{"operation":"document","citation":"PHMSA FIR, Centurion, 2015-08-02","title":"Centurion Pipeline L.P.-8/2/15","source_type":"incident","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2015-06-06","effective_on":"2015-08-02","summary":"Centurion; Hazardous Liquid; TX; failure 2015-08-02; apparent cause: Equipment Failure.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-centurion-pipeline-lp-8215.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-centurion-pipeline-lp-8215.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-centurion-pipeline-lp-8215","source_url":"https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/inspections-and-investigations/centurion-pipeline-lp-8215","body":"<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\nDOT US Department of Transportation\nPHMSA Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nOPS Office of Pipeline Safety\nSouthwest Region\nPrincipal Investigator Jocelyn M. Kerl\nRegion Director R. M. Seeley\nDate of Report May 13, 2016\nSubject Failure Investigation Report – Centurion Pipeline L.P.\nOperator, Location, & Consequences\nDate of Failure 08/02/15\nCommodity Released Crude Oil\nCity/County & State Denver City/Yoakum/TX\nOpID & Operator Name 31888 Centurion Pipeline L.P.\nUnit # & Unit Name 36294 West System – New Mexico/Texas\nSMART Activity # 151238\nMilepost / Location MP 419.74\nLatitude – N 32º.9869'\nLongitude – W -102º\n.7691'\nLocation – 4 miles Northeast of Denver City, Texas\nTank Mixer Failure\nType of Failure Fatalities 0\nInjuries 0\nDescription of area\nimpacted\nProperty Damage $62,457\nClass 1 outside of an HCA\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Centurion Pipeline L.P.\nDenver City, TX (Yoakum County)\nAugust 2, 2015\nExecutive Summary\nOn Sunday, August 2, 2015, at approximately 7:55 a.m. CDT1\n, Centurion Pipeline L.P. (Centurion)\nidentified a release at their Wassom Station. Centurion reported the accident to the NRC at 10:30 a.m.\non Aug. 2, 2015 (NRC#1124543) indicating a failure of a tank mixer on Tank 6830 located in the Wassom\nStation, Yoakum County, TX. PHMSA responded to the site on Monday, Aug. 3, 2015.\nThe accident occurred in a rural section of Yoakum County and the product was contained within the\ndike of Tank 6830. The final release was reported to be 321 barrels (bbl) of crude oil. There was no\noffsite impact as a result of the release. There were no reported fatalities or injuries. The total\nestimated damages reported on the Form 7000-1 #20150313 were $62,457.\n(b) (7)(F)\n(b) (7)(F)\nFigure 1. Aerial Photograph – Pipeline Failure Site\nSource: NPMS – Centurion Wasson Facility, Denver City, Texas\n1 All times are Central Daylight Time (CDT) unluess otherwise noted.\nPage 2 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Centurion Pipeline L.P.\nDenver City, TX (Yoakum County)\nAugust 2, 2015\nSystem Details\nCenturion Pipeline L.P., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Occidental Petroleum, is an oil-gathering, common\ncarrier pipeline and storage operator with more than 2,700 miles of pipelines extending from southeast\nNew Mexico across the Permian Basin of West Texas to Cushing, OK. Targeted destinations for the\ncrude oil are market centers, third party connecting carriers, and ultimately, refineries. Several pipelines\nboth intrastate and interstate transport product into and out of the Wassom Station, which is located at\nmilepost (MP) 419.74 on the Wasson to Slaughter 16-inch system. This station is located approximately\n4 miles northeast of Denver City, TX. This is an unmanned station with six tanks located at this facility.\nThe station is remotely operated by the Centurion Control Center (CCC) using a\n(b) (7)(F)\n. The station is maintained by Centurion field\npersonnel headquartered in Lovington, NM, located approximately 45 miles away. Call-outs from the\nLovington, NM facility require about one hour for response time to the station.\nFigure 2. Map – The Centurion Pipeline System\nSource: Centurion Pipeline L.P. – http://www.centurionpipeline.com/about/map.aspx\nPipe Specifications\nThe tank involved in the accident was Tank No. 6830 and is used for crude oil service. This tank is\napproximately 56 feet in height and has a diameter of 120 feet, with an external floating roof. It was\nconstructed in 1947 and its volume is . A Phildelphia Cutlass Mixer (Model #SA-BSE-8)\nwas installed on Tank 6830 by BP Pipeline prior to the acquisition of the Wasson Facility by Centurion.\nPage 3 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Centurion Pipeline L.P.\nDenver City, TX (Yoakum County)\nAugust 2, 2015\nThe release did not occur in, or affect a High Consequence Area (HCA), and the Wasson Station is not\nsubject to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90).