, Descr be:\n- If Previous Mechanical Damage NOT Related to Excavation: Complete Questions 3-7 ONLY IF the \"Item Involved in\nAccident\" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n3. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of\nthe Accident?\n3a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run:\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Crack\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescr be:\n4. Do you have reason to believe that the internal inspection was\ncompleted BEFORE the damage was sustained?\n5. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted\nsince original construction at the point of the Accident?\n- If Yes:\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure (psig):\n6. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on the pipeline\nsegment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident:\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\n7. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\npoint of the Accident since January 1, 2002?\n7a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radiography\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescr be:\n- If Intentional Damage:\n8. Specify:\n- If Other, Descr be:\n- If Other Outside Force Damage:\n9. Describe:\nG5 - Material Failure of Pipe or Weld - only one sub-cause can be selected from the shaded left-hand column\nUse this section to report material failures ONLY IF the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C, Question 3) is \"Pipe\" or\n\"Weld.\"\nMaterial Failure of Pipe or Weld – Sub-Cause:\n1. The sub-cause shown above is based on the following: (select all that apply)\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1\nPage 10 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 28>>>\n\n147585 Appendix C_Incident Report Form F7000.1\n- Field Examination\n- Determined by Metallurgical Analysis\n- Other Analysis\n- If \"Other Analysis\", Descr be:\n- Sub-cause is Tentative or Suspected; Still Under Investigation\n(Supplemental Report required)\n- If Construction, Installation, or Fabrication-related:\n2. List contr buting factors: (select all that apply)\n- Fatigue or Vibration-related\nSpecify:\n- If Other, Descr be:\n- Mechanical Stress:\n- Other\n- If Other, Descr be:\n- If Environmental Cracking-related:\n3. Specify:\n- If Other - Describe:\nComplete the following if any Material Failure of Pipe or Weld sub-cause is selected.","truncated":true,"body_characters":46290}