\nFigure 3. Pipeline schematic – Wasson Station to Slaughter Station\nSource: Centurion – Wasson Pipeline-Specific Operations Manual\nEvents Leading up to the Failure\nOn Saturday, Aug. 1, 2015, the Centurion Measurement Specialist began the monthly task of gauging the\ntanks at the Wasson Station and completed this activity at approximately 8:15 a.m. During that time,\nthere was no product noted around Tank 6830. Later that evening, at 10:40 p.m., the CCC noted a\ncommunication failure and immediately called the I&E Technician. The I&E Technician arrived at\nWasson Station shortly after midnight on Sunday, August 2, 2015. While onsite, the I&E technician\npower-cycled the programmable logic controller (PLC) “off” and then back “on.” The I&E technician\nverified with the CCC that communications had returned and that they could again remotely monitor\nthe tank level gauges. During the time he was onsite, he stated that there was no indication the mixer\nwas leaking. The I&E Technician departed shortly after 1:55 a.m.\nPage 4 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 5>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Centurion Pipeline L.P.\nDenver City, TX (Yoakum County)\nAugust 2, 2015\nOn Sunday, Aug. 2, 2015, at approximately 7:10 a.m., the CCC again contacted the measurement\nspecialist and stated that a motor operated valve (MOV 24067) for Tank 6719 would not open. At\napproximately 7:43 a.m., the Measurement Specialist arrived at the Wasson Station. He verified that\nthere was no power to the MOV for the tank.\nEmergency Response\nAt the time the measurement specialist arrived at the Wasson Station, he also smelled the odor of crude\noil. He investigated and found that product was leaking at the mixer on Tank 6830. He began\nemergency response activities and notifications. Centurion Supervision began contacting oil removal\nand remediation contractors to assist with the clean-up inside the tank dike. By 9:00 am, vacuum trucks\narrived to begin removing the surface oil only to determine they would need more hose to accomplish\nthe task. At approximately 9:30 am, sufficient hose had arrived for the vacuum trucks to begin removal\nof the free oil. During this phase of the cleanup, personnel on-site realized the oil pool in a low area\nnear the dike wall was deeper than anticipated, and that the soil impact was deeper than initially\ndetermined. These new facts increased the estimate of the volume released. This discovery required\nrecalculating the release volume and reassessing the cost of cleanup and recovery. At that time\nCenturion, determined the cost would exceed the $50,000 threshold which established the need for our\ninitial telephonic report. Centurion contacted the NRC on August 2, 2015 at approximately 10:30am and\nreported the release. (NRC#1124543) The crude oil product that was released during the accident was\nrecovered by approximately 11:45 am.\nInvestigation Details\nPHMSA Southest Region (SWR) staff conducted an onsite investigation into the release on Monday, Aug.\n3, 2015, after receiving an email notification from the Crisis Management Center on Sunday, Aug. 2,\n2015. There were no injuries, fire, evacuations or media coverage associated with the release. Upon\narrival, it was noted that the product had been cleaned up and the mixer had been removed from the\ntank. The control panel is approximately 400 feet away from Tanks 6830 and 6831, which are located in\nthe same secondary containment dike. PHMSA SWR conducted a site visit to the CCC to review the\nactions and the response of the controllers on duty from Saturday, August 1, 2015, to Monday, August\n3, 2015. The investigation focused on the actions of the controllers and the field operators, as well as\ninspection and maintenance records of Tank 6830 and its associated equipment.\nThe Centurion Pipeline Control Room Management Manual (rev. 3) was reviewed. TAB #2, Section 2-\n2.3.7-Loss of Communications Procedure provides direction for controllers in the event there is a loss of\ncommunications at a station or facility. The procedures state that the outage could be a partial or a\ntotal system outage, and give the controller the latitude to make a decision as to whether that outage is\nof high or low importance. The procedures allowed a 60-minute time interval for the controller to make\nthat determination. The Centurion Controller Event Log/Record for the Wasson to Slaughter system and\ndesignated as record PAR ID: 2824 with a start date 08-01-15 (6:00 a.m.) to 08-02-15 (6:00 a.m.), notesPage 5 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 6>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Centurion Pipeline L.P.\nDenver City, TX (Yoakum County)\nAugust 2, 2015\nthat at 10:40 p.m. on Saturday, Aug. 1, 2015, Tank 6830 and 6831 experienced a communication failure.\nThe CCC notified the Centurion I&E technician at approximately 10:40 pm, and at 1:55 am, the Wasson\nTank communications were back in operation. Centurion controller event log/record PAR ID: 2825 with\na start date 08-02-15 (6:00 a.m.) to 08-03-15 (6:00 a.m.), notes that at 7:10 a.m. on Sunday, Aug. 2,\n2015, the CCC tried to start the Wasson transfer but the MOV (No. 24067) for Tank No. 6719, did not\nopen and the CCC notified the measurement specialist. The measurement specialist arrived on site at\napproximately 7:43am. According to the operator, the decrease in volume and decrease in pressure was\nnot significant enough to trigger a SCADA alarm. The Centurion controller contacted field personnel per\nthe procedures outlined in Centurion’s CRM; Section 2.3.7. Field personnel were notified and arrived\nwithin an hour of notification.\nThe last API 653 Out-of-Service Inspection of Tank 6830 was conducted on June 8, 2005 (Job No. 2111-\n7045). The report shows that the mixer was inspected, checked for proper mounting flange and\nsupport, leakage, shell distortion, and passed as “OK”. The last API 653 In-Service Inspection of the tank\nwas February 24, 2012. The Nozzle and Appurtenance Inspection Checklist Item No. 60 included in the\ninspection showed that there were indications of leakage around man ways, nozzles, flanges, valves and\nappurtenances (including reinforcement, bolting, gaskets, seals, and mixers) as “Acceptable”. The\nreport included a picture of the mixer installed at that time. It appears to be the same Philadelphia type\nmixer that experienced the seal failure on Sunday, August 2, 2015. The monthly inspection records for\nTank 6830 were reviewed and did not show any problem noted related to the mixer. The tank\ninspections (Out-of-Service and In-Service) were performed within the required intervals and did not\ndetect any problems with the tank mixer.\nThe past record inspections and the P&ID diagrams show that the mixer that failed on Tank 6830 prior\nto the accident was a Philadelphia Cutlass Mixer. Centurion reported on Form PHMSA F7000.1, Number\n20150313, that the mixer was installed in 2005. Centurion stated that they had not experienced any\nprevious problems with this type of mixer and that they had been in the process of installing mixers of a\ndifferent model as tank mixers go out or are added to tanks. Centurion stated that the decision to install\ndifferent type mixers was initiated prior to this accident.\nPrevious PHMSA records show that on October 11, 2010, Centurion Pipeline experienced a mixer failure\non a tank at the Slaughter Station in Sundown, TX (NRC Report No. 956628). According to the 2010\nPHMSA investigation, the failure occurred on a Jensen Variable Angle Mixer, 650-VA-25/2H-6862. The\nleak was caused by a broken Jensen mixer snap ring. This snap ring failed causing the mixer to separate\nfrom the tank and allowed the crude oil release.\nThe replacement Jensen Mixer for Tank 6830 was purchased in August 2013 and has the new pin\ndesign.\nFailure Analysis\nPage 6 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 7>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Centurion Pipeline L.P.\nDenver City, TX (Yoakum County)\nAugust 2, 2015\nCenturion personnel conducted a failure investigation of the mixer. Centurion disassembled the mixer\nand found that, there was a failure of the sealed outboard bearing, which lead to the failure of the oil\nshut-off device. (see Appendix C)\nFigure 4. Photograph – Worn Mixer Shaft\nSource: Failure Analysis of Centurion Pipeline – Wasson Station Tank 6830 Mixer Failure Investigation\nFigure 5. Photograph – Missing bearings on Mixer\nSource: Failure Analysis of Centurion Pipeline – Wasson Station Tank 6830 Mixer Failure Investigation\nPage 7 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 8>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Centurion Pipeline L.P.\nDenver City, TX (Yoakum County)\nAugust 2, 2015\nSummary of Initial Start-Up and Return-to-Service\nCenturion replaced the Philadelphia Cutlass (F) Fixed-Angle Side Entry Mixer with a Jensen Series\nVariable Angle Mixer on Monday, August 3, 2015 and Tank 6830 was returned to service. (See Appendix\nD)\nConclusions\nThe investigation identified that the cause of the accident was the failure of one of the sealed-for-life\nbearings on the Philadelphia Cutlass mixer. The design of the Philadephia Cutlass Mixer was not a factor\nin this accident.\nAppendices\nA NRC Report\nB Operator Accident/Incident Report – PHMSA Form F 7100.2\nC Operator Failure Investigation Report\nD Drawing of Jensen VA Mixer\nPage 8 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 9>>>\n\nTeleDetail\nPage 1 of 2\nHMIS->INCIDENTS->TELEPHONICS\n(Version 4.0.0 PROD ) Rules of Behavior Home Logout Menu\n[Return to Search]\nNRC Number: 1124543\nCall Date: 08/02/2015 Call Time: 11:30:00\nCaller Information\nOSWALD Last Name: CUNNINGHAM\nCENTURION PIPELINE L.P.\n5 GREENWAY PLAZA\nTX\nFirst Name: Company Name: Address: City: Country: Phone 1: HOUSTON USA 7134972016 State: Zip: Phone 2: Organization Type: PRIVAT Is caller the spiller? Yes Yes No No No Response No Response\nConfidential: Yes Yes No No No Response No Response\n77046\n8325840097\nFirst Name: Company Name: Address: City: Country: Phone 1: Organization Type: OSWALD Discharger Information\nLast Name: CUNNINGHAM\nCENTURION PIPELINE L.P.\n5 GREENWAY PLAZA\nHOUSTON USA 7134972016 State: Zip: Phone 2: TX\n77046\n8325840097\nPRIVAT\nState: Nearest City: Location\nTX DENVER CITY Spill Information\nCounty: Zip Code:\nYOAKUM\nTANK FARM\n\n\nSpill Date: DTG Type: Incident Type Description\n08/02/2015 08:15:00\n(mm/dd/yyyy)\nSpill Time: < <- - Select DTG Type Select DTG Type - - \nStorage Tanks  Reported Incident Type STORAGE TANKS\nStorage Tanks\n(24hh:mm:ss)\nCALLER IS REPORTING THAT A SEAL FAILED ON A MIXER RESULTING IN A SPILL OF CRUDE\nOIL FROM A STORAGE TANK.\n\n\nMaterials Involved\nMaterial / Chris Name Chris Code Total Qty. Water Qty.\nOIL: CRUDE OIL 350 BARREL(S)\nMedium Type: Additional Medium Information:\n< <- - Select Medium Select Medium \nCONTAINMENT SYSTEM\n\n\nInjuries: Fatalites:\nhttp://hmis.phmsa.dot.gov/hmis/telephonics/Teledetail.aspx?showresult=Y&ReceivedDate=...\n9/3/2015\n\n<<<PAGE 10>>>\n\nTeleDetail\nPage 2 of 2\nEvacuations: Yes Yes No No Unknown Unknown No. of Evacuations:\nDamages: Yes Yes No No Unknown Unknown Damage Amount:\nFederal Agency Notified: Yes Yes No No Unknown Unknown State Agency Notified: Yes Yes No No Unknown Unknown\nOther Agency Notified: Yes Yes No No Unknown Unknown\nRemedial Actions\nMATERIAL SPILLED INTO SECOND CONTAINMENT, CLEAN UP CREW ON-SITE, CLEAN UP\nUNDERWAY. THE TANK IS BEING PUMPED OUT.\n\n\nAdditional Info\n\n\nLatitude\n32 102 Degrees: Longitude\nDegrees: Distance from City: Section: Range: Minutes: 59 Seconds: 23 Quadrant: N\nMinutes: 46 Seconds: Direction:\nTownship:\nMilepost:\n9 Quadrant: W\n\n\nRescinded Rescinded Comments (max 250 characters)\n<< Previous << Previous 1..1 of 1 << Save >>\nhttp://hmis.phmsa.dot.gov/hmis/telephonics/Teledetail.aspx?showresult=Y&ReceivedDate=...\n9/3/2015\n\n<<<PAGE 11>>>\n\nNOTICE: This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195. Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to\nexceed $100,000 for each violation for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil\npenalty shall not exceed $1,000,000 as provided in 49 USC 60122.\nOMB NO: 2137-0047\nEXPIRATION DATE: 07/31/2015\nOriginal Report\nDate: 08/31/2015\nU.S Department of Transportation\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nNo. 20150313 - 20706\n--------------------------\n(DOT Use Only)\nACCIDENT REPORT - HAZARDOUS LIQUID\nPIPELINE SYSTEMS\nA federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a penalty for failure to comply\nwith a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of information displays a current valid\nOMB Control Number. The OMB Control Number for this information collection is 2137-0047. All responses to the collection of information are mandatory.\nSend comments regarding this burden or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden to: Information\nCollection Clearance Officer, PHMSA, Office of Pipeline Safety (PHP-30) 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, Washington, D.C. 20590.\nINSTRUCTIONS\nImportant: Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin. They clarify the information requested and provide specific\nexamples. If you do not have a copy of the instructions, you can obtain one from the PHMSA Pipeline Safety Community Web Page at\nhttp://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/library/forms.\nPART A - KEY REPORT INFORMATION\nReport Type: (select all that apply) Original: Yes\nSupplemental: Final:\nLast Revision Date:\n1. Operator's OPS-issued Operator Identification Number (OPID): 31888\n2. Name of Operator CENTURION PIPELINE L.P.\n3. Address of Operator:\n3a. Street Address 5 GREENWAY PLAZA, SUITE 110\n3b. City HOUSTON\n3c. State Texas\n3d. Zip Code 77046-7570\n4. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of the Accident: 08/02/2015 07:55\n5. Location of Accident:\nLatitude: 32.989666\nLongitude: -102.7692504\n6. National Response Center Report Number (if applicable): 1124543\n7. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of initial telephonic report to the\nNational Response Center (if applicable): 08/02/2015 10:30\n8. Commodity released: (select only one, based on predominant\nvolume released) Crude Oil\n- Specify Commodity Subtype:\n- If \"Other\" Subtype, Describe:\n- If Biofuel/Alternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is\nEthanol Blend, then % Ethanol Blend:\n- If Biofuel/Alternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is\nBiodiesel, then Biodiesel Blend e.g. B2, B20, B100\n9. Estimated volume of commodity released unintentionally (Barrels): 321.00\n10. Estimated volume of intentional and/or controlled release/blowdown\n(Barrels):\n11. Estimated volume of commodity recovered (Barrels): 165.00\n12. Were there fatalities? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\n12a. Operator employees\n12b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n12c. Non-Operator emergency responders\n12d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nassociated with this Operator\n12e. General public\n12f. Total fatalities (sum of above)\n13. Were there injuries requiring inpatient hospitalization? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\n13a. Operator employees\n13b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n13c. Non-Operator emergency responders\n13d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nassociated with this Operator\n13e. General public\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1\n\n<<<PAGE 12>>>\n\n13f. Total injuries (sum of above)\n14. Was the pipeline/facility shut down due to the Accident? Yes\n- If No, Explain:\n- If Yes, complete Questions 14a and 14b: (use local time, 24-hr clock)\n14a. Local time and date of shutdown: 08/02/2015 08:15\n14b. Local time pipeline/facility restarted: 08/02/2015 13:30\n- Still shut down? (* Supplemental Report Required)\n15. Did the commodity ignite? No\n16. Did the commodity explode? No\n17. Number of general public evacuated: 0\n18. Time sequence (use local time, 24-hour clock):\n18a. Local time Operator identified Accident - effective 7- 2014\nchanged to \"Local time Operator identified failure\": 08/02/2015 07:55\n18b. Local time Operator resources arrived on site: 08/02/2015 12:00\nPART B - ADDITIONAL LOCATION INFORMATION\n1. Was the origin of the Accident onshore? Yes\nIf Yes, Complete Questions (2-12)\nIf No, Complete Questions (13-15)\n- If Onshore:\n2. State: Texas\n3. Zip Code: 79323\n4. City Not Within a Municipality\n5. County or Parish Yoakum\n6. Operator-designated location: Milepost/Valve Station\nSpecify: Wasson Sta.\n7. Pipeline/Facility name: Tank #6830\n8. Segment name/ID: Artesia to Wasson\n9. Was Accident on Federal land, other than the Outer Continental Shelf\n(OCS)? No\n10. Location of Accident: Totally contained on Operator-controlled property\n11. Area of Accident (as found): Tank, including attached appurtenances\nSpecify:\n- If Other, Describe:\nDepth-of-Cover (in):\n12. Did Accident occur in a crossing? No\n- If Yes, specify type below:\n- If Bridge crossing –\nCased/ Uncased:\n- If Railroad crossing –\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\n- If Road crossing –\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\n- If Water crossing –\nCased/ Uncased\n- Name of body of water, if commonly known:\n- Approx. water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident:\n- Select:\n- If Offshore:\n13. Approximate water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident:\n14. Origin of Accident:\n- In State waters - Specify:\n- State:\n- Area:\n- Block/Tract #:\n- Nearest County/Parish:\n- On the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) - Specify:\n- Area:\n- Block #:\n15. Area of Accident:\nPART C - ADDITIONAL FACILITY INFORMATION\n1. Is the pipeline or facility: Interstate\n2. Part of system involved in Accident: Onshore Breakout Tank or Storage Vessel, including\nAttached Appurtenances\n- If Onshore Breakout Tank or Storage Vessel, Including Attached\nAppurtenances, specify: Atmospheric or Low Pressure\n3. Item involved in Accident: Tank/Vessel\n- If Pipe, specify:\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1\n\n<<<PAGE 13>>>\n\n3a. Nominal diameter of pipe (in):\n3b. Wall thickness (in):\n3c. SMYS (Specified Minimum Yield Strength) of pipe (psi):\n3d. Pipe specification:\n3e. Pipe Seam , specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3f. Pipe manufacturer:\n3g. Year of manufacture:\n3h. Pipeline coating type at point of Accident, specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Weld, including heat-affected zone, specify. 3a through 3h above are required:\nIf Pipe Girth Weld,\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Valve, specify:\n- If Mainline, specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3i. Manufactured by:\n3j. Year of manufacture:\n- If Tank/Vessel, specify: - If Other - Describe:\n- If Other, describe:\n4. Year item involved in Accident was installed: 5. Material involved in Accident: - If Material other than Carbon Steel, specify:\n6. Type of Accident Involved: - If Mechanical Puncture – Specify Approx. size:\nin. (axial) by\nin. (circumferential)\n- If Leak - Select Type: - If Other, Describe: - If Rupture - Select Orientation:\n- If Other, Describe:\nApprox. size: in. (widest opening) by\nin. (length circumferentially or axially)\n- If Other – Describe:\nPART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION\n1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Fish/aquatic\n- Birds\n- Terrestrial\n2. Soil contamination: 3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: 4. Anticipated remediation: 4a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Surface water\n- Groundwater\n- Soil - Vegetation\n- Wildlife\n5. Water contamination: 5a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Ocean/Seawater\n- Surface\n- Groundwater\n- Drinking water: (Select one or both)\n- Private Well\n- Public Water Intake\n5b. Estimated amount released in or reaching water (Barrels):\n5c. Name of body of water, if commonly known:\n6. At the location of this Accident, had the pipeline segment or facility\nbeen identified as one that \"could affect\" a High Consequence Area\n(HCA) as determined in the Operator's Integrity Management Program?\n7. Did the released commodity reach or occur in one or more High\nConsequence Area (HCA)? 7a. If Yes, specify HCA type(s): (Select all that apply)\n- Commercially Navigable Waterway:\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1\nMixer\n2005\nCarbon Steel\nLeak\nOther\nTank Mixer failure\nNo\nYes\nNo\nYes\nYes\nNo\nNo\nNo\n\n<<<PAGE 14>>>\n\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nIntegrity Management Program?\n- High Population Area:\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nIntegrity Management Program?\n- Other Populated Area\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\" determination\nfor this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity\nManagement Program?\n- Unusually Sensitive Area (USA) - Drinking Water\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\" determination\nfor this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity\nManagement Program?\n- Unusually Sensitive Area (USA) - Ecological\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\" determination\nfor this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity\nManagement Program?\n8. Estimated cost to Operator – effective 12-2012, changed to \"Estimated Property Damage\":\n8a. Estimated cost of public and non-Operator private property\ndamage paid/reimbursed by the Operator – effective 12-2012,\n\"paid/reimbursed by the Operator\" removed\n$ 0\n8b. Estimated cost of commodity lost $ 2,650\n8c. Estimated cost of Operator's property damage & repairs $ 26,589\n8d. Estimated cost of Operator's emergency response $ 3,218\n8e. Estimated cost of Operator's environmental remediation $ 30,000\n8f. Estimated other costs $ 0\nDescribe:\n8g. Estimated total costs (sum of above) – effective 12-2012,\nchanged to \"Total estimated property damage (sum of above)\" $ 62,457\nPART E - ADDITIONAL OPERATING INFORMATION\n1. Estimated pressure at the point and time of the Accident (psig): 3.00\n2. Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) at the point and time of the\nAccident (psig): 14.70\n3. Describe the pressure on the system or facility relating to the\nAccident (psig): Pressure did not exceed MOP\n4. Not including pressure reductions required by PHMSA regulations\n(such as for repairs and pipe movement), was the system or facility\nrelating to the Accident operating under an established pressure\nrestriction with pressure limits below those normally allowed by the\nMOP?\nNo\n- If Yes, Complete 4.a and 4.b below:\n4a. restriction?\nDid the pressure exceed this established pressure\n4b. State?\nWas this pressure restriction mandated by PHMSA or the\n5. 2?\nWas \"Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites\" OR \"Offshore\nPipeline, Including Riser and Riser Bend\" selected in PART C, Question\nNo\n- If Yes - (Complete 5a. – 5f below) effective 12-2012, changed to \"(Complete 5.a – 5.e below)\"\n5a. Type of upstream valve used to initially isolate release\nsource:\n5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release\nsource:\n5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft):\n5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal\ninspection tools?\n- If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? (select all that apply)\n- Changes in line pipe diameter\n- Presence of unsuitable mainline valves\n- Tight or mitered pipe bends\n- Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's,\nprojecting instrumentation, etc.)\n- Extra thick pipe wall (applicable only for magnetic\nflux leakage internal inspection tools)\n- Other -\n- If Other, Describe:\n5e. For this pipeline, are there operational factors which\nsignificantly complicate the execution of an internal inspection tool\nrun?\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1\n\n<<<PAGE 15>>>\n\n- If Yes, Which operational factors complicate execution? (select all that apply)\n- Excessive debris or scale, wax, or other wall buildup\n- Low operating pressure(s)\n- Low flow or absence of flow\n- Incompatible commodity\n- Other -\n- If Other, Describe:\n5f. Function of pipeline system: > 20% SMYS Regulated Trunkline/Transmission\n6. Was a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)-based\nsystem in place on the pipeline or facility involved in the Accident? Yes\nIf Yes -\n6a. Was it operating at the time of the Accident? Yes\n6b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident? Yes\n6c. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s),\nalert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with\nthe detection of the Accident?\nYes\n6d. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s),\nalert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with\nthe confirmation of the Accident?\nYes\n7. Was a CPM leak detection system in place on the pipeline or facility\ninvolved in the Accident? Yes\n- If Yes:\n7a. Was it operating at the time of the Accident? Yes\n7b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident? Yes\n7c. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as\nalarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist\nwith the detection of the Accident?\nNo\n7d. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as\nalarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist\nwith the confirmation of the Accident?\nNo\n8. How was the Accident initially identified for the Operator? Ground Patrol by Operator or its contractor\n- If Other, Specify:\n8a. If \"Controller\", \"Local Operating Personnel\", including\ncontractors\", \"Air Patrol\", or \"Ground Patrol by Operator or its\ncontractor\" is selected in Question 8, specify:\nOperator employee\n9. Was an investigation initiated into whether or not the controller(s) or\ncontrol room issues were the cause of or a contributing factor to the\nAccident?\n- If No, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the\ncontroller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to:\n(provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)\nNo, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the\ncontroller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary\ndue to: (provide an explanation for why the Operator did not\ninvestigate)\nLeak not associated with operational functions of Control\nRoom\n- If Yes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that apply)\n- Investigation reviewed work schedule rotations,\ncontinuous hours of service (while working for the\nOperator), and other factors associated with fatigue\n- Investigation did NOT review work schedule rotations,\ncontinuous hours of service (while working for the\nOperator), and other factors associated with fatigue\nProvide an explanation for why not:\n- Investigation identified no control room issues\n- Investigation identified no controller issues\n- Investigation identified incorrect controller action or\ncontroller error\n- Investigation identified that fatigue may have affected the\ncontroller(s) involved or impacted the involved controller(s)\nresponse\n- Investigation identified incorrect procedures\n- Investigation identified incorrect control room equipment\noperation\n- Investigation identified maintenance activities that affected\ncontrol room operations, procedures, and/or controller\nresponse\n- Investigation identified areas other than those above:\nDescribe:\nPART F - DRUG & ALCOHOL TESTING INFORMATION\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1\n\n<<<PAGE 16>>>\n\n1. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator employees tested\nunder the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of DOT's\nDrug & Alcohol Testing regulations?\nNo\n- If Yes:\n1a. Specify how many were tested:\n1b. Specify how many failed:\n2. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator contractor employees\ntested under the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of\nDOT's Drug & Alcohol Testing regulations?\nNo\n- If Yes:\n2a. Specify how many were tested:\n2b. Specify how many failed:\nPART G – APPARENT CAUSE\nSelect only one box from PART G in shaded column on left representing the APPARENT Cause of the Accident, and answer\nthe questions on the right. Describe secondary, contributing or root causes of the Accident in the narrative (PART H).\nApparent Cause: G6 - Equipment Failure\nG1 - Corrosion Failure - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nCorrosion Failure – Sub-Cause:\n- If External Corrosion:\n1. Results of visual examination:\n- If Other, Describe:\n2. Type of corrosion: (select all that apply)\n- Galvanic\n- Atmospheric\n- Stray Current\n- Microbiological\n- Selective Seam\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3. The type(s) of corrosion selected in Question 2 is based on the following: (select all that apply)\n- Field examination\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n4. Was the failed item buried under the ground?\n- If Yes :\n4a. Was failed item considered to be under cathodic\nprotection at the time of the Accident?\nIf Yes - Year protection started:\n4b. Was shielding, tenting, or disbonding of coating evident at\nthe point of the Accident?\n4c. Has one or more Cathodic Protection Survey been\nconducted at the point of the Accident?\nIf \"Yes, CP Annual Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\nIf \"Yes, Close Interval Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\nIf \"Yes, Other CP Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\n- If No:\n4d. Was the failed item externally coated or painted?\n5. Was there observable damage to the coating or paint in the vicinity of\nthe corrosion?\n- If Internal Corrosion:\n6. Results of visual examination:\n- Other:\n7. Type of corrosion (select all that apply): -\n- Corrosive Commodity\n- Water drop-out/Acid\n- Microbiological\n- Erosion\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n8. The cause(s) of corrosion selected in Question 7 is based on the following (select all that apply): -\n- Field examination\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis\n- Other:\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1\n\n<<<PAGE 17>>>\n\n- If Other, Describe:\n9. Location of corrosion (select all that apply): -\n- Low point in pipe\n- Elbow\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n10. Was the commodity treated with corrosion inhibitors or biocides?\n11. Was the interior coated or lined with protective coating?\n12. Were cleaning/dewatering pigs (or other operations) routinely\nutilized?\n13. Were corrosion coupons routinely utilized?\nComplete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C,\nQuestion 3) is Tank/Vessel.\n14. List the year of the most recent inspections:\n14a. API Std 653 Out-of-Service Inspection\n- No Out-of-Service Inspection completed\n14b. API Std 653 In-Service Inspection\n- No In-Service Inspection completed\nComplete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C,\nQuestion 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n15. Accident?\nHas one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the\n15a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: -\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool\nMost recent year:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year:\n- Crack\nMost recent year:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year:\n- Other\nMost recent year:\nDescribe:\n16. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted since\noriginal construction at the point of the Accident?\nIf Yes -\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure:\n17. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on this segment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident::\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\n18. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\npoint of the Accident since January 1, 2002?\n18a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radiography\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1\n\n<<<PAGE 18>>>\n\nG2 - Natural Force Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-handed column\nNatural Force Damage – Sub-Cause:\n- If Earth Movement, NOT due to Heavy Rains/Floods:\n1. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Heavy Rains/Floods:\n2. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Lightning:\n3. Specify:\n- If Temperature:\n4. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Other Natural Force Damage:\n5. Describe:\nComplete the following if any Natural Force Damage sub-cause is selected.\n6. Were the natural forces causing the Accident generated in\nconjunction with an extreme weather event?\n6a. If Yes, specify: (select all that apply)\n- Hurricane\n- Tropical Storm\n- Tornado\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\nG3 - Excavation Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nExcavation Damage – Sub-Cause:\n- If Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity: Complete Questions 1-5 ONLY IF the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART\nC, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n1. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of\nthe Accident?\n1a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: -\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Crack\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\n2. Do you have reason to believe that the internal inspection was\ncompleted BEFORE the damage was sustained?\n3. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted since\noriginal construction at the point of the Accident?\n- If Yes:\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure (psig):\n4. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on the pipeline\nsegment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident:\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\n5. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\npoint of the Accident since January 1, 2002?\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1\n\n<<<PAGE 19>>>\n\n5a. If Yes, for each examination, conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radiography\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\nComplete the following if Excavation Damage by Third Party is selected as the sub-cause.\n6. Did the operator get prior notification of the excavation activity?\n6a. If Yes, Notification received from: (select all that apply) -\n- One-Call System\n- Excavator\n- Contractor\n- Landowner\nComplete the following mandatory CGA-DIRT Program questions if any Excavation Damage sub-cause is selected.\n7. Do you want PHMSA to upload the following information to CGA-\nDIRT (www.cga-dirt.com)?\n8. Right-of-Way where event occurred: (select all that apply) -\n- Public\n- If \"Public\", Specify:\n- Private\n- If \"Private\", Specify:\n- Pipeline Property/Easement\n- Power/Transmission Line\n- Railroad\n- Dedicated Public Utility Easement\n- Federal Land\n- Data not collected\n- Unknown/Other\n9. Type of excavator:\n10. Type of excavation equipment:\n11. Type of work performed:\n12. Was the One-Call Center notified?\n12a. If Yes, specify ticket number:\n12b. If this is a State where more than a single One-Call Center\nexists, list the name of the One-Call Center notified:\n13. Type of Locator:\n14. Were facility locate marks visible in the area of excavation?\n15. Were facilities marked correctly?\n16. Did the damage cause an interruption in service?\n16a. If Yes, specify duration of the interruption (hours)\n17. Description of the CGA-DIRT Root Cause (select only the one predominant first level CGA-DIRT Root Cause and then, where\navailable as a choice, the one predominant second level CGA-DIRT Root Cause as well):\nRoot Cause:\n- If One-Call Notification Practices Not Sufficient, specify:\n- If Locating Practices Not Sufficient, specify:\n- If Excavation Practices Not Sufficient, specify:\n-","truncated":true,"body_characters":49442